# The Globalization of Strangeness

Chris Rumford

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# The Globalization of Strangeness

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



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*For Füsun and Lara*

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# Preface

Strangeness is neither an overly familiar concept in the social sciences, nor a particularly well defined one. While it is certainly the case that strangeness is becoming increasingly popular with theorists who seek to understand societal transformations which elude more conventional interpretative frames it suffers, predictably perhaps, from a more than a little vagueness about the processes it is supposed to help conceptualize, and also from the 'curse of the commonplace', social scientists not always comfortable with their valued concepts being confused with common linguistic expressions. Strangeness also suffers – and I suspect that this is more of a problem in North America – from an association with the popular literature on alien abduction, 'high strangeness' being the term used to denote the bizarre range of phenomenon that are thought to accompany sightings of UFOs.[1]

Nevertheless, the term strangeness is slowly becoming understood as a term which helps capture the unfamiliarity of everyday encounters, which can nowadays be conducted across huge distances, and which bring people into regular contact with distant others, while at the same time estranging them from those who would conventionally be considered as neighbours. Strangeness is not a synonym for globalization but it is closely associated with it. However, it is not the global as such that is deemed to be strange: it is the everyday, the local, the routine, in other words, the familiar. There is a degree of consensus that strangeness designates societal conditions in which neighbours are strangers and we are all a little bit strange to each other (and to ourselves). Strangeness thus denotes a situation where it is no longer meaningful to identify (a small number of) others as strangers: strangeness is a condition of the social and envelops us all. This book represents the first substantial attempt to discuss strangeness as a feature of contemporary society, and also the first to link the condition of strangeness to processes of globalization.

If a concern with elaborating upon 'the globalization of strangeness' (as promised by the title of the book) is my primary concern then understanding the sociological figure of the stranger is no less important. In my research for this book I was struck by how little the figure of the stranger has changed in the (mainly sociological) literature over a long period of time. The stranger is still usually portrayed as an out-

sider who is not wholly of society although s/he may be in it. In contrast, I would argue that the relationship between the stranger and society is no longer straightforward. It is increasingly difficult to talk of discrete societies comprising members (insiders) who can be contrasted to others that remain outside (and others who are within society but not part of it). In other words, the stranger might still be a key sociological figure but does not often resemble the outsider who 'comes today and stays tomorrow', as in Simmel's classic formulation. It is my contention that contemporary strangers are 'here today, and gone tomorrow', a very different state of affairs. It is clear to me that contemporary strangers do not fit the mould established by Simmel and others in an earlier phase of sociological thinking. The upshot is that our understanding of the figure of the stranger is in serious need of an overhaul.

## The origins of strangeness

I was alerted to strangeness before I encountered the stranger, so to speak. I only became interested in the figure of the stranger following an engagement with strangeness, which in my work was one outcome of a prolonged exposure to literature on globalization. I became aware that much literature on the transformatory potential of global processes focused on the transformation of spatiality. The attention paid to flows and mobilities and the onset of a world of connectivity placed emphasis on new spaces created by globalization. What was missing from this account, I believed, was an understanding of the ways in which our familiarity with these new spaces is undermined and the strangeness and unpredictability – unknowability even – of the world has increased. If globalization makes and re-makes the world, it also makes the world increasingly strange.[2]

I thought that the apparent lack of interest in the strangeness engendered by new global spaces stemmed from a more general neglect of the possibility that globalization may result in a diversity of experiences not all of them following the same developmental logic. Of particular concern was an imbalance between the idea that globalization leads to the 'oneness of the world' and alternative accounts of globalization (and indeed cosmopolitanism) which have made it possible to view the world as a more uncertain and strange place. This is because at the heart of our understanding of globalization lies a paradox. At the same time as generating an awareness that the world is a single place and encouraging actors to rethink their place in relation to the world

as a whole (Robertson, 1992), globalization can also provoke a sense that the world is larger, more complex, and more threatening and dangerous than was hitherto the case. In other words, globalization both compresses the world, and, paradoxically, brings its enormity into focus. While we are increasingly conscious of the compactness of an increasingly interconnected world in ways that bring the globe within the grasp of all individuals, we can also recognize that the flows and mobilities constitutive of globalization constitute a threat to the integrity of our familiar (nationally-constituted) communities, and are disruptive of our attempts to maintain those communities. While globalization is generally associated with connectivity, the possibility of disconnectivity is never far away, and animated by the same processes.

My first encounter with the notion of strangeness linked to globalization was in the work of Robertson (2007a). His reading of strangeness according it the status of the 'flip-side of securitization' by means of which social cohesion can be sustained through the invocation of the threatening 'other'. Strangeness, on this account, equates to the threatening difference associated with the Other. It is exacerbated by processes of globalization which leave us unprotected from threats that come from beyond previously secure borders. Robertson's thesis is that globalization creates the sense that we are living in an open and networked world and, at the same time, increases our perceptions of the threats inherent in such an 'open' world. One response to this is to create at a local level what we no longer believe the nation-state of being capable of or committed to: our collective security. In short, the increasing securitization of our lives exacerbates our sense of alterity (the threat posed by the Other): the world is rendered unfamiliar and is full of strangeness.

However, Robertson's link between alterity and strangeness has been far less influential on my thinking than another valuable insight, which Robertson skims over in this particular publication, which is that a world of mobilities, flows and connectivities is ushering in a world of unfamiliar spaces, a world of strangeness in which the 'normal rules' of engagement do not necessarily apply. However, over time my interest in strangeness has settled on neither of these poles – the novel spatiality of globalization or an increasingly threatening alterity. Rather, strangeness has for me become of more general experience of globalization, one which is often ignored in thinking about globalization in terms of enhanced connectivity. Strangeness is encountered when there exists the realization that the social world is unrecognizable in many ways, and where familiar reference points no longer exist (or are far from

reliable). In more everyday terms we can say that strangeness occurs when we recognize that we have lost our collective bearings and our social compass is giving strange readings. In other words, strangeness is a type of social disorientation (resulting from an experience of globalization) as a result of which we are no longer sure who 'we' are, and we find it difficult to say who belongs to 'our' group and who comes from outside.

Strangeness is central to this book but has a way to go before it becomes a readily accepted and widely utilized social science concept. However, there are already signs that a range of thinkers are prepared to employ the notion of strangeness to designate a realm of unfamiliarity opened up by globalization. That a number of academics are employing the term, and tailoring it to their needs, while working independently of each other bodes well for its potential application across the social sciences, particularly so when amongst those employing the term are leading scholars such as Bryan Turner and Ulrich Beck. Strangeness may still mean different things to different people but at least a kernel of common understanding exists.

If the book aims to help constitute strangeness as a social science concept it is also concerned with rethinking the stranger as a sociological figure. In many ways this task is likely to be of more interest to a greater number of readers, at least initially. The book claims that it is not possible to understand the stranger outside of an understanding of strangeness and from this position makes substantial claims about the nature of the contemporary stranger, the most complete expression of which is the 'cosmopolitan stranger'.[3] I would hope that for those readers looking for strangers (of any stripe) rather than strangeness there are treats in store, for this book represents the most comprehensive attempt yet to map the changing nature of the stranger. To cut a long story short, the book argues that conventional notion of the stranger – based on Simmel's classic figure no longer adequately captures the figure of the stranger in the Global Age. Today's stranger is 'here today and gone tomorrow', emerging from within our midst, briefly in many cases, before disappearing.

## A very different stranger

The figure of the stranger on offer here is very different from usual representations. I have already hinted at why this might be the case. Firstly, the global context means that we need to address the stranger in a different way, based on a different set of assumptions. At the very basic level this means that the 'potential wanderer' can come from a

greater range of places, meaning that societies are both more diverse and less bounded. If globalization causes us to question the boundedness and cohesion of society it also leads us to look again at those who are travelling across borders. In a world of mobilities and connectivities the stranger has diverse origins and can take many forms. Secondly, introducing the idea of strangeness transforms further the ground upon which our understanding of the stranger rests. The argument here is that the figure of the stranger cannot be properly understood outside the context of strangeness. If we increasingly encounter our neighbours as strangers then a considerable social transformation is underway and we should no longer make facile assumptions about who 'we' are, let alone who the stranger might be.

The 'globalization of strangeness' transforms the stranger in many ways. But there are other reasons why the figure of the stranger on offer here is very different from usual representations, the most important of which is that many existing accounts are insufficiently ambitious and/or not prepared to deviate from the 'straight and narrow' of the Simmelian tradition. I would say that this book is less a contribution to a long tradition of thinking about the stranger and more a complete break with much of it. In my assessment of the existing literature I emphasize that there has been surprisingly little change in the way that the stranger is imagined in a wide range of literature over a considerable period of time. As a result, for all the reasons outlined above I have felt obliged to re-imagine the stranger from the bottom up, so to speak. Therefore, I see my task not as offering an updated account of the stranger or one which refigures the stranger based on certain 'real life' developments, but as one in which the stranger needs to be completely rethought. It is for this reason that the figure of the stranger, under conditions of strangeness, is so very removed from earlier incarnations.

When I began this project I wondered why there were relatively few full-length studies of the stranger. After six months of reading around the subject I believed this was because there has been too much consensus for too long. Around the same time I genuinely wondered if it would prove feasible to produce a book-length treatment of the subject. That it has been possible, and you have the evidence in front of you, is due to the intellectual potential that contrariness holds and a strongly held belief that strangeness is a very important notion, not only in helping to explicate the contemporary stranger but for understanding our experiences of globalization. If the quest to identify the stranger has proved slightly disappointing, the pursuit of strangeness has been revelatory and has opened up important new windows upon globalization.

# 1
# Introduction: When Neighbours Become Strangers

## Strangers or strangeness?

According to Zygmunt Bauman, the most cited contemporary commentator on the stranger, each society 'produces its own kind of strangers, and produces them in its own inimitable way' (Bauman, 1997: 17). This book takes issue with this statement, not because it is wrong in any fundamental way, but because it doesn't go far enough. Firstly, Bauman doesn't take sufficiently into account the global dimension. Even a cursory awareness of the multiplicity of transformations bundled under the heading 'globalization' make it increasingly difficult to defend the idea that societies are discrete, self-contained and easily bounded. Expressed in slightly different terms, in a world of flows and networks driven by communication technology, on the one hand, and a whole range of mobile individuals on the other, it is difficult to maintain the fiction that one society can remain insulated from others. Secondly, it perpetuates the notion that in order to study the stranger we need to study individuals who are outsiders, or at least clearly marked off from mainstream society. Strangers do still exist but – and this is one of the central arguments advanced in the book – they are best understood within the context of a more generalized condition of societal strangeness in which differentiating 'us and them' is increasingly problematic.

Our first task then is to understand the difference between the relatively familiar idea of the stranger and the newer concept of strangeness. Strangers are still a common feature of social life, even if they do not always appear in the guise of the migrant or the refugee or any of the other 'usual suspects'. Contemporary figures of the stranger are many and various and include the tourist, the 'illegal' immigrant, the 'trusted traveller', the mystery shopper, organizers of 'secret cinema'

showings, and call centre workers. We will give full consideration to a very different contemporary figure of the stranger, the 'homegrown terrorist' in Chapter 5. But first, in this section we will introduce several examples of the contemporary stranger in order to both illustrate the changing nature of the stranger and introduce the idea of strangeness.

The first of these examples explores the role of the stranger in contemporary social life, finding it less restricted and predetermined than in earlier times. It highlights the fact that in many ways strangers have become a routine and familiar part of our everyday lives. The second example complements the first but highlights a more conventional (and more troubling) figure of the stranger. Although these two examples are very different they illustrate an important aspect of the contemporary stranger: they are both examples of what I call the 'here today, gone tomorrow' stranger which I argue has replaced the more traditional notion of the stranger as one who 'comes today and stays tomorrow'. The third example, again taken from the contemporary UK, reinterprets recent events through the lens of strangeness and shows how this, much more than the existence of individual strangers, can have a destabilizing effect on social life.

For my first example of the contemporary figure of the stranger I have drawn upon a recent trend in the UK: 'rent-a-friend' services. Following the success of rent-a-friend services in Japan and the US and elsewhere rentafriend.com launched in the UK in the summer of 2010. According to its founder, Scott Rosenbaum, people often live far away from where they grew up and they work long hours, leaving limited time to meet new people. 'As the internet has replaced face-to-face time, there are a lot of people out there who want to get out and socialise with new people but it has got harder to meet people.'[1] So, for a fee it is possible to hire a 'friend' for a day. In the words of one journalist;

> [Y]ou can purchase friendship at your convenience, by the hour. For a certain consideration, you can hire someone to go to a museum with you, or hang out at the gym, or keep you company while you shop. A stranger, you might say, is just a friend who hasn't invoiced you yet.[2]

It may be argued that this is not a meaningful or representative example; rent-a-friend services are still a novelty (in the UK) and provide (at best) a pseudo-service to a small number of relatively affluent people (who perhaps have more money than sense). It could further be objected that rent-a-friend services are not really a sociological phenomenon, more a

'flash in the pan' news issue, and possess no real social base for long-term existence. These are all reasonable concerns, but the point I wish to emphasize is that rent-a-friend services make certain uses of strangers and alert us to something important about both who might be considered a stranger and the role of strangers in our social environment. In the case of rent-a-friend services the stranger-as-friend is an individual who emerges from the mass of people who form the backdrop to our existence, drawn into our orbit only by the offer of a job. The stranger who we employ to be our friend would not necessarily be considered as a stranger under other circumstances. Indeed, we call the stranger into being by allocating him/her a new socio-economic role; that of rent-a-friend. The key element of this is that strangers in contemporary social life are less people marked out by some indelible difference, more selected for this role by circumstances (or opportunity). Rent-a-friend services position strangers as unthreatening and socially useful: strangers as lifestyle accessories. The stranger is chosen by both the person renting the friend (choosing to spend time with a stranger rather than exploring avenues which might lead to friendships based on shared interests, such as joining a club, taking up a hobby, playing sports), and by the employee who chooses to occupy the role of stranger. Rented friends cease to be strangers the moment they are no longer employed (they also cease to be 'friends', of course): they are 'here today and gone tomorrow'. In this sense the rent-a-friend stranger shares much in common with other contemporary figures of the stranger, as I will demonstrate throughout this and subsequent chapters.

A rent-a-friend is a very good example of the contemporary stranger, for all the reasons outlined above. But at the same time, s/he is not everyone's idea of a stranger, particularly as the figure of the stranger is frequently associated with the migrant, the refugee; outsiders in a more obvious sense. For this reason it would be a good idea to give another example of the 'here today, gone tomorrow' stranger, one which fuses elements of conventional expectations with contemporary concerns. In February 2004, 23 illegal immigrants from China died while attempting to collect cockles in Morecombe Bay, Lancashire. They were swept out to sea after the fast-rising tide engulfed them before they had a chance to return to land. The tragedy led to the jailing of the gangmaster held responsible for the deaths, found guilty of 21 cases of manslaughter,[3] and the setting up by the UK government of the Gangmasters Licensing Authority in an attempt to regulate what had been an unregulated and largely invisible sector of the economy. To the UK public the Chinese cockle pickers' tragedy was particularly shocking, not just because of the

large numbers of people killed, or because it brought the somewhat shady figure of the gangmaster out into the open, or even because of the poor conditions under which illegal labourers are obliged to work and live, which was revealed via the media in the aftermath of events in Morecombe Bay. Perhaps the most shocking aspect of the tragedy was that very few people had any idea that the cockle pickers even existed (or that illegal immigrants from China were working in such an organized way).

The cockle pickers do not fit the profile of the conventional stranger figure. As illegal immigrants controlled by gangmasters, who organized their living and working arrangements as well as links to families back home in China, they were consigned to a life beyond the margins of society. They were not 'come today, stay tomorrow' strangers because of their lack of visibility and lack of choices. Until their tragic deaths most British people would have been unaware of their existence; to be a stranger, in the conventional, Simmelian, sense you have to be seen (and once seen you can be positioned by others as newcomers, wanderers, foreigners, outsiders). The cockle pickers, in common with other contemporary figures of the stranger, were never accorded the status of outsiders: instead they erupted into our consciousness via a tragedy, visible only in death when they emerged briefly from a society that had obscured them and rendered them invisible. For all these reasons they are also good examples of the 'here today, gone tomorrow' stranger, the existence of which works not only to confound our expectations of the stranger but serves to emphasize the strangeness of our social world.

We have so far looked at two examples of the contemporary stranger. What we must do now is to establish the idea of strangeness as a context for understanding the stranger. In the summer of 2011, during the rioting which broke out in London and other UK cities, there was one incident which the public found particularly disturbing, in many ways more so than images of burning buildings, looting, and violence directed at the police. Captured on CCTV, images of Asyraf Haziq Rossli, a 20 year old student from Malaysia, being robbed by people who were pretending to help him were particularly memorable and emerged as one of the defining moments of the events of August 2011. The CCTV footage of the 'bad Samaritan' incident, as it became known, was shown a great deal on TV and was also relayed around the world on news websites and social networking sites. For many people it summarized all that was bad about the motives – and morality – of the rioters.

Immediately prior to being robbed by the 'bad Samaritans' Asyraf Haziq Rossli had been attacked by other rioters and had suffered a broken

jaw. The CCTV footage shows him sitting on the ground looking stunned and bleeding from the mouth. He is helped to his feet by a young man who appears to be offering genuine assistance; the act of a 'good Samaritan'. Moments later the 'good Samaritan' shows his true colours as he attempts to take possessions from the rucksack which Asyraf Haziq Rossli was still wearing. At this point, other youths turn their attention to the rucksack and one of them clearly removes an item from it and walks away. Asyraf Haziq Rossli is unaware that this is happening as he is being distracted by other rioters and still appears confused and dazed as a result of his earlier attack.

The few minutes of drama captured on video seemed to sum up the problem with the rioters, in the view of many commentators. 'The "bad Samaritan" incident has come to encapsulate the moral vacuum that is at the heart of these disturbances' (BBC News).[4] The Prime Minister, David Cameron, echoing his 'broken Britain' theme was quoted as saying; '[w]hen we see the disgusting sight of an injured young man with people pretending to help him while they are robbing him, it is clear there are things that are badly wrong in our society'.[5] The riots more generally were viewed as an abnormal series of events, displaying behaviour which was held to be untypical of British youth, even those in thrall to the 'get rich quick' culture which was for many at the root of the problem. The overwhelming response to the riots was shock and anger, as it was not easy for people to understand the motives of the rioters, who were compared unfavourably with rioters from previous decades who were thought to have been motivated by understandable political concerns.

> The widespread rioting and opportunistic looting of 6–9 August 2011 shook Britain to the core. What apparently started as a community's protest over the police shooting of Mark Duggan in Tottenham, north London, swiftly degenerated into an orgy of wanton violence, theft and destruction that afflicted many parts of the capital and other cities. Politicians, the police, community leaders and citizens alike were left dazed, shocked and confused. It was as if no one could quite believe what had happened (Birch and Allen, 2011: 1).

The shock and confusion stemmed not only from the apparent lack of any social justification for the riots, but also because of the speed with which they spread to other parts of the country, their unpredictability and the ways in which 'familiar and well-loved streets were turned, for a time, into alien, frightening battle zones'.[6] But perhaps the most

shocking aspect of the rioting and looting, as represented in the mainstream media, was the social distance between the rioters and the rest of society. It was this perceived distance, reinforced day by day as the riots continued and exacerbated by the absence of an obvious 'explanation' for the events, that was particularly disturbing.

For Marotta (2011: 107) 'when those who are physically close are socially and culturally distant' a situation of 'strangeness' exists. This is an interesting idea and one that goes to the heart of why we experience the riots as disturbing and difficult to accommodate within our sense of what is 'normal'. Asyraf Haziq Rossli certainly experienced a great distance between himself and society, and those people who he perhaps could have expected to offer support were not just cold and distant but actively hostile – his violent treatment at the hands of the rioters positioned him very much an outsider. In a conventional sense Asyraf Haziq Rossli was obviously a stranger, an overseas student whose residence in the UK was temporary and who would have been marked out by various kinds of difference (ethnic, linguistic, cultural). As we have seen, a stranger is usually seen as one 'who comes today and stays tomorrow' in Simmel's famous formulation, and is a person who exhibits some form of difference which forever marks him or her as not 'of' society.

The idea advanced here is that a conventional notion of the stranger is no longer adequate. There are many reasons for this but the most immediately important are that we no longer live in societies in which it is easy to distinguish who has 'come today and will stay tomorrow' and ethnicity and other markers of difference no longer necessarily signify someone who is not 'of' society. For these reason *The Globalization of Strangeness* advocates a shift from a focus on the stranger to consideration of a societal condition of strangeness. Marotta's strangeness thesis is a valuable starting point in this regard. It introduces the idea that in society we can be physically close while remaining disconnected in important ways. Marotta's strangeness thesis appears to be applicable to Asyraf Haziq Rossli's case, at least at first glance. It helps understand what happened to him in a way that labeling him as a stranger does not. Those who were physically close to Rossli did not constitute a community and they did not offer him hospitality as an outsider, a visitor to the UK. There existed a gulf of social and cultural distance between Rossli and those physically proximate to him. But ultimately this is not an adequate account of the strangeness generated by the riots, in my view. This is because for Marotta, strangeness is something only experienced by those conventionally labelled as strangers, like Asyraf Haziq Rossli.[7]

The interpretation of strangeness advanced in this book starts from the idea that strangeness is a more general experience of social life, experienced not only by those strangers who 'come today and stay tomorrow' in the conventional sense, but importantly also by members of the host society. This condition of strangeness occurs when people are no longer sure who 'we' are, and who 'the other' might be. In other words, strangeness is a sense of disorientation resulting from – as I will argue – an experience of globalization in which previously reliable reference points have been eroded and we encounter strangers where previously we encountered neighbours. The rioting and looting in London and other UK cities revealed new strangers, who emerged from within and made palpable the strangeness of society. These were by and large people who should have been 'of' society but were in fact revealed by their actions to be somewhat alien to it.

A caveat is necessary. The temptation to draw glib conclusions from the events of August 2011 should be resisted. My point here is not to join the debate on the causes of the riots, the role of gangs in organizing the looting, the lack of role models for young people in society, or any of the other social issues that these events raised. The point is to register both that strangeness is not such an exceptional state of affairs – it is rather easily achieved (and at times may possibly be more like a norm than an exception) – and also that it is a central feature of the contemporary stranger that s/he emerges from within society (rather than being from elsewhere, as in the classical sociological interpretation) and erupts onto the political scene in an unpredictable way. These aspects of the stranger will be investigated throughout the book, and it is suggested, can be best pursued via a new framework for understanding the stranger, one which is in fact much needed (and probably long overdue).

In short, this book will advance a new and different reading of the stranger, and assert that the stranger does not necessarily come from elsewhere, as in the conventional sociological sense. Rather, the stranger emerges from within a social order previously unaware of the stranger's existence. The stranger is of society and upon emergence contributes strangeness to it. This stranger often appears with great rapidity, in a surprising and even disconcerting way, and his/her appearance is frequently interpreted as an index of the fragility of social bonds and community sentiment. But there is more to the contemporary stranger: the stranger has to be placed in the context of a more widespread state of strangeness, a development which is of equal if not greater importance than the changing nature of the figure of the stranger. Our

contemporary societies are characterized by strangeness – which is palpable in the distance we perceive between ourselves and those to whom we are supposed to be close. Strangeness exists when people are no longer sure if they belong to a 'we' collective and cannot say with any certainty who 'the other' members of this 'in group' might be. I argue that this state of affairs – the strangeness of society – is a product of the Global Age. It is an as-yet barely recognized product of globalization concealed hitherto because insufficient attention has been paid to our personal and individual experiences of globalization. Not everyone experiences globalization in the same way and in addition to opening a world of opportunity (for some) it may also be the case that for others globalization actually turns the world into a rather claustrophobic, restrictive, and limiting place.

## Placing strangeness in a global context

Why write a book on the stranger? A conventional answer to this question might be as follows: because we need to understand those people who are 'in but not of society' (and because they may pose a threat to us). My answer is rather different. We can no longer assume that we know who the stranger is. More importantly perhaps, we do not necessarily know who 'we' are anymore. It is likely that, to some degree at least, 'we' are at the same time also strangers (both to ourselves and to others). A key feature to have emerged from the literature on the stranger in recent years is the idea that 'we are all strangers now'. This means that when we study the stranger we are not focusing exclusively on 'the other' (the migrant worker or the refugee, for example). Nowadays, the study of the stranger is also a study of ourselves and our 'we-ness'. To study the stranger is to explore the ways in which society coheres and the forms of association and solidarity that may exist, in a context in which we can no longer assume that community is proximate and nested within the social structure of national societies. These are the sort of changes that are placed under the heading of globalization: blurring of inside and outside, domestic and foreign; the possibility of global connectivity by means of readily available communication technology; routine exposure to cultural artefacts from around the globe etc. It is for these reasons that I wish to place the study of the stranger within a global frame and investigate it as a phenomenon of the Global Age.

But as indicted earlier we need to study the stranger for other reasons too. It is not just that the figure of the stranger is changing, from being

an obvious outsider to being just like 'one of us'. Central to this book is the idea that we live in a generalized condition of strangeness, conceived as a situation in which it is no longer possible to easily separate 'us' from 'them'. Not only do we find it difficult to discern 'them' because 'they' lack the obvious markings normally possessed by strangers – think of how the London bombers were undetectable before the tragic events of 7th July 2005 – (see Chapter 5), but we also find it difficult to know who 'we' are (distinctive markers of 'we-ness' are lacking too). Think how difficult it is to square the abuse by British military personnel of Iraqi prisoners with our image of the decency and fairness of the British troops during WWII, at least as represented to us by a plethora of British-made Second World War movies. Elucidating this condition of strangeness, and explaining why an understanding of it is important, not only as a means of apprehending the changing nature of the stranger but also the experience of globalization, is a core task of this book. Strangeness and globalization are very much linked. It is not just that we cannot understand the contemporary stranger without a global context, but that it is also important to have a better understanding of people's experiences of globalization. As such this is a book about the sociological figure of the stranger, as well as a book about how we experience globalization.

*The Globalization of Strangeness* is concerned with many key themes at the forefront of social science research: the nature of community under conditions of globalization, the 'we-ness' of society, the dividing line between 'us and them', and the impact of global processes on our sense of self, both individually and collectively. The book also aims to place the question of the stranger at the forefront of social science enquiry or at the very least reinstate it as one of the key sociological issues of the day. Rethinking the stranger through the lens of globalization has the potential to do this, and I am not alone in believing this to be the case. Bryan Turner has noted that it is possible to;

> argue that Robertson's globalization thesis is a form of Simmelian sociology and that many of the underlying themes of globalization theory are related to ideas which preoccupied Simmel: How is society possible? What is the social role of the stranger? (Turner, 1992: 318)

In order to re-instate the stranger high on the social science agenda the global context is crucial. This context is not entirely lacking in the existing literature although it is less common than one might suppose,

and nothing like a comprehensive theory of the stranger under conditions of globalization yet exists, despite the laudable contributions of Papastergiadis, Beck and a few others.

As we have seen, strangeness is much more than a perception of the difference associated with 'the other' as stranger. It is a form of social disorientation resulting from an experience of globalization, particularly the loss of reference points, social signposting, and an awareness that community is not built from the building blocks of physical contiguity. Strangeness connotes that conventional notions of society, community and belonging are all problematic and require investigation. Strangeness may also be something that we recognize in ourselves, not just something that other people attribute to us. When we are no longer convinced that we belong to the 'we' group, either because we identify with distant others or because we no longer associate with the values of those we believed were representative of our own group (or when group members appear to have abandoned previously constitutive beliefs), then we have encountered strangeness in our lives. This encounter may be our own individual 'globalization moment': the point at which we experience globalization bearing down on our lives and transforming the terrain of the everyday in such a way as to lead us question our place in the world.

So why is this global context so important for understanding the stranger? There remains an assumption in the literature that the stranger can be mapped with reference to the divide between citizens/non-citizens. 'Acts of citizenship … produce citizens and their others: strangers, outsiders, aliens' (Nyers, 2008: 163). In a nation-state context the strangeness of strangers is palpable, and rather predictable. This conventional interpretation does not entertain the possibility that citizens can also be strangers (even if the stranger as migrant or refugee cannot normally be a citizen). 'We' groups do not necessarily map onto a citizens/others division. The question of who 'we' are and how we know this is not easy to answer in the contemporary context: one of the arguments advanced in this book is that 'we' might in fact be strangers to ourselves (and others). The question of who is a stranger in an era of global connectivity in which the division between inside and outside is no longer obvious is still a necessary one. On the one hand then, the question of who is the stranger is very important, and one where conventional answers do not necessary carry the authority that they once did. At the same time, the stranger is a more mundane figure than hitherto. Globalization leads to an increasing proximity to strangers and an experience of society characterized by a 'routinization of alterity' (Mendieta,

2007). This is in fact not a new idea in and of itself. There is a long sociological tradition of seeing the city as a 'society of strangers' (Lofland, 1973) in which contact with strangers becomes routine, neatly summed up by Sennett's (1997: 39) idea that 'a city is a human settlement in which strangers are likely to meet'. What is different under conditions of globalization is that there is no longer the comfort of knowing that such a 'society of strangers' is the exception, not the norm. The 'routinization of alterity' is now a generalized social condition, in the sense that it is one dimension of strangeness, and there is no longer any refuge from this state of affairs. So consideration of global processes has added a new dimension to the idea that we live in a world of strangers. Global connectivity creates the possibility of new (transnational or global) collectivities but increases the likelihood that people living in geographical proximity become disconnected. This version of the idea that 'neighbours are strangers' is captured by Bryan Turner in the following terms. 'Whereas the problem of the stranger within a Simmelian world still had a scarcity value, in the global village all participants are likely to be strangers' (Turner, 1992: 316).

That we increasingly live in proximity to 'the other' or that alterity is everyday and routine is but part of the story, however. What is more striking is that we are increasingly strange to ourselves; *we* are the strangers, and we increasingly find it difficult to recognize ourselves in deeds done in our name (such as the 'war on terror', attacks on human rights). Many people do not encounter society as a 'membership organization' (Stichweh, 1997) and as a result the 'us/them' distinction breaks down and we feel distanced from the 'we' group to which we supposedly belong. The book aims to extend our understanding of the ways in which globalization transforms alterity and otherness and offers an innovative account of how the globalization of strangeness leads to our increasing distancing from ourselves. This distancing can be socially productive, and should not be read as a simile for the breakdown of social solidarity or an advanced form of anomie. As Julia Kristeva points out 'only a thorough investigation of our remarkable relationship with both "the other" and *strangeness within ourselves* can lead people to give up hunting for the scapegoat outside their group' (Kristeva, 1993: 51). Kristeva's emphasis may be very different from that found in *The Globalization of Strangeness* but a core sentiment is shared: only by looking at the 'strangeness within ourselves' can we understand the contemporary stranger, and indeed the very nature of sociality.

The key to all this then is the idea of strangeness, used here to denote a generalized state of affairs rather than the characteristics possessed by the

stranger. In other words, it is not that the stranger him or herself possesses strangeness; rather society does. As Bryan Turner states, 'in contemporary society globalization forces strangeness upon the whole of society' (Turner, 1997: 14), the emphasis here on *the whole* of society is significant (although also slightly problematic as it presupposes a boundedness to society which may not in fact exist). Turner's point, I believe, is that strangeness is not only to be found at the margins (even if it is possible to identify where the margins lie). Strangeness is a quality of the social. This means that we need to refocus our attention from the strangeness of individuals to a generalized societal condition of (global) strangeness, and development the concepts and frameworks necessary to accomplish this task.

The idea of strangeness, as developed in this book, does find echoes in the literature. Ulrich Beck (2010) is one author who draws a link between globalization and strangeness. He writes that one consequence of globalization is 'the human condition of un-excludability', in other words it is not possible to 'exclude the nationally constructed other anymore', one consequence of which is the globalization of strangeness.

> People suddenly experience themselves living in a very strange world and being confronted with all kind of strangeness. They don't recognize anymore the city they are living in, maybe even the street because of all kind of globalizations happening into those areas; people feel to have no place in this new context, and feel frightened by this new situation of un-excludability of the strange-other (Beck, 2010).

In this passage Beck captures well the dynamics of (certain aspects of) the globalization of strangeness but has not (as yet) developed the idea of strangeness further in his published work. In particular he has identified the need to go beyond what Bauman identifies as a core concern of modernity; the drive to either assimilate or exclude the stranger in order to provide the order that modern societies craved. At the same time, it does not seem as if Beck makes much advance beyond the point that the issue today is how to live with difference and accommodate Mendietta's 'routinization of alterity'. The account of strangeness advanced in this book differs from Beck's outline suggestion in that it places emphasis on the generalized nature of strangeness rather than the strangeness of the stranger per se (for a detailed critical appraisal of Beck's work on the stranger see Chapter 3).

The above limitations notwithstanding, by highlighting the importance of the relationship between globalization and strangeness Beck has made a significant contribution to the literature. *The Globalization of Strangeness* aims to further explore the ways in which the condition of strangeness is related to global transformations. This means that the book is centrally concerned with questions of the nature of dynamics of cultural globalization and in pursuing this theme confronts some accepted thinking in respect of global processes, particularly as they relate to the dynamics of global/local relations, the transformation of subjectivity, and the cohesiveness of contemporary societies. The headline argument in respect of globalization runs contrary to approaches which see the flows, mobilities and connectivities which are constitutive of globalization resulting in world openness. On the contrary, the book focuses on the ways in which globalization can 'weigh heavily' upon individuals, close off global linkages, and constrict choice. The world can bear down upon self and other to such a degree that there exists no separation between them. Globalization can press the world in on us in a rather unpleasant way – thus giving another meaning to the idea of 'small world' – yet does not, contrary to received wisdom, always offer up connections to that world. This is a side of cultural globalization which is rarely explored, but is important as it gives rise to the idea that one consequence of globalization has been a shift from the stranger as a social type to strangeness as a social condition.

Although it deals squarely with questions of belonging, subjectivity and community the book does so in a selective way. It broaches these themes from the perspective of strangeness and does not attempt to offer a comprehensive critique of multiculturalism, for example, or the changing nature of community, or even the politics of identity and belonging. In respect of these themes I would argue that *The Globalization of Strangeness* makes an original contribution not by contributing to scholarship on, say, community in a comprehensive manner but by exploring the issue of why it is sometimes the case that 'the neighbour is the nearest stranger' (Albrow et al, 1997: 31).

*The Globalization of Strangeness* does not have a subtitle, but if it were to be given one it would probably be 'when neighbours become strangers', which I think would be both an accurate indicator of the book's content, and a flavour of its argument (and which it is why I have used it as the subtitle of this introductory chapter). But it might also make the book appear rather more pessimistic, sinister even, than I hope it really is. I would not want the title or the subtitle to suggest that the book was a lament for the loss of (idealized) community or a

rant about the strangeness of foreigners living in 'our' midst, for example. To offset possible negative interpretations I would offer the following (paraphrasing Albrow et al, 1997: 33): the danger to local community is not the cultural stranger as neighbour but the neighbour who does not want to be engaged in the maintenance of the local community. This idea, and the work of the Roehampton School more generally (see Chapter 4), offers a fresh perspective on the issue of 'when neighbours become strangers', and importantly opens up a range of possibilities which the 'stranger as problem', or 'stranger as threat' forecloses.

## What do we mean by globalization?

There are very many accounts of globalization and consequently many interpretations of it. Even within sociology the range of globalizations on offer is impressive (or confusing, depending on your point of view): economistic approaches (for example, those of Sklair and Sassen) compete with cultural approaches (Robertson and Holton) and organizational approaches (Meyer, Castells). My intention here is not select one interpretation over others as a way of embedding *The Globalization of Strangeness* within a particular tradition of understanding globalization, although I do see it being aligned with 'cultural' interpretations, broadly conceived. Rather I wish to draw upon various approaches which can help explicate the notion of strangeness and provide it with the appropriate intellectual scaffolding so as to raise it to the level of 'indispensable concept' within Global Studies. It is my view that strangeness provides a 'missing link' between the recognition that the impact of globalization can be ambivalent and double-edged and a need to explore the transformative impact of globalization on the lives of individuals. In other words, a focus on strangeness can help both make globalization more relevant to the study of everyday life at the 'local level' and also help us understand how globalization works (perversely) to shut down global access and cut people off from the flows and networks which many believe are constitutive of globalization. In other words, strangeness is related to dis-connectivity, the flip-side and/or frequently ignored dimension of globalization.

So what do we mean by globalization? Following Robertson, globalization is best thought of as a series of transformative processes through which the world is becoming increasingly interconnected and our consciousness of the world as a single place is heightened. Consistent with this initial definition it is also possible to assert that a key dimension of globalization is the tension between our consciousness of the globe

and our access to it; the world does not necessarily 'open up' for us just because we are aware of global interconnectivity. There can easily be a miss-match between a heightened global consciousness and access to global flows. When dis-connectivity thwarts global awareness then we are likely to encounter strangeness, an experience of disorientation characterized by a loss of familiar reference points and societal coordinates, a state of affairs which can be captured metaphorically (and sometimes even literally) in the following terms: our neighbours may become the nearest strangers.

Robertson's definition of globalization – 'the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole' (Robertson, 1992: 8) – which has inspired the above formulation, is important for many reasons. Most significantly it suggests that an important global dynamic is the subjective experience of globalization which itself can further drive interconnectivity. On Robertson's view individuals are not simple those on the receiving end of global processes which transform their lives for good or bad. Our consciousness of the world as a single place is also a driver of globalization: the awareness that the world is compressed and interconnected inspires further efforts to create global linkages. This is an especially valuable contribution in and of itself but it also allows for the possibility of strangeness, unformulated in Robertson's account, but existing as a latent possibility certainly; strangeness resulting from a tension between a highly developed global awareness, on the one hand, and the global dis-connectivity which results from our individual experiences of less-than-complete global connectivity, on the other.

On many accounts, globalization has rendered useless conventional ideas of belonging, community, and society offering instead the promise of new forms of connectivity driven by networks, flows and mobilities. The individual can find this liberating or else threatening (or both) and globalization tends to be seen in dichotomous terms, particularly but not exclusively in journalistic accounts; good or bad, opportunity or threat, empowering or disempowering or, in a completely different register (and far more productively) it is seen as transformative across a variety of domains. What I wish to explore is a rather different set of questions and is focused on the experience of globalization – following Robertson's insight that globalization is not just about the increasing interconnectedness of the world but also the consciousness that this is so. In recent years an interest in global consciousness or awareness has been displaced somewhat by the rise of cosmopolitanism, which has almost become, for some commentators at least, a default global

consciousness. There are many good reasons to renew an engagement with the experience of globalization. One reason is that cosmopolitanism presumes that the world is much more open and accessible than it really is. The argument here is that as well as leading to an awareness of the world as a single place globalization leads to an experience of the world bearing down on us and closing us in. Having a global consciousness is to be aware that globalization may open up the world to us but also that it may not: the global is palpable but the way it impacts upon us is uncertain and therefore potentially unsettling.

Strangeness results from a particular experience of globalization, particularly from the ways in which processes of globalization have transformed the relationship between near and far, inside and outside, self and other. There is an assumption in a good deal of the Global Studies literature that the social, political, economic and cultural transformations which fall under the heading of globalization are what we should endeavour to understand so as to be able to make confident claims about 'the global order' or 'global society'. The argument here is that rather than being simply an object of investigation globalization is a key to understanding strangeness (and the stranger). Strangeness is a puzzle that globalization can help us solve.

But our understanding of strangeness, to the extent that we can apprehend it, is hindered by a lack of a conceptual vocabulary; our sociological landscape is constituted by the language, concepts, imagery, norms and presuppositions of modern social science, rather blunt instruments with which to discern emergent strands of transformative sociality. Strangeness belongs to a social world which will only be revealed more fully by the development of an appropriate sociological imaginary. But we are not without the tools with which to conduct the groundwork. To begin with, a sophisticated understanding of global-local relations is, I believe, a useful aid with which to understand strangeness, as it allows for both the fragmentation of social life and re-formulation of community over large distances. Exploring the big themes brought into existence by the study of globalization (belonging and identity, we-ness, networked connectivity, glocalization) can all be brought to bear in order to understand the condition of strangeness.

## The organization of the book

Each chapter of this book approaches the issue of identifying the stranger and/or elaborating upon the condition of strangeness from a different perspective. The following chapter does this by offering a critique of

the existing literature on the stranger, finding this inadequate in important respects. At the same time it highlights the most significant contributions to the debate on the changing nature of the stranger and extracts from these accounts something of value. Chapter 3 is an extension of this process and focuses on the work of one commentator, Ulrich Beck. The chapter constitutes a critical engagement with what is adjudged the most substantial interpretation of the stranger currently available. Interestingly, Beck has also broached the topic of strangeness, although this remains underdeveloped in his work. Beck's main achievement, it is asserted, is his perspectival understanding of strangerhood, which can be appropriated in order to advance the theorization of strangeness.

Chapter 4 explores the global dimension of strangeness by focusing on the ways in which the differential experiences of global processes have been theorized by scholars of globalization. This is achieved through a focus on different readings of global/local relations and the idea of glocalization. The chapter gives particular consideration to the work of the Roehampton School and their ability to understand global processes which result in 'strangers becoming neighbours'. Although the Roehampton scholars do not theorize strangeness as such they have provided, it is argued, the foundations upon which a theory of strangeness can be constructed.

Chapter 5 explores one of the most troubling contemporary figures of the stranger: the 'homegrown terrorist', focusing on the London bombers of July 2005, and in particular one who became known as the 'cricketing terrorist'. It is argued that the 'homegrown terrorist' is a misnomer; what characterized the 7/7 bombers was an orientation towards global jihad. Moreover, the label 'cricketing terrorist', which was interpreted by many commentators as an emblem of the embeddedness and Britishness of the 7/7 bombers, was actually a clue to their transnational orientation.

Chapter 6 explores the emergence of a new figure, the cosmopolitan stranger, which it is argued is the paradigmatic stranger figure of the Global Age. A number of examples of this figure are explored. It is discovered that the cosmopolitan stranger is not always revealed as an individual figure. The cosmopolitan stranger can be manifested as a collective actor. Chapter 7 explores representations of the stranger in film and television drama. A number of stranger figures are identified: the 'terrorist as stranger', and the 'migrant as stranger' both being quite familiar. Less familiar figures of the 'self as stranger', and the 'cosmopolitan stranger' are both portrayed well in film and TV drama. It is concluded that film provides rich source material for understanding

the stranger. Moreover, it is also possible to identify representations of strangeness in contemporary drama, the recent US television series *Homeland* being an excellent example.

The conclusion attempts to point the way to future research rather than attempt to draw together a large number of diverse and possibly divergent strands. Two core questions are posed. What does the discovery of new kinds of strangers tell us about power relations in society today? What contribution can the idea of strangeness make to Global Studies? In the first case, the contemporary stranger often confounds expectations based on assumptions of difference and hierarchy. In circumstances where we can all be positioned at times as strangers, stranger-making is no longer in the hands of the few. Moreover, there is possible advantage to be gained from occupying the role of stranger; strangerhood can be a valuable political resource. In the second case, it is argued that strangeness can become a key term and aid in understanding different experiences of globalization. In particular, it provides a way of understanding what occurs when the interconnectedness of the world does not live up to the heightened expectations generated by a global consciousness.

# 2
# The Unchanging Stranger: A Critical Survey of the Literature

## Introduction

In important ways, thinking and writing about the stranger, across a range of social science disciplines, but particularly sociology, has changed remarkably little since Simmel's classic formulation in the early part of the twentieth century. This is surprising, most obviously in the sense that one might expect our thinking about the stranger to 'move with the times' and reflect thinking about society in the parent discipline. But where is the postmodern stranger, the network society stranger, the post-industrial stranger, or the global stranger? Some of these figures may have been mooted at one time or another but have not had a lasting impact on studying the stranger. It is also the case that the massive influence that thinking about globalization has had on the social sciences and the way we study society is only now just starting to be reflected in our thinking about the stranger. On the whole though, the relationship between the stranger and society, formulated by Simmel in terms of one who 'comes today and stays tomorrow' remains largely intact, changes to the nature of community and society notwithstanding.

Simmel's stranger remains the archetype, but attempts to re-frame the stranger within a global context have at last started to emerge, and the figure of the cosmopolitan stranger has made an appearance even more recently (Marotta, 2011; see also Chapter 6). The most celebrated commentator on the contemporary stranger, and indeed the changing nature of the stranger, is of course Zygmunt Bauman, who does – in his more recent work – acknowledge the need to offer a global context within which to understand the changing nature of the stranger, but does not develop this to any great extent. Within studies of the stranger, Bauman's work forms a contemporary reference point or baseline from which all

other thinking takes flight. It is rare to encounter discussion of the stranger which does not defer to Bauman or at the very least reference his ideas. The centrality of Bauman to the study of the stranger means that we must deal with his ideas, and this will be the theme of the section that follows, but before proceeding to this task it will be useful to map the wider field and assess the range of perspectives that exist on the stranger. This will be done initially via the identification of a number of key themes in the literature, namely the routine world of strangers, the ambivalence of strangers, and neighbours as strangers. This survey will serve as an introduction to an extended discussion of particular key thinkers; Bauman, Simmel, Papastergiadis, and Amin. The following chapter takes this further with a full-length treatment of Beck's writing on the stranger.

**The routine world of strangers**

The idea that the city is a prime location for encountering the stranger pervades the literature. It is also the origin of the idea, resurrected by scholars of globalization, that contemporary life involves a routinization of contact with strangers. In other words, whereas once the city was thought of as a world of strangers, where strangeness becomes routine (Lofland, 1973), now the whole world shares this experience.

In the sociological literature the city has historically been the place where one encounters strangers. Urban living has long been characterized as a constant negotiation with strangers and a struggle to domesticate the difference that strangers represent in order to be able to carry on with everyday life. The challenge for the individual, a stranger in the midst of strangers (Lofland, 1973: 12), is to order individuals comprising the urban population in terms of their appearance in such a way as to 'eliminate some of the strangeness' (Lofland, 1973: 176). In this sense, 'ordering the city' is the key to knowing the stranger. Sennett (2002) also considers the stranger and the city in a similar way. But for him, the idea of the city as a 'the site of strangeness' is too simplistic. The real issue is the tension between difference and alterity: 'the possibility of classifying strangers in terms of difference versus the possibility of the unknown other' (Sennett, 2002: 43). Otherness in terms of 'mere' difference is now routine (for example the ethnic and cultural mix in a major city) but genuine alterity still exists, and encounters with such strangeness is not routine and can be much more unpredictable.

The 'routinization of strangeness' is *the* theme for many commentators. For example, Dessewffy (1996: 608) holds that the routine experience of the stranger is a metaphor for society as a whole, and Mendieta

argues that globalization has led to an increasing proximity to strangers and an experience of society characterized by a 'routinization of alterity' (Mendieta, 2007).[1] The routinization of estrangement should not simply be viewed in negative terms. Iveson (2005) holds that strangeness is a condition of urban life shared by everybody. Individuals recognize that they are all (partial) strangers living in a community of strangers. Being strangers provides people with common ground. From this it is possible to infer that the recognition of strangeness may form the basis for a new form of community solidarity. Amin (2012) would beg to differ. He does not see the forging of a 'society of strangers' as a necessary strategy. What is more important than the elimination of the strangeness of strangers is the existence of a public sphere which allows strangers to 'play out their differences'. In other words, rather than the formation of some artificial community of communities it is better that some friction exists between strangers in order that the productive disordering that difference can yield is not lost in the search for a bland multicultural consensus.

**The ambivalence of the stranger**

The ambivalence of the stranger – the undecidability of the stranger (Bauman, 1991: 55) – is rooted in an appreciation of the changing nature of society. Pickering is the commentator most attuned to the fact that strangeness is now 'central to our sense of the world' (Pickering, 2001: 215). He quickly goes to the heart of the problem: what used to be the case for the stranger is now pretty much true for all of us. This means that 'it is not so much that the stranger is elusive to definition, rather that it is difficult to define the stranger in a way that doesn't include all of us' (Pickering, 2001: 204). So, according to a conventional, Simmel-inspired, definition 'we are all strangers now'. The key issue attached to strangers, for Pickering as for Bauman, is their ambivalence. The stranger exists as a challenge to the drive for order which characterized the societies of modernity. In Bauman's, terms strangers 'poison the comfort of order with the suspicion of chaos' (quoted in Pickering, 2001: 211–212). The 'solution' to the problem of the stranger – a task charged to the nation-state – was to either assimilate or expel/destroy strangers, which for Bauman were more threatening to societal order than formal enemies (Bauman, 1991: 63). But this way of looking at the 'problem' of the stranger necessities adopting a statist vantage point from which decisions about what constitutes 'ambivalence' or 'undecidability' can be made. From the perspective of the stranger of course the 'problem' would look very different (although

we learn about this perspective too infrequently in the literature). We need to develop a stronger sense of who is constructing the binaries such as us/them, inside/outside etc. against which the stranger is positioned. To decide that the stranger does not fit into the order imposed by a world of binaries requires a particular type of monoperspective. As Bauman says, we need to look at who is deciding upon who constitutes the stranger (Pickering, 2001: 215).

For Papastergiadis, the value of studying the stranger is that it enables us to examine one of the 'blind spots' of classical social theory, 'the personal experiences of displacement in modernity' (2000: 64) which go hand-in-hand with the major transformations in economic and bureaucratic systems which were the focus of the attention of Marx, Weber and Durkheim. According to Papastergiadis (2000: 65):

> the stranger is not just a social type, nor is it an empirical study of a solitary figure who wanders and has no fixed relationship to place. Rather, the identity of the stranger is highlighted to illuminate the subjective experience of ambivalence.

Moreover, regular contact with strangers can lead to new forms of intimacy and new forms of indifference towards others in keeping with a reordering of nearness and farness which is one feature of globalization. Expressed in other terms, this means that we can experience crowds without experiencing solidarity. It is possible to be surrounded by others yet feel isolated. This is a key aspect of the experience of ambivalence. The key to understanding the stranger, for Papastergiadis, is the nature of the local or fixed community to which the stranger has a relation. Such communities cannot be conceived as unified and/or homogenous. The pairing of the stranger with a 'settled citizen' (2000: 68) no longer has purchase. An emphasis on the experience of the stranger also points to the need to explore the experience of 'we-ness'. It is no longer enough to assume that the stranger is one who is other to us. We need to ask the question, 'who are we?' before can begin to identify the stranger.

**Neighbours as strangers**

The most important insight offered by Pickering, at least in the context of the themes developed in this book, is the assertion that 'we are the strangers' (Pickering, 2001: 218), and that the strangers are already within. For Pickering, the search for the stranger requires looking inwards: 'difference resides in the heartlands of similitude' (Pickering, 2001: 220).

Expressed slightly differently we can say that when we look in the places we would expect to find neighbours, community and other signs of we-ness we increasingly find strangers and evidence of strangeness.

The complex relationship between community and strangers is of course a key feature of the literature, driven by the recognition that there is no longer any necessary correspondence between location and belonging and relations based on physical contiguity have declined in importance. For Meyrowitz, 'neighbours become more like strangers at the same time that electronic media continually bring news of "foreign" people and lands into our lives and homes' (quoted in Morley, 2000: 178). Because of the complex ways that we are connected with others it is likely that we encounter a greater number of strangers than members of 'our' community in the course of everyday life. Moreover, as Papastergiadis (2000: 14) recognizes this state of affairs is not considered strange at all, in fact it is very normal for our neighbours to be 'strangers' from different countries.

A key feature of the literature on the stranger is a growing recognition of the need to understand the stranger in a changing society, following Bauman who argues that every society produces its own strangers. This means that the category of stranger is unstable and varies a great deal across cultures (Månsson, 2008: 157). This line of exploration has been very productive for the study of the stranger even if it ultimately reinforces the ingroup/outgroup distinction through its focus on the guise of the stranger: tourist, vagabond, immigrant, refugee over the need to understand the dynamics of inside/outside.

The most astute commentators have identified the need to re-think inside/outside. For example, Stichwech argues that in world society there is no longer an outside. This calls into question the existence of the stranger, conventionally understood: under conditions of globalization can anyone truly be a stranger? But this is not the only way that the experience of globalization can transform the stranger. A very different (contradictory) account can be generated from the same observation. This is that under conditions of globalization there is no longer anything like a fixed community to which the stranger can enjoy a relationship. Under such conditions, who is not a stranger? And more importantly, who are 'we'? Thus the need to explore relations between inside/outside and us/them can take on a different complexion. Rather than assuming that globalization means there is no longer an outside (à la Hardt and Negri) we need to consider the possibility that there is no longer an inside. Such a recognition shifts the emphasis in studying the stranger from a concern with the 'outsider' to

a focus on the 'we-ness' of our community life. In other words, without a sense of who 'we' are we have no chance of apprehending the stranger.

## Bauman's stranger

The most prolific contributor to debates on the nature of the contemporary stranger is Zygmunt Bauman (for example, Bauman, 1991, 1995, 1997). Bauman's work on the stranger is citied very regularly by other authors and he is the 'go to' writer when commentators need to substantiate an argument or reference a point. Bauman stands shoulder-to-shoulder with Simmel as a sociological interpreter of the stranger. It is also the case that Bauman's work has structured the terms of the contemporary debate on the stranger: people tend to work with him rather than against him. Almost every account of the stranger references (or pays homage to) Bauman's work, and few authors challenge or dissent from Bauman's interpretation. It is difficult to find a contemporary account of the stranger which does not orientate itself in relation to Bauman's work. Bauman normally has the last word on the stranger, except on the occasions when the last word is given to Simmel.

One could argue, rather uncharitably perhaps, that Bauman's work on the stranger over the past 20 years or so has consisted of the recycling of several core ideas – that strangers are the 'undecidables' of the modern world (Bauman, 1991: 55), that they are a threat to social order, and that to counter this threat the nation-state's historic mission has been to eliminate strangers. Nevertheless, his work continues to shape the agenda for the study of the stranger and he broaches the question of how globalization has catalysed strangeness, although this is by no means his strongest suit. In his more recent writings he has grappled with the inside/outside problem and the ways in which we have all become partial strangers.

In his earlier work his focus was much more on the ways in which the stranger, as an outsider, was a threat to societal order. In *Modernity and Ambivalence* Bauman (1991) advances the case for the stranger having an unsettling impact on community. The stranger does not fit into a dichotomous friend/enemy relationship. The threat of the stranger 'is more horrifying than that which one can fear from the enemy' (Bauman, 1991: 55). The reason for this is that 'the stranger is neither friend nor enemy, and because he may be both. And because we do not know, and have no way of knowing …' (Bauman, 1991: 55). This fits with Bauman's thesis that modernity was all about establishing order on the world and in the social world one necessary task was the

elimination or control of ambivalence. In the modern world, friends and enemies result from the logic of either/or, black and white, good and bad. But as Bauman points out, 'There are friends and enemies. And there are strangers' (Bauman, 1991: 53) which complicates the situation somewhat. The stranger disrupts the dichotomous harmony of the world. 'Against this cosy antagonism … the stranger rebels. The threat he carries is more horrifying than that which one can fear from the enemy. The stranger threatens … the very *possibility* of sociation (Bauman, 1991: 55), or expressed in slightly more evocative language 'the arrival of a Stranger has the impact of an earthquake … and shatters the rock on which the security of daily life rests' (Bauman, 1997: 10).

The stranger may be friend or enemy, or both; the problem is that we do not know. The stranger is therefore an 'undecidable' who resists and disorganizes the neatness of binary oppositions. By bringing the outside into the inside strangers can 'poison the comfort of order with suspicion of chaos' (Bauman, 1991: 56). Against this threat, 'order-building was a war of attrition waged against the strangers and the strange' (Bauman, 1997: 18). What makes strangers a problem is their ability to 'befog and eclipse boundary lines which ought to be clearly seen' (Bauman, 1997: 25). In this process strangers were either assimilated (making the different similar) or banished i.e. excluded. If neither of these strategies worked then extermination was another option for strangers. The constraints of order-building meant that 'strangers lived, so to speak, in a state of suspended extinction. The strangers were, by definition, an anomaly to be rectified' (Bauman, 1997: 19). For Bauman (1991: 59) the stranger has the power to 'destroy the world' by unmasking 'the brittle artificially of division'. Bauman (1991: 59) reiterates that the stranger is a 'constant threat to the world's order'. This accords the stranger considerable power and influence, even if the threat is to ontological order in the world rather than the world order in a geopolitical sense. Bauman's vision of the stranger 'makes sense' in the context of a particular world order. The order imposed on the world – a world of nation-states, for example, positions the stranger as a potentially powerful disrupter of fixed arrangements. It is a feature of Bauman's work that the problematic nature of this world order has been the subject of a good deal of attention in his writing over the past 20 years. But whether Bauman has revised his thinking sufficiently to take account of the transformed 'world order' is an important question which we need to explore.

The stranger is considered such a threat that elimination by various means is sometimes the preferred solution of nation-states, something

they were designed for. More specifically, nation-states are engines of 'we-ness; imposing uniformity, promoting a sense of common destiny, generating homogeneity. The 'naturalness' of the community of the nation-state is the product of policies designed to 'promote "nativism" and construe its subjects as "natives"' (Bauman, 1991: 64). The nation-state works to create a clear-cut distinction between friends (fellow natives) and enemies (or potential enemies). In order to bring about this state of affairs strangers have to be converted into either friends or enemies; assimilation or stigmatization, banishment (or worse). Or more accurately perhaps, they first have to be constructed as strangers. As Bauman (1991: 70) point out, '[d]eterminants of "strangeness" are … eminently pliable; man-made, they can be in principle man-unmade'.

Assimilation aims to not only eliminate the strange but to create individual former-strangers where previously a group of strangers existed. 'Acquisition of native culture is a thoroughly *individual* affair, while the production of 'cultural strangeness' is always *aimed at a collective*' (Bauman, 1991: 72). The stranger can haul him/herself out of the category of the stranger only by 'admitting first one's own inferiority' (Bauman, 1991: 73) and then putting his-herself permanently on trial: a former stranger is a friend on approval' (Bauman, 1991: 72). Bauman argues that escape from strangerhood is in fact impossible. Achieving the 'natural' state of nativism will always be an ordeal for the former-stranger for whom the distance between the artificiality of his new status and the naturalness of the situation of members of the community is a constant reminder of his newcomer role. Assimilatory attempts work to render 'the strangeness of the stranger yet more obtrusive and vexing' and 'reveal this strangeness as irredeemable' (Bauman, 1991: 80). According to Bauman the idea that the stranger is a newcomer is rather over-simplistic. 'Unlike an alien or a foreigner, the stranger is not simply a newcomer, a person temporarily out of place. He is an *eternal wanderer*, homeless always and everywhere, without hope of ever "arriving"' (Bauman, 1991: 79). The 'homelessness' of the stranger is in fact hotly disputed in the literature, especially recent work on the cosmopolitan stranger (see Chapter 6).

The escape from strangerhood is also impossible for more fundamental reasons: in contemporary societies everyone is rootless. Everyone is socially displaced to a greater or lesser extent. We do not belong fully to any 'subsystems of society', therefore the individual is always a partial stranger (Bauman, 1991: 95), not properly at home anywhere and permanently uprooted wherever he finds himself. 'There is a substantive difference between being a stranger in a well settled native world, and a stranger in a world on the move' (Bauman, 1991: 97). The

former can aspire to assimilation, the latter cannot locate 'native' society and so assimilation is not an option. Strangerhood is not a temporary condition; strangers remain strangers (Bauman, 1991: 97). This state of affairs may be unsettling for everyone, particularly if the state of strangerhood is akin to social death and therefore to be avoided at all costs (e.g. for ultra-nationalists), but on the positive side strangeness is no longer a condition from which one must escape. 'Difference now bears no guilt; and the shame of being guilty of difference no longer prompts the culprit to escape from estrangement' (Bauman, 1991: 97). This then is liberating for those positioned as strangers. 'Strangerhood becomes universal. Or, rather, it has been dissolved; which after all amounts to the same. If everyone is a stranger, no one is' (Bauman, 1991: 97). This dissolution of the stranger is problematic, resting on a key motif of globalization; the erasure of boundaries between inside and outside. But like the idea of a borderless world the dissolution of the stranger is an overenthusiastic extrapolation of certain global trends. Bauman charts the demise of the stranger (group) and the rise of the former stranger (individual). Contrary to Bauman, the argument of this book is that under conditions of globalization the figure of the stranger has given way to the condition of strangeness. Framed in Baumanesque language we can say that 'once we had strangers, now there exists strangeness'. Strangeness, rather than strangerhood, has become the universal condition.

Bauman's assessment of the stranger under conditions of globalization is an updating of his original interpretation of strangers as a threat to social order. This means that his understanding of globalization and strangerhood does not embrace the idea of strangeness as developed in this book. For Bauman, the world is constantly on the move and this means that the 'the anxiety which condensed into the fear of strangers saturates the totality of daily life – fills every nook and cranny of the human condition' (Bauman, 1997: 11). Order-making, which was the goal of modernity, has been displaced by the identification of 'new "abnormalities" drawing ever new dividing lines, identifying and setting apart ever new "strangers"' (Bauman, 1997: 11). This means that next door neighbours can become strangers overnight if suspicions and uncertainty dictate that new dangers must be identified, and eliminated. This means that 'strangers are no longer routine' (Bauman, 1997: 11), and routine ways of dealing with them no longer suffice. If everyone is a potential stranger then new ways of encountering and dealing with, the stranger are needed. Bauman's 'new strangers' thesis retains, at its heart, a strong sense that 'we' may face new threats and new strangers

to be identified. Neighbours can become strangers if new dividing lines place suspicion on previously friendly people. What the 'new strangers' thesis does not allow for is the possibility that 'we' might become strangers or that a renewed sense of 'we-ness' is not possible.

There are certain other points at which the globalization of strangeness thesis outlined in this book departs from Bauman's account of 'new strangers'. Take for example his classic formulation, 'all societies produce strangers; but each kind of society produces its own kind of strangers, and produces them in its own inimitable way' (Bauman, 1997: 17). This quote was discussed at the beginning of the Introduction in the context of the absent global context. The focus here is rather different. In this formulation strangers are produced by society, indeed Bauman talks about society 'gestating' strangers (1997: 17). Against this I would assert that strangers can in fact produce themselves, in the sense that they emerge at a particular time of their choosing (or they respond to a call for new strangers). In a limited (but growing) sense at least people may choose to be strangers, an identity choice not considered by Bauman, a certain lingering stigma to strangerhood being assumed. Pickering (2001: 218) is aware that strangers are immanent. They can come from anywhere, 'they are already here, we are among them, "we" *are* "them"'.

Bauman struggles to break out of the dichotomies by means of which we come to know the stranger. Our experience of the stranger is either/or; good or bad, or even, good then bad. This is the dilemma of living side by side with strangeness, as with the classic case of urban living where 'difference comes at a premium' and the challenge is how to live with alterity, daily and permanently' (Bauman, 1997: 30). There exists 'almost universal agreement that difference is not merely unavoidable, but good, precious and in need of protection and cultivation' (1997: 31). However, living with strangers leads to a situation which Bauman (1995: 181) terms 'proteophobia', the dislike of situations in which one feels lost, confused, disempowered. Or as expressed in other terms by Bauman, 'the apprehension aroused by the presence of multiform, allotropic[2] phenomena which stubbornly elide assignment and sap the familiar classificatory grids' (Bauman, 1995: 181). All of which is akin, Bauman says, quoting Wittgenstein, to 'not knowing how to go on'. But, at the same time, in contemporary urban life estrangement can be a source of pleasure. No commitment or lasting obligations offer the promise of anonymity, pleasure and temptation. But this type of stranger can always be turned into a source of threat. The stranger is Janus-faced; opportunity, adventure, mystery versus sinister, menacing and intimidating (1995: 138).

There are two points of contention here. The first concerns the binary structure of society, the second proteophobic tendencies. An experience of strangers which is charted on a good/bad continuum will forever maintain a divide between 'us' and the 'others' who are labelled strangers. On this account there is no possibility of awareness of self as stranger. Secondly, for Bauman, routine proximity to strangers can induce proteophobia. However, disorientation is not necessarily a product of daily encounters with difference (strangers) but with the loss of societal reference points and orientations; in other words, the globalization of strangeness.

## Back to Simmel

According to Pickering (2001: 205), Simmel's interest in the stranger 'derived from an alertness to those moments outside of the attainment of sociality when the equilibrium of its elements begins to shift'. The stranger causes us to think again about the nature and organization of society: for the stranger 'being "here" does not betoken any sense of belonging' (Pickering, 2001: 205). This is a good point at which to enter Simmel's thinking on the stranger; community requires more than mere physical proximity and strangers are not simply potential new group members. The stranger, by being the potential wanderer who may 'stay tomorrow' brings a little bit of the outside world into the group, and therefore can be reckoned to be a potential catalyst for change.

I would argue that Simmel is more radical a thinker on the stranger than many who have followed. According to Simmel, people who are physically close by can be remote and those who are far away may in fact be close in many ways. To anyone with a rudimentary understanding of cultural globalization these are quite familiar themes. But how well understood would Simmel's linkages between near and far be in the absence of a global context for understanding 'distant proximities'? Another example of the contemporary relevance of Simmel's ideas is the way he is not prepared to view the stranger within a simple inside/outside frame. For Simmel the stranger is an element of the group. 'His position as a full-fledged member involves both being outside it and confronting it as an element of the group itself.' Indeed the stranger's nearness and farness accords the stranger a special status in respect of the group. The objectivity of the stranger can be a valued commodity and stems not from passivity and detachment but from a combination distance and nearness, indifference and involvement. The mixture of

nearness and remoteness which constitutes the objectivity of the stranger, 'also finds practical expression in the more abstract nature of the relation to him … with the stranger one has only certain more general qualities in common, whereas the relation to more organically connected persons is based on the commonness of specific differences from merely general features'. Simmel here anticipates the discussions of universalism and particularism in respect of globalization.

Simmel's vision is original and compelling. 'The stranger is close to us', he argues 'insofar as we feel between him and ourselves common features of a national, social, occupational, or generally human, nature. He is far from us, insofar as these common features extend beyond him or us, and connect us only because they connect a great many people.' In other words, what makes us close to others is the sense of shared human nature; but, at the same time, connection with others on the basis of shared humanity may lead onto to the realization that there is nothing personal about this bond. Community is formed on the basis of something other than inherited characteristics. There is no uniqueness which is not also a general condition; there is nothing specific about a place that is not replicated elsewhere. These are the symptoms of living in a Global Age. In other words, what is first thought to be unique (local difference) is often less so when viewed from a global perspective.

This is also, for Simmel, the origin of strangeness. For him, 'strangeness is not due to different and ununderstandable matters. It is rather caused by the fact that similarity, harmony, and nearness are accompanied by the feeling that they are not really the unique property of this particular relationship.' In other words, we can become distanced from ourselves and our important others upon the realization that what we value as 'ours', as specific to our own individual circumstances, are globally reproducible. Simmel here anticipates the idea of glocalization (see Chapter 4). The result of this recognition, for Simmel, is that 'a trace of strangeness … easily enters even the most intimate relationships'. There are no relationships which cannot be penetrated by strangeness; it structures everyday existence.

## Global strangers

A sociology of the stranger does not have to derive from the work of Simmel. For example, Bauman has not seen the need to anchor his thinking on the stranger in the Simmelian tradition. However, it is quite possible that Simmel's work is more relevant to social theory

now, as scholars attempt to place the stranger in a global context. Simmel's work is not usually considered as offering a global frame, but it is as a proto-sociologist of globalization that he is interpreted here.

Papastergiadis (2000: 13) asserts that we need to understand the stranger beyond the dichotomies employed by Simmel; us-them, modern-traditional, insider-outsider. These fixed positions do not deal adequately with contemporary shifting patterns of inclusion and exclusion. He takes as a starting point the recognition that our understanding of the stranger has a marked global component:

> It is now commonplace for our neighbours are strangers from different countries, our security in the workplace to be dependent upon the priorities of transnational corporations, and our cultural knowledge to be formed through the interaction of signs taken from a variety of places (Papastergiadis, 2000: 14).

In revising Simmel's understanding of the stranger it is first necessary to acknowledge the fluidity of the stranger-community relation. For Simmel, the 'stranger's identity is defined through the oscillation between being inside and outside the group. However, for this dynamic position to be established at the borders of the group, another static position is implied at its centre' (Papastergiadis, 2000: 67).

The inside/outside distinction is no longer adequate as a baseline from which to understand the stranger, and indeed encounters between the stranger and 'locals' which have multiplied in frequency and can take place pretty much anywhere. We are no longer surprised by an unexpected encounter with strangers: 'our prior knowledge and tacit expectations of strangers … become an active part of the social world' (Papastergiadis, 2000: 67). This means that thinking about strangers has become 'a necessity of everyday life' (Papastergiadis, 2000: 68).

Ash Amin's *Land of Strangers* (Amin, 2012) advances a novel reading of the idea that we live in a 'society of strangers' and he is concerned that contemporary narratives of society focus too much on the domestication of the stranger driven by expectations of reconciled differences (Amin, 2012: 2–3). He argues that the 'society of strangers' is more complex and the 'gap between singularity and plurality' (Amin, 2012: 2) deserves much more attention, as this is where the labelling of insiders and outsiders takes place. He is particularly interested in 'the multiple ways in which the stranger is construed as an outsider: the object of ejection, domestication or tolerance' (Amin, 2012: 2). This is of particular concern in 'a time of extreme societal fluidity in an unstable and

insecure world' (Amin, 2012: 4), Amin's reading of the global context, which he believes leads to a 'yearning for the society of mutual obligations and strong social ties' (Amin, 2012: 4). In other words, the experience of globalization – open borders, heightened mobilities, footloose individuals – has tended to result in a more defensive and inward looking posture on behalf of many people – what Amin (2012: 14) terms the 'anxiety of cohesion' – and a desire to form tight knit communities displaying social unity (and homogeneity), all of which has clear implications for the stranger.

For Amin the underlying concern is that the public sphere – and even the social itself – is becoming seen as a 'space of encounter and reconciliation' (Amin, 2012: 4). The sense of the public sphere as a field of interaction between 'diverse publics and counter-publics' (Amin, 2012: 4) – a space of dissensus – is being lost. Amin summarizes this in the following terms, 'a politics of respectful distance, principled disagreement and common life becomes discarded as a way of negotiating the society of strangers'. This is important. It is an argument for encouraging the strangeness of strangers rather than eliminating them. Amin argues for 'the virtues of the society of strangers' and 'new ways of gathering diversity into a functioning commons' (Amin, 2012: 11).

Amin is critical of attempts to eliminate the strangeness of strangers through strategies of what we may term 'convenient mutuality' which attempt to 'smooth the edges' of communities of strangers who may come into contact in the urban environment. Rather, it is possible for strangers to exist without recognizing each other or being bound together, but this requires a public sphere which allows strangers to 'play out their differences' and inhabit multiple networks.

> [S]trangers are not of necessity tied to each other or inclined to recognize each other, dispersed as they are throughout the city, familiar with only particular spaces, locked into elective networks of belonging and intimacy, frequently compelled to stave off difference to cope with the multiple assaults of urban modernity (Amin, 2012: 65).

Of course the threat to strangers does not only come from others positioned as strangers by the host society. The drive to domesticate the stranger and construct a social space of reconciled differences is fuelled by 'a politics of aversion in which states and publics feel morally unperturbed in demanding an end to veils, religious schools, and the linguistic and cultural isolation of minorities' (Amin, 2012: 99). Strangers

who maintain their strangeness can easily be perceived as threatening and dangerous by those alarmed by perceived threats to national security and as such domestication (or elimination) becomes the sensible option. In the past decade or so we have witnessed the return of 'a politics of disciplining minorities and strangers' (Amin, 2012: 100), which also allows for 'past racisms to return' (Amin, 2012: 100).

Unlike many other scholars Amin is not concerned to investigate 'who are the strangers?' in the contemporary context. He assumes that the strangers are pretty much the same figures as always: minorities, immigrants, refugees, and those generally who look as if they 'do not belong'. In this sense, Amin still holds to an idea of the stranger as 'coming today and staying tomorrow'. But not all strangers are 'outsiders' to the same degree and not all strangers are equally at threat from processes of assimilation (or elimination):

> [I]t is the most visible, vulnerable, needy, ill-equipped stranger who is most at risk. For this stranger – graded by colour and cultural affinity to the mythic community – the combination of intrusive state surveillance and raw phenotypical racism can only mean universal condemnation (Amin, 2012: 103).

Amin's work is unusual in that he sees a very positive role for the stranger in contemporary society, but not by heralding a new multicultural consensus; strangers add extra dimensions of diversity which cannot easily be homogenized and /or domesticated so as to be non-threatening. Instead the stranger exists as a figure which forces us to think creatively about diversity and reminds us that one-size-fits-all social policies fail to account for the unpredictability of the social relations which strangeness can engender. The presence of the stranger should not inspire policies designed to homogenize the social but the creation of a public arena in which difference can be played out and harnessed as a productive force.

## Conclusion

The history of the study of the stranger can be summarized, very briefly, as follows. In the first place, the focus was very much on 'the other' as stranger, one who was new to society and stood out in some way. This way of viewing the stranger has been the norm until relatively recently. Latterly, there has been a shift to discovering 'the stranger within' and the recognition that we share much with those labelled strangers. These newer themes are making an impact on a literature in

which an association of 'the other' as stranger still dominates. *The Globalization of Strangeness* takes us beyond a study of the stranger, narrowly defined. It advances the case that neither the idea of 'the other' as stranger nor the idea of ourselves as strangers are in and of themselves sufficient to understand contemporary strangerhood. Rather, in order to study the stranger we must study strangeness as a generalized social condition.

Accounts of the stranger under conditions of globalization have hitherto focused on the ways in which globalization leads to an increasing proximity to strangers and an experience of society characterized by a 'routinization of alterity' (Mendieta, 2007). This leads to a situation in which difference becomes mundane and everyday, but, at the same time, the proximity of 'others' means that the potential risks posed by 'stranger danger' is ever present (Robertson, 2007a). The metaphor of the city as a 'world of strangers' is in serious need of revision, primarily because it obscures the fact that the experience of the city is no longer unique in respect of the stranger. The notion of strangeness carries with it the idea that contact between individuals is anything but routine. Many approaches to globalization emphasize that it heralds a world of increased connectivity. Strangeness is one name for what occurs when connectivity is absent and what we have in its place is a world of dis-connectivity. In such circumstances we become distant from 'our' familiar reference points (communities, neighbours, symbols of legitimate authority) and we must re-negotiate the terrain of our everyday existence. A 'routine world of strangers' does not begin to capture the dynamics of strangeness.

# 3
# Ulrich Beck: A Perspectival Account of Strangeness

## Introduction

I start this chapter with a personal reflection. Coming across the passage quoted below – in which Beck gives outline form to his idea of the globalization of strangeness – was important for the development of this book in several ways.[1] First, it encouraged my belief that others may see strangeness in the same way that I do, which up to that point was looking extremely unlikely. The globalization of strangeness may not yet be a recurring theme in the social sciences, but at least there is evidence of it emerging in the literature. Second, I was excited by the fact that another social theorist was offering an alternative (and critical) perspective on the figure of the stranger, too often treated uncritically in the literature. Third, it was good to know that a writer with whose work (on cosmopolitanism, particularly) I was already familiar was 'speaking' to me in a language I could so clearly understand. It seemed to me, for a brief moment anyway, that I was the intended reader of this passage, which seemed to simultaneously confirm my views on the relationship between globalization and strangeness, subtly challenge them, and direct my thinking in new and productive directions. Fourth, as usual when reading Beck's work I was both excited by the possibilities it opened up and aware that despite the beguiling formulation it might quite possibly be wrong. The more I read the passage the more I am confirmed in this view. But I cannot deny the impact of this short section on my thinking at a crucial stage of writing this book. Although Beck formulates his ideas on strangeness in more sophisticated terms elsewhere in his work (as discussed later in the chapter) there is an urgency and economy of words here which makes the force of the ideas contained all the more powerful. Fifth, coming across the passage almost

by accident, and not previously being aware of its existence, reminded me that internet searches can occasionally be serendipitous.

Having introduced it, and signalled its importance, let's now look at the passage in detail. In an online article entitled 'For a cosmopolitan outlook' Beck writes:

> I think the term globalization – as it is commonly used – is not really giving meaning to the important subject we are involved in. And this is the human condition of un-excludability; it means you cannot exclude the nationally constructed other anymore. Politically, as sociologically, this is the issue we are confronted with, and this has a lot of very different meanings. One of them is what I would call now the globalization of strangeness. People suddenly experience themselves living in a very strange world and being confronted with all kind of strangeness. They don't recognize anymore the city they are living in, maybe even the street because of all kind of globalizations happening into those areas; people feel to have no place in this new context, and feel frightened by this new situation of un-excludability of the strange-other. On the other hand, there's an enlightenment function, as people are opening up, realizing they necessarily have to deal with each other in order to find solutions to the big problems. So, both things are happening, in an ambivalent dynamic (Beck, undated).

There is much in this statement, rough and ready as it is, and it deserves unpacking (and perhaps reformulating in more precise language). First of all, Beck problematizes the way in which the idea of globalization, 'as it is commonly used', is too blunt an instrument to reveal the important social dynamics of our time. This in itself is a highly contentious statement, at least among the Global Studies constituency, but one with which I would agree, up to a point: certainly, if globalization is held to be responsible for every transformation then it explains nothing. But Beck is interested in one particular aspect of globalization; the fact that it is no longer possible to border people out, as it was in a tightly-bound nation-state society. The 'human condition of un-excludability' has been propagated in a number of ways associated with globalization: we no longer only inhabit communities constructed within and circumscribed by national borders; regimes of human rights have helped create global forms of individualism; geographical proximity is no longer a pre-requisite for group membership; there no longer exists a strict hierarchy of belonging, headed by class, ethnicity, gender. In short,

what Beck is saying is that it is no longer possible to exclude 'the other' because we no longer live in communities that are wholly constructed and maintained by nation-states (and which have the desire and/or the capability to work to exclude). Expressed in different terms, we no longer live in societies which have such a strong interest in labelling the stranger. Elsewhere, Beck talks about the 'pluralization of borders', a multitude of non-identical borders – economical, cultural, political, legal, technological etc. Each of these named domains possesses its own borders which may or may not map on to the borders of the nation-state. Whereas according to the logic of methodological nationalism these borders coincide; in terms of a methodological cosmopolitanism these borders diverge (Beck, 2002: 19). It is not possible to exclude 'others' when 'nationally-constructed' mechanisms of exclusion no longer fulfil this function.

Second, and this is Beck's main point about strangeness, the 'unexcludability of the strange-other' means that it is impossible to talk of strangers as such. It is no longer possible for a society to construct 'others' as stranger in a straightforward way. It is not the case that no-one 'comes today and stays tomorrow,' rather it is that there is no longer a cohesive and bounded society against which to cast individuals as strangers. This is a variation on the argument that if everyone is a stranger then no one is. In Beck's version, under conditions of globalization-induced strangeness it is no longer possible to identify strangers. Nowadays, everyone looks a bit like a stranger and therefore those who 'come today and stay tomorrow' do not stand out from the crowd. In sum, the transformations wrought by globalization make the conventional sociological figure of the stranger impossible, while creating a state of generalized strangeness, framed by Beck as a global phenomenon in which we are all 'confronted with all kind of strangeness'.

Third, following from this, the human condition of un-excludability contributes to the globalization of strangeness. Beck's statement on the experience of strangeness is very interesting: 'People suddenly experience themselves living in a very strange world and being confronted with all kind of strangeness'. The key thing here is the self-awareness of strangeness, which for Beck is a life-defining experience, at once disorientating, dislocating, and destabilizing. People find previously familiar environments unfamiliar ('they don't recognize the city they are living in'), but more than this they may even experience more intimate surroundings as strange ('maybe even the street') – there is no nook or corner of our daily lives that globalization cannot penetrate. The point that Beck wishes to emphasize is not simply that globalization is transformative of our

daily routines and the localities in which they take place, but that the places familiar to us no longer always appear to be 'ours'. In other words, strangeness exists when we feel that we are not at home, even when we are physically in our homes and surrounded by our nearest and dearest. These feelings of strangeness are reinforced by the 'un-excludability of the strange-other'. But Beck does not cast this as an entirely negative development. In itself, it is not necessarily a bad thing. We may respond to this strangeness by becoming more open to the world as we realize that we 'have to deal with each other in order to find solutions to the big problems', as Beck anticipates with respect to 'world risk society', for example (Beck, 1999). However, there is also the possibility that we become cowed by the power of globalization to prise open our previously tight-knit local lives.

Fourth, Beck casts the experience of globalization as one in which people are 'confronted' by the new reality of their lives, in the sense that previously familiar places no longer always appear to be 'ours'. As a result of such experiences people are less likely to associate globalization with the opening up of the world; globalization can result in the perception that the world is a less open, less friendly, and more unfair place than was hitherto the case. That '[p]eople suddenly experience themselves living in a very strange world and being confronted with all kind of strangeness' is not likely to be a positive change for the majority, despite the potential for new risk society communities that this can foster. The combination of sudden change and the relativization of social positions makes for a particularly unsettling combination. This is why this sort of experience frequently engenders reactionary political sentiments: feelings of being swamped by 'foreigners' being a routine response to the realization that familiar places no longer always appear to be 'ours', this being the basis of 'white flight' syndrome, for example.

In the passage under discussion here Beck's account of strangeness relies much on the irresistible transformative potential of globalization and its tendency to confront us with the 'un-excludability of the strange-other'. I have interpreted this as supporting the argument for a shift from the stranger to strangeness, developed elsewhere in this book. However, Beck stops short, in this formulation at least, of allowing for the possibility that we might come to the recognition that we are strangers too. The self-awareness of strangeness referred to above is limited to an awareness of strangeness, not an awareness of self-as-stranger. In other words, the problem with the focus on the 'un-excludability of the strange-other' is that strangeness is rendered as an

experience of 'the other' not a form of self-reflexivity. It discounts the possibility that one consequence of strangeness is that we are obliged to recognize that we, too, may be strangers.

## Beck on borders and strangers

In this chapter I advance the case that Ulrich Beck is a key theorist of the stranger and strangeness, while recognizing that this theme is not one with which his work is normally associated. In addition to his one published article on the subject (reprinted in Beck, 1998a) there are a number of contributions in articles and book chapters, which, while not explicitly focused on the stranger, when taken together, provide a valuable resource for studying the stranger under conditions of globalization. I am referring to those publications which develop his ideas on exclusion/inclusion in a variety of contexts, particularly in relation to cosmopolitanism and globalization. In this chapter I aim to interrogate Beck's published work on the stranger – focusing on his paper entitled 'How neighbours become Jews; the political construction of the stranger in the age of reflexive modernity' (Beck, 1998b) – and other writing on exclusion/inclusion, in particular his writing on borders (another topic with which he is not normally associated, but in fact he makes a potentially important contribution to Border Studies – see Rumford, 2012).

His contribution to the study of strangeness is significant, it is argued in this chapter, because he advances a distinctive post-Simmelian vision of the stranger, setting strangeness in a global context.[2] Beck's vision is also very different (and arguably more innovative) to that of Bauman, usually considered to be the leading contemporary scholar of the stranger. Beck's work is also important because of his awareness of the perspectival construction of strangeness. He is one of the few writers who consider that strangeness does not look the same from every vantage point, and that strangers too, have a view of strangeness (their own, and that of others). These points will be elaborated upon as the chapter unfolds. First of all it is necessary to appreciate Beck's understanding of the dynamics of exclusion revealed in his writings on borders and exclusion, as a context for understanding his writing on the stranger.

In the context of a discussion about the role of borders in processes of (attempted) exclusion, Ulrich Beck makes what at first sight appears to be the counter-intuitive claim that borders should be conceived of as mechanisms of inclusion. For Beck (2000: 51–52), borders are 'mobile patterns that facilitate overlapping loyalties'. He acknowledges both that this idea cuts across the grain of conventional thinking on

the role and function of borders, and that his argument for inclusion is not the only way in which borders can be conceived. However, he argues – somewhat provocatively perhaps – that 'it may be an important way in the future' (Beck, 2000: 51).

The idea that borders are 'mobile patterns that facilitate overlapping loyalties' is an insightful claim about the nature of contemporary borders. To understand the potency of the claim we need to situate Beck's ideas in relation to current thinking on the changing nature of borders, no longer conceived simply as the (securitized) perimeter of a polity, controlled by the state, and represented by thin lines on a map. Indeed we must dispense with the idea that borders always correspond to the edges or limits of a nation-state (Rumford, 2008b). The idea that borders can now be diffused throughout society (Balibar, 2002) has become widely recognized throughout the social sciences (if not wholeheartedly accepted by all commentators). This shift in understanding has been supplemented by a whole range of important changes in the ways we comprehend borders, driven by the need to understand the variety of borders and bordering processes that exist in a changing and unpredictable world. In the contemporary literature, across a number of disciplines – geography, sociology, international relations – the following have emerged as key changes in the nature of borders.

The first key change is the idea that 'borders are everywhere', mentioned above, and associated most closely with the work of Etienne Balibar. This registers the multiple sites of bordering that now exist; at airports, Eurostar terminals and maritime ports, but also in other locations, many of which would not be thought of as borders in the conventional sense: in travel agencies and other offices where travel documents are issued and databases checked, in universities and colleges where excessive absence from overseas students must be reported to the UK Border Agency, along motorways where trucks are scanned and car number plates monitored, and when shopping on the internet where credit card usage leads to the 'transaction mining' of information for security purposes (Amoore and de Goede, 2008).

The second change is the recognition that borders mean different things to different people and act differently on different groups. This is Balibar's (2002) idea of polysemy, which suggests that borders are becoming 'asymmetrical membranes' (Hedetoft, 2003) or acting like 'firewalls' (Walters, 2006). These metaphors point to borders being designed so as to allow the passage of 'desirables' while keeping out 'undesirables'. For example, the UK has developed polysemic borders in its attempt to create 'security in a global hub' (Cabinet Office, 2007) through e-borders

designed to be 'open to business but closed to terrorists and traffickers'. The third change is the acknowledgement that borders can be remote and distant from the territory they are designed to protect. The UK is now developing 'offshore borders all over the world' (Home Office, 2007) in order to prevent undesirables from starting their journey to the UK. The Eurostar train link has introduced 'juxtaposed' borders so that UK passport control takes place at Gare du Nord and French passport control at St Pancras. In Lahav and Guiraudon's (2000) terms 'borders are not always at the border'.

The fourth change follows from the first three: borders are mechanisms to 'control mobility rather than territory' (Durrschmidt and Taylor, 2007: 56). The traditional idea that borders lock-down territory or form a security perimeter for the sovereign nation-state has given way to the idea of the border as a conduit, speeding up transit where necessary, blocking passage when required. Finally, the fifth change in understanding is that borders are conceptualized less as things (lines on a map) but as processes. The diffusion and dispersal of borders, their polysemic qualities and their remoteness means that borders are not what or where they used to be. It is for these reasons that it makes more sense to talk about processes of bordering rather than fixed or territorial borders, although of course walls are still employed at many border locations (Turner, 2007). The enduring preference for constructing walls as borders is termed 'teichopolitics' by Rosiere and Jones (2011).

Beck's idea that borders are 'mobile patterns that facilitate overlapping loyalties' both resonates with these changes and also importantly challenges them for having still understood borders to be primarily institutions of division. Beck's intervention can be seen to presage a recent wave of thinking about borders which sees borders in terms of both connectivity and their potential as political resources for a whole range of actors, in addition to being instruments of securitization and division (Cooper and Rumford, 2011; Cooper and Perkins, 2012). In this way it is possible to talk of the 'cosmopolitanization' of borders (Rumford, 2007) or the 'vernacularization' of borders (Perkins and Rumford, 2013; Rumford, 2013). The idea that borders are 'mobile patterns that facilitate overlapping loyalties' is not only an insightful claim about the nature of contemporary borders but it is also the basis for an important contribution to the study of the stranger and strangeness. The vast majority of writing on the stranger does not challenge the assumption that the stranger can be easily distinguished from the rest of society, that the stranger's passage into society is observable and

traceable, and that even when settled in society following his/her decision to 'stay tomorrow' the stranger always stands out from the crowd. These characteristics of the stranger rest upon the assumption that society (and/or communities comprising the wider society) possesses clearly demarcated borders which must be crossed in order to enter a fairly homogenous and coherent society against which strangeness stands out. But not only has society changed but importantly so have borders.

Beck rightly draws attention to the mobility of borders rather than assume only an enhanced mobility for individuals across borders – often assumed to be the basis for cosmopolitanism (Rumford, 2012). Borders can be mobile in several ways. They may change location, for example European Union borders following enlargement, or Europe's borders shifting as a result of the instability of discursively constructed 'important borders' (Rumford, 2006), as in the case of the Iron Curtain being replaced by a new EU dividing line further to the east. Borders may be deployed wherever they are deemed most effective; they range across society, not only at its edges (Balibar, 2002). A good example of these changes are the aforementioned 'juxtaposed' borders at either end of the Eurostar line. A new border can be called into existence very quickly when required. For example, the boat patrols carried out by the EU's border harmonization agency, Frontex, in the Mediterranean and off the West coast of Africa operationalize a new sort of flexible border, deployed whenever and wherever it is needed but projected at a distance from the borders of EU member states. In sum, whereas conventionally the emphasis falls on mobility in terms of border-crossings, Beck emphases the heightened mobility of borders themselves.

Also, Beck's claim accords with the idea that borders should be conceived of in terms of processes, not things. Understanding borders as mobile patterns means that we should focus on bordering processes, which can take many forms, not just the obvious or predictable forms that borders conventionally take: walls, armed checkpoints etc. The idea of 'mobile patterns' places greater emphasis on the arrangement of objects (constituting a pattern), rather than the things in themselves, in isolation: security arches positioned in city centre locations to check for terrorist suspects at entry and exit points, London's 'ring of steel' surrounding the city in a bid to counter terrorist threats, the mirror imaging of 'juxtaposed' passport controls in France and the UK.

Importantly, for Beck borders facilitate overlapping loyalties. Borders do not divide one set of loyalties from another. Borders do not impose order on an inchoate collection of shifting loyalties. Borders are not a

solution to the problem of overlapping loyalties (as they perhaps would be thought to be from a nationalistic perspective). It can be inferred that without borders there would be no overlapping loyalties: borders cause the overlap. Globalization means that we may fall within the orbit of many communities but are not necessarily committed to (or captured by) any of them. In Beck's words, someone 'is part of a large number of circles and is circumscribed by that' (Beck, 2000: 51). Some of these communities may claim us as a member while others fail to capture our allegiance either because they hold no interest for us or because they fail to touch our lives (they lack reach). That loyalties (comprising ties of varying strengths) overlap is due to the cultural encounters engendered by the connectivity inherent in borders (and the fact that the outcome of these encounters in not easy to predict). In such a situation it is easy to envisage a social world in which everyone is (a partial) stranger to everyone else. It is impossible not to be a stranger to someone because no community has firm boundaries and no-one can be corralled into fixed community, arrangements which would preclude strangeness. In a situation where borders are mobile and best thought of as processes not things it is not adequate to think of the stranger as one who 'comes today and stays tomorrow'. It is more appropriate to see the stranger as one who can pop-up anywhere, anytime, not previously observed arriving (for a full development of this idea see Chapter 6).

From the perspective of understanding the stranger the idea that borders should be conceived of as 'mobile patterns that facilitate overlapping loyalties' points to the non-exclusivity of belonging. The mobility of borders means that there are far fewer inside/outside reference points and subsequently fewer us/them reference points. Individuals may be captured by the orbits of a multiplicity of communities which compete for allegiance. However, belonging does not 'nest' in this environment; the hierarchical order of communities and belonging which is associated with modernity – nation and class being primary, standing above (but rarely challenged for primacy) by gender, ethnicity, and religion, and supplemented by regional, urban, or subcultural identification – no longer holds. 'Overlapping loyalties' mean that the hierarchies of belonging are no longer set in stone, membership is elective rather than ascribed, and those loyalties traditionally considered as primary now vie for attention with what were previously relativity unimportant communities associated with lifestyle choices and personal preferences. People choose the basis of their loyalty, it is no longer imposed on them: people choose how best to demonstrate that they

are loyal, and to whom they offer their loyalty; it cannot be assumed or 'read off' from an imputed location in the social order.

The key point here is that individuals are able to connect to a variety of communities and project themselves into 'distant' collectivities by using borders as connective tissue: 'mobile borders' can work to (selectively) enhance mobility. If we conceive of borders not as barriers to mobility but as mechanisms to manage mobility then it is possible for them to speed up flows as well as slow them down. In such a context opportunities arise for people to utilize the connective potential of borders for their own ends. Loyalties are overlapping in the sense that they are not rooted in separate, discrete geographical spaces. Loyalties are clamouring for attention in the geographical space inhabited by the individual. Belonging is selective and perhaps also transitory, community is bespoke and borders are a networking resource.

From the above it can be seen how Beck's work on borders and bordering informs his other work on inclusion and provides a useful context within which to understand his approach to strangeness. Beck's work on the stranger is every bit as innovative as his work on borders, and is certainly informed by it, and it is to this that we must now turn.

## How neighbours become strangers

> 'People are strange when you're a stranger'
> ('People are Strange' by The Doors, 1967)

In this section we will deal centrally with Beck's innovative ideas on strangers and strangeness. These ideas arise in the context of a discussion of the issue of how, in Nazi Germany, Jewish neighbours were made into strangers, and how in more general terms 'neighbours become strangers and enemies' (Beck, 1998b: 124). One of Beck's broader aims is to understand how the construction of strangers in the mid-twentieth century (during the period of 'simple modernity') is different from the social construction of the stranger in the contemporary period ('reflexive modernity'). This agenda is to be applauded and resonates with my own aims and objective for this book, even if I do not find Beck's categorization of modernities particularly useful. Moreover, Beck has hit upon an important point; why is it so rare to find approaches to the stranger which recognize that the contemporary stranger is very different from that found in the early twentieth century?

According to conventional thinking, for Beck, strangers do not fit into neat pre-determined containers of identity and as a result create friction in society. Indeed, Bauman's 'undecidables of the modern world' are a threat precisely because they are difficult to 'pigeon-hole' in convenient ways. Beck summarizes this thinking in the following terms. 'Strangers are therefore neighbours of whom it is said that they are not like "us"! By category, strangers are a double provocation: they are locals; and yet they do not obey the stereotypes which locals develop and maintain for themselves' (Beck, 1998b: 127). Strangers blur the clear boundaries and demarcations upon which modernity rests. 'Strangers are, in this way, a living refutation of the apparent clear borders and natural foundations through which affiliations and identities are expressed in the nation-state' (Beck, 1998b: 127).

So far Beck is treading a fairly familiar path. What distinguishes Beck's account of the stranger in modernity from that of other commentators is that he introduces an important (and much needed) perspectival dimension: the strangeness of the stranger is relative (Beck, 1998b: 127). In my view, this is his most distinctive and original contribution to the study of the stranger. According to Beck (1998b: 127), '[e]ach person has only to pass through some boundary in order to change into the situation of the stranger'. In other words, each person can become a stranger by shifting position in relation to others or crossing over from one cultural group to another. There is no fixed position that the stranger occupies (or that 'we' occupy in relation to the stranger). We cannot assume it will always be others who occupy the role of the stranger. Another contemporary commentator on the stranger makes an important, related point. Tibor Dessewffy (1996: 613) reminds us that 'late modernity imposes more and more roles on us', not all of which we can occupy with equal success. Rather optimistically perhaps Dessewffy believes that by learning 'the role of the loser' we will be more empathetic towards the weak. In recognizing the complexity of our own identities we will come to terms with 'the potential stranger in ourselves' and in doing so learn to 'attach importance to similarities' and hence cooperate more effectively (Dessewffy, 1996: 613–614). Beck's interpretation of the 'self as stranger' goes much further than Dessewffy's call to recognize the stranger within (from a position of weakness). Whereas Dessewffy's position is essentially a liberal and inclusive one – the existence of the stranger is not a threat it is a learning opportunity, and recognizing the potential stranger within will help us get on better with others in a multicultural society[3] – Beck argues that we must recognize that each and everyone of us can be

constructed as someone else's stranger; there is no guarantee that we will not be positioned as 'other' at some point. Identities are relative, not immutable, and the social roles we occupy and our relations to others can always be viewed from another perspective; there is no guarantee that others will not come to see us as strangers. This state of affairs is doubly unpredictable in the sense that not only do we not know who might come to see us as strangers but we cannot predict when this might happen.

Beck's notion of 'passing through a boundary' is also interesting given the diffuse nature of borders and generalized bordering processes which exist. Passing through a boundary may be done inadvertently – there is no guarantee that we will recognize the existence of someone else's border (Rumford, 2012) – and there is certainly the possibility that boundaries can be crossed and re-crossed on a routine basis. Avoiding these boundaries may not be easy and the possibility of (falling into) strangerhood is ever-present. A society in which borders are multiple, fluid, diffused, and bespoke – and in which there is no clear-cut demarcation between inside/outside, and categories of us/them are blurred – is also a society in which a high degree of strangeness exists.

Not only is strangerhood relative but it is structurally inherent: 'the stranger is a concept without a counterconcept' (Beck, 1998b: 128). What Beck means by this, I believe, is that it is not possible to contrast strangers with 'locals'; as mentioned above it is no longer easy to identify the stranger via some crude inside/outside, us/them, resident/newcomer dichotomy. In other words, we cannot pair 'stranger' with another concept as is the case with the binary doubles mentioned above. Strangers and locals no longer stare at each other across the binary divide. Beck spells out the importance of this. 'Strangers *are* locals (neighbours); and they are at the same time in certain respects (sometimes from their own perspective, sometimes from the outside perspective of the locals) also not locals' (Beck, 1998b: 128). Not only can there be different perspectives on the stranger, but the stranger may have a perspective on his/her own strangerhood.

Beck's ideas push the conventional notion of the stranger to the very limit. In doing so, he provides us with a provocative and revealing account of the conventional stranger in 'simple modernity'. His work deserves to be read alongside that of Bauman, generally considered to be the benchmark author in scholarship of the stranger. But Beck's work does not complement that of Bauman; it offers a critique of it, although this critique is implicit as Beck does not engage directly with Bauman's work (and vice versa).

## Introducing strangeness

To better understand the stranger in the contemporary world of 'reflexive modernity' we need to dispense with the assumptions associated with the societies of 'simple modernity'. Beck sums this up in the following terms. The stranger of modernity 'presumed a relatively simple world' (Beck, 1998b: 130), in which there exist polarizations between 'us and them' and where members of society ('locals') vastly outnumber the strangers. In short, '[t]he social construction of the stranger is performed here in contexts of relative clarity. The "locals" have their place in the structure of social order, from which "strangers" must be distinguished and excluded' (Beck, 1998b: 131). Things have now changed, however. This 'simple world' of first modernity no longer exists (if it ever did), and belonging is no longer clear-cut. 'On the domestic level, own-group identities – regional, national and individual – are becoming indistinct, dubious, and being re-blended by a variety of mobility processes …' (Beck, 1998b: 131). Beck's argument is that under conditions of reflexive modernization, and the 'turbulence of global risk society' (Beck, 1998b: 132), a relatively closed society is an impossibility. In short, 'the social construction of the stranger can no longer rely on the cultural self-understanding of a closed social circle; the definition of the self becomes particularly problematic. Individualization means, after all, that the culture of one's own group fragments and becomes more differentiated' (Beck, 1998b: 132).

Individualism is a key concept for Beck, being a product of the welfare state addressing its rights and services to the individual (Beck, 2004a: 156). As a result individuals are empowered and 'no longer need to participate in the functioning of society' (Beck, 2004a: 156). There is thus a discrepancy between 'highly individualized life forms, and … institutions which still conceptualize these life forms in given collective categories (like class and family)' (Beck, 2004a: 157). In the age of individualism the situation of Simmel's stranger is no longer exceptional; it is set to become commonplace. But contemporary strangeness is more than the generalization of the Simmelian stranger. There is no longer a reference point according to which a stranger can be identified. The stranger has been replaced by a situation of 'universal estrangement' (Beck, 1998b: 133). In other words, a condition of generalized strangeness has overtaken the figure of the stranger. This leads to the somewhat paradoxical situation where there are no longer any strangers, because everyone is a stranger, or more accurately everyone experiences strangeness, which is not exactly the same thing.

Beck's perspectival understanding of strangeness is finely tuned. We can point to two key instances where this is clearly revealed. First, Beck states that '[p]eople live with strangers to whom they are also strange' (Beck, 1998b: 133). It is no longer possible to stand outside of societal strangeness; everyone is a stranger to someone else. This was the point introduced above, in light of which conventional understandings of the stranger break down. Second, following on from this, '[t]he question is therefore no longer how we deal with strangers, but how strangers of various sorts deal with one another' (Beck, 1998b: 133). In a world of individualization strangers are compelled to engage with other strangers, rather than with a 'host society' which marks them out as different. The local society/stranger opposition no longer holds. The stranger is no longer a problem which is amenable to a solution advanced through social policy, although societal inertia will almost certainly mean that this will still be attempted.

Strangers are not incidental to our lives and we cannot choose to engage or not engage with them, as was the case in Simmel's classic account. We are engaged with the stranger precisely because our own strangeness commits us to deal with the strangeness of others, and vice versa. The bottom line then is that it is not possible to stand outside of strangeness: 'strangers and strangeness are increasingly caught in the horizon of one's own life' (Beck, 1998b: 134). One consequence of this is that the enhanced strangeness of social life means that life may well be experienced as more uncertain: 'many people experience their own global world as threatened by universal strangeness' (Beck, 1998b: 134). This is revealed as a rather important point, somewhat buried in Beck's account, and as such deserves unpacking and further discussion.

Beck makes this point in a wider discussion of security and the way individuals go about ensuring this in an uncertain and potentially dangerous world. It is possible that the means by which we attempt to ensure personal security in an environment in which we no longer have belief in the state being able to fulfil this function may actually contribute to our perception that strangeness is threatening. For example, do people living in a gated community perceive the world beyond as being safe and secure, or do they have a heightened sense that the world is dangerous and threatening? While the former perception is perhaps what they hoped for when choosing to live behind security gates, it is also possible that the desire for this added level of protection confirms suspicions that the world is fundamentally threatening and that life is insecure. If life was guaranteed safe and violence-free there would be no need to live in a gated community. In one sense

this is true of all measures which depend upon enhanced securitization in order to be effective: having to put your shoes through an x-ray machine at the airport may be reassuring in the sense that we may feel that it is less likely that someone can smuggle a bomb onto the plane, but at the same time it serves to remind us that sometimes people manage to smuggle bombs onto planes in their shoes. The more security checks exist at the airport, the more we are reminded that all flights are potential targets for terrorists. The ritualistic nature of airport security checks, where passengers transit through different levels of security in order to pass through the airport, and in the process give out information, take off clothing, and allow possessions and even bodies to be subjected to intimate investigation, helps to construct a sense of ontological security. The checks are vaguely reassuring, even if somewhat unwelcomed and inconvenient, and often we find the lack of familiar reference points in the checking system disconcerting when they are absent. For example, using the 'Project Iris' channel at the airport, whereby pre-registered passengers can pass through a designated channel without stopping while a scanner 'recognizes' them via a scan of their eye and a database which contains biometric information specific to each individual, can be experienced as disconcerting in the sense that it is counter-intuitive to move swiftly though the passport control area of the airport, particular when other passengers are waiting in long queues to have their passports checked.

## The implications of perspectival strangeness

In this section I will outline the significance of Beck's idea that we can all be somebody else's stranger, and therefore strangerhood must be considered as a subjective category; it is a matter of perspective. This, I believe, is Beck's most original and important contribution to the literature on the stranger. To begin the discussion I would like to return to the 'rough and ready' quote from Beck, consideration of which formed the introduction to this chapter. Re-quoting Beck:

> People suddenly experience themselves living in a very strange world and being confronted with all kind of strangeness. They don't recognize anymore the city they are living in, maybe even the street because of all kind of globalizations happening into those areas; people feel to have no place in this new context … (Beck, undated).

When this was discussed above it was in the context of the 'condition of un-excludability' and the ability of globalization to penetrate our

everyday lives. Here I want to draw attention to another, very different dimension of Beck's thinking, and my interpretation of it. The strangeness of familiar places, which is at the heart of the quote, is the result of 'all kind of globalizations happening', in Beck's words. However, it is possible to re-interpret this quote placing greater emphasis on the role of the awareness of strangeness in causing this shift. If we follow Robertson in believing that our consciousness of globalization is an essential element in the increasing interconnectedness of the world – and therefore an essential element of globalization itself – then we can see how the 'all kind of globalizations' which are happening all around us are happening, up to a point, because of our awareness that we are living in a time of global transformations. Extending this reading in a particular direction, we can say that people are both feeling out of place (no longer at home) in familiar settings as a result of their experience of global processes, and, at the same time, 'experience themselves "living in a very strange world"'. It seems to me that it would be a mistake to reduce this experience of strangeness to a 'globalization reflex'. In Beck's formulation it is strangeness that people are conscious of: they 'experience themselves living in a very strange world and being confronted with all kind of strangeness'. The perception of strangeness is a very important element of this because it suggests that people have the ability to reflect upon and make sense of their own experience of a 'very strange world' (although as mentioned before Beck stops short, in this formulation, of allowing that people can understand themselves as strangers). Globalization might be seen as the cause of the 'strange world' that we live in but its strangeness is the result of a perspective borne out of reflection on experiences in the world (the city, the street).

A perfect illustration of this type of experience, drawn from recent history, is a case from Birmingham of halal pizza being sold in a Domino's Pizza restaurant in the Hall Green district of the city. The pizza chain had made a commercial decision, based on their understanding of the demographics of the local area, to use only halal meat in the toppings of its pizzas (thereby offering no ham or bacon choices). A spokesperson for Domino's said: 'In that particular area of Birmingham there are a large number of Muslims so there is naturally more of a demand for halal-based products.'[4] Some regular non-Muslim customers were unhappy that their favourites had been removed from the menu. One customer was quoted as saying;

> It's a disgrace, I can appreciate them having it as an option but to have it completely halal is just not on … I'm all for racial and reli-

> gious tolerance but if anything this is intolerant to my beliefs and discriminatory against me … Hall Green is a mixed race area and should therefore cater to its multicultural make-up … In a society that promotes racial and religious integration, this sort of things only isolates people.

This is an interesting 'stream of consciousness' with the (ex-)customer quoted using the language of multiculturalism to oppose what amounts to the culinary equivalent of positive discrimination. His/her interesting conclusion is that the shift to halal products works to 'isolate people'. What we can observe here is the discomfort experienced by one who is becoming aware that s/he is not in fact a member of the majority after all: s/he has been positioned as a member of a (new) minority with all the implications that follow from this change in status. Another non-Muslim resident of Hall Green made the following point: 'This is a global pizza chain that is isolating western values and choice. It's alienating people and that's just not on.'[5] It would be easy to dismiss these comments as evidence of narrow self-interest ('I had to travel two miles out of my way to another branch – I was appalled'), intolerance of multiculturalism, or journalistic (over-) enthusiasm. However, the points I wish to make in relation to our consciousness of a 'very strange world' are of a different nature.

The above pizza-related quotes are interesting for several reasons. We have already noted the way in which those quoted evoke multiculturalism in defence of their (lost) freedom of choice, coupled with the awareness of being positioned as a member of a minority (and facing discrimination). However, what is most significant is the perception of being hemmed in by globalization: the global chain which is turning against 'western values' (although it may be difficult to sustain the argument that a pepperoni pizza topping is a meaningful index of westernization). Globalization in this case is not perceived to be opening up 'a world of choice' but in working to constrain freedom of choice is ushering in 'all kinds of strangeness'. In this case, globalization has resulted not in openness (the sampling of food from around the world) but instead in a heightened, if short-lived, sense of strangeness.[6] The familiar and unthreatening (the pizza chain) became strange.[7] In fact, this episode is a perfect illustration of Beck's idea of strangeness. The non-Muslim pizza eating population of Hall Green 'didn't recognize the city they were living in,' and they 'had no place in this new context'.

Such an experience of strangeness, interrupting our lives in places and in ways that allow us to 'measure' the extent to which we no longer

recognize 'our cities and our streets', give it an immediacy that globalization, as an explanatory category, cannot match. The argument here is not that globalization and strangeness are not connected – after all the book is entitled *The Globalization of Strangeness* – but that consciousness of strangeness might be a better notion to work with in respect of eliciting views from those caught up in events. As scholars of cosmopolitanism are well aware it is difficult to ask people to assess their own cosmopolitan orientation. Similarly, it can be difficult to ask people to adjudge the impact of globalization on their lives. Requesting that people reflect on the ways in which their cities and streets no longer appear to be 'theirs' is much more practical, potentially. The usefulness of the idea of strangeness then is that it provides a productive way of thinking about global transformations at the local level, without reducing the former to the latter, and without trying to explain everything in a glib and superficial way as being 'caused by globalization'. The relationship between strangeness and globalization cannot be assumed to be constant; it must be established in each instance. Strangeness is an especially useful way of thinking about aspects of globalization which do not open up the world to us or provide us with mobility-based opportunities. In this sense, strangeness is a counterbalance to the highly optimistic accounts of cosmopolitanism which are currently so popular. Cosmopolitanism is not normally employed to assist us in understanding the ways in which the world presses in upon us or disempowers us by means of processes of relativization (Robertson, 1992).[8]

We can say that strangeness is a product of the uncertain experience of globalization, providing we recognize that there is no particular direction to (or systematic unfolding of) global processes. We are aware both of strangeness as a general condition and the possibility that we too may be, or may become, strangers to others. The experience of strangeness begins when we acknowledge that it is not always others who are strangers; any of us could be strangers or become strangers in the future, either as we take on more and more roles in our complex lives (Dessewffy, 1996) or as the perspectives of others change in such a way as to position us as strangers. The boundaries that separate us from strangerhood are increasingly flimsy and it is easy to cross and re-cross these boundaries (often without knowing that we have done so). In this sense, we can slip in and out of strangerhood. This may be easier than we think. From the conventional (Simmelian) perspective the construction of the stranger required a society to both receive and differentiate him/her as someone not of the society; the stranger 'came today and stayed tomorrow' and in doing so was visible against the backdrop of a society where this was a relatively unusual act. In the contempo-

rary world things are different. Strangers can be created without the need for a societal context. The stranger can come into existence, by an act of will at times, as an expression of a generalized societal strangeness. In the same way as contemporary processes of individualization empower individuals directly rather than work through the (welfare) state, contemporary strangerhood can work directly on the individual.

## Concluding comments

Beck's perspectival account of strangeness alerts us to the possibility that we cannot simply assume it is others who are the strangers. We also might be strangers, from the perspective of others, and also we may come to recognize that we are strangers. Coupled with this is the relative ease which it is possible to cross the boundary into strangerhood. A good example can be drawn from the explosion of social networking which has taken place in recent years. It is no longer sufficient to talk about the 'digital divide' which separates those with the skills, inclination and opportunity to use computer technology from those who have never learnt how to use it (often assumed to be the elderly). Nowadays, it is not enough to be a confident internet user but it is also increasingly beneficial to have a presence on social networking sites. As a recent article on the BBC news website pointed out, '[t]here are areas of advertising, marketing, public relations, journalism, academia, design, and finance where workers might find themselves looking a bit silly if they reveal they have no idea of the technological lie of the land'.[9] More generally, having little knowledge about Facebook, Twitter and the rest can, the article suggests, 'create anxiety at the back of the mind that you are missing out' and the suggested term for this anxiety is 'trendfear'. Another possible outcome, not identified by the article, is that by not engaging with social networking opportunities you may be distancing yourself from the people you think of as friends and, by not accessing information shared by the others in social networks, run the risk of not being included in group activities. This would be one way in which it would be very easy to cross the boundary into strangerhood; the world around you changes as you remain oblivious to the importance or implications of that change.

Slipping into strangeness may be the fate for all of us living with the mobilities and fluidities of the Global Age. The strength of Beck's account is that he does not seek to explain strangeness as an inevitable product of globalization. For Beck, strangeness is a particular experience of globalization, and the consciousness of this experience is a particularly

important aspect of contemporary life. To feel out of place in familiar settings (being no longer properly at home) is one experience of global processes. Importantly, for Beck people can be conscious of strangeness: they 'experience themselves living in a very strange world and being confronted with all kind of strangeness'. One of the most significant aspects of Beck's contribution is the recognition that our experience of strangeness conditions our appreciation of globalization. This establishes linkages between the stranger and globalization which is quite rare in the literature. Another noteworthy feature is the emphasis which is placed on the 'mutuality of strangeness' resulting from the perspectival approach which he advances. An awareness of the 'strangeness of self' is an important aspect of the strangeness of society, and it marks Beck's account off from all others in the field.

In other words, it is not sufficient to acknowledge that we are 'strangers to ourselves'; what is needed is the recognition that we can all become someone else's stranger. This recognition stems from the knowledge that it is relatively easy to pass through a boundary (possibly arbitrary, and almost certainly unmarked) in order to flip over into strangerhood. This may be a daily possibility depending upon our activities and our starting position. We can all become (temporary) strangers by subtly shifting position in relation to others, or, as the result of others moving relative to us. We simply have very little (or no) control over these relative shifts. The upshot is that at any given time, from the position of some observers, we may be viewed as a stranger. The social roles we occupy and our relations to others can always be viewed from another perspective – a perspective not sanctioned, predicted or acknowledged by ourselves. There is never a guarantee that others will not come to see us as strangers.

So rather than attempting to protect against the possibility of becoming a stranger, which is likely to be unrewarding for the reasons stated above, it will be more productive to learn how to live with the strangeness of self and others. The classical figure of the stranger generated strategies for urban living which involved categorizing strangers in such a way as to make them less threatening. Those strategies are no longer adequate under the conditions of strangeness outlined by Beck. However, the challenge remains even if we need to invent new strategies. As Beck makes clear nowadays people need to adjust to living with strangers to whom they are also strange. The emphasis no longer falls on the stranger per se; the challenge is not how we deal with strangers, but how a diverse array of strangers deal with one another.

# 4

# The Global Context: Rethinking Strangers and Neighbours

> [I]n contemporary society globalization forces strangeness upon the whole of society.
>
> (Turner, 1997: 14)

In 2009 a UK broadsheet newspaper carried the story that locals in an Australian bar were spending time online monitoring the US-Mexico border via live webcam links. 'Once logged in the [Australian] volunteers spend hours studying the landscape and are encouraged to email authorities when they see anyone on foot, in vehicles or aboard boats heading towards US territory from Mexico'.[1] In fact, the US/Mexico border can now be policed by anyone with an Internet connection, hence it being dubbed the 'Google border'.[2] This form of vigilante securitization has of course attracted a good deal of criticism: 'Border security deserves trained professionals, not pub-goers in Perth'.[3]

I introduce the chapter with this news story because it illustrates, albeit in a small way, one of the core themes developed in the chapter; that we live in a general condition of strangeness. The example of the Australian pub vigilantes is of interest to me, not because it tells us that people with too much time on their hands (and perhaps having had too much to drink) are using the internet in a voyeuristic way, looking in at other people's misfortunes (although the episode could be interpreted in this way), but because it demonstrates that neighbourhood watch activities (and also its more extreme cousin, vigilantism) once considered a staple of community life may now be conducted not by locals but by people from distant places who have little or no connection to the 'community'. The pub vigilantes from Western Australia are not alone in their concern for the security of someone else's back yard. Nick Vaughan-Williams (2008: 74–76) writes about citizen surveillance

initiatives in London, post-7/7, including a 'television channel in east London allowing residents to monitor local CCTV cameras'. In Shoreditch residents can 'pay £3.50 per week in exchange for cheap telephone calls, a free digital set-top box and access to over 400 CCTV cameras as part of a "Community Safety Channel"' (Vaughan-Williams, 2008: 74). While being nowhere near as remote as the Perth pub vigilantes participants in the Shoreditch neighbourhood watch scheme may not be people actually living in the immediate neighbourhood. Moreover, the scheme works to blur the distinction between neighbourhood-orientated securitization and broader anti-terrorist campaigns, both drawing heavily upon similar technological surveillance techniques. As Vaughan-Williams points out it is a short distance from neighbourhood watch cyber patrols to citizen-detectives active in the 'war on terror'.

## The condition of strangeness

The preceding examples introduce certain aspects of the condition of strangeness rather well. Strangeness occurs when people find it difficult to distinguish between 'us' and 'others', and where 'our' society stops and another one begins. This is likely to be the case when 'strangers' start acting like 'locals' and working to enhance the security of the neighbourhood. In this sense, strangeness results from the social disorientation which stems from an experience of globalization – in this instance internet connectivity leading to 'distant proximity' (Rosenau, 2003). In other words, social disorientation – and hence strangeness – stems from the loss of familiar reference points and an awareness that community is not necessarily built from the building blocks of physical contiguity.

A core concern of this book is how to understand the stranger under conditions of globalization, which requires us to acknowledge that the stranger is unlikely to reveal him/herself in familiar guise, or to be found in the most obvious places. Indeed before we can understand the stranger we need to first understand that globalization has created a generalized condition of strangeness within which the stranger exists. Gaining an understanding of this condition of strangeness is more important in many ways than tracking the changes to the figure of the stranger, although this too is a necessary task, and of course the two things are closely linked. An initial step then on the path to better understanding the stranger is to first recognize the global dimensions of strangeness.

To this end, we must confront the fact that much thinking about globalization is not directed at explicating the everyday lives of people in a way that might throw light on the differences in individual experiences of globalization. Globalization thinking normally aims at elucidating the 'bigger picture'. This 'bigger picture' tends to be framed by familiar concerns. Ash Amin (2012: 138) argues that there are strong apocalyptic themes running through Anglo-American public culture. 'It is an imaginary that … draws a parallel between diverse threats such as global warming, health pandemics, natural catastrophes, technological risks, and international crime and terrorism …' I agree with this analysis and would add that Beck's 'world risk society' thesis is only one instance of this logic being imported into Global Studies. In recent times natural and political hazards and threats have been ascendant in the study of globalization. They have been viewed as the most pressing issues which a developing Global Studies must grapple: the war on terror being the obvious case in point, with environmental concerns, natural disasters, migration and refugees (viewed through the lens of security concerns rather than humanitarianism, it should be noted) not far behind.

In an attempt to better substantiate the global 'level' scholars of globalization have tended to eschew the finer-grained analysis of everyday lives, aspects of this project being taken up by scholars of cosmopolitanism, but for the most part it is less a feature of global studies than one might imagine, given the early focus of much cultural globalization scholarship. In general, I would argue that the locus of global studies has settled firmly on the study of networks and mobilities, on the one hand, and catastrophe, on the other, and that previously fruitful avenues of exploration have been relatively neglected in the past decade or so of studying globalization. There is a real need to rejuvenate Global Studies with a fresh injection of concern with the fate of the individual under conditions of globalization, coupled with a renewed focus on the productive dynamics of global/local relations, with the aim of illuminating both the ability of individuals to make and shape globalization (even in modest ways) and the diversity of human experiences that globalization promotes. Put another way, there is a need for a wider range of approaches to, and a renewed focus on, the 'small time' aspects of globalization, the processes and problems that exercise ordinary people in their everyday existence. These have no less of a global dimension than much more obvious globalized phenomena: the Internet, the World Social Forum, the Olympics. The reasons why we should not

neglect 'small time' globalization are summed up nicely by Bauman (2005).

> Globalisation is not a process taking place somewhere far away in some exotic place. Globalisation is taking place in Leeds as well as in Warsaw, in New York and in any small town in Poland. It is just outside your window, but inside as well. It is enough to walk down the street to see it. Global and local spaces can be separated only as an abstraction, in reality they are intertwined.

If the key to a better understanding of the stranger is to understand the global dimensions of strangeness it is essential that a way of addressing strangeness be identified. This in turn requires a re-appraisal of the traditional background against which the stranger has been (and continues to be) identified: neighbourhood, community, and society. A re-appraisal is necessary because globalization has rendered conventional ideas of community, neighbourhood and society extremely problematic. The sociological challenge then is to rethink community, neighbourhood and society without reducing these to the side-effects of networks, flows, and mobilities.

The chapter thus aims to accomplish two tasks. The first is to elucidate an approach to globalization which is sufficiently sensitive to everyday experiences and captures the dynamics of global/local relations in such a way as to throw fresh light on the nature of community and belonging thereby making it possible to better understand the contemporary stranger. The second is to illuminate the richness of the idea of strangeness and make it valuable for the study of both neighbourhoods and communities as well as individual experience, and, at the same time, demonstrate the ways in which it can also be used as a designation for a contemporary 'condition' associated with globalization, thereby making meaningful the idea of the 'globalization of strangeness' as promised in the title of this book. From the perspective of theorizing globalization it is important that concepts which link the mundane and everyday with the global are fully developed. Similarly, there is a real need for concepts which allow us to connect individual experiences with processes which define the nature of contemporary globalization. It is my conviction that strangeness is a much needed concept in this regard, and that it is capable of rejuvenating a particular strand of globalization thinking associated with human agency and the nature of contemporary social transformations.

## Current thinking on the stranger and globalization

> The condition of 'overall strangeness', becomes the condition par excellence of global society.
>
> (Anthias, 2001: 28)

We have already seen how giving consideration to the contemporary figure of the stranger requires us to also deal with the nature of community and the construction of 'we-ness' as well as paying attention to questions of identity and belonging. Furthermore, knowing the stranger first requires us to know ourselves, a much more difficult task in many ways. In any case the question of who 'we' are and what we stand for, along with more general questions concerning the nature of community and belonging in the contemporary world are made much more complicated by the fact that the reference points familiar to the classical literature on the stranger – community, neighbourhood, society – have all undergone far-reaching change, both as a result of life as it is lived in a post-industrial and/or globalizing society (or postmodern society, according to taste), and as a result of the way we go about our business as social scientists. In many ways the claims of social scientists that we now live in a very different world to our parents and grandparents – as evidenced by designations such as network society, world risk society, liquid modernity – have placed such an emphasis on wide-ranging and fundamental transformations that it is not possible to proceed on the basis that the tried and trusted framework of sociology which was previously adequate to the task still has a purchase on the contemporary world. Beck (2000) makes this point in a memorable way, with the help of the notion of 'zombie categories,' social science staples such as class, family, nation, community – 'living dead' concepts which were devised for studying national societies which have been radically transformed. They are 'zombie categories' because they live on in social science research and general discussions of social issues despite the societies which they were devised to study having changed beyond recognition. Beck advocates 'methodological cosmopolitanism', as a corrective.

> Social science must be re-established as a transnational science of the reality of denationalization, transnationalization and 're-ethnification' in a global age – and this on the levels of concepts, theories and methodologies as well as organizationally. This entails a re-examination of the fundamental concepts of 'modern society'.

> Household, family, class, social inequality, democracy, power, state, commerce, public, community, justice, law, history and politics must be released from the fetters of methodological nationalism, reconceptualized and empirically established within the framework of a new cosmopolitan social and political science (Beck, 2007: 167).

It is not necessary to buy into Beck's cosmopolitan project in order to recognize that a global context is now becoming *de rigueur* in the social sciences (and beyond).[4] There is certainly a need to re-examine the stranger within a global framework, and in fact a number of authors writing on the contemporary stranger have begun to do this (for example, Papastergiadis, 2000; Stichweh, 2003; Marotta, 2011), but these efforts remain underdeveloped, incomplete, and as I will argue, in many cases flawed. Globalization changes the context within which we approach thinking about the stranger. For example, when inside and outside are no longer clearly demarcated, blurred by global process which project distant others into our daily lives and allow for us to act in the world while remaining geographically remote and distant, who then is the stranger? The task of understanding the contemporary figure of the stranger is also an exercise in understanding the core transformations at the heart of present day society. The question of the stranger then is also a question of the nature of society under conditions of globalization.

Social scientific studies of globalization mostly focus on the nature and dynamics of social, political and economic transformations, and the need to generate sophisticated analytical tools with which to study these transformations. While acknowledging the importance of attempts to characterize the transformation of society under condition of globalization (for example, the work of Ulrich Beck on risk society, John Urry on flows and mobilities, Manuel Castells on 'network society') it is necessary to offer a caveat: it is equally important to study the lived experiences of people whose lives are transformed by global processes. Unfortunately, the everyday experience of globalization is too often marginal to studies of globalization-as large-scale-transformation.

The global context that will be of most assistance in understanding the fate of the stranger in contemporary life is one which connects transformations and lived experience in a particularly compelling way. There are a number of questions which strike at the heart of understanding the lived experience of the global. What connects people

to the global? How does globalization transform everyday life? How can ordinary people shape the course of globalization? How are we to understand global-local relations? In what ways can globalization shape individual identity? Only an emphasis on everyday experience of the global as it is lived by a range of people will allow us to answer the question of what becomes of the stranger under conditions of globalization. The stranger after all (at least as conventionally understood) is a result of a subjective judgement based on the experience of groups or individuals vis-à-vis others. How people perceive, act upon and seek to transform their societies will frame the way they perceive the stranger. Moreover, how people perceive globalization – as an opportunity or as threat, for example – will influence the way they perceive both their societies and the strangers that they may or may not come into contact with.

As Ray (2007: 40) points out globalization can lead to very different experiences: insecurity and a sense of loss may override a sense of enhanced possibility and a world of opportunity. Similarly, at the same time as generating an awareness that the world is intensely networked and encouraging actors to rethink their place in relation to the world as a whole (a world of possibility, in other words), globalization can also lead to the realization that the world is hostile and unwelcoming. As a result not everyone finds that globalization opens up the world, in the sense that it becomes immediately accessible and equally available to all. Sometimes the world closes in on us so as to make the experience of globalization a claustrophobic one. In order to explore the lived experience of globalization in all of these dimensions – opportunity/threat, big world/small world, open/closed – we must focus on conceptualizations of global-local relations, on which subject a wide-ranging literature already exists. But by no means all of this literature allows for a reciprocal relationship between the local and the local or sees globalization as a series of processes which can be influenced from the 'bottom up', or even as something which is detectable 'just outside your window, but inside as well', in Bauman's words (quoted above). However, it is certainly the case that some theorists of cultural globalization have been pre-occupied with the 'global in the local' and the sophistication of some accounts of global-local relations can tell us a good deal about the human experience of globalization. Approaches to globalization which emphasize a role for the local in global processes, or which see the local as connected to the global offer the potential to see beyond the idea that globalization is 'out there' at some remove from daily life.

## Rethinking global-local relations

For many scholars the relationship between the global and the local is one of the most important questions that Global Studies has foregrounded. It is also an issue which is particular to Global Studies in the sense that global-local relations was not an issue which existed before the study of globalization became an established dimension of social science enquiry. One reason why it is accorded such importance is that it informs so many core concerns in the study of globalization. Indeed, it raises the question of what the focal point of Global Studies should be – earth-encircling networks of transformation (global financial flows, commodity chains, regimes of global governance) or the transformation of particular places and their individual economic and cultural situations (or both). Consideration of global-local relations also informs a range of other questions. Does globalization represent an opportunity or a threat, a good thing or a bad thing? Is it possible to resist (unwanted) globalization? Is globalization only a top-down process or does it also possess 'bottom-up' dimensions?

The question of global-local relations is also important in the sense that it is a key marker of differentiation between schools of thought within Global Studies. Put simply, cultural perspectives on globalization tend to favour the idea that the global and the local are intimately related whereas IR-inflected positions and economistic interpretations of globalization tend to place the global and the local in very different orbits. There is at lot at stake here. On the former interpretation globalization is viewed as a unique ensemble of processes, the apprehension of which requires an original conceptual framework, on the latter interpretation the global is little more than an alternative designation for 'international' or 'transnational' which can be understood using the tools of conventional political science.

Despite the importance of the global-local question, and the ongoing debate about how it can best be conceptualized, it has had a negative impact on globalization scholarship in at least one important sense. This is the way that the terms 'global' and 'local' have become essentialized, in part as a by-product of their overuse in the literature, and also due to the tendency to treat globalization as something which only occurs at a great remove from individuals. Thus, the global and the local have become abstracted from lived experience and do not easily map onto everyday reality (Kennedy, 2009: 143). In other words, discussion of the global and the local may possess a theoretical resonance and a strong provenance in the core literature but it does not

necessarily help us to understand the impact of globalization on human lives. This represents one of the great lost opportunities in Global Studies, in my view. Scholars have constructed a conceptual terrain which is self-referential, helping us better understand the theoretical underpinning of globalization rather than helping us understand the global dimensions of life as lived by many people. What we need, I am arguing, is an approach which allows us to apprehend the global processes which are at play when we 'walk down the street', as Bauman phrased it. Without this corrective to 'global abstraction' the concepts through which we try to apprehend the impact of globalization on our lives may lead to an experience of globalization as a fetter on our ability to act effectively in the world. We may become concerned that we remain too local to take advantage of global opportunities, or that in remaining local, we will become a victim of global processes. Alternatively, in our desire to retain authenticity or act on a human scale we may become concerned that we are trapped between the global and the local.

In this section we will explore the potential usefulness of a focus on global-local relations and the way that this can be pursued without becoming overly reliant upon abstraction. In order to do this we should begin by looking at the place of the local within theories of globalization. Globalization is most commonly thought of as a useful shorthand term for a range of economic, social and political transformations. It is commonly understood as a process or series of processes which work to transform a pre-existing institution or organization (such as nation-states, cities, welfare systems). This emphasis tends to lead to the assumption that globalization emerges subsequent to the thing being transformed (and does not take into account the wealth of literature on the long history of globalization, see Holton, 2005). Globalization as relatively recent external development is the way, for example, that the relationship between globalization and the European Union is conventionally understood (for a critique of conventional thinking on this subject, see Rumford and Buhari-Gulmez, 2012). For the task in hand what is needed is an approach which places emphasis less on transformations in general and more on the experience of globalization, particularly as a way of relating to the world. It is argued that within the literature on global-local relations, there is evidence of a concern with the connectedness of the global and the local, and this has the potential to offer much in this regard. There are two main reasons for this optimism. Firstly, approaches to globalization which emphasize global-local relations tend not to see globalization

only as something 'out there' and removed from the concerns of everyday life. Secondly, more sophisticated positions view the global and the local and being connected in important ways thereby providing an ideal context for exploring the cultural encounters which are so central to strangeness.

Without a doubt, the most significant contribution to thinking about global-local relations is to be found in the work of Roland Robertson, particularly his book *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture* (Robertson, 1992). For Robertson the global and the local are indivisible; they must be considered together, as a nexus. However, he recognizes that this is not the way that the relationship between them is generally understood. 'Indeed, to this day it is not at all unusual to find the local being regarded as the opposite of the global' (Robertson and White, 2007: 62). A good example of this latter tendency is the work of David Held and colleagues, particularly their *Global Transformations* volume (Held et al, 1999). Rather than seeing the local and the global existing in a relation of mutual implication, they see the local and the global at opposite ends of a linear scale. Globalization can be located on a continuum with the local, national and regional. At the one end of the continuum lie social and economic relations and networks which are organized on a local and/or national basis; at the other end lie social and economic relations and networks which crystallize on the wider scale of regional and global interactions (Held et al, 1999: 15). On this view, processes of globalization and localization do not exist as a 'globe-wide cultural nexus' as they do for Robertson, but form distinct spheres of activity which operate at different levels. Local networks operate at the local level but are distinct from global or supranational networks which do not have to work within the same spatial restrictions. For Robertson there is no separation between the global and the local, they inform each other and require each other; they are two sides of the same coin. The local has been globalized; '[l]ocality is, to put it simply, globally institutionalized' (Robertson, 1992: 172). What this means is we cannot separate out the local from the global; 'much that might be called global or local may better be regarded as a syncretic mix of global and local elements … the global and the local interpenetrate rather than maintaining a distinct free-standing character' (Holton, 2005: 64).

This leads us logically to consideration of the term 'glocalization'. Glocalization is a key concept in the study of global-local relations and one of Roland Robertson's most significant contributions to Global Studies.[5] Interpreting Robertson, Holton suggests that glocalization is

'our human fate, for while being profoundly local we cannot understand our fate without an increasingly and equally profound engagement with the global' (Holton, 2005: 66). Glocalization refers to the ways in which global processes can be appropriated, even domesticated, and through which globalization finds local expression. Glocalization points to something which is global and local at the same time. Examples include the Maharaja Mac produced by McDonald's for their Indian market and Domino's pizzas with halal toppings (discussed in Chapter 3). Both of these products are simultaneously global and local; global food staples which are given local flavour. For Robertson the term glocalization is at the heart of his account of globalization. It is centrally important because it allows for;

> the intensification of social connectivity and stronger forms of global consciousness. Capturing the broad interplay of the universal and particular, glocalization registers the 'real world' endeavours of individuals and social groups to ground or to recontextualize global phenomena or macroscopic processes with respect to local cultures (Giulianotti and Robertson, 2009: 46).

From the perspective of understanding the relationship between globalization and lived experience then, the idea of glocalization promises much, drawing attention as it does to the 'real world' endeavours of actors. Longstanding processes of globalization and the cultural interpenetration and commingling that these have engendered have resulted in 'a profusion of "glocal" cultures, such that the old binary distinction between "here-it-is" local and "out-there" global cultures becomes increasingly untenable' (Giulianotti and Robertson (2009: 46).

The idea of glocalization is not without its critics. Interpreted as 'the localization of the global' Albrow (1996: 93) makes the point that all globalization has a local impact. Glocalization, for Albrow (1996: 211n), is too focused on the 'local adaptation of a global product or practice'. This, Albrow (1996: 211n) terms the 'Mecca effect' 'where one place appears to be the focus for the whole globe, as with Hollywood for films or Silicon Valley for computing'. Connell (2007: 57) interprets the global and the local as existing in a state of tension, in opposition. 'To speak of "glocalization" is to resolve nothing. It is to assert both terms of a static polarity at once. The local/global opposition has not been conceptually resolved.' Holton (2005: 127–128) takes up similar themes but advances more sophisticated criticisms, in particular the question of whether the inter-penetration of elements is stable and

irreversible. Can what is fused into the glocal be subsequently separated out? Can we talk of de-glocalization? Holton also poses the question of why in some cultural instances inter-penetration occurs and on others it doesn't. Does this lead, as Bauman suggests, to globalization for some and localization for others? Mendieta (2007: 28) holds that glocalization represents an 'experience in which culture ceases to be the property of one specific community of society and appears to belong to global humanity.' But this is not a new phenomena for Mendieta (2007: 29) and as such glocalization 'is the name for a process that makes explicit what has been going on at least since humanity began to trade' – the interweaving of cultures which can find renewal in ideas from afar; culture is always synthetic in this sense.

Perhaps the most far-reaching critique of glocalization comes from George Ritzer. In his book *The Globalization of Nothing* (Ritzer, 2004) he takes to task thinking about globalization which has become preoccupied with trying to understand the local impact of transnational processes rather than looking to understand the dynamics of global transformation. It should be noted that in formulating the problem this way he is taking a position diametrically opposed to my own: i.e. that globalization studies have largely abandoned local impacts and local experiences of globalization in favour of, what might be termed 'the globalization of catastrophe'. Ritzer's position, formulated some ten years ago, is the product of a critique of (what he sees as the excesses of) cultural globalization and, more importantly for him, a desire to locate the study of globalization within a recognizable sociology of modernity.

Ritzer approaches his task through an exploration of the 'globalization of nothing'. According to Ritzer, 'nothing' is dominating our lives. By nothing, he is referring to 'social forms which are centrally conceived, controlled and comparatively devoid of distinctive substantive content' (Ritzer, 2004: 3). Four types of nothing are elaborated upon: non-places; non-things; non-people; non-services. Fast food restaurants – McDonald's and Starbucks are singled out – are replacing local cafés. Shopping malls are replacing local markets. The supermarket and the fast-food restaurant are 'classic examples of non-places where non-service is the norm' (Ritzer, 2004: 69). Call-centre workers and flight attendants are examples on non-people. Nothing cannot properly be understood except in relation to something. Something is defined as social forms which are indigenously conceived and controlled, and relatively rich in distinctive substantive content. In other words, something is unique: local food products, service providers that are rooted in local communities, craftsmen and people with hard-won expertise.

Every place, thing, person, and service can be placed on a continuum with nothing at one end and something at the other. The point, states Ritzer, is not that the world is increasingly full of nothing, but that nothing is proliferating around the world as a result of the globalization of nothing (Ritzer, 2004: xii). That which is centrally conceived and controlled is relatively easy to globalize. Fast-food restaurants, universities offering MBA qualifications, airport lounges, branded fashion stores – in their form and their number, are all the product of the globalization of nothing.

There are many things that we might want to say about Ritzer's globalization of nothing thesis. Of particular concern is the mono-perspectival reading of nothing: the idea that non-places, non-things, non-people, non-services cannot be viewed, experienced or interpreted in any way other than the negative 'nothing'. On Ritzer's view, there is no opportunity for us to experience hamburgers, airports, call-centres, Internet shopping, or a cup of coffee at Starbucks in a way which accords them the status of things, places, services, etc. But contrary to the globalization of nothing thesis, for many people, McDonald's or Starbucks exist as places rather than non-places: the people who work there for example, or customers who find the openness and generally pleasant atmosphere less exclusive, homophobic or racist than the local pub, for example. In short, Ritzer does not allow for the possibility that what he believes are non-places could be experienced in other ways by other people, and his line of argument contains more than a whiff of high versus low culture snobbery.

The growth and spread of nothing in all its forms can be accounted for in terms of 'grobalization' which Ritzer defines as a supplement to the idea of glocalization, as developed by Roland Robertson.[6] Ritzer argues that conventional approaches to globalization and social change have focused on the conflict between the global and the local. The key dynamic, however, is the conflict between grobalization and glocalization. Whereas, glocalization involves the interaction of the global and the local, grobalization is the expansion of homogeneity (Ritzer, 2004: 75). For Ritzer, the idea of grobalization is necessary in order to provide a more balanced view of globalization (Ritzer, 2004: 73), and in particular a more balanced view of the relationship between the global and the local. This is necessary because the idea of glocalization lays too much emphasis on the creative potential of 'the glocal'; new spaces, new meaning, new experiences, heterogeneity, etc. The idea of glocalization suggests that the conflict between the local and global can be resolved in terms of the (g)local, but in doing so it seriously downplays

the extent to which the local is disappearing. In other words, the idea of glocalization does not recognize that grobalization represents the death of the local. It follows that for Ritzer the central dynamic in globalization is not to be found in the relation between the global and the local, but between the global and the glocal. Countering Ritzer's rather negative conclusion that the local is unable to resist processes of grobalization, Giulianotti and Robertson (2009: 47) hold that global forces do not trump locality; global and local, homogeneity and heterogeneity come together and the result is increased diversity.

From my own perspective I would want to draw attention to the direct connection between the global and the local that glocalization supposes. Robertson assumes a high degree of global openness in processes of glocalization; there seems to be little resistance to the cultural interpenetration which results in glocalization. But does globalization offer connections to the world that easily? The overall impression made by Robertson's account of global-local nexus is that accessing the globe is fairly straightforward as it exists as an open field from which to choose. This assumption of openness is also evident in related aspects of Robertson's work. For example, his idea that globalization encourages us 'to sift the global-cultural scene for ideas and symbols relevant to our identities' (Robertson, 1992: 46).

There are many ways that this insight can be used to understand identity construction. I offered a critique of Robertson's idea that we can 'sift the global scene' in my 2008 book *Cosmopolitan Spaces: Europe, Globalization, Theory* (Rumford, 2008b) in which I gave the example of the Taliban seeking ICC (International Cricket Council) recognition for cricket in Afghanistan, a country with little prior tradition of domestic cricket.[7] For the Taliban, sporting participation was viewed as a vehicle for wider international diplomatic recognition, and cricket was considered a sport which could be both compatible with Islam (in terms of dress code) and their global aspirations, and therefore viewed as a portal allowing entry into the wider world of international relations (Rumford, 2008b: 140–141). An interpretation based on Robertson's ideas would emphasize that cricket was chosen because it was a vehicle through which Afghanistan could project a 'normalized' identity onto the global stage. Another example of the presumption of global openness is the influence of reggae music and style on punk rock in Britain in the mid-1970s (Hebdige, 1979).[8] This influence was most evident in terms of an oppositional stance, an articulation of the experience of oppression, and a culture of resistance, rather than a direct influence of the music. As with the previous example, cultural elements have been

taken from one context and appropriated by a very different group who have seen something of themselves in the actions, aspirations, or identities of distant others.

For Robertson the oneness of the world makes it amenable to exploration and elements of world culture can be appropriated for use in 'local' identity construction. On Robertson's reading, the whole world is placed within the grasp of individuals and groups who become empowered by an awareness of their global reach to 'discover' something of themselves in other cultures, and to use the world of cultural differences as a resource in the construction of identity and lifestyle choices. The global search for ideas and elements of identity is at the same time a way of consolidating and expanding circuits of globalization. This all rests on the assumption that the world is accessible to all who wish to view it in terms of a 'global-cultural scene'. There needs to be a debate which assesses the validity of claims as to the openness and connectivity which on some accounts are characteristic of globalization, versus the idea that globalization weighs heavily on individuals and does not automatically yield anything like this degree of connectivity or autonomy.

Global-local relations are at the heart of discussions about the nature and dynamics of globalization. They are also central to an understanding of strangeness. The relationship between strangeness and glocalization is an interesting one. Ritzer is critical of the concept of glocalization because for him it presumes too large a role for 'the local' in an understanding of globalization. My criticism is rather different; that it presumes a substantial degree of openness in the world and allows for ready connectivity between individuals and the world. For Robertson, people can 'sift the global-cultural scene' and draw down elements useful in the construction of cultural identity. The presumptions of the glocal world are challenged by the idea of strangeness, which suggests that one outcome of globalization is a much less open and more restrictive world of choice. The openness presumed by glocalization can only occur when in the process of 'cultural sifting' 'we' know which cultural elements belong to someone else and come from elsewhere. One feature of globalization is a blurring of boundaries between us and them and a lack of clarity about where 'our' society stops and others begin.

## The contribution of the Roehampton School

We earlier identified the need for an approach to understanding the dynamics of community, belonging, and identity which incorporates a

global perspective, puts local-global relations at its heart, and which can throw light on the question of the stranger. Finding such an approach in the existing literature might appear to be a tall order but fortunately the basis for such an approach does exist. I am referring to the work of the Roehampton School which flourished in the 1990s under the guidance of Martin Albrow. Their sociological studies of global/local relations in and around the borough of Wandsworth in South London are underpinned by the belief that global linkages are intrinsic to the study of locality. This work is best represented by the book *Living the Global City: Globalization as Local Process* (Eade, 1997a), edited by John Eade, and containing contributions from John Eade, Martin Albrow, Jorg Durrschmidt, Darren O'Byrne and others. This collection has much to say about the nature of community and belonging under conditions of globalization, and although the authors do not deal to any great extent with the issue of the stranger I believe that their work provides a very valuable framework within which to understand the stranger under conditions of globalization.

The work of the Roehampton School is strangely neglected in scholarship on both globalization and on community (for example Delanty, 2003). This may be partly a result of the fact that although many of the contributors to *Living the Global City* continue to publish (separately) on related topics there was no follow-up publication which consolidated and enhanced the reputation of the foundational text. Nevertheless, the book stands up extremely well almost 15 years after publication, but it does stand alone. Another contributing reason for the neglect of the Roehampton School's work is that the group's leading theorist Martin Albrow retired from full-time academia not too long after *Living the Global City*'s publication and several notable essays notwithstanding did not publish a follow-up to his own landmark book *The Global Age* (Albrow, 1996), rightly still regarded as a major contribution to the sociology of globalization. None of these factors by themselves can fully explain why the contribution of *Living the Global City* to debates on urban life, community and belonging, and global transformations is not more widely recognized. It certainly deserves to be, and via a critical exegesis of their work I will demonstrate why I believe this to be the case.

The Roehampton School was influenced by other writing on cultural globalization which emerged around this time, particularly the work of Roland Robertson, Anthony Giddens, and Arjun Appadurai. As we have already seen Robertson is acknowledged as a pioneer of the idea that the local and the global are related through a 'globewide cultural nexus'.

Giddens' work on 'disembedding' proved to be a valuable resource for understanding the ways in which the local can be stretched across space, and has influenced others, including Beck. Appadurai's insight on the perspectival nature of processes comprising the global cultural economy was an inspiration for Albrow's idea of 'socioscapes'. At the same time as building upon Appadurai's innovative conceptual framework Albrow and Eade are critical of his reliance upon rather conventional notions of community. Before looking at the innovative concepts associated with the Roehampton scholars in more detail it will be useful to explore the influential ideas garnered from Giddens, Beck, and Appadurai.

Giddens' notion of disembedding is an important one in relation to both the lived experience of globalization and the vexed question of the opening up of the world which thinking about globalization often supposes. In any case the idea that globalization leads to forms of disembedding is a familiar one in sociological work on globalization (Giddens, 1991; Beck, 1997; Holton, 2005). For Giddens (1991: 21) disembedding refers to 'the "lifting out" of social relations from local contexts of interaction and their restructuring across indefinite spans of time-space'. Under such conditions social life becomes reorganized across time and space, or, to put it another way, sociality is no longer tied to place and modern forms of connectivity allow for long-distance communities. In Beck's (1997: 12) terms '[n]eighbourhood is becoming place-independent'.

Giddens famously identifies two kinds of disembedding mechanisms, symbolic tokens (of which money is the only example developed) and expert systems, which can now be remote from the domain they seek to influence or govern. Lash and Urry (1994) take this idea in a slightly different direction arguing the 'emptying out' which occurs during disembedding leads to economies that produce not things but 'signs', hence the title of their book *Economies of Signs and Space*. As Holton (2005: 32) points out disembedding implies an engagement with a world beyond that of self-contained groups. At the same time, it requires that we address some very important questions concerning belonging and we-ness: 'If we become increasingly aware of and connected with the world outside our original points of local reference, then who are we and where do we belong?' (Holton, 2005: 32). Along with Robertson (1992: 143–144) Holton is critical of Giddens for reading into disembedding the recent origins of globalization – the stretching of social relationships across the globe are a product of late-modernity/community has been lost under conditions of globalization – when in fact it may have pre-dated modernity.

For Beck (1997: 95), disembedding refers to the loss of industrial-society ways of life. What he is more interested in is the re-embedding of new ways of life, 'in which the individuals must produce, stage and cobble together their biographies themselves. If the ways of life characteristic of modernity are nested or embedded – for which the welfare state is the paradigm – re-embedding requires the invention of new certainties which may also be constructed around notions of community and belonging. For the Roehampton scholars the idea of disembedding is a useful starting point for discussion of the concepts of sociospheres and milieu, as we shall see, but is ultimately something of a blunt instrument, failing to adequately deal with the possibility that disembedding might operate very differently on different groups, for example (Albrow, 1997: 53).

For Appadurai the global cultural economy is characterized by 'fundamental disjunctures between economy, culture and politics' (Appadurai 1990: 296). In other words, these domains do not come together to form a seamless whole and no longer 'fit' neatly within the confines of the nation-state. To better understand these disjunctures he proposes that we study the 'relationship between five dimensions of global cultural flow which can be termed ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, finanscapes and ideoscapes'. There are two initial points that should be made before considering what these scapes signify and how they help us better understand the cultural economy. The first concerns the word 'disjuncture' the second the word 'scape'. Disjuncture designates disjointedness or separation; dislocation. Appadurai employs this term to distance himself from the suggestion that in studying the global he is positing another kind of unity: the world as an integrated global economic or cultural system, for instance. The designation scape is used to indicate that these dimensions of global cultural flow are 'perspectival constructs' rather than objective relations. In other words, different actors (governments, businesses, and individuals) will have different perceptions as to the meaning of, and their place within, global flows.

Appadurai recognizes that under conditions of globalization social and political actors inhabit not just the imagined communities of nation-states (Anderson, 1983) but also imagined worlds. These worlds consist of shifting landscapes which are not integrated or unified, but exhibit changing structures and relationships. It is important to register that Appadurai is looking at key aspects of global cultural *flow*. The importance of this can be seen in his conceptualization of ethnoscapes, for example. Ethnoscapes comprise groups and persons in motion – tourists, immigrants, guestworkers – who influence 'the politics of and between

nations to a hitherto unprecedented degree' (Appadurai, 1990: 297). The stability of societies and networks is constantly undermined by human movement. Technoscapes are formed by high-speed communications moving across 'previously impervious boundaries'. Finanscapes refers to the flows of global capital and speculation on commodities which are increasingly difficult for nation-states to regulate. Mediascapes refer to the global reach of news, television and film, as well as the images of the world which they produce. Ideoscapes also comprise images but centre on conflicts between state ideologies and counter-ideologies and contestation over the meaning of democracy, sovereignty, and freedom.

One crucial thing to understand about these scapes is that there are disjunctures between them all (Appadurai, 1990: 306). In particular, 'the global relationship between ethnoscapes, technoscapes and finanscapes is deeply disjunctive and profoundly unpredictable' (Appadurai, 1990: 298). It is at this point that the importance of the disjunctures becomes clear. Disjunctures have become central to the global politics. It is the disjunctures which facilitate global flows which in turn 'occur in and through the growing disjunctures between ethnoscapes, technoscapes, finascapes, mediascapes and ideoscapes' (1990: 301). Appadurai is offering us a model of global processes which emphasizes not global integration and interconnectedness but 'global fragmentation, uncertainty and difference' (Appadurai, 1990: 308). According to Eade (1997b: 7) 'Albrow implicitly endorses Appadurai's model of a disjunctive order in his development of the socioscape'. As a corrective to Appadurai's 'assumptions concerning the stability of the communities through which people move' (Eade, 1997b: 5) – which Albrow believes should also be treated as scapes – he offers the concept of 'socioscape' – a vision of social formation which allows for the disembedding of local attachments and acknowledges that these may be delocalized as they become stretched across space.

## Living the shrinking world

There is no necessary connection between glocalization as a process and the lived experience of globalization. Glocalization, which was developed as a concept with which to differentiate the impact of globalization on different peoples in different places (and suggest that people can utilize elements of globalization in the re-construction of identity) can also be used to abstract one element of the globalization process, and disconnect it from questions of individual experiences and

life trajectories. In distinction to Ritzer, the Roehampton School are centrally concerned with the experience of the individual. There are two aspects of this emphasis which are particularly important in the context of the globalization of strangeness. One is the recognition that people 'inhabit a shrinking world', which, in the hands of other commentators is usually taken as an index of connectivity and/or the extent of the penetration of globalization into everyday experience. The idea that we live in 'a shrinking world' is a metaphor for the way in which global connectivity makes the world part of our routine experience and also a reminder that 'the global' is not an abstract 'level' removed from the everyday, but is something which is within our grasp. From this follows the second aspect. The Roehampton School take this idea further in the sense that 'a shrinking world' becomes the raw material out of which we make our lives. This shrinking world causes individuals to rub up against others, their lives overlapping and intermingling, in such a way as to cause them to negotiate the 'relevant spaces of "their" world' (Eade, 1997b: 15).

As they frame it, the priority task of the Roehampton scholars in *Living the Global City* is to construct a conceptual framework which will allow them to investigate the social transformations associated with globalization, and for which task terms such as 'community' and 'neighbourhood' are no longer adequate (Eade, 1997b: 6). The quest for an adequate conceptual array is expressed by Eade (1997b: 14) in the following terms. 'A sociological framework is required which dispenses with those staple concerns of modernization debates – community, nation and culture.' This chimes with Beck's idea of 'zombie concepts', no longer adequate for a sociology of globalization (see above).

In the context of this book the most important concepts developed by the Roehampton scholars are 'socioscape' which Albrow introduces as an alternative to community, and Durrschmidt's idea of 'milieu' which allows for a discussion of an 'extended locality' in which people live out their lives (Eade, 1997b: 15). Some of these ideas are developed in a collaboratively authored chapter entitled 'The impact of globalization on sociological concepts: community, culture and milieu' (Albrow et al, 1997). The problem with the idea of 'community', the authors note, is that it is not well suited to situations in which linkages of ethnicity or kinship are shaped by global processes and are stretched over large distances. The point they wish to make is that 'local solidarities and imaginings may also be produced by global processes', the upshot of which is that 'the construction of "community" in a specific locality, therefore, cannot be analysed on the assumption that the local is prior,

primordial, more "real"' (Albrow et al, 1997: 24). The relationship between the local and the global is thus central to understanding collective life and the ways in which people relate to each other.

**Milieu**

Conventionally, the term 'milieu' denotes a 'social environment or set of surroundings' (Chambers dictionary). Sociologically, the notion of 'milieu' as developed by the Roehampton School is important because it furthers the project of rethinking community, and helps us to understand the circumstances under which the individual operates in the world under conditions of globalization. Milieu is important also because it speaks to 'the individual's active efforts to create and maintain his or her own world', and 'the reappropriation of meaning by individuals in a world escaping their control' (Albrow et al, 1997: 29–30). The Roehampton authors make the interesting point that with its emphasis on the willed activity of the individual 'milieu' has been under-utilized by sociologists who have preferred community and culture instead. Milieu accords a high degree of voluntarism to individuals under conditions of globalization. It allows us to focus on an individual's active approach in relation to his/her environment (Durrschmidt, 1997: 62), and, by extension, restrictions on the activities of individuals.

Milieu can be thought of as 'relatively stable and situated configurations of action and experience, in which individuals actively generate a distinctive degree of familiarity and practical competence' (Durrschmidt, 1997: 57), or more straightforwardly as a 'familiar frame of daily conduct that filters our experience of the wider environment' (Durrschmidt and Taylor, 2007: 152). The familiar conditions which characterize the milieu are maintained by the contribution of individuals who then have confidence in self and world (Albrow, 1996: 158), what might be referred to by others as 'ontological security'. It should be pointed out that 'familiar' in this context should not be confused with 'local'. Indeed, the advantage of the notion of milieu is that it is well suited to understanding the importance of the abstract and far-distant in everyday life, in a way that community is not (Albrow, 1996: 158). The conventional understanding of community requires that we direct our gaze inwards, in order to focus on the closeness of ties within a delimited geographical area. Milieu, on the other hand, allows for (indeed expects) forms of connectivity and association which require a global orientation.

For Durrschmidt (1997: 57) there is a related term, microglobalization, which refers to 'the integration of global difference(s) and variety

into a distinctive social environment'. Microglobalization means that local places become invested with the global and people from far away can feel at home anywhere. In a sense then microglobalization is not dissimilar to the idea of glocalization, but it invests more in the human experience dimension. There are two sides to this development. 'Local' places become 'globally charged' as a result of the blending of sameness and difference, On the other hand, 'people can inhabit the same local environment and yet live in different milieux' (Durrschmidt, 1997: 62). This is an important idea in relation to strangeness: that two people living side by side can, as a result of microglobalization, have very different life experiences. In one case, the 'globally familiar' forms the 'local' environment and 'home' is a place for meeting distant others. In the other case, neighbourly proximity and contiguous living can be perceived as a threat, leading to one's neighbours being perceived as the nearest strangers. A transnational community of religious believers might be an example of the first case, CCTV-watching citizen-detectives, as in the Shoreditch case mentioned earlier, an example of the latter.

The notion of milieu can be extended to the idea of 'generalized milieu': 'places which provide or serve the basic needs of the global individual in an organized or standardized manner' (Albrow et al, 1997: 32): hotels, fast-food restaurants, airport waiting lounges, petrol stations etc. The idea of generalized milieu is not dissimilar to Auge's idea of non-spaces (the possible origin of Ritzer's 'globalization of nothing' thesis). 'Detached from localities, milieux such as the airport hotel, the gas station, Starbucks, are places that are familiar to the traveller, could be anywhere, and are vital to the journey' (Albrow, 2007: 329). This draws upon the familiar idea that when we are in a chain hotel or restaurant we feel that we 'could be anywhere'. McDonald's is the classic example where experience of one in a particular town allows us to use others anywhere in the world' (Albrow et al, 1997: 32). Whereas for Ritzer the proliferations of Starbucks, McDonald's and Pizza Hut restaurants are representative of the triumph of nothing over something, Albrow allows for the possibility that they can be interpreted in another way. They can serve to extend our 'zones of familiarity' in such a way that we are never away from home even if we are physically thousands of miles from where we reside.

**Socioscapes**

In order to understand strangeness it is important that we do not continue to view the figure of the stranger against a backdrop of static, fixed social relations. In Albrow's (2007: 328) terms, '[w]e cannot …

allow the ethnography of local space to be dominated by the concept of community'. The Appadurai-inspired idea of socioscapes emerges from Albrow's problematization of the sociological staple, community, when problematized under conditions of globalization. '"Socioscape" and "sociosphere" may be better adapted to render the contemporary quality of social relations in a locality than community or even network' (Albrow, 2007: 319), and, we might add, better adapted to understanding the stranger.

By socioscape Albrow is referring to an assemblage of social life, which takes on a different appearance depending upon the perspective from which it is viewed. The organizing principle or driver for this form of social life may be distant and removed from those living it. The socioscape does not necessarily possesses a unifying mechanism, and individuals contributing to the socioscape may not be aiming for anything like social cohesion, being guided instead by the desire to 'mind their own business' or 'not getting involved' (Albrow, 1996: 158). Albrow's thesis is that people living in the same area are no longer necessarily connected in any meaningful way, despite their geographical proximity. This phenomenon he terms 'disconnected contiguity' (Albrow, 1996: 157), or expressed in different terms perhaps, 'living together, but living apart'. Albrow is not suggesting that people are no longer connected to others in important ways, it is just that they may not be connected to the people next door to them (and, by the same token, their next-door neighbours may be strangers); the geographical scope of connected activities can extend across the globe. That 'multiple coexisting worlds' (Albrow, 1997: 156) may exist in the same geographical locale reinforces the idea of strangeness advanced in this book.

The terms 'milieu' and 'sociospheres' complement each other. The former speaks to individual experience and allows for the possibility that people can shape and give meaning to their social interactions. The latter offers a way of rethinking community in a way which does not presumes social cohesiveness. Both concepts help us rethink sociality across global space. So for Albrow, people inhabit 'sociospheres' not functionally integrated communities. People inhabit sociospheres which intersect at the locality they occupy for the moment without necessarily interfering with each other (Albrow, 1996). They have no necessary specific location, but require space and material conditions in order to exist. Sociospheres may touch down in localities (Albrow, 1997: 52) but are on the whole delinked from place. In place of community what we have are a number of sociospheres of varying sizes and extents. The

socioscape 'is constituted by sociospheres which have very different extensions in time and space' (Albrow, 1997: 53). Again, this reworks community, now allowing for the possibility that connections are transnational not merely local. The socioscape is revealed at the point where sociospheres intersect. Both the intersections and the various sociospheres contribute to the multiperspectivalism of socioscapes. 'Both concepts [sociopheres and socioscapes] contribute to the deconstruction of the communitarian, national, and territorial assumptions that older nation-state sociologies smuggled into the idea of society' (Albrow, 2007: 329). It follows from this that we should not assume that society is bounded and already inhabited by constituent groups and communities. Further, if society is perspectival and functions in the absence of an overarching principle of cohesion it is not the sort of place where the stranger, conventionally thought of as one who 'comes today and stays tomorrow', would stand out from the rest.

## Rethinking the stranger

The global-local relations which inform activities, identities and sense of belonging in any given place, and which are made amenable to understanding through the concepts of socioscapes and sociospheres, allow us to think productively about the stranger under conditions of globalization. The Roehampton scholars do not devote much time to talking about strangers, although they are mentioned in passing. Nevertheless it is my belief that the work of Albrow et al provides the raw material out of which we can construct a compelling framework within which we can approach the stranger under conditions of globalization. From the perspective of understanding the stranger the key aspect of the Roehampton account is the way in which community (or what is suggested in its place) is released from any necessary ties to locality. The idea of sociospheres allows us to chart the occupancy of local space – street, housing estate, gated community, suburb – in a way that does not prejudge the degree of social integration enjoyed by the occupants (Albrow, 2007: 328). Albrow understands that geographical proximity does not necessarily correlate with cultural closeness. Rather, the key to understanding the relation between geographical positioning and social coherence is the degree of global connectivity. Albrow states, '[l]ocal spaces are inhabited by long-term residents, recent immigrants, workers, visitors, and strangers. They occupy them in co-presence, unequally, but in dynamic relations. Their local relations with each other are close or distant, but are mediated by their global relations' (Albrow, 2007: 328).

A recurrent theme in this book is the way in which globalization, in addition to opening up the world to individuals, forcibly in some cases such as where welfare state provisions are replaced by the allocations of the free market, or alternatively in the sense of enhancing the choices that individuals have in terms of constructing a sense of self, can also work to constrain the individual's experience of the world. We have already seen that how, following Robertson (1992), globalization allows us to 'sift the global-cultural scene for ideas and symbols relevant to our identities'. On this view, the oneness of the world makes it amenable to exploration and elements of world culture can be appropriated for use in everyday identity construction. On Robertson's reading, the world opens up and is within the grasp of individuals and groups who become empowered by an awareness of their global reach to 'discover' something of themselves in other cultures, and to use the world of cultural differences as a resource in the construction of identity and lifestyle choices (Rumford, 2008b: 141). This is certainly not the only way in which people relate to the world, or how the world appears to them. The 'world of choice' scenario advanced by Robertson appears overly optimistic in certain respects.

Milieu, as understood by Durrschmidt, requires a degree of effort on the part of the individual in order to sustain it. The integrity of a milieu is always threatened by the possibility of fragmentation. The jostling amongst and possibly conflictual relationship between milieux make their status rather precarious. According to Eade (1997b: 15), people 'inhabit a shrinking world, co-existing, overlapping and intermingling with other peoples' "milieu," and thus negotiating the relevant spaces of "their" world'. The Roehampton account of milieu paints a very different picture of the openness of the world, choosing instead to emphasize the ways in which the global can 'press down' on individuals constraining their global opportunities and thereby engendering the conditions within which localized strangeness emerges. This is because, in Albrow et al's (1997: 30–31) terms, '[w]e see our fellow-beings in the milieu, neither as complete strangers nor as whole individuals but as people who fit somehow'. The 'fit' is qualified and contingent, and is not guaranteed. It is also provisional: one who fits today may fit less well tomorrow. The friction between milieux means that they can be perceived by their inhabitants as precarious and as so much emphasis falls on the 'shared borderlines of individual milieu' (Albrow et al, 1997: 31). It would be a mistake to presume that those with whom we share borderlines also share the meaning we give to the world. In other words, under these conditions it is likely that 'the

neighbour is the nearest stranger' (Albrow et al, 1997: 31). It is also likely that strangers are routine; a much more important question is 'who is my neighbour?' This question arises because, as Albrow (1996: 110) points out in an earlier publication, under conditions of globalization our lives are characterized by disconnection as well as enhanced connectivity.

> What used to be connected is often disconnected. People are separated by highways where once there were fields and village streets. Neighbours no longer come from the same class or even country. One generation fails to appreciate another's music. Night is divided from day by danger on the street. This is the daily experience of living in a locality.

Under such conditions the borders separating milieu must be maintained by cooperation (or through conflict) but certainly through active effort. The neighbours with whom the individual finds him/herself cooperating (or in conflict) will not always be geographically close. 'With the internationalization of the local milieu it is very likely to be the cultural stranger who becomes my neighbour with whom I have to interact to maintain the common boundaries of our milieux' (Albrow et al, 1997: 33). This is an important insight, and is followed up by an even more important one. The danger to the local milieu 'is not the cultural stranger as neighbour but the neighbour who does not want to be engaged in the maintenance of the milieu' (Albrow et al, 1997: 33). The fact that people can be living in the same physical space yet belong to different milieux (Durrschmidt, 1997: 62) causes us to re-assess the stranger. The real stranger is one who is indifferent to the maintenance of milieu and/or the borders separating them, and this person may be in close proximity. The conventional stranger, the outsider or the one marked off by cultural difference, might in fact prove to be more neighbourly.

## Conclusion

In June 2010 *The Guardian* reported that in two largely Muslim areas of Birmingham, Washwood Heath and Sparkbrook, approximately 200 CCTV cameras that had been recently installed were designed for anti-terrorist surveillance.[9] According to the newspaper article;

> the suburbs were to be monitored by a network of 169 automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) cameras – three times more than

> in the entire city centre [plus 49 additional CCTV cameras]. The cameras, which include covert cameras secretly installed in the street, form 'rings of steel' meaning residents cannot enter or leave the areas without their cars being tracked.

Local councillors were particularly angry when this was discovered because according to the newspaper those who had been briefed about the existence of the cameras 'said they were misled into believing they were to tackle antisocial behaviour, drug dealing and vehicle crime'. After the story broke, Birmingham City Council announced that the cameras would not be used until a process of public consultation had taken place.

This news story provides a very good illustration of Roehampton School ideas. In the case of these districts of Birmingham people living side by side are no longer necessarily connected in any meaningful way. Some sections of the population are treated with suspicion and are being targeted for surveillance (by means of subterfuge). In this case, geographical proximity provides no basis for community. This is indeed exactly what Albrow means by 'disconnected contiguity'. We can observe groups of people inhabiting the same local environment, the same urban space, and yet living in very different milieux. Living side by side can result in very different life experiences and opportunities; 'living the global city' is also living a life of strangeness.

The work of the Roehampton School, when linked with the notion of strangeness developed here, provides the basis for an important critique of certain tenets of cultural globalization theory, and also provides for the development of new analytical tools for the study of contemporary society. The notions of milieu and socioscape are both designed to address the multiple coexisting worlds of globalization, thereby contradicting the idea that globalization leads inevitably to a heightened perception that we are 'living in one world'. Viewing social organization via the concept of milieu means that we are immediately confronted with the idea that people can be living in the same geographical space but existing in totally different milieux. The idea of milieu thus underpins the notion of strangeness developed here; the distance between one milieu and the next – being both near and far – means that it is often difficult to know who is a member of the 'we' group and who is not.

# 5

# The 'Cricketing Stranger': The London Bombings and the 'Homegrown Terrorist'

## Introduction

Who are the strangers in contemporary society? Who are the undecidables of the modern world (Bauman, 1991: 55), figures of the stranger particular to our present day societies? Following earlier discussions we know that these undecidables are not necessarily going to be those who 'arrive today and stay tomorrow' as in the classical formulation of the stranger, nor are they going to be those who are easy to position in terms of us/them and inside/outside dichotomies, bearing in mind the difficulty of sustaining such binaries under conditions of globalization. Contemporary figures of the stranger, I argue, occupy an indeterminate place in society, but not in the sense that they are neither friend nor enemy, neither us nor them, but because they emerge – rapidly, in many instances, and for only a brief duration – into a social world to whose citizens they remain totally anonymous. Their strangeness inheres in their brief eruption from routinized existence, an emergence which often causes consternation, anxiety or even fear in the rest of the population. These strangers don't 'come today and stay tomorrow', they are 'here today and gone tomorrow'. They don't arrive as such; they burst forth from their embedded existence, either because they have drawn attention to themselves through some public act or because the media casts the spotlight on them for a brief period.

There are a number of candidates for the figure of the stranger cast in these terms, all of who disrupt everyday life (to varying degrees) through their assertion of identity and/or demonstration of connectivity with other places: the 'posted worker' confronted by angry UK trade unionists protesting at European Union attempts to open borders to labour mobility; call centre workers confounding expectations of proximity;

'flash mobs', undermining everyday experiences of public spaces through their staged celebration of strangerhood; online classroom assistants who conduct one-to-one tutorials with British school children from their homes in India. But perhaps the most compelling candidate is the 'homegrown terrorist' who has replaced the 'foreigner' and 'migrant' as a particularly threatening stranger figure. The 'homegrown terrorist' represents a double threat: terrorism, coupled with the realization that this threat comes not from without but from within.

The 'homegrown terrorist' is both a threat to order, in line with the classical conception of the stranger, and importantly also one who cannot be easily detected, unlike the conventional stranger figure. The 'homegrown terrorist' emerges from hiding within society, the stamp of the contemporary stranger. The 'homegrown terrorist' is an apparently ordinary and unremarkable citizen, a regular member of the community – a doctor (the Scottish airport bombers were doctors), a student, a teacher, a community worker – until the point at which he (it is invariably a he) emerges from anonymity and perpetrates an act of terrorism. The 'homegrown terrorist' is also an undecidable in as much as our understanding of what makes an apparently well-adjusted citizen become a 'homegrown terrorist' is far from complete. For this reason he is often positioned, for very understandable reasons, as a person who is unfathomable or evades comprehension (or whose actions are non-rational).

The contemporary figure of the stranger is different from Simmel's stranger. Strangers are not necessarily visible; they do not stand out from the rest of society. They are not necessarily new arrivals. Their strangeness can be constituted by a single act. We cannot easily identify the 'homegrown terrorist' until the moment that he detonates his bomb-filled rucksack. This type of stranger does not originate outside, he is not significantly different in any obvious sense. The person sitting next to you on the tube may be a terrorist, but you cannot be sure. Indeed this is how terrorists engender a culture of terror; by making citizens suspicious of one another. 'Homegrown terrorists' blend in so well because they share many points of common culture with the rest of us. The only thing that makes them a stranger is the act of terrorism itself; an assertion of their fundamental difference, masked by a lack of obvious distance from society.

This assertion, this eruption of strangeness, which may be masked or invisible until the moment when it is revealed requires much more detailed exploration. A caveat is also required. Some achieve strangeness (through their actions), while others have strangeness thrust upon

them (by circumstances, or as a result of heightened public awareness) – for the purposes of our argument we can assume that no-one is born strange. Strangeness is therefore either the result of willed actions, of human agency and conscious goal-orientated activism, or it is a product of the way the media frames events or constructs narratives so that actors appear in such a way as to render them strange. In this way, an array of figures can be constituted as strange by making them appear as if they are a new problem, an emerging phenomenon, or a threatening social type. In recent years this spotlight has fallen on different groups at various times constituting them, to varying degrees, as strangers: Chinese cockle pickers, Polish plumbers, self-immolating Kurdish protesters, anti-globalization activists, and begging Bosnians being just a few examples.

In this chapter we will investigate the strangerhood of the 'homegrown terrorist' (specifically the London bombers of 7th July 2005) as a prime example of 'undecidables of the present', looking both at the ways in which their motivations as terrorists are constructed for us, and also how they become labelled as strangers. It is clear that in attempts to understand the 'homegrown terrorist' it is not only difficult to ascertain why they come to act in the way that they do (that is to say, choosing to kill themselves and lots of other people on a crowded tube train) but also how they have achieved their degree of strangeness (how far they have travelled in a very short time from cultural embeddedness to lethally dangerous outsider).

## The cricketing terrorist

The July 7th 2005 bomb attacks in London, which killed 52 people and injured more than 770, were extremely disturbing for many reasons, not least of which was the puzzle of the 'homegrown terrorist'. What leads young men brought up in the UK and evidently embedded in local communities to become terrorists capable of carrying out an attack of this magnitude? As I will argue in what follows this is a genuine conundrum and social scientists' attempts at advancing answers to this puzzle have been only partially successful, at best.

If the 'homegrown' nature of the terrorism was at the root of what was especially disturbing about this event then, what emerged as an emblem of its strangeness and an index of the difficulty in comprehending it was the 'cricketing connection'. One of the bombers, Shehzad Tamweer, was a local cricketer (in the Leeds area) and the fact that he and some of the other terrorists had played cricket on the days before the attacks, was picked up by many news reports.[1] More than any

other fact about the men who carried out the attacks their attachment to cricket was the thing which marked out their strangeness. The 'cricketing connection' was always referred to in terms of a puzzle which needed explaining and its presence in the narrative of the terrorists' preparation for their trip to London made the event more inexplicable.[2] Tamweer's father stated in an interview that, '[a]s far as I can understand, my son was more British in his orientation than anything else … he has planned his career in sport. Even on the night before he died, he was playing cricket'.[3] His 'cricketing connection' was prominent enough to lead to him being described as 'The cricketer' in a 'suicide bomber profile' published by the *Daily Mail* on 14th July 2005.[4] His credentials as a cricket lover were even emphasized by *The Washington Post* (whose readership may have been unclear about cricket's cultural significance), in the following terms: his 'primary passion was cricket, and he rarely missed a Wednesday night match at the local park'.[5] The cricket connection was also used by the media to root him in a community and a particular way of life – his British orientation. This was then juxtaposed with the mobility of the jihadist, a trip to a jihadist training camp in Pakistan, and ultimately the trip to London.

In this way the conundrum of the 'cricketing terrorist' was constructed, emphasizing the irreconcilable aspects of Tamweer's life: local boy, cricketer, and British citizen versus jihadist. That Tanweer was an enthusiastic cricketer who played in a match on the eve of the bombings is used as an index of his strangeness and of the unfathomable nature of the attacks. In the words of *The Independent* newspaper, 'Tanweer played a game of cricket the night before he travelled down to London – now are these the actions of someone who is going to blow themselves up the next day?'[6]

What is of particular interest in the portrayal of Tanweer as the 'cricketing terrorist' is both the way that this label is employed as an index of his strangeness, and the meanings ascribed to cricket in this construction. Cricket here is associated strongly with civilizational values, cultural attachment, 'normalness', and Britishness. As we will see, some of these assumptions may well be flawed, and the link between cricket and Britishness is the result of a particular cultural construction which is open to re-interpretation.

## Cricket and the democracy myth

It is necessary to further explore the 'cricketing connection' in order to get a better sense of why the 'cricketing terrorist' should carry such a

clear marker of strangeness. In order to do this we must examine the wider cultural resonances of cricket, and particularly its stereotypical association with civilization values.

In a recent book, the journalist John Simpson tells the story of Adolf Hitler's brief encounter with cricket during his time in a military hospital towards the end of the Great War. Following reviews of Simpson's book the media picked up the story and several British newspapers published articles detailing Hitler's proposals to make changes to the game of cricket, such as advocating the removal of batsmen's pads on the grounds that they were 'unmanly'. The stories also highlighted Hitler's frustrations with the complexity of the laws of cricket and his lack of comprehension of the finer points of the game.

What made these stories newsworthy is not the fact that Hitler learned the rudiments of the game from British POWs, or that he thought the game would be good training in the fight against Bolshevism, or even that he wanted to simplify the laws of the game. Had it been discovered that Hitler actually played the game and 'faced one ball', as one journalist drolly remarked, the story would not in fact have been any more interesting. What makes Hitler's 'cricketing connection' a story at all is the juxtaposition of the laws of cricket (and the largely unwritten 'spirit of the game') and fascist dictatorship. The story plays on the clash between images of 'Englishness' and a 'gentleman's game', on the one hand, and the cruelty and intolerance of a genocidal fascist, on the other. In short, it works on a juxtaposition of two images that are never supposed to sit side-by-side. In the words of one journalistic headline; 'Blue shirts and blitzkrieg? It's just not cricket' (Macintyre, 2010).

The phrase 'just not cricket' is often used to refer to the supposed British traits of honesty and fairness of which the game is often seen as the embodiment. If something is considered 'just not cricket' it is adjudged fundamentally unfair or underhand. This heightened sense of fairness (romantically) attached to the playing of cricket underpins a host of civilizational associations.

> The traditional view of cricket is of a leisurely, gentleman-like sport played in pristine, creased whites and with plenty of long breaks for tea. The sound of willow on leather, the sun shining on the village green. Even the word 'cricket' has come to symbolise fair play and good sportsmanship.[7]

Cricket is also associated with the timelessness and permanence of British civilization. For example, former Prime Minister, John Major

(who wrote a book on the history of cricket) once said that 'fifty years from now' Britain 'will still be the country of long shadows on county (cricket) grounds, warm beer, invincible green suburbs, dog lovers and pools fillers',[8] although it is surely stretching a point to claim this for the whole of Britain rather than England.

Perhaps the most complete claim for the centrality of cricket to English identity and civilization was formulated by the journalist Neville Cardus who wrote,

> If everything else in this nation of ours was lost but cricket – her Constitution and the laws of England – it would be possible to reconstruct from the theory and practice of cricket all the eternal Englishness which has gone to the establishment of that Constitution and the laws aforesaid (quoted in Smith, 2009: 54).

The association of cricket with a civilizing mission is not limited to the cultural history of British (or English) imperialism. This is the 'democratic myth' of cricket (Smith, 2009: 63) which encourages us to believe that, in the words of the historian G.M. Trevelyan, 'if the French noblesse had been capable of playing cricket with their peasants, their chateaux never would have been burnt', or, in the words of a t-shirt slogan I saw at the Sydney Cricket Ground a few years ago, 'If Stalin had played cricket the world might now be a better place'.


The civilizing potential attributed to cricket animates the story of the Compton Cricket Club, formed by charity workers Katy Haber and Ted Hayes working with the homeless in Los Angeles. According to Haber,

'we started training the homeless guys in alleyways, with rubbish bins as stumps, in the art of cricket' (quoted in Bowes, 2011). In the opinion of the charity workers, it was as a result of learning the etiquette associated with cricket that many young men were able to get their lives together. In Haber's words, 'We were so successful at teaching the homeless guys civility through the game that we lost a lot of players' (because they moved on to better things) (quoted in Bowes, 2011). According to Peter Bowes (2011), the journalist who reported for the BBC 'It was the start of what was to become a collaboration of former gangsters, homeless men and street kids, who now see cricket as a metaphor for living a purposeful and law-abiding life'.

The Compton Cricket Club goes from strength to strength and has employed former Warwickshire player Paul Smith as a coach. Smith reiterates the aim of the club: playing cricket is not an end in itself but a way of making sure that 'the etiquette of cricket spills over the boundary rope and into people's lives, gelling communities where gangs otherwise rule'.[9] To help with the aim of community cohesion the team also contains several police officers.

> It's a bizarre world where the LAPD is playing cricket to speak with the would-be, could-be, or erstwhile gangster. Similarly, the New York police department has teams that have joined leagues in an attempt to reach out to foster better relationships with the Pakistani community and to speak to and even befriend young men in and around mosques.[10]

The novelist Joseph O'Neill offers an interesting interpretation of the 'democracy myth'. In his novel *Netherland*, O'Neill writes that cricket represents 'civilization' – 'you ask people to agree to complicated rules and regulations? That's like a crash course in democracy'. But importantly a form of civilization which is inclusive rather than exclusive. O'Neill is well aware that it would be a mistake to place too much faith in cricket's civilizing mission (after all it was Robert Mugabe who is reputed to have said, 'Cricket? It civilizes people and makes gentlemen'). In any case, there is a more important point that O'Neill wishes to make. The 'lesson in civility' which cricket affords is one which both brings civilization where it is most needed – 'What's the first thing that happens when Pakistan and India make peace? They play a cricket match' (O'Neill, 2008: 204) – and civilizes the civilizers, so to speak, by civilizing the colonialists as well as the colonized: 'people, all people, Americans, whoever, are at their most civilized when they're playing

cricket' (O'Neill, 2008: 204). Through its cricketing minorities the United States has the potential to both connect with universal aspirations and 'educate' its masses: Americans would be more civilized if they played cricket. For O'Neill cricket offers the USA the chance to re-connect with universal themes of civilization, morality and democracy; O'Neill's account of cricket in America confounds our expectations of its place in that society – a very marginal sport played only by immigrants from Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka etc. For O'Neill, its democratic potential inheres in the opportunities it affords minorities to change the perceptions of the majority.

Cricket, particularly in more recent times, has begun to generate other stereotypes. One of these encourages a quite different reading of the 'cricketing terrorist'. In 2006 former Australian Test batsman Dean Jones, working as a commentator for a Sri Lankan TV station, described South African batsman Hashim Amla, a devout Muslim who wears a long Islamic-style beard, as 'the terrorist' during the commentary on a Test match between Sri Lanka and South Africa. Jones was sacked for making the remark, made live on air and also broadcast in South Africa. After the incident the South African team denied rumours that Amla's nickname in the dressing room was 'the terrorist'.[11] In a separate incident, an English county player, Bilal Shafayat, was described as 'Al Qaeda' by an Australian journalist, David Penberthy, during the 2009 Ashes series when he appeared for England as a substitute fielder.[12] Settling out of court the Australian-based Nationwide News paid 'significant damages and costs as well as offering an unreserved apology for offensive remarks'.[13]

Recent portrayals of Islamic-looking cricketers as 'terrorists' notwithstanding the idea that cricket encourages civility is still a dominant one. In the words of Ted Hayes, co-founder of the Compton Cricket Club, 'The aim of playing cricket is to teach people how to respect themselves and respect authority so they stop killing each other'.[14] In a media environment in which the cricket-civilization connection is largely unquestioned the success of the Compton Cricket Club is attributed to cricketing etiquette. Remarkable though the story of 'The Homies and the Popz' undoubtedly is the success of the club may be as much to do with introducing discipline and structure into the lives of young people coupled with a team ethic and a sense of hope. The cricketing dimension may be of secondary importance, although the 'exotic' origins of cricket coupled with its largely-unwritten ethos of on-field etiquette, and the availability of black role models may have played a part in its popularity. Certainly, the 'Sacred Etiquette of Cricket'

section of the Compton Cricket Club webpage offers few clues as to why cricket should be such a major contributor to civility: 'batmen carrying or displaying the bat incorrectly – is not cricket',[15] this branch of etiquette probably having more to do with local factors than with the 'spirit of the game'.

In his novel *Against the Day* Thomas Pynchon refers to cricket as a metaphor for the Great Game, in other words imperial strategizing and espionage. In the novel, there is a character known as the Gentleman Bomber of Headingly (sic), whose weapons of choice are 'spherical handbombs disguised as cricket balls' (Pynchon, 2006: 236). We discover that this gentleman bomber does not actually throw the bombs while the match is in progress – he waits for the tea break. This literary reference serves no purpose in my account other than to remind us that cricket can be a metaphor for something other than civility and etiquette; cricket, particularly when given an upper-class inflection, can also bring to mind images of deceit and underhandedness, masked by civility and etiquette.[16] The point here is that the same stereotypes which encourage the association between cricket and civility also contain a 'darker side'. In the words of one commentator, '[t]he game of cricket, as we have seen, has a stereotype of coded gentlemanly behaviour, but beneath the surface – in reality – we have seen that it is other than that' (Vernon, 2007).

## Understanding 7/7

What made the London bombers become terrorists? With their backgrounds in community life how could they perpetrate mass murder? These are questions that do not easily yield satisfactory answers. An initial shock on learning that London had been bombed by terrorists prepared to blow themselves up with homemade bombs in a desire to kill innocent passengers on London Transport was followed by the further shock that the perpetrators were probably not members of Al Qaeda but four pretty ordinary guys who were all known to those with whom they shared a community. There have been many attempts to explain these acts of terrorism and the motivations of those responsible. Most of these accounts are unable to explain why these four individuals became terrorists when many other people who share the same background, religious upbringing, and social circumstances, never contemplate jihadism.

In this section I will examine several explanations for the bombings, exploring in particular the motivations of the 'homegrown terrorists'

advanced by Jock Young, Arjun Appadurai and Stuart Croft. Young (2007) points to the embeddedness of the bombers; they possessed 'Northern accents, jobs, universities, family – seemingly solid roots within the country'. In another iteration of the 'cricketing connection' these credentials are confirmed for Young by the fact that two of the four jihadists were cricketers or cricket fanatics. Young offers a number of examples of media reactions which drew attention to the difficulty in understanding how these seemingly ordinary men from 'utterly British streets' (in the words of the *Daily Mail* newspaper) could become 'suicide bombers from suburbia'.

Young focuses on the question of 'how do normal people do evil things?' The answer he offers emerges from his account of 'othering'. There are three stages in this process of 'othering'. Firstly, a particular social group will become dissatisfied with the inequalities or discriminations which members of the group encounter. Specifically, the Pakistani and Bangladeshi populations of towns in the north of England are thwarted on a daily basis in their attempts to live according to the values of liberal democracy. 'They suffer both an experience of relative deprivation, materially, and a stigmatised identity.'[17] This amounts to what Young terms 'a bulimic process – they assimilate the values of their host and are rejected by it. It is not an experience of being alien, it is a processes of being alienated'. Many responses to these circumstances are theoretically possible, including hybridization or identification with the impoverished white working class.

A different response entirely is fundamentalism. In a section entitled 'The othering of the otherer' Young explores the second stage of the process leading to 'normal people doing evil things'. The host society is found deficient in important respects, for example 'the rule of law is deemed a sham'. The processes of othering is catalysed by multiculturalism which 'champions difference, and it encourages the discovery of one's "roots," as a key to personal understanding'. Young's argument here then is that people are encouraged to see themselves as different and society easily becomes divided into black and white, Muslim and Christian. But according to Young, 'neither the anger of injustice nor the channelling of declared differences between the immigrant and the host are sufficient to explain the ability of normal people to engage in acts of wanton evil'. In order to understand this we need to move on to the third stage of the process of 'othering'.

Violence becomes more likely when it is deemed normal. This occurs during a time of war, for example. What also occurs is that at such times we exhibit a 'strange indifference about the fate of the bad guys

and an obsessive concern with our own'. In other words, war creates the environment in which we justify forms of attitudes and behaviour which would otherwise be unacceptable: murderous anger, brutality, 'unspeakable acts'. In this sense, 'violence is as American as apple pie, as British as the origins of Empire'. Young makes the case that these things are true 'on both sides of the line of terror'. The 'cloak of martyrdom' in times of war can change people. It can turn young men into soldiers fighting and dying on the battlefield and it can turn people into terrorists. The process that begins with the thwarting of Western values and fuelled by a political culture which protects the right to be different, can, when inspired by the violence which war engenders, 'transform young men from the North of England into warriors on a mission in the heart of London'.

Young's is an excellent account which usefully locates the terrorist impulse with the violence which characterizes contemporary society. In this sense, terrorism is not an aberration but emerges from a reaction of norms as a response to particular circumstances, in this case the alienation experienced by certain young men in the North of England. Young both explains the roots of terrorism and how it can become domesticated, showing that it emerges within a society not from without, and in this sense offers a persuasive explanation for the 'homegrown' element of the 'homegrown terrorist' (although he does not offer a convincing explanation of why some young men within this milieu become terrorists while the majority do not). But what Young's account does not do is to explain how the 'homegrown terrorist' connects to the world of global jihad. This is necessary in order to explain the way in which disaffected young men express their anger and frustration through particular forms of violent activity, in this case suicide bombing. What it lacks, in other words, is a transnational or global context.

For Young, globalization takes the form of external force pressurizing the 'insecure citizen' and causing him/her to 'reach out for strong lines of identity'. This can lead to both hybridization and a 'blurring rather than strict lines of demarcation'. But cultural globalization also exacerbates the bulimia which Young uses to explain the disaffection of sections of society who find that the host society does not appreciate its efforts to assimilate and are denied access to the freedoms and citizenship benefits which global narratives of neo-liberalism generate. Cultural globalization 'raises people's aspirations, threatens their identities, and fuels their discontent' by undermining social cohesion both by eroding the differences between cultures and through the inability of the

market to fairly allocate opportunities: 'economic and cultural globalization has brought us closer together, where the arbitrariness of wealth, comfort, indeed of lifespan itself becomes all the more apparent'. This account of cultural globalization does not allow for the connectivity which is a potentially empowering feature of globalization nor does it allow for people to be global actors. They are portrayed as being acted upon by global processes which work to shape their life chances.

To remedy this we need to explore the forms of active participation in global processes which are possible and how this participation makes new connectivities and new communities of interest possible, particularly in relation to jihadism. According to Faisal Devji (2005: xii), 'jihad makes Islam into an agent as well as a product of globalization by liberating it from its specific content. Islam becomes a global fact by destroying its own traditions and recycling their fragments in novel ways'. The politics of jihad has 'gone global', and in doing so has vacated the traditional ground of political movements. It now operates on the terrain of ethical struggles and has more in common with those movements normally associated with civil society, environmentalism, 'antiglobalization', animal rights, and anti-abortion (Devji, 2005: 130). This is a commonality based on form rather than content, of course. All share an organizational form based on 'cellular' or networked connectivity (Appadurai, 2006). Islam's globalization is possible because it is anchored neither in an institutionalized religious authority like a church, nor in an institutionalized political authority like a state. For Appadurai, the 'homegrown' London bombers on July 2005 were young Muslims who 'could not have failed to make connections between 9/11 in New York, the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, the ongoing brutalization of their fellow Muslims in Palestine' (Appadurai, 2006: 112). They became terrorists because they identified themselves with 'the cellular world of global terror rather than the isolating world of national minorities'. They morphed 'from one kind of minority – weak, disempowered, disenfranchised, and angry – to another kind of minority – cellular, globalized, transnational, armed, and dangerous' (Appadurai, 2006: 113).

The ideas of Devji and Appadurai, summarized very briefly here, introduce an important global dimension to the account of why 'ordinary young men' become terrorists; networking and connections beyond their immediate world of experience is key. The existence of the 'cellular' world of terrorism, which is capable of generating and sustaining jihadism on what may first appear to be unpromising terrain, the North of England, also calls into question the 'homegrown' element of the terrorism, a point to which we will return later.

## Securitizing Islam

In his recent book *Securitizing Islam: Identity and the Search for Security* (Croft, 2012) Stuart Croft claims that Islam has been 'securitized' on the basis of a particular understanding of Britishness. This is an interesting thesis, less so for the explanation for the motives of the 7/7 bombers but more for the insights into the designation 'homegrown' that it stimulates, which is itself a very important dimension of our understanding of the jihadist phenomenon. Croft's account begins with the idea of ontological security; that we can achieve a strong sense of security in our everyday lives through everyday routines and being surrounded by familiar reference points. Our world is secure because we can proceed with our lives as usual. This security enables us to 'keep calm and carry on' rather than being paralysed by disturbing events.[18] The belief that our world is not going to fall apart, despite tragedies occurring near to home or further afield, is achieved via our routines and regular day-to-day activities, which necessarily involve interactions with others (Giddens, 1991: 167). In short, ontological security requires both a consistent sense of self and also having that sense confirmed by others: a sense that the world is what it appears to be.

Croft, following Giddens, identifies four elements central to ontological security. The first of these is 'biographical coherence', in other words self-identity performed through everyday routines. We have a coherent sense of self because we recognize our continuous selves through the ordinary rituals and routines which comprise our normality: getting up, cleaning our teeth, getting dressed, taking the dog for a walk, reading the newspaper etc. Importantly, we also recognize ourselves in the responses of others (feedback) while we are conducting these tasks. The second element is the availability of 'trust structures'. Our sense of security is enhanced by the availability of things (institutions) that we can rely on. Examples could include; the value of money, the advice given by local government officials, and the impartiality of BBC news reporters. Trust structures comprise a diverse group of things and according to Croft all engender our confidence in 'social tokens' and experts. The third element is self-integrity, that is to say our awareness of what is appropriate and acceptable in speech and public behaviour. In this sense, that we self-regulate our statements and actions is due to a sense of ontological security which not only tells us who we are but tells us that we know how to behave as good citizens in public life. The fourth element is the awareness of the possibility of ontological insecurity. It is not possible to be ontologically secure unless we

are self-reflexive enough to realize that threats to our sense of security are possible; we have to imagine a world without security in order to be able to live in an ontologically secure world.

According to Croft a key source of ontological security is a sense of national identity. His account of Britishness is central to his thesis. 'This book is … an account of Britain as an imagined community, of Britishness as an institution – evolving, always in motion – that offers to individuals a contribution to the achievement of their ontological security …' (and conversely, desecuritizing to the life of others). This is an important point; what contributes to the ontological security of some can work to undermine it in others. National belonging is of course an exclusionary business; the nation-state is not a club to which everyone is offered membership. But Britishness can also be exclusionary in other ways. Croft does not take into account that sometimes 'Britishness' can also be desecuritizing to British people, i.e. people who are already formal members of the national club. For examples, British ex-pats encountering colonial types in India in the days of the Raj, or in a more up-to-date example, British Muslims who as we have already heard can be *in* Britain (for generations) but are not always encouraged to feel that they are *of* Britain. Britishness does not mean the same thing to everyone. The Welsh and the Scots may find Britishness threatening if it is judged to be little more than Englishness writ large.

According to Croft then, Britishness is important for 'providing one element of structure for ontological security'. Sometimes this Britishness inheres in 'images that evoke the stable, peaceful, ever-Britain; cricket on the village green; the mother of parliaments, symbolized by Big Ben; the Tower of London and the Crown Jewels'. It is worth noting in passing that Croft's images of 'ever-Britain' seem particularly English. According to Croft, in the modern context the Second World War was foundational for contemporary Britishness, both via a (negative) construction of Germanness, and, more positively, for the knowledge that it was possible to defend against and ultimately defeat the Nazis. Through this episode '[t]he British learned that they were collectively heroic and exceptional; that they were conditioned by the genius of common sense, and of getting on with it (keeping calm and carrying on); and that they could be morally certain when they used force'.

Britishness is not static, and Croft outlines 'three waves' of change which have contributed to contemporary narrations of Britishness. The first of these is associated with the post-war period when there was still

a degree of certainty associated with moral rightfulness in the use of force coupled with collective phlegmatism. The second wave coincided with the period of immigration to Britain from the Commonwealth, from 1960s to the 1980s, and was characterized by tolerance and inclusion. The third wave, from the 1990s onwards can be characterized as the onset of a post-class society.

Britishness is still changing and according to Croft, in the twenty-first century a new Britishness is being constructed through fears of new terrorism and in opposition to a new Other. His thesis is that one consequence of the securitization of the terrorist threat in Britain has been the construction of a 'radical and orientalized other', and this in turn has led to a reconstitution of Britishness. He is dismissive of accounts which fail to chart the dynamic nature of Britishness, for example explanations of the 7/7 bombings which root them in the failure to entrench the Britishness of Norman Tebbit's 'cricket test'[19] thereby leading to a society of 'two cultures'. According to Croft a logical extension of the 'Tebbit-test' argument is that a rather 'liberal' (ill-disciplined) Britishness led to the emergence of British citizens who were prepared to kill fellow British citizens: an enemy within. We have already seen that ontological security for some can be at the expense of the ontological security of others. Croft makes the case that if (a shifting) national identity cannot be successfully communicated and there is a lack of ontological security at a national level 'then it is inevitable many people will look elsewhere for resources for their ontological security', that is to say, to Islamic radicalization.

The idea of Britishness is expected to do a lot of heavy lifting in Croft's thesis and it's by no means certain that it is up to the task. That Britishness has failed to bind society is not particularly surprising. Being British involves negotiation of a multiplicity of identities; local, regional, national, supra-national (European) in addition to the nationalist construction which is Britishness. It is possible that Britishness has never been the sort of national identity that has the power to bind citizens ideologically to the state. Indeed, not everyone identifies strongly with being British; some people see themselves in nationalistic terms as Welsh, Scottish, or English, and for them Britishness might be a relatively unimportant identity. Nevertheless, Croft holds that a 'new Britishness is being built in part as a response to the new terrorism'. But Croft says little else about the nature and characteristics of 'New Britishness', save that it is the latest stage in a constantly evolving identity, now formed (in part) in opposition to a new threat and a new Other. The oversimplified formulae is repeated frequently; new terrorism + new Other = new Britain.

This 'Britishness has been reconstituted as a means and result of securitizing Islam …' To this end the media has worked to construct a single category – the British Muslim – and to ascribe to it a single value – alienation'. In other words, Muslims are undifferentiated – for example, as Sunni or Shi'a or originating in different Muslim countries; Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran – and this massification of a diverse range of Muslim identities reinforces the idea that they represent a threat. Croft may well be correct to point to a negative construction of the British Muslim being a securitized category. But his narrative of Britishness is no less a singular, undifferentiated category. The Britishness versus Muslim tension is too polarized to form the basis of a useful understanding of the terrorists' position vis-à-vis mainstream society, from which they were not too far removed. In the case of the 7/7 bombers the description of them as 'cricketing terrorists' is rather apt, in a certain kind of way, and it certainly side-steps many of the problems associated with trying to fix them on a scale of (a threat to) Britishness. This is one (serendipitous) case where media labelling and 'soundbite' epithets work well, although it is unlikely that this was at the forefront of journalistic considerations.

## Beyond Britishness: A new perspective on 'homegrown' terror

The reason the term 'cricketing terrorist' is useful, I would suggest, is that it offers something other than a failed Britishness with which to position the terrorists vis-à-vis the rest of society, and by extension it suggests that Britishness is not where we should be looking for answers to the question of why people commit terrorist acts. It also helps to deconstruct the category 'British': cricket and Britishness are not synonymous, although there is a certain nostalgic sense in which cricket and 'Englishness' might be. As mentioned above, the epithet 'cricketing terrorist' is useful because it says something about the identity of the terrorists, and their relationship to the country in which they lived, while at the same time avoiding reducing this cultural encounter to a question of Britishness. Tanweer played cricket in Leeds but his cricketing experiences (as a follower of the game, and perhaps as a player) could have easily stretched to Pakistan, a country he is known to have visited, Pakistan also being a major cricket-playing country. Tanweer would perhaps have failed the 'Tebbit test', supporting the Pakistani team when they played test matches against England. Being a cricketer, even a cricketer who played in matches in the local park, suggests the possibility membership of networks beyond the local or the national

(or at the very least an interest in international cricket). As such, the 'cricketing' element suggests something like a transnational dimension to the identity: British and not-British at the same time (equally English but not only English), but recognizably familiar. 'Cricketing' also suggests also civility, which means that the shock element of the homegrown terrorists is not so much that they were British citizens killing British citizens but that they were civilized people who acted in a way contrary to the norms of civilization. 'Cricketing' suggests cosmopolitan horizons and multicultural sensibilities, which may or may not have been present to a large extent in the figure of Tanweer, but which help position the bombers outside of a limiting framework of Britishness.

Let us now return to the problematic term 'homegrown terrorist'. There is a suggestion in Croft that it is the designation 'British Muslim' that allowed for the idea that the terrorists were 'homegrown' to gain purchase. I think that more could be made of this; there is something 'not quite right' about the designation 'homegrown' which deserves investigation. Why were the 7/7 bombers termed 'homegrown' but not IRA bombers in previous decades? It could be the case that choosing to characterize Mohammad Sidique Khan and the others as 'homegrown' prevents us seeing something else more important about them; that they were highly (and globally) networked, for example. Nevertheless, the idea that the 7/7 bombers were 'homegrown' has become part of the 'common sense' understanding of the bombings. It was also one of the factors which made the 7/7 episodes particularly disconcerting to the public. How can you border out 'homegrown terrorists'? What defences can be put into place to prevent a repeat of the 7/7 events? These are questions that are extremely difficult to answer, more so if we persist with the 'homegrown terrorist' designation.

Croft makes an important point when he states, 'Although "7/7" brought the threat of "home-grown terrorism" to the status of conventional wisdom, it quickly became set into a narrative of terrorist plans emanating from the "British Muslim community" since the attacks of "9/11"'. By this I understand that the 'homegrown' terrorist is not simply a terrorist with domestic origins, all the more threatening because he has travelled from being 'one of us' to being 'one of them'. On my reading of Croft the 'homegrown' terrorist is one that can be located within a particular community, and associated with a group that is increasingly undifferentiated in the eyes of the rest of society: the British Muslim community. However, if we take on board Appadurai's point about the nature of cellular politics we can see that the London bombers identified with jihadism 'rather than the isolating world of

national minorities'. They actively connected themselves to another world which was, in Appadurai's words, 'cellular, globalized, transnational, armed, and dangerous' (Appadurai, 2006: 113). In this sense, Mohammad Sidique Khan and the other 7/7 bombers are not best thought of as 'homegrown terrorists'. The idea of 'networked terrorists' or 'cellular terrorists' better captures a centrally important facet of their nature (as does 'cricketing terrorists', of course). The point that Croft makes, but weakly rather than drawing out its full implications, is that they only became designated as 'homegrown' because of the way the media and public discourse worked to homogenize the British Muslim community and tar it with the brush of terrorist activity.

The idea of the 'homegrown terrorist' goes hand-in-hand with the idea that the London bombers were fully integrated into their local communities, for which the 'cricketing connection' has sometimes been employed as shorthand. But the fact that they played cricket is both an index of their embeddedness and of their strangeness. Likewise, the 'homegrown' mantra discounts the fact that jihadists are marked out by their separation from wider society (Mirza, 2006). The jihadist version of Islam does not require a mosque and the community life associated with it, indeed it rejects it. This new religiosity therefore transforms the individual's relationship to society. Mirza also makes the point that the religiosity of younger Muslims also seems much more centred on the self or the clique structure, rather than the wider, established community. The identification with victimized Muslims abroad in fact reveals the self-oriented character of jihadism: empathy for the plight of others is really about the perceived victimization of the self (Mirza, 2006). Reading journalistic accounts of the last days of the 7/7 bombers it is possible to see that their supposed high degree of embeddedness in society, which is always seen as making understanding of their actions all the more difficult, actually declined in the weeks and months prior to July 2005. In fact, they became more distant from their immediate social world as 7/7 approached, a development which could perhaps have been seen as significant (with the benefit of hindsight, perhaps), but which clearly did not alert family and friends to anything untoward. The (in)famous cricket match that Tanweer participated in on the eve of their trip to London has come to symbolize their 'normality' in respect of their community involvement. In fact, it masks so much else about the four young men and their trajectory from members of local communities and national minorities towards jihadism. An alternative reading of the cricket match, coupled with an acknowledgement of the increasing distance between

Tanweer's religious routines and community norms, would emphasize both evidence of transnational identification and his own search for ontological security: cricket as a signifier of normality (for a jihadist).

## Conclusion

The problem of understanding the 'homegrown terrorist', it has been argued, stems from the assumption that Britishness is the key with which all questions of belonging and identity (in the case of the London bombers) can be unlocked. In this context, the 'cricketing connection' has been interpreted as an indicator of Britishness when in fact it points more to the transnational connectivity and global ambition of jihadism. Cricket cannot be seen only as an emblem of Englishness (or in this case, Britishness); it can also signify Indian-ness, or Pakistaniness, and Australian-ness. Other nations claim ownership over cricket: according to Ashis Nandy (2000: 1) 'cricket is an Indian game accidentally discovered by the English'. As a result, the idea of the 'homegrown terrorist' is not synonymous with the 'cricketing terrorist'. Rather than the latter helping to explain the former, the latter actually points to a radically different and much more dangerous form of terrorism: global jihad. Reinterpreting the 'homegrown terrorist' requires a shift away from the stranger in favour of an appreciation of the societal condition of strangeness. At the outset, this chapter sought to understand the 'homegrown terrorist' as a particularly threatening figure of the stranger. But the idea of the 'homegrown terrorist' has been undermined by the dynamics of jihadism, and what is revealed is a tension between a conventional figure of the stranger and a much more profound shift towards strangeness.

# 6
# The Cosmopolitan Stranger: A Thesis

## Cosmopolitanism: Sounds like a job for Superman

Superman, the comic book superhero, has become a cosmopolitan. In a recent issue of Action Comics the Superman character states that he intends to give up his US citizenship: 'I'm tired of having my actions construed as instruments of US policy'. But this is not all. Superman decides he is better off serving the world than serving the US. Action Comics co-publishers Jim Lee and Dan DiDio were quoted as saying that, 'Superman announces his intention to put a global focus on his never ending battle'.[1] In a statement full of cosmopolitan intent Superman says, '[t]ruth, justice and the American way – it's not enough anymore', '[t]he world is too small, too connected'.

Cosmopolitanism is not mentioned in the news article and the (unnamed) BBC journalist responsible does not make the cosmopolitan connection. Similarly, the publishers quoted above make no reference to cosmopolitanism in their explanation for Superman's ethical reorientation. Nevertheless, Superman is making a clear and unambiguous statement of cosmopolitan intent. There is an irony here. Making the world a more cosmopolitan place is traditionally viewed as a task so difficult (impossibly utopian) that it would require a superhuman effort to make it a reality. What is interesting now is that this view of cosmopolitanism has been largely abandoned in favour of a cosmopolitan realism which views cosmopolitanism as something already existing and everyday. Cosmopolitanism is all around is us; the key thing is to recognize it and to accept its existence. Superman throws in his lot with cosmopolitanism just at the time when it has become accessible to anyone and everyone. When it was truly a job for Superman he was nowhere to be found.

## The cosmopolitan context: The rise of cosmopolitan realism

Cosmopolitanism, as an increasingly important research theme across the social sciences and major growth area in academic publishing over the past decade, has developed into a broad based and generally relevant perspective on contemporary affairs (contrasting sharply with the marginal value previously accorded to it during the period characterized by Beck as 'methodological nationalism'). The consolidation of cosmopolitanism has been occasioned by the publication of several 'cornerstone' texts in cosmopolitan studies which survey recent trends and developments and encourage the extension of cosmopolitanism to new fields of study. Two edited collections are particularly significant: Delanty's *Routledge Handbook of Cosmopolitanism Studies* (Delanty, 2012), and Rovisco and Nowicka's *Ashgate Research Companion to Cosmopolitanism* (Rovisco and Nowicka, 2011).[2] These scholarly compendia stand alongside a number of other key texts in the study of cosmopolitanism that have also been published in the last few years. Of these, the following have been particularly important in shaping the field: Beck's *Cosmopolitan Vision* (Beck, 2006), Archibugi's *The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy* (Archibugi, 2008), Holton's *Cosmopolitanisms* (Holton, 2009), Delanty's *The Cosmopolitan Imagination* (Delanty, 2009), and Kendall, Woodward and Skrbis' *The Sociology of Cosmopolitanism* (Kendall et al, 2009). Books such as these can make cosmopolitanism more relevant to researchers in many disciplines, help instil in researchers the confidence to work within a cosmopolitan frame, and to extend the applicability of cosmopolitanism to new areas of investigation.

Going hand in hand with these developments in publishing has been an important shift to 'cosmopolitan realism' as the default perspective on cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitan realism, as represented by the work of Beck and Delanty, for example, insists that the world is/has all along been cosmopolitan, although it is only now that we are beginning to see this clearly. This is a much more confident vision of cosmopolitanism and a much more confident assertion of its relevance to understanding the contemporary world than was evident just a few years ago. The emergence of cosmopolitan realism is explained by Beck in the following way.

> In the age of national modernity, cosmopolitan realism could hold sway only in people's heads; it could only be conceptualized, not experienced. Nationalism, on the other hand, resounded in people's hearts.

> This dualism of head and heart has been reversed in the second modernity where everyday life is banally cosmopolitan, while in the head (even in the theories and research routines of the advanced social sciences) the conceptually suggestive power of the national dimension continues to work its hidden tricks almost without interruption (Beck, 2004b: 133).

Beck's argument here is that although the national imagination continues to hold sway in intellectual life and in explanatory frameworks everyday life is cosmopolitan, although this is not necessarily acknowledged in efforts to account for or explain everyday life.

## The temptations of cosmopolitan realism

One consequence of the 'cosmopolitan turn' which has been a feature of the social sciences over the past decade or so (Beck and Grande, 2010) is the confidence with which the existence of 'cosmopolitan reality' has been proclaimed. The journey from the first claims for a 'new' cosmopolitanism – originating with the 'cosmopolitan democracy' project for greater democracy between nation-states launched by Archibugi and Held (1995), to a range of assertions that modernity has been cosmopolitan all along (even though we did not recognize it as such) has taken place in a relatively short period of time. For some this cosmopolitan reality finds fullest expression in the European Union (Beck and Grande, 2007a), for others it signals a shift in emphasis in concern from 'sociality to humanity' (Ossewaarde, 2007). The popularity of cosmopolitan realism should not mask the fact that it is by no means the only way to understand cosmopolitanism. In the remainder of this section we will examine the claims of cosmopolitan realism, offer a critique, and suggest an alternative basis for a cosmopolitan social science.

Ulrich Beck leads the way in advocating cosmopolitan realism with his argument (introduced above) that the 'cosmopolitan condition' is the reality of contemporary society: social reality has become cosmopolitan. Cosmopolitan reality can be discerned from the fact that people are living in an interconnected world and experience it as such. This then is what is termed 'banal cosmopolitanism' (Beck, 2006: 19) and which predominates in everyday life: 'the many-coloured mixture of food, drinks, nourishments, restaurants, music, etc. that characterises the cities all over Europe' (Beck and Grande, 2007b: 72). Banal cosmopolitanism is experienced in the supermarket where culinary cultures and a steady growing variety of produce from around the world are

made available to shoppers as a matter of course. Banal cosmopolitanism is an unconscious cosmopolitanism rather than a reflexive cosmopolitanism. Beck draws a distinction between cosmopolitanism, as a set of ideas and beliefs, and 'cosmopolitanization', which results from unconscious decisions but which is leading to reality 'becoming thoroughly cosmopolitan' (Beck, 2006: 21).

Underlying Beck's approach is the idea that we are witnessing a 'cosmopolitanization of reality', the full dimensions of which can only be apprehended once we dispense with the 'methodological nationalism' which pervades the social sciences. 'Methodological nationalism' refers to the ways in which 'social scientists in doing research and theorizing take it for granted that society is equated with national society' (Beck and Sznaider, 2006: 2). As outlined by Beck and Sznaider cosmopolitan realism has three facets: a critique of methodological nationalism; the recognition that 'the twenty-first century is becoming an age of cosmopolitanism' (Beck and Sznaider, 2006: 3); and a recognition that what we need is 'some kind of "*methodological cosmopolitanism*", which can dispense with the dualisms that have informed globalization theory: global/local, national/international, inside/outside' (Beck and Sznaider, 2006: 3). Beck and Sznaider seek to mark a distinction between their vision of cosmopolitanism – the 'really-existing processes of cosmopolitanization of the world' (Beck and Sznaider, 2006: 7) – and the more commonly held view of cosmopolitanism as 'a set of normative principles, for example the project of 'cosmopolitan democracy' advanced by Held and Archibugi. Interestingly, Daniele Archibugi also looks at the EU and sees 'actually existing cosmopolitanism', or the nearest thing to it, thus demonstrating that these contending perspectives on cosmopolitanism do share some important common ground.

Beck finds cosmopolitanism wherever he looks for it. The logic of 'side effects' means that the EU has brought about the cosmopolitanization of Europe even though this was never the intention. Europe possesses a cosmopolitan reality which 'normal social science' tends to overlook; the 'real Europe' can only be understood through the cosmopolitan lens (Beck, 2008). Beck's belief is that once we have learnt to transcend the restrictions placed on social science by 'methodological nationalism' we will discover ways of studying transnational reality and in doing so discover (cosmopolitan) dimensions to Europe that we never realized existed. It is possible that Beck's cosmopolitan version of Europe is the result of what Philip Schlesinger has termed the 'cosmopolitan temptation', whereby wishful thinking about cosmopolitanism gets in the way of clear analysis (Schlesinger, 2007).

As a result of the rise of cosmopolitan realism the context in which we discuss cosmopolitanism is very different today than it was a few years ago; this is particularly true of the discussion of the cosmopolitan stranger, which is the theme of this chapter. In introducing the idea of the cosmopolitan stranger I am not advocating cosmopolitan realism, nor am I attempting to give a familiar topic a new twist by labelling it cosmopolitan in the hope that it becomes more interesting and relevant to contemporary discussion on the stranger. In talking about the cosmopolitan stranger I am hoping to draw attention to a phenomenon which cannot be understood in standard terms, using conventional tools of social science. Ways in which the figure of the stranger has been hitherto understood will not help us apprehended the cosmopolitan stranger, who is not to be found in predictable places and who does not conform to the 'comes today, stays tomorrow' expectation. The cosmopolitan stranger, on my interpretation, is a very contemporary figure who heralds a greater degree of strangeness than the stranger as traditionally understood. I believe that this new form of stranger has to be understood using the appropriate tools; to this end the designation cosmopolitan stranger works well, particularly when the relationship between cosmopolitanism and globalization with which I'm working is made evident.

The relationship between cosmopolitanism and globalization (in the contemporary context) is usually seen as one in which the later has encouraged the former (creating the grounds for 'cosmopolitan realism'). On this conventional reading, cosmopolitanism is stimulated by globalization and is dependent upon it. But such interpretations are the result of very broad brush strokes indeed: what is meant by both globalization and cosmopolitanism varies greatly from formulation to formulation, and the assumed relationship only 'works' if cosmopolitanism is a form of consciousness which corresponds to contemporary processes of globalization.

Inglis and Robertson (2011: 296–297) summarize the connections between globalization and cosmopolitanism advanced in the current literature in the following way. They identify four connections. First, globalization generates 'cosmopolitan conditions' such as the 'global capitalist market … cosmopolitan political structures and legal norms … cosmopolitan modes of citizenship … cosmopolitan lifestyles … cosmopolitan cultures … and cosmopolitan forms of consciousness (Inglis and Robertson, 2011: 296). Second, what are previously thought of as processes of globalization can also be seen as processes of cosmopolitanization (in the way understood by Beck) in the sense that these undermine boundaries both with and between nation-states. This feeds

the tendency towards 'cosmopolitan realism' I identified above. Third, '[g]lobalization produces needs for, and generates forms of, social science which can analyse its deepening complexity' (Inglis and Robertson, 2011: 297), Beck's cosmopolitan sociology being a good example. On this understanding, cosmopolitanism is called forth so as to help make sense of globalization. Fourth, some cosmopolitan theories are an attempt to correct or 'tame' tendencies associated with globalization. In this sense, globalization is the backdrop against which cosmopolitan perspectives emerge and 'make sense'. There is also a sense in which cosmopolitan perspectives can contain a degree of optimism which has been difficult to sustain in many readings of globalization. Many accounts of globalization emphasize the transformations which are wrought by global processes and these may be associated with negative subjective experiences of globalization as 'something that happens to you' and which is largely beyond your control. At the same time, cosmopolitanism is seen to be more about shaping the world according to a normative vision. If globalization is a 'done deal', cosmopolitanism embodies the hope that other forms of (human) connectivity are possible.

Inglis and Robertson provide us with a very good account of how the relationship between cosmopolitanism and globalization is usually understood across a range of interpretations. They proceed to elaborate their own account of that relationship, which, they argue, requires an understanding of how globalization and cosmopolitanism have been entwined throughout the history of social and political thought. The understanding of the relationship advanced in this chapter has a very different dynamic, and is at root a contingent relationship. There is no reason to assume that globalization has ushered in a greater need for cosmopolitanism as an alternative to or solution for globalization-as-problem. On the contrary, the historical priority needs to be investigated; given the very long history of cosmopolitan thought (dating back to ancient Greece), and given the long history of globalization supposed by many commentators (including the two authors under discussion) it is likely that Inglis and Robertson's emphasis on the interconnectedness of the two lines of thinking has much merit. Certainly, it would be naive to suppose a historical priority for globalization.

But of course, the major point of interest in the relationship between globalization and cosmopolitanism is located very much in the present, where questions of historical priority are less important. In this context, the consensus is very much that accelerating (technologically-driven) processes of globalization over the past 30 years or so have caused the renewal of interest in, and new forms of, cosmopolitan thought. There is

every reason to contest this line of causality: the relationship between cosmopolitanism and globalization in this chapter is understood in very different terms. To the extent that a connection exists it is the exception not the rule. It is further argued that cosmopolitanism is a strategy of connectivity resulting from an experience of 'strangeness', a particular form of 'global closure' and/or societal fragmentation. Cosmopolitanism is often thought to depend upon 'global openness' but, it is argued, such a state of affairs is a lot less common than scholars of cosmopolitanism believe to be the case. Globalization, in the way that it is experienced at the level of individual experience, often 'presses down' on people and restricts access to the world. This then provides a corrective to accounts which emphasize that globalization opens up the world to experience and imagination. Cosmopolitanism is a strategy for living under conditions of strangeness. In the contemporary context cosmopolitanism allows for the possibility of breaking out of the constraints imposed by an experience of globalization, by creating 'room for manoeuvre' in what are experienced as the tight spaces of globalization. More specifically, cosmopolitanism is a political strategy which draws upon resources of the imagination in order to constitute an alternative social connection between previously unconnected individuals. On this reading cosmopolitanism is not a social reality or existing state of affairs, rather it is the product of subjective experience and the need to open up new possibilities for human sociality; it is a strategy for sociality under the constraints imposed by strangeness. To the extent that this points to a link between cosmopolitanism and globalization it is a contingent one: not all encounters with globalization result in a perception of strangeness. Not all attempts at cosmopolitan connectivity are the result of a troubled experience of globalization. New forms of sociality can be advanced by 'entrepreneurial' cosmopolitans not driven by global flows and mobilities.

## Towards a critical cosmopolitanism

In many contemporary accounts of cosmopolitanism the prime concern is to reveal the world as already cosmopolitan, not to view the world through a cosmopolitan perspective in order to better understand the dynamics of social and political transformations. Many approaches to cosmopolitanism are directed to questions such as whether people can identify with cosmopolitan ideas and/or acquire a cosmopolitan identity, whether it is meaningful to talk of cosmopolitan citizenship, whether cosmopolitanism can be institutionalized and a world level of

governance become a reality, and whether international institutions (such as the EU) can develop a cosmopolitan policy agenda. What is much more important, and certainly more practical and down to earth, is that we move towards a cosmopolitan social science, one which is genuinely pluralist, multiperspectival, and not framed solely by European priorities and preoccupations. The real value of cosmopolitanism, I wish to argue, lies in its potential to transform the way we think about the world, formulate new research questions, and do social science differently (and better).

In an earlier publication (Rumford, 2008b) I advanced the idea of 'critical cosmopolitan' as an alternative to cosmopolitan realism. This critical cosmopolitanism had three main components. The first was a resistance to the idea that cosmopolitanism 'belonged to Europe' to which end I advanced 'postwesternization' as a context within which cosmopolitan developments should be understood. Postwesternization offers a different perspective, one which seeks to displace the west (or Europe) from the centre of our world. The second, is the idea of multiplicity; multiple perspectives, multiple voices, and multiple worlds. Cosmopolitanism is incompatible with what I have called a 'high point' perspective, a privileged, single position from which to view and make sense of the world (Rumford, 2008b: 104–109). Third, a critique of (certain strands of) globalization thinking, specifically the idea that we live in 'one world'. Over the past few years it has become clear to me that critical cosmopolitanism is by itself not adequate to the task, as critical cosmopolitanism is not incompatible with cosmopolitan realism. To understand how this can be the case we need to explore the recent work of Gerard Delanty. Delanty outlines a critical cosmopolitanism which is concerned with the 'very conceptualization of the social world as an open horizon in which new cultural models take shape … and wherever new relations between self, other and world develop in moments of openness' (Delanty, 2006: 27). His notion of 'world openness' is important: 'cosmopolitanism must somehow invoke a sense of openness as opposed to a closed or particularistic view of the world' (Delanty, 2009).[3] Cosmopolitanism should be seen as 'a cultural medium of societal transformation that is based on the principle of world openness' (Delanty, 2006: 27). The key to the cosmopolitan imagination, states Delanty, is 'new relations between Self, Other and World' developing in 'moments of openness' (Delanty, 2009). Cosmopolitanism is therefore a form of 'immanent transcendence' (rather than externally induced transcendence) (Delanty, 2009) brought about by self-transformation; human agency trans-

forming the present in the image of an imagined future (Delanty, 2009).

Delanty holds that cosmopolitanism is a 'new definition of social reality'. For Delanty, cosmopolitanism should not be reduced to a set of principles, an ideal, or a political project. According to Delanty (2009) 'the global and local are intertwined in complex ways and in ways that have created new spaces in which a cosmopolitan reality has been constituted'. In *The Cosmopolitan Imagination* Delanty (2009) embraces 'cosmopolitan reality' at the same time as attempting to offer a 'critical cosmopolitanism'. He writes, 'the distinctive approach adopted in this book will be termed critical cosmopolitanism', which invokes 'a new definition of social reality as opposed to a set of cosmopolitan principles …' – which is very close to the position advanced by Beck (see above). It also has in common with Beck the tendency to impose upon society a cosmopolitan interpretation, to see cosmopolitanism where it previously was not deemed to exist. For example, the cosmopolitan imagination encourages a view of society in which cultural difference is recognized 'as both a reality and a positive ideal for social policy' (Delanty, 2009). On Delanty's account then, the mundanity of cultural difference is evidence of cosmopolitanism. When identifying the difference between globalization and cosmopolitanism Delanty (2009) makes the point that 'cosmopolitanism represents a different reality from globalization in that it concerns rather the field of tensions when global forces interact with the local'. But this does not adequately separate globalization and cosmopolitanism. If cosmopolitanism can be located at the intersection of the global and the local why do we need the idea of cosmopolitanism at all when arguably the idea of glocalization could serve just as well, and is likely to be better placed to fulfil this specific conceptual role?

## Cosmopolitanism beyond cosmopolitan realism

According to Kendall et al (2009: 14–22) there are four problems with contemporary approaches to cosmopolitanism: (i) 'indeterminacy'; cosmopolitanism can stand for almost anything. (ii) 'identification'; who are the cosmopolitans? (iii) 'attribution', what constitutes cosmopolitan behaviour or culture? (iv) governance, what forms of rule are envisaged under the cosmopolitan banner? To a point I would agree with this sketch of deficiencies in cosmopolitanism but would wish to argue that it goes nowhere near far enough to constitute a representative critique of contemporary cosmopolitanism. The three dominant (and overlapping)

strands of cosmopolitan thinking contain the above problems and also embody others. Cosmopolitanism as a model of a new world order (Held and Archibugi's neo-Kantian 'Cosmopolitan Democracy' project), cosmopolitanism as a European quality (Derrida and Habermas), and cosmopolitan realism (Beck and Delanty) all come together on one point: that the European Union is an example of 'actually existing' cosmopolitanism. Kendall, Woodward and Skrbis also advance this claim, and in doing so succumb to the temptation of cosmopolitan realism. They hold that the EU:

> is an illustration of what we call imaginative realism because the building and strengthening of the European agendas is fundamentally about the combination of a cosmopolitan vision in conjunction with the recognition of the need to take this vision through the process of public and institutional deliberation (Kendall et al, 2009: 53).

When cosmopolitanism was deemed to be idealistic and utopian – could it ever really be possible to become a 'citizen of the world'? – it was widely acknowledged that cosmopolitanism was difficult to achieve and that there was not much of it around, except in the form of lofty aspirations. The 'cosmopolitan turn' over the past decade or so has not only seen the application of cosmopolitan ideas to new domains, e.g. transnational governance (Parker, 2012), but social scientific assumptions about what counts as cosmopolitanism have also changed dramatically. The rise to prominence of cosmopolitan realism has worked to fix cosmopolitanism in the everyday routine; cosmopolitanism is now held to be part of the fabric of the workaday world.

I wish to dissent from this view of cosmopolitanism as a commonplace reality. The problem with cosmopolitan realism is that it makes cosmopolitanism appear to be nothing out of the ordinary (and easy to achieve). I think there is considerable value in holding on to the idea that cosmopolitanism is a rare commodity and is difficult to actualize, and the core of this value lies in its ability to explain unusual or singular events: cosmopolitanism is a key with which to unlock strangeness. Another problem with cosmopolitan realism is that is assumes an unrealistically high degree of openness in the world. This, in my view, stems from the assumption that cosmopolitanism is intimately related to globalization. According to Delanty cosmopolitanism is dependent upon globalization: globalization provides 'the external preconditions for the emergence of cosmopolitanism', and cosmopolitan reality is constituted by the intertwining of the global and the local.

I prefer to view cosmopolitanism as the exception rather than the run-of-the-mill, and see it not as an underlying reality but an intervention, or series of interventions, attempting to establish new forms of association in a far-from cosmopolitan world. Cosmopolitanism thus can only be apprehended in fleeting glimpses and as partially formed and transient. As we will see in the case of the cosmopolitan stranger (introduced later in this chapter) the existence of cosmopolitanism is rarely planned or intended and certainly does not take the form of a general reality. It is mostly accidental and unexpected. Rarely do cosmopolitan actors know themselves as such. According to Beck we live in an age of reflexivity when we are all able to contextualize and reflect upon the consequence of human actions. Cosmopolitanism sits uneasily with such an account, despite Beck's attempts to reconcile them. Cosmopolitanism is rarely brought into being by people who believe themselves to be cosmopolitan. In this sense cosmopolitanism is an elusive state of affairs which can be achieved but not programmed. Cosmopolitanism cannot be a new reality because it is evidence of incompleteness, its very existence is indicative that societies are characterized by fragmentation, transformation, and multiplicity. Cosmopolitanism is likely to appear only under conditions in which identities are partially fixed and there is no firm barrier between, for example, inside/outside, self/other, individual/group. Moreover, there is no perspective from which we can view 'cosmopolitan reality': the multiperspectival foundations of cosmopolitanism make it impossible to posit anything like a manifestation of cosmopolitan reality. In sum, cosmopolitanism is best thought of as an escape from permanence and solidity. A 'cosmopolitan moment' would be fatally undermined by an attempt to make it more permanent and durable. It is a feature of the cosmopolitan stranger that s/he may advocate new forms of sociality and hold out the promise of a yet unrealized community but is unable to realize these to the point where they can be described as a society-defining reality.

## Self, other and world reconsidered

Cosmopolitanism is centrally concerned with relations between self, other and the world (Delanty, 1999), or from a slightly different perspective the individual, community, and the world (Rumford, 2008b – and see below). In my earlier book *Cosmopolitan Spaces* I argued that in discussion of cosmopolitanism the emphasis normally falls on relations between self and other, or self and community, and the third part of the triad – the world – is treated as the relatively unproblematic

relation, in the sense that it is assumed that cosmopolitanism betokens access to the world for individuals and communities. In that book I also argued for a more active engagement with the 'worlds of cosmopolitanism' and emphasized the need to problematize the relation the individual enjoys with the world: connecting with the world is in fact far from straightforward (Rumford, 2008b: 14). Cosmopolitans do not automatically belong in or to the world. Access to the world, rather than being 'a given', requires cosmopolitan opportunities or what Delanty (2006: 27) calls 'moments of world openness'. I now wish to further extend this discussion and take it in a new and hopefully productive direction.

Before doing so we should briefly consider the reason for wishing to insert 'community' into relations between self, other and the world. A focus on relations between self and other is a feature of thinking and writing on both cosmopolitanism and the stranger. In fact, thinking about the stranger alerts us to a potential problem in the self, other, world triad which is that self and other cannot be so easily distinguished. There is a blurring of self and other, outsiders and insiders, local and global so as to require careful negotiation on the part of any would-be-cosmopolitan. My earlier preference for self, community and the world acknowledged that self and other are not totally distinct and that community is often particularly difficult to connect to given that there are multiple communities that may make claims on our allegiance and from which we may want to distance ourselves. We do not automatically wish to belong to all communities that we come into contact with, although some of these will no doubt wish to claim us as one of their own and/or seek to work on our behalf. It seems to me that community is far from straightforward particularly so when we aspire to cosmopolitanism. Taking self and community relations more seriously would also have the additional benefit of proving an alternative context within which to study self/other relations.[4]

For Delanty (2009) self and other are distinct. The interplay of the global and the local conditions the ways in which self and other interact, and the interplay of self, other and the world causes cosmopolitan process to come into play. The self and other undergoes transformation as a result of the cosmopolitan imagination. These formulations suggest that the transformation of self and other under the aegis of cosmopolitanism is of the nature of an internal transformation of discrete entities rather than a merging or blurring of once distinct entities. What is key for Delanty is the interplay of self and other rather than the erosion of their distinctive status. One thing that studying the

stranger tells us is that us/them, friend/enemy binaries are undermined. It is also clear that the blurring of distinctions has been heightened with the breakdown of inside/outside demarcations. We must approach questions of cosmopolitanism without the reassuring framework that such binaries provide.

A better starting point would be to proceed from the idea that self and other are blurred and that access to the world is rather more problematic than hitherto thought. We could then reformulate one of the core issues at the heart of the study of cosmopolitanism in the following way. Cosmopolitanism does not stem in a straightforward way from the interplay of self, other and the world but is to be found in attempts to negotiate the 'claustrophobic' lack of space between the self, other, community and the world. It seems to me that the 'self, other, world' triad may lead to the impression that the world is more open and achievable than it actually is. Cosmopolitan moments may afford themselves but do not emerge automatically from relations between self, other and the world. In fact these relations can constrain cosmopolitan activity as much as enable it; 'the world' can impinge upon self and other to such a degree that there exists no separation between them; the global penetrates self/other relations in such a way as to reformulate them in a non-cosmopolitan direction.

On this reading, to be cosmopolitan means living with blurred distinctions between us and them, friend and enemy, inside and outside (which also suggests the ability to live in and across borders). Cosmopolitanism is about creating autonomy within the tight spaces which globalization imposes on us. The idea that globalization 'opens up' a world of possibility to people is romantic at best, and certainly simplistic. Globalization can press the world in on us in a rather unpleasant way and yet does not easily offer up connections to that world. Cosmopolitan opportunities, which allow us to connect to the world in a productive way (and which offer the potential of becoming a citizen of the world in a meaningful sense), are not always readily available or easy to find. Without these cosmopolitan opportunities the world can appear to be rather oppressive. On this reading the cosmopolitan challenge is to find room for manoeuvre in an environment where the world, others, and community can appear to smother rather than nourish the self, by working to obliterate its distinctiveness.

In such cases cosmopolitan openness may not result from the engagement; it may be foreclosed by an increasing strangeness which can characterize contemporary social life. According to Marotta (2011: 107) (drawing upon Simmel) strangeness is a result of the proximity or

distance between social actors. Strangeness exists 'when those who are physically close are socially and culturally distant'. He makes the point that not all strangers feel the same sense of strangeness: 'the experience of strangeness may not coincide with being constructed as a stranger' (Marotta, 2011: 107). I would say that strangeness can be experienced by members of the host society too, and this is a more valuable way in which we can talk about a condition of strangeness, occurring when people are confused about who 'we' are, and who 'they' might be, and where the us/them line is being drawn. It follows that strangeness is more than a perception of the difference associated with 'them'. It is a disorienting experience resulting from an engagement with globalization, especially the openness/non-openness of the world. The world does not always open up before grateful cosmopolitans: the world can be experienced as rushing in on us in a troubling and possibly threatening way leaving us vulnerable to threats that may traverse previously secure borders. Thus, openness is a double-edged sword offering, on the one hand, a world of opportunity, while on the other, a sense of disorientation and increased strangeness.

It will be useful at this point to explore some examples of the claustrophobic [constricting] potential of self, other and the world which can inhibit cosmopolitanism, but may at the same time increase strangeness. One example would be the so-called 'homegrown terrorist' discussed in Chapter 5. As we have seen, it is a feature of attempts to understand the London bombings that the 'homegrown' nature of the terrorism is foregrounded to the point where the 'bigger picture' becomes distorted. In Chapter 5 we challenged many of the ideas used to 'explain' the terrorist attacks: that until the day of the bombings the DIY-jihadists appeared to be 'one of us,'; that they demonstrated a reassuringly high degree of 'we-ness,'; that cricket was an emblem of their Britishness. It is true that the 7/7 bombings created disorientation by destabilizing what were previously relatively stable reference points: us/them, domestic/foreign, friend/enemy. However, the resulting strangeness cannot be adequately captured by Marotta's 'continuum of strangeness'. It was not simply the case that the physically close were culturally distant. It was more the case that the physically close where so close that their dangerousness was obscured, until, that is to say, the moment when their cultural distance manifested itself in the murderous explosions caused by home-made bombs. It is very likely that the bombers did manage to make a global connection, by tapping into jihadist networks, and taking up a position in relation to a global community of (jihadist) believers. They were not cosmopolitans however, in any conceivable sense, despite the

altruism that Best (2010) argues that they possessed and the humanitarianism detected by Devji (2009). There was no desire on their part to assist others in achieving a global consciousness or to share the opportunities opened up by global connectivity. The bombings increased a sense of strangeness throughout the British population, and amongst Londoners in particular, because of the ways in which the global (connectivity of others) impacted upon (local) everyday life in London (the intrusion of the global) and weighed down the London Transport-using public, turning fellow passengers into potential terrorists and causing Londoners to be suspicious of each other. In this case, the global flattened any difference between us and them to the point where, for a brief period, citizens had trouble sustaining a frame of reference which would allow them to distinguish between friend and enemy.

## Cosmopolitanism and the stranger

There are some striking resemblances between the figure of the stranger, as conventionally understood, and the figure of the cosmopolitan. Indeed, according to a number of commentators the figure of the stranger is emblematic of contemporary cosmopolitanism (Marotta, 2011; Iveson, 2005). Underlying these assertions is the idea that cosmopolitanism leads to a 'society of strangers' (Ossewaarde, 2007).

This chapter challenges any facile association between cosmopolitanism as a social reality and the stranger as a social figure. Indeed, it is argued that the study of the contemporary stranger – the quest to understand the stranger – is made more difficult by the popularity of cosmopolitanism across the social sciences. This is despite the fact that there are many obvious points of contact between a study of cosmopolitanism and a study of the stranger, not least of these being the fact that both the stranger and the cosmopolitan are seen as outsiders, to a greater or lesser extent, not easily fitting with the structures and organizations of society. The reason that cosmopolitanism makes the study of the stranger more difficult inheres in the fact that although there is much talk of cosmopolitanism – as a world view, an aspiration for humanity, or as a social condition – there are very few cosmopolitans in the world, in the sense of people who actively and self-consciously identify with this designation. The argument developed here is that this is because cosmopolitanism is quite easy to aspire to but rather difficult to achieve. In fact, the conditions which are deemed to constitute 'cosmopolitan reality' actually work to constrain the cosmopolitan possibilities which exist in the contemporary world.

It could be argued that the idea of a cosmopolitan stranger is in fact a contradiction in terms, if only because while a cosmopolitan is believed to be at home everywhere, the (conventional) stranger is thought to be homeless (Bauman, 1991: 79). For the cosmopolitan the world is a place which is accessible and full of opportunity; the stranger on the contrary has no place to call home and does not properly fit in anywhere. The promise of cosmopolitanism to forge 'solidarity between strangers' or lead to a 'society of strangers' appears problematic. The cosmopolitan stranger has been invoked as a new 'undecidable of the present' (e.g. Marotta, 2011) but isn't the cosmopolitan always already a stranger (in the sense of conventional understandings of the stranger)? Are cosmopolitans not more strange than strangers? Cosmopolitanism involves juggling 'us and them' and because of this cosmopolitanism is centrally concerned with 'we' questions. Ultimately cosmopolitanism causes us to rethink who 'we' are, particularly in the context of 'the other' with whom we identify. As I wrote in an earlier book, 'cosmopolitanism requires us to recognise that we are all positioned simultaneously as outsiders and insiders, as individuals and group members, as self and the other …' (Rumford, 2008b: 14). When we are not sure who 'we' are, who then is the stranger? Cosmopolitanism is a form of cultural experience which appears in the changing relations between individuals, their communities, and the world (Rumford, 2008b: 5). However, communities are anything but straightforward, partly because it is difficult to continue to talk of communities under conditions of globalization (see Chapter 4), and, if we do continue to use the term we must acknowledge that we will inevitably belong to multiple communities. Also, we must recognize that all communities exclude 'others' who, as a result of cosmopolitanism, we may identify with.

The argument advanced here is that the cosmopolitan stranger does exist, although does not emerge in obvious or predictable ways. In the extant literature the idea of the cosmopolitan stranger is introduced as an attempt to domesticate the stranger. Such thinking proceeds from the assumption that cosmopolitanism trumps strangeness. The cosmopolitan stranger is a key figure in contemporary society, but has not yet been charted and properly defined and explained. A detailed exploration of the cosmopolitan stranger reveals some interesting (and potentially troubling) aspects of contemporary thinking about cosmopolitanism.

## The cosmopolitan stranger and multi-perspectivalism

Via a discussion of the 'in-between stranger' Marotta (2011) outlines the affinities between the sociological figure of the stranger and the

'cosmopolitan subject'. Working with the ideas of Simmel and Bauman, Marotta (2011: 108) draws out the ambivalence of the stranger, neither friend nor enemy, neither close nor distant. The 'in-between' stranger is a hybrid, physically close but socially distant. One problem with this formulation is that it is not clear what advantage is to be had from using the designation 'in-between stranger'. The stranger is already an undecidable, an inbetweener, as constructed in the writings of Bauman and Simmel. In addition, the idea of the cosmopolitan stranger is at odds with the idea that cosmopolitanism may constitute a portion of our identity, or be a role that we adopt, rather than being a source of subjectivity. We may adopt cosmopolitan attitudes or espouse cosmopolitan ideals although few people, when asked, will identify themselves as cosmopolitans. As Dessewffy (1996: 613) rightly states contemporary life imposes a multitude of roles upon us. To a certain extent or at certain times we may identify with cosmopolitan ideals (or indeed feel that we are strangers, to a greater or lesser extent) but few of us will see ourselves as cosmopolitans and believe that we can live our lives as cosmopolitans.

Another issue raised by Marotta is the privileged status of the cosmopolitan subject, particularly one who is 'autonomous, masterful and expansive' (Marotta, 2011: 112). This purposeful subject translates into a cosmopolitan stranger who is 'more perceptive' possessing a 'broader and keener insight than those confined to either a particular or universal perspective' (Marotta, 2011: 105). The cosmopolitan stranger, being both near and far, inside and outside, has a privileged perspective (Ray, 2007: 105). The in-between status of strangers allows them 'to see things more clearly' than others (Marotta, 2011: 109). But how do they see more clearly? On Marotta's (2011: 109) interpretation they have a 'birdseye' view and are not 'immersed in the particularities of the opposing parties or cultural groups'. This allows them to understand the viewpoints of contending parties while remaining detached in such a way as to be able to 'identify underlying common or universal interests' (Marotta, 2011: 109).

Marotta's work builds upon established views of the stranger as justice-bringer or educator. According to Pels (1999: 67), '[t]he stranger has often been envisioned as both the historical and normative prototype of the true intellectual, possessing a unique set of epistemic advantages … Hence the long-standing connection between estrangement or distanciation from local cultures and beliefs, and claims about "better vision," a deeper reflexivity, increased objectivity, cognitive innovation, access to larger truths.' Pels draws upon the work of Simmel and concludes that, '[t]he specific mobility of the stranger, and the amalgam of detachment and involvement which he embodies, lay the foundations for a specific form of *objectivity*' (Pels, 1999: 68).

There are other traditions within cosmopolitan though, which do not see cosmopolitans as occupying privileged positions. Viewing society from a 'high point' is the antithesis of cosmopolitanism. Indeed, it can be argued that cosmopolitanism encourages multiperspectivalism rather than reproducing 'high point' thinking (Rumford, 2008b: 104–109). Mignolo's work challenges the assumption of a 'high point' or a monoperspective in cosmopolitan social science. For Mignolo (2000a: 724) critical cosmopolitanism is designed to bring about 'the transformation of the hegemonic imaginary' from the perspective of the excluded. Mignolo holds that critical cosmopolitanism is a potential antidote to cosmopolitan projects, of a top-down nature, which are coloured by what Mignolo terms the legacy of 'global designs'. '[C]osmopolitanism … can no longer be articulated from one point of view, within a single logic, a mono-logic' (Mignolo, 2000a: 741).

The term multiperspectival requires some background and explanation. It has its origins in the idea that contemporary transformations cannot be properly understood from a single privileged vantage point and that events, processes, and actors can be interpreted differently from different perspectives (Haraway, 1991). In discussing the development of the modern state, Ruggie demonstrates that that the Renaissance technique of developing a single perspective in art was quickly translated into statecraft, and territory became viewed from a single vantage point. In the world of nation-states, political space came to be defined as it appeared from a single fixed viewpoint. On Ruggie's argument, the concept of sovereignty became 'the doctrinal counterpart of the application of single-point perspectival forms to the spatial organization of politics' (Ruggie, 1993: 159). In this way, Ruggie accounts for the development of the monoperspectival viewpoint associated with the politics of modernity, against which he offers us the European Union as possibly the 'first multiperspectival polity' to emerge since the advent of the modern era. 'Network Europe' has allowed for the creation of multiple perspectives as territorial nation-states now exist alongside non-territorial networks which do not necessarily fit together to form an integrated whole (Ruggie, 1993: 172). Ruggie's work opens up the possibility that different forms of linkages and flows can generate different perspectives on spatial integration/non-integration. We need to develop this in a different direction and see how it can be applied to the experience of different groups and interests. Appadurai's multiperspectivalism, developed in his celebrated paper 'Disjuncture and difference in the global cultural economy' (Appadurai, 1990), is relevant in this context. He explores the ways in which the 'world in motion' associated with globalization prevents cultural flows from crys-

tallizing into objective relations. For Appadurai 'scapes' (components of global cultural flows) do not look the same from every angle. '[T]hey are deeply perspectival constructs, inflected very much by the historical, linguistic and political situatedness of different sorts of actors: nation-states, multinationals, diasporic communities, as well as sub-national grouping and movements (whether religious, political or economic), and even intimate face-to-face groups, such as villages, neighborhoods and families' (Appadurai, 1990: 296). Haraway reminds us that we should not romanticize or appropriate 'the vision of the less powerful while claiming to see from their position' in our attempts to 'see from the peripheries' (Haraway, 1991: 191).

## The cosmopolitan stranger: A new sociological figure

It might appear strange to propose 'a new sociological figure' when the agenda for thinking about the stranger has changed remarkably little since Simmel expounded his classic thesis (Chapter 2). However, there are signs that thinking about the stranger is shifting away from its conventional ground, or at least the need to incorporate a global dimension has been recognized. We can point to some interest in understanding the stranger under conditions of globalization (Stichweh, Papastergiadis), and a degree of interest in the possibility of the cosmopolitan stranger (particularly Marotta, 2011, but also Ossewarde, 2007) but for most commentators global concerns remain at the margins of thinking about the stranger, and the conventional understanding of the stranger remains largely intact. It is for these reasons that the stranger is still usually associated with 'migrants, foreigners and outsiders' (Kendall et al, 2009: 92) (although it should be noted that there is no reason why a concern with 'migrants, foreigners and outsiders' cannot be allied to a global perspective).

Before formally introducing the cosmopolitan stranger let us take a moment to reconsider how thinking on the stranger has changed of late, using Bauman's work as a benchmark, and outline how we might want to move beyond current thinking on the stranger. According to Morley (2000: 211), Bauman's account of the changing nature of the stranger proceeds as follows; in modernity strangers lived in 'a state of suspended extinction', they were an anomaly to be rectified. Strangers were not permanent; they would be assimilated or excluded. By contrast, in the contemporary world identities are unfixed and destabilized and the 'postmodern strangers are here to stay' (Morley, 2000: 211); it is no longer easy to distinguish between the familiar and the stranger,

or 'us and them'. This is a fair summary in changes to Bauman's thinking on the stranger (the reference to postmodernity being an unnecessary diversion perhaps), and this has influenced a range of writers for whom either no one is truly strange any more (because difference is routine), or else everyone is potentially a stranger (neighbours are the nearest strangers). In fact, Morley's reading of Bauman – that 'strangers are here to stay' – points up a limitation in Bauman's thinking. A key feature of the cosmopolitan stranger is that s/he is 'here today, gone tomorrow' (not 'comes today and stays tomorrow'), a theme which will be taken up below.

Developments in our understanding of the stranger are still rooted in an assumption of inside/outside distinction and a reliance upon markers of 'us and them'. This does not adequately take into account that we live in a world where global connectivity is an everyday (potential) reality, where communities may be virtual, and where social solidarity is not rooted in geographical proximity. As a result we need to rethink the stranger. An important starting point is the recognition that it is no longer just individuals (outsiders) who appear strange, but in fact society itself is strange: we are strangers to ourselves and others in a situation of generalized societal strangeness. Under such circumstances the study of the stranger must adapt more radically, and the basis of strangerhood needs to be re-theorized.

Against such a backdrop there are very good reasons for proposing the cosmopolitan stranger as a new sociological figure. Firstly, conventional thinking on the stranger, still dominant within sociology, is not able to capture some key developments which I have introduced in this book under the heading of strangeness. Strangeness results in different kinds of strangers, not all of which fit into the categories of 'migrants, foreigners and outsiders'. Second, and following on from the previous point, the cosmopolitan stranger, as advanced here, is compatible with the idea of strangeness, whereas more conventional approaches to understanding the stranger are not, relying as they do on us/them, inside/outside dichotomies. Third, the stranger can tell us much about cosmopolitanism. A range of cosmopolitan positions exist but the middle ground is largely vacant as a result of cosmopolitan being seen as either utopian or as an already-existing reality. The cosmopolitan stranger thesis is working with a less extreme and more inclusive version of cosmopolitanism.

The argument here is that with the onset of general societal strangeness there exists a new figure; the cosmopolitan stranger. The cosmopolitan stranger is not simply someone who crosses borders with ease

or who is at home everywhere, a citizen of the world in conventional parlance. The cosmopolitan stranger is a figure who has the potential to connect people with distant others, who betokens new forms of social solidarity, and who can manoeuvre in the restricted spaces caused by the social and political compression characteristic of the Global Age (see Chapter 4). The cosmopolitan stranger is not easily captured by existing forms of community and does not echo staple expressions of solidarity. Moreover, the cosmopolitan stranger is not 'here to stay'. A key feature of the cosmopolitan stranger is his/her 'here today, gone tomorrow' existence. The cosmopolitan stranger often has a relatively short-term or fleeting existence. Interestingly, the cosmopolitan stranger is able to recognize and acknowledge his/her status as a stranger. Hitherto, strangers would not be able (or inclined) to identify themselves as such. Who would wish to be a stranger in a world in which belonging was so important? Who would choose to live in Bauman's 'state of suspended extinction'? Cosmopolitan strangers find utility in being strangers: strangerhood can be a political resource, and it opens up a range of possibilities under conditions of strangeness.

As we have previously discussed Bauman holds that (1997: 17), '[a]ll societies produce strangers; but each kind of society produces its own kind of strangers, and produces them in its own inimitable way'. This is an oft quoted but rarely explored statement on the origins of the stranger. The cosmopolitan stranger inhabits 'our' societies[5] and is very different from his/her predecessor. Whereas Simmel's stranger 'comes today and stays tomorrow', the cosmopolitan stranger is not an outsider or newcomer in the conventional sense. The cosmopolitan stranger is 'here today and gone tomorrow' and whose transience has a good deal in common with the idea of the 'vertiginous rise and fall' of many contemporary public figures, including celebrities, to whose trajectory Bill Wasik attaches the term the 'nanostory' (Wasik, 2009).

Conventionally, the stranger is strange to a group of people who form a community or society which is hosting the stranger, temporarily, in Bauman's view. The cosmopolitan stranger is strange to everyone, including him/herself. Whereas the cosmopolitan is a figure considered (rather optimistically, it has to be said) to be at home everywhere, the cosmopolitan stranger is 'everywhere, at home'. Expressed more prosaically, we can say that the cosmopolitan stranger has the capability to connect globally without leaving home, so to speak. The cosmopolitan stranger enjoys heightened mobility, but not necessarily corporeal mobility. The mobility may stem from forms of connectivity

made possible by developments in communicative technology – satellite television, the worldwide web, mobile telephony – all of which can be consumed in a domestic setting. The average home is an impressive communication hub and mobile phones, laptop computers and wi-fi connectivity are not particularly expensive. All of these factors point to 'staying in being the new going out' for the cosmopolitan stranger. Bauman (1998: 77) makes the point well when he says that;

> [M]ost of us are on the move even if physically, bodily, we stay put … When, as is our habit we are glued to our chairs and zap the cable or satellite channels on and off the TV screen – jumping in and out of foreign spaces with a speed much beyond the capacity of supersonic jets and cosmic rockets, but nowhere staying long enough to be more than visitors, to feel *chez soi*.

In this fascinating quote, at the same time as elucidating the idea of being 'everywhere, at home' Bauman manages to frame the cosmopolitan experience of strangeness in a retro language of speed; 'supersonic jets and cosmic rockets' in a way which makes his account of being 'on the move' a curiously nostalgic undertaking. His work also undermines the idea that a cosmopolitan is at home everywhere; on his account we are never at home, even when we are *chez soi*. The idea of being 'everywhere, at home' can be extended yet further. Such is the desire to be 'everywhere, at home' the idea of being only in one place is an anathema to the cosmopolitan stranger, for whom being in only one place makes being captured by communities of fate and acknowledging conventional forms of solidarity an unwelcome possibility. More generally it seems, being in one place has lost much of its appeal. To give an example from a totally unconnected debate, in a recent discussion of town twinning and why it is declining as a practice between towns worldwide one commentator voiced the opinion that because of the enhanced mobility that is a feature of life for many of us, 'the idea of fixing on one place is slightly inconsistent with the free movement that many, if not all of us, expect'.[6] This quote was made outside of any discussion of strangerhood yet seems to illuminate one dimension of the cosmopolitan stranger extremely well. Travelling to one place may result in you becoming a stranger; the cosmopolitan stranger, on the other hand, wants to be free of the ties and obligations which come from (attempted) belonging. The cosmopolitan stranger not only recognizes the potential pitfalls of conventional strangerhood but also realizes that strangeness provides political resources for the cosmo-

politan stranger but only if s/he remains unclaimed by communities. Being 'everywhere, at home' provides the basis for new forms of solidarity and alternative forms of collective action but only if the networking with distant others is as a result of multiple connectivities which do not settle on only one place.

Remaining free from the ministrations of existing communities allows the cosmopolitan stranger a certain freedom from both physical and ideological commitment. The cosmopolitan stranger's mobility is won at the expense of full membership of society and the sense of belonging that goes with it. Being 'everywhere, at home' captures nicely an important dimension of the cosmopolitan stranger: taking advantage of the possibility of enhanced mobility and being able to connect with distant others can only be achieved by someone who eschews regular social contact and does not seek conventional forms of community involvement. The cosmopolitan stranger is more likely to be found at home than in public engagement; paradoxically, by being at home he/she is best able to engage with others. The cosmopolitan stranger draws on domestic communicative technology in order to connect people with distant others. The cosmopolitan stranger facilitates networking while him/herself remaining apart from existing social groupings. These new kinds of social solidarity are likely to be 'long distance' rather than proximate groupings, but this is not essential, and may be virtual communities. The cosmopolitan stranger is likely to advocate a society of individuals.

But what about the idea of home which is promoted by the idea of being 'everywhere, at home'? In my reading of Bauman's quote above I concluded that he undermines the idea that a cosmopolitan is at home everywhere and moreover suggests that we can never be at home, even when we are *chez soi*. But in the conventional idea of the stranger 'home' is that which is denied the stranger by the community who sees him/her as 'coming today and staying tomorrow' but never fully belonging. In other words, the stranger will never be one of 'us'. The cosmopolitan stranger, on the other hand, not only escapes the clutches of communities who may have designs on him/her but is able to decide for him/herself where home might be, and what counts as home. One aspect of strangeness is that all of us feel increasingly not at home 'even when we are *chez soi*'. Another aspect of strangeness is that the people who are likely to feel most at home are the cosmopolitan strangers, who realize that it does not pay to fix on one place and that feeling 'at home' is only likely when one is so dispersed that one is connected 'everywhere'.

## Who are the cosmopolitan strangers?

The cosmopolitan stranger is only a distant cousin to Simmel's stranger, at best. But like Simmel's stranger the cosmopolitan stranger is a key figure for understanding the dynamics of societal change. The existence of the cosmopolitan stranger should not be taken as 'proof' that we live in a cosmopolitan society or indeed that the world is becoming more cosmopolitan. The cosmopolitan stranger is neither a harbinger of cosmopolitanism nor a purposive agent of cosmopolitan social change.

So who then are the cosmopolitan strangers? There are several compelling candidates for this form of strangerhood, and in the sections that follow we will become acquainted with some of them. All exhibit the features outlined above; they are 'here today, gone tomorrow' figures, they work to connect people who otherwise have no connection, they suggest a novel form of association, they are able to escape the clutches of existing ideological or cultural groupings, they are able to manoeuvre in the closed spaces which can be one outcome of global processes, and to differing extents they celebrate their role as strangers.

All examples of the cosmopolitan stranger considered below have a high visibility and live life in the public eye, to a greater or lesser extent. Given the above discussion we might expect them to be 'everywhere, at home', but we are not viewing them 'at home' due to their public activities. This is not necessarily a contradiction but it does pose an interesting methodological question; how can we see the cosmopolitan stranger if s/he is 'everywhere, at home'? In order to study the cosmopolitan stranger – and of more immediate importance, in order to exemplify them – we need to consider public figures who have a high visibility. This means that out of necessity the examples chosen below only capture a portion of potential cosmopolitan strangerhood.

### Phoenix Jones

We expect strangers to be individuals, easily identifiable people who stand out from the crowd because they are different in key ways. However, I doubt that cosmopolitan strangers are best represented by individuals at whom we can point and say 'there goes the cosmopolitan stranger'. In the discussion of the cosmopolitan stranger that follows there is certainly a tension between attempting to find an individual figure of the cosmopolitan stranger and recognizing that in fact this new form of stranger is more likely to be represented as a collective actor. Nevertheless, it may be useful to identify an individual who may represent the cosmopolitan stranger, if only to further investigate the

possibility of an individual fulfilling this role. The chapter following this one attempts a similar task in terms of film and television representations of the cosmopolitan stranger, where it has proved much easier to find individual representations.

The first candidate for cosmopolitan stranger is Phoenix Jones, self-styled superhero who wears a mask and a black and yellow superhero costume and patrols the streets of Seattle, USA and attempts to protect the public from violence and crime. Jones is a member of the Rain City Superhero Movement comprising a number of other DIY superheroes, including The Ghost, Pitch Black, and Knight Owl.[7] Phoenix Jones (real name Benjamin Fodor) sees himself as a concerned neighbour; 'I am just like everybody else. The only difference is that I try to stop crime in my neighbourhood',[8] while others see him as a vigilante who makes the job of the police more difficult by provoking trouble while attempting to apprehend 'criminals'. From the perspective of the police: 'Just because he's dressed up in costume, it doesn't mean he's in special consideration or above the law. You can't go around pepper spraying people because you think they are fighting.'[9]

On Ronson's (2011) account Fodor chose the name Phoenix Jones 'because the Phoenix rises from the ashes and Jones is one of America's most common surnames: He was the common man rising from society's ashes'. Phoenix Jones sees himself very much as the common man standing up for what is right, fighting for justice. 'It just takes one person to say, "I'm not afraid." And I guess I'm that guy' (quoted in Ronson, 2011). The purpose of the mask is interesting. Jones appropriated it after a burglar had left it behind. According to Jones: 'He [the burglar] used the mask to conceal his identity … I used the mask to *become* an identity' (Ronson, 2011).

Jon Ronson's account of Phoenix Jones and some of the other real-life superheroes in other US cities (apparently, there are around 200 in total)[10] – the most high-profile piece of journalism on the phenomenon to date – is respectful and appreciative. The author does not doubt the sincerity of their beliefs or their commitment to making the world a better place, but it is not a particularly analytical piece of writing. Nevertheless, Ronson does make an important observation.

> The real-life superheroes like to portray their motives as wholly benevolent, but if they were driven purely by altruism, they'd have become police officers or firefighters or charity volunteers. Something else is evidently propelling them – a touch of narcissism. It's an odd sort of narcissism, of course, when the narcissist disguises

> his face, but the lust for fame and glory is unmistakable (Ronson, 2011).

Ronson of course does not consider Phoenix Jones for the role of cosmopolitan stranger, but how well is he equipped for this role? He fulfils some of the requirements for cosmopolitan strangerhood. He falls into the category of 'here today, gone tomorrow' stranger; if Benjamin Fodor no longer donned the superhero uniform (because of injury, ill-health, or because the courts determined that he is a menace to society) then Phoenix Jones would cease to exist. In the meantime he continues to avoid 'capture' by community, most members of which would simply accept a degree of criminality in their neighbourhoods and opt for the quiet life. So, wearing the mask and donning the uniform prevents him from being the ordinary citizen that he claims to represent. The narcissism that Ronson identified could be interpreted as a refusal to be 'one of the crowd' and to remain removed from the 'herd instinct, of society's collective domesticity. But wearing the mask is also a strategy for appropriating the political resources which are contained within strangerhood. A superhero – in order to be effective as a deterrent to crime – has to remain apart from society. The mask bestows an identity on Phoenix Jones, as he himself recognizes, an identity which, in part at least, is consciously framed by the notion of the outsider or the stranger.

This chapter opened with a revealing development in the career of another and much more celebrated superhero, Superman, who was considering being less obviously pro-American in his dealings with the world. He claimed to want to adopt a greater global focus and serve the world, rather than the US. While Superman embraces cosmopolitanism it is less clear that Phoenix Jones is able to connect with distant others (unless these others are also real-life superheroes). A key aspect of the cosmopolitan stranger is the ability to connect with distant others and to embody new forms of solidarity. 'Standing up for the little guy' neither suggests distant connectivity nor new ways of forging community among strangers. The altruism demonstrated by Phoenix Jones, while laudable, is evidence of partial cosmopolitan strangerhood, at best.

### The flash mob

Another candidate for cosmopolitan stranger status is not an individual but a collective; the flash mob. A flash mob is a group of hitherto unconnected individuals who rendezvous at a pre-arranged date

and time in order to perform a particular action or create an event. The Oxford dictionary offers the following definition: 'a public gathering of complete strangers, organized via the Internet or mobile phone, who perform a pointless act and then disperse again'.[11] This definition is useful in that it identifies the flash mob as a group of strangers, and it emphasizes the brevity of the event.[12]

The flash mob is a fairly recent phenomenon, the development of which is often attributed to Bill Wasik, a US journalist (Molnár, 2009). 'With its meteorological resonance, its evocation of a "flash flood" of people mobbing a place or a site or a thing all at once and then dispersing, the term "flash mob" was utterly perfect' (Wasik, 2009).[13] Wasik's project was to create newsworthy events out of nothing by utilizing the communicative potential of new technology. For Wasik, organizing flash mobs was a challenge designed to encourage spontaneity and mobilize large groups in order to temporarily take over public spaces, carefully selected: 'only in enclosed spaces could the mob generate the necessary self-awe; to allow the mob to feel small would have been to destroy it' (Wasik, 2009). Wasik is very aware that the fragmentary tendencies of globalization also allow opportunities for new forms of sociality: the Internet 'has allowed us to connect with farther-flung people who are more and more like ourselves' (Wasik, 2009).

Wasik does not himself draw out the relationship between flash mobs and the strangers who largely comprise them. But many features of the flash mob make them attractive to strangers: the arbitrary date and time of meetings, the short window of opportunity within which to meet others, the dynamics of the crowd. It is also worth noting that the flash mob depends upon the coming together of strangers to form a mob, rather than existing groups of connected individuals. The flash mob requires spontaneity and this can only be properly delivered by a collection of strangers drawn together for a deliberately brief time.

It would be a mistake to make too many claims for the political significance of flash mobs. That they 'can be seen as a form of resistance' (Saunders, 2008: 295) is highly debatable. Saunders chooses to 'read the flash mob as a means of creating spaces in which claims to rights and recognition occur' (Saunders, 2008: 296). Saunders is right to point to the contradiction at the heart of the flash mob phenomenon, which is that the spontaneity which gives it the 'jarring presence' which can be so memorable is in fact the result of a high degree of organization and planning. It is difficult to sustain the interpretation of the flash mob as a 'form of resistance'. The spaces in which the flash mob comes together are not 'created' as such, but chosen for the

qualities that Bill Wasik highlights: public spaces that are accessible to large groups which wish to assemble and disperse quickly, but which are not so open that the impact of the gathering is lost. Wasik draws attention to the importance of the mob generating 'the necessary self-awe', and this is only possible if they assemble in a carefully chosen location. The self-awe that Wasik talks about will only be generated by the coming together of strangers, who are equally surprised and impressed by what has been briefly achieved. To the extent that the flash mob has an identity, it is through the self-awareness which accompanies being in awe of the impact of disciplined spontaneity.

For Molnar, in contrast, 'flash mobs are interesting precisely because they provide insight into the *intersection and interaction* between new communications media and physical space'. But to focus exclusively on this dimension is to downplay the centrality of strangers to the success of the flash mob. Molnar identifies several categories of flash mob, the original form being the 'atomized flash mob' in which 'people who are mobilized mostly through text messaging and emails come together in a public or semi-public space … to perform the same activity and disperse within ten minutes. People strictly do not interact with each other and the apolitical nature of the gatherings is strongly emphasized.' The individual actions of the members of the flash mob is thus brought to the fore. Interactive flash mobs, the second type, involve group game playing (for example, 'follow the leader') and have been associated with the idea of the 'reclaim the streets' political movement. This approximates to Saunders idea of flash mobs as resistance. In fact, Molnar offers another category: political flash mobs/smart mobs. Performance flash mobs have artistic intent and are often more thoroughly designed or choreographed. Advertising flash mobs form the final category. Molnar discusses the T-Mobile advertisement, one of the most well known, particularly to TV viewers in the UK. 'The cell phone service provider organized a "flash mob dance" at Liverpool Street Station in London … On January 15th, 2009 a single "commuter" suddenly broke into a dance on the main concourse of the train station. More and more people joined until over 300 "strangers" performed a perfectly choreographed dance routine, drawing in unsuspecting bystanders into the show.'

Although Molnar does not explore the important role of the stranger in flash mobs (and clearly in the T-Mobile example the 'strangers' are in fact a trained dance troupe, acting as if they are strangers) he is aware that they represent a new form of sociation. To explore this dimension he draws upon Simmel's concept of sociability in order to capture 'the social logic of the type of digitally mediated socialization incarnated

by flash mobs'. According to Molnar, for Simmel, sociability in its pure form has 'no ulterior end, no content and no result outside itself' and the 'free-playing, interacting independence of individuals' takes center stage in the interaction.

Does the flash mob represent the cosmopolitan stranger? It was stated earlier that the cosmopolitan stranger possesses some or all of the following characteristics: is not embedded in existing community structures, has access to transnational networks, is capable of exploiting the opportunities made available by globalization, represents a new type of social solidarity, and, importantly, is 'here today and gone tomorrow,' emerging from within society, briefly, only to disappear again very quickly. Flash mobs tick all these boxes. Having said that, over time flash mobs have become more and more associated with advertising and in the process the networked connectivity of the flash mob has become equated with mobile phone networks. These associations both discount the future potential of flash mobs and obscure their origins in the collective spontaneity of strangers.

**Public artists**

Taking up Papastergiadis' (2012) idea that art can be associated with new exchanges between strangers and alternative frameworks for organizing collective action it will be interesting to look at the activity of a number of artists (not discussed by Papastergiadis) who, I believe, can be classed as cosmopolitan strangers. I am thinking of artists who have designed large pieces of public art or monuments and whose activity works to connect distant others and offer the beginnings of a new form of social solidarity. In the discussion that follows I am concerned primarily with the work of artists Mark Wallinger and Anthony Gormley, and the architect Cecil Balmond.

In 2010 Cecil Balmond was announced by the Gretna Landmark Trust as the winner of a competition to design a public monument 'that celebrates and explores the border crossing [from England] into Scotland at Gretna'.[14] His winning design, 'The Star of Caledonia', is due to be constructed on the England-Scotland border on the A74 road at Gretna and will 'mark the point where the two nations meet' (McLaughlin, 2011). But the Gretna Landmark Trust and the architect expect that it will perform a more important function. In the architect's own vision for the monument the theme of connectivity is very much to the fore. 'The Star of Caledonia is a welcome; its kinetic form and light paths a constant trace of Scotland's power of invention.'[15] It is 'designed to be welcoming to the people coming to Scotland'.[16]

The connectivity of the monument is more than 'local'. The monument is expected to have iconic significance that will be recognized beyond the border country: 'the project is not just a regional project. The development of the landmark is an international project'.[17] The hoped-for international connectivity is also reflected in the presentation of the monument on the official webpage: 'The presence of a world-class iconic Scottish Landmark will signal a meaningful exploration of identity and borders .... The Star of Caledonia supports an image of a dynamic, innovative, outward-looking region.'[18] The ability of the monument to not only re-inscribe the border but to create a sense of place is a key element of the design, which fulfils the Landmark Trust's aim to raise awareness of Gretna as a 'significant national location as a Border Crossing and the southern gateway to Scotland'.[19] The rejuvenated border offers the possibility of international connectivity, but not as a of re-kindling the nationalist antagonism of the historical English/Scottish border.

A contemporary of the 'Star of Caledonia', and like that monument still to be built, Mark Wallinger's 'White Horse' at Ebbsfleet, is another recent public monument which celebrates connectivity and communication. The 'White Horse' is a 50 metre high representation of a thoroughbred horse looking out over Ebbsfleet Valley and the Thames Estuary. Like the 'Star of Caledonia' the 'White Horse' was the winning design in a landmark competition, commissioned by Ebbsfleet Project Limited, a company funded by Eurostar, Land Securities, and London and Continental Railways (LCR). Unlike the 'Star of Caledonia' which was immediately understood to have an obvious connection to its location (a 'welcoming' border marker) which was reflected in its design, Wallinger's 'White Horse' proved more difficult to understand and its form and subject matter considered by some to be rather arbitrary, particularly so as it had been dubbed 'The Angel of the South' by some commentators.[20]

Labelling Wallinger's 'White Horse' as 'The Angel of the South' does not help us understand the design. In fact, the 'White Horse' design only makes sense when viewed as a border monument, although Ebbsfleet is not normally thought to be located on a border. Ebbsfleet can be considered a new border as a result of Ebbsfleet Eurostar railway station (opened in November 2007), located between London St Pancras and Ashford International stations. As it is used for the embarkation/disembarkation of passengers to and from France and Belgium it is a site of UK border controls. Ebbsfleet is unusual in that it is a border first and a place second (some would see it as a non-place). Ebbsfleet is also

unusual in that the border is less obviously a marker of local/national difference or of a parochial notion of inside/outside.

Interpretations of the 'White Horse' have tended to focus on the representation of the horse and its historical significance. According to one commentator:

> Wallinger's horse is … designed to look surreal and uncanny, to amaze train travellers arriving from continental Europe … Wallinger's dreamlike spectacle fuses the art of Magritte with that of the 18th-century British painter George Stubbs … at the same time the horse's whiteness associates it with the British folk tradition of giant figures incised into chalk hillsides. In other words, this horse has a sense of history that belies its apparent simplicity (Jones, 2009).

In the above passage understanding the monument is approached via the figure of the horse rather than where it is located and why, although an intended audience – Eurostar travellers – is identified, thereby locating it on a border.

In fact, what makes the 'White Horse' monument particularly interesting is its location on a new border, a border which didn't exist a decade ago and which demarcates the UK and France and UK and Belgium even though it is situated at a distance from the periphery of the UK's territory. It is a border monument that inscribes the border in a similar way to the 'Star of Caledonia' but which does not have the existing borderline to draw upon. Wallinger's 'White Horse' makes visible the border in a way that Ebbsfleet railway station – the 'official' border location – has so far not been able to achieve. Another interpretation of the monument emphasizes the 'place making' potential of public monuments.

> 'Public art' … is said to provide economic value by branding urban space or by aiding 'place making', for example, Mark Wallinger's proposal for a giant white horse, commissioned by Ebbsfleet Project Limited … Cultural policy has become one of the mainstays of economic policy initiatives by a neo-liberal state faced with industrial decline and urban neglect and an ideology that has turned away from state intervention (Hewitt, 2011: 25).

On this reading, the monument is seen as an aide to economic growth, attracting interest and investment in a region not previously known to investors. Ebbsfleet in located in the Thames Gateway region designated

as a national priority for urban re-generation. The regeneration theme and the role of the 'White Horse' in marking a 'non-space' is summarized by one perceptive commentator in the following terms:

> The Ebbsfleet Valley is a development zone occupying an unpromising stretch of ex-industrial territory sandwiched between the Thames Estuary and the outer London motorway system. In the future, this is planned to be a community of 10,000 houses – a medium-sized town – but before anyone moves there, in a move possibly unique in art history, it was decided to give this hypothetical place a sculptural emblem sited near the confluence of the Eurostar railway line and major roads, including the M25 motorway … (Gayford, 2008).

Anthony Gormley is probably best known for his work 'Angel of the North' (1992), and also 'Another Place' comprising 100 life-size, cast iron figures on Waterloo Beach in Crosby, Merseyside, UK, and other similar installation in the Alps and elsewhere, e.g. 'Event Horizon' (2007). Gormley used cast iron figures in his earlier work, particularly 'Total Strangers' (1997). These figures were exhibited in Cologne, Germany – positioned both inside and outside a gallery (some of them on pavements and in public spaces) – and according to one commentator 'reveal themselves as instruments of the perception of the other in oneself' (von Graevenitz, 1999: 9). The sculptures seem familiar and yet not familiar at the same time. The figures provoke self-reflection; the viewer is not presented with a mirror-image but 'the "image" of the fictitious stranger' (von Graevenitz, 1999: 10). The result is a distancing from the self; the idea that we can be a stranger to ourselves. In an interview, Gormley admitted that the title of the exhibition referred to 'not really knowing where I belong, you know, where my home is' (Kittelmann and Gormley, 1999: 25).

So what of Balmond, Wallinger and Gormley as cosmopolitan strangers? Both the 'Star of Caledonia' and the 'White Horse' generate ideas (or feelings) of distant connectivity, as does Gormley's 'Another Place' and 'Event Horizon'. Public artists are not 'of' the communities in which they work but work to connect 'locals' to remote others. The nature of their work makes them 'here today and gone tomorrow' strangers. They are all, to a greater or lesser extent, aware of their strangerhood and the political resources that this affords; a fresh perspective not bound in local tradition, a certain critical distance, a mixture of professional disinterest and emotional engagement. In many respects then public artists are very good examples of the cosmopolitan stranger, the

recognition of which is implicit in Papastergiadis' idea that artists can generate new connections and exchanges between strangers thereby engendering fresh understandings of social organization action. In his words, 'art has become a medium for reconstituting the social' (Papastergiadis, 2012: 14).

**Communities of disaster**

Many issues in the contemporary world – 9/11, global warming, the Asian tsunami of December 2004 – can appear too big to comprehend, and/or their consequences too enormous to be easily assimilated. As a result, governments and other authoritative bodies are under pressure to provide an official version of events on the basis of which people can begin to make sense of that which at first appears to make no sense. At the same time as many people rely upon the emotional and practical support that these responses can represent other people prefer to generate their own 'unofficial' version of events (sometimes because they are mistrustful of the official version), and these contending narratives often come into conflict, particularly when governments or other official bodies have an interest in promoting a certain interpretation of events, as in cases where national security interests are evoked.

One very good example of this is the way in which the events of 9/11 were experienced in the US (and elsewhere). The attacks on the World Trade Centre and on other sites in the US forced citizens to confront an enormity of which they had little or no comparable experience. Making sense of this event and representing the 'unrepresentable' was only possible when people began to make connections, not only with previous experiences (such as Pearl Harbour), but with others in a wider global community. Kate Nash, writing about 9/11, makes the point that 'at moments of heightened emotion national feelings of belonging are experienced temporarily in a way that makes them impossible to separate absolutely from strong feelings about people who are "like us," not just as fellow nationals but also as human beings' (Nash, 2003: 510). Nash identifies these emotional groupings as cosmopolitan communities of sentiment. Attempting to apprehend the unfathomable, rendering it intelligible, and representing the unrepresentable, are all key to an understanding of how cosmopolitan communities can be formed. This cosmopolitanism can also be seen in many responses to the London bombings of July 7th 2005 (see also Chapter 5). These responses ranged from the somewhat predictable 'we are all Londoners now' (echoing responses to 7/11) to more explicit depictions of London as the cosmopolitan city par excellence, and the embodiment of values of inclusion,

diversity, tolerance, open-mindedness etc: a city where everyone can belong. Underlining this sense of cosmopolitan community , a memorial plaque unveiled in Victoria Embankment Gardens reads, 'Under this tree people of all faiths and nationalities, united in grief, laid wreaths in memory of those killed on 7th July 2005, following the attacks on London's public transport system'. Other cosmopolitan metaphors such as London as a community of communities, 'the world in one city', and 'the world on a train' were employed in an attempt to reflect the ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity of London's populace captured in a series of horrific snapshots at the moment of the explosions.

The cosmopolitan dimensions of responses to disaster have been charted most fully by Rebecca Solnit (admittedly without drawing on the language of cosmopolitanism), particularly in her book *A Paradise Built in Hell: The Extraordinary Communities That Arise in Disaster* (Solnit, 2009). Her thesis is that in the aftermath of a disaster there is an increase in altruism; people are 'urgently engaged in caring for themselves and those around them, strangers and neighbours as well as friends and loved ones' (Solnit, 2009: 2). She is keen to counter the myth, propagated by much of the media, on the one hand, and disaster movies, for example on the other, that in the face of calamity, 'ordinary people are hysterical or vicious' (Solnit, 2009: 8) and prone to chaotic behaviour and selfishness leading to a climate of fear and mistrust. Solnit writes of the positive public response to the disasters of 9/11 and in particular the influx of people into New York to help with relief work, and at communications centres and hospitals. In addition, there were a lot of people meeting in New York's public spaces. 'Union Square … became the city's great public forum … it exemplified what cities can be at their best, a place where strangers come to meet, discuss, and debate, to be present in the public life of their country' (Solnit, 2009: 200). According to Solnit 'this awakened civil society seemed to alarm the Bush administration, which immediately took measures to quell it' (Solnit, 2009: 222). She writes, '[p]eople were encouraged to stay home, to go shopping to stimulate the economy, to keep buying big cars … they seemed desperate to push people back into an entirely private life of consuming and producing' (Solnit, 2009: 222). The mistrustful response of political elites had the effect of dissipating the post-disaster atmosphere of public service, connectedness and improvisation.[21]

Solnit's argument is that in the aftermath of disasters we are allowed a glimpse of an alternative society which is built on altruism and collabora-

tion between strangers. The collective response to disasters points the way to a form of sociality which cannot thrive in a world of individuation, neo-liberal precepts, and a 'me first' culture. The spontaneous action of people coming together outside of any formal structures of community or belonging – 'improvising another kind of society' (Solnit, 2009: 305) – is difficult for official administrations to cope with and as a result they work hard to reclaim the social from the people.

## Concluding comments

This chapter has sought to advance an understanding of cosmopolitanism that is much removed from the cosmopolitanisms which are currently popular in the social sciences, achieving some distance from 'cosmopolitan realism' being a particular priority. As has been argued here, cosmopolitanism is better understood as a strategy of connectivity under conditions where 'global openness' is not manifest and individuals are constrained by a lack of networking options. On the basis of this understanding of cosmopolitanism it has been possible to re-imagine the figure of the stranger, one consistent with the realities of the Global Age. The cosmopolitan stranger is a distant relative, at best, of the strangers imagined by Simmel, Bauman and many other commentators. The cosmopolitan stranger does not attempt to disguise or shy away from his/her strangerhood. As distinct from previous incarnations of the stranger the cosmopolitan stranger embraces a role which positions him/her at the margins, or even beyond, existing social groupings. The cosmopolitan stranger works to maintain separation from 'community' in order that s/he can work to propagate new forms of social solidarity, ones which connect people across distances and/or creates neighbours where previously only strangers existed. The cosmopolitan stranger aims at the reconstitution of community, even though s/he chooses to remain free of community ties.

The cosmopolitan stranger exists in theory then, but does s/he exist in reality? Examples of the cosmopolitan stranger do exist, it has been shown, but not necessarily in the form of an individual stranger figure. The cosmopolitan strangers identified here – a real-life superhero, the flash mob, public artists, and communities that arise in disaster – are very different (the latter three, at least) from the cosmopolitan strangers which are identified in film and television drama (see next chapter). This could be because the conventions shaping film narratives prefer to work with individuals rather than collectivities. Perhaps individual

examples of the cosmopolitan stranger are less easy to identify because as suggested above they are 'everywhere, at home', not needing to engage publically or visibly in order to succeed in connecting people across large distances. It could be that following further investigation a different range of cosmopolitan strangers may emerge, and one must retain an open mind about the variety of forms that the cosmopolitan stranger might take.

# 7
# Representing the Stranger: Film and Television

## Introduction

The stranger, conventionally understood, has long been a staple of several film genres, notably westerns and science fiction. The figure of the stranger works well within the structure of film dramas, allowing for the introduction of new characters and scenarios with an economy of narrative development (a stranger rides into town and disturbs the status quo in some way, being perhaps the most tried and tested narrative device). The figure of the stranger also allows us to view the familiar workings of society with fresh eyes and encourages an examination of taken-for-granted norms and values. The stranger can be represented as a threat, as a catalyst for change, or as a dispassionate judge of human behaviour. The stranger that is so represented is inevitably the stranger which emerges from the work of Simmel; someone who 'comes today and stays tomorrow', and in doing so brings about changes to the host community, perhaps fracturing a previous unity or alternatively redoubling the ties that bind a community.

In exploring contemporary representations of the stranger in film I am primarily concerned with films that depict a new type of stranger, rather than perpetuate the classic figure who is inevitably contrasted to a fixed and bounded community. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that this 'new' type of stranger is also to be found in films from different periods, and in this sense is not only a recent development. Furthermore, contemporary film continues to depict the conventional figure of the stranger. However, I believe that in contemporary cinema it is possible to identify four distinct representations of the stranger. These are the stranger as migrant, the stranger as terrorist, the self as stranger, and the cosmopolitan stranger, the figure outlined in Chapter 6.

It is argued that representations of the cosmopolitan stranger are both more common and more important than generally understood, and the films concerned can be interpreted, in part, as commentaries on important aspects of social change and nascent trends in societal development. In reading film in this way it is necessary to challenge established interpretations of several films, for example *Fight Club* which is not generally thought to be a 'stranger movie'.

But why should we bother with representations of the stranger in film at all? Before we proceed it will be useful to assert the value of exploring representations of the stranger, and also reasons why I have chosen to explore representations mainly in film (and TV, to a much lesser extent), as opposed to, say, contemporary literature. On the first point, I would say that representations of the stranger provide an opportunity to better understand both the stranger in contemporary society and the condition of strangeness that we find ourselves in. This is because strangeness is a liminal state of affairs, by which I mean, 'a comparatively unstructured state of the in-between, where neither the old nor the new frames of reference work properly' (Durrschmidt and Taylor, 2007: 1). In other words, conventional perspectives on the stranger are no longer adequate while a new framework of understanding has yet to fully crystallize. In this liminal, or inbetween, state of affairs representations of the stranger in film, it is argued, provide a very valuable resource for understanding the stranger. It could be that what is taking sociologists some time to work out is already being understood, interpreted, and incorporated into a view of the world by film-makers and producers of television series.

On the second point, the choice of film over literature is an arbitrary one in some ways, but I believe that film has a more central place in popular culture and as such it is likely that the discussion of films will be accessible to a greater number of readers. There is also the practical consideration that students can 'catch up' with films they have missed more quickly than they can read a pile of novels. Nevertheless, a good case could be made for choosing literature over film, not least because films such as *Fight Club*, and *Children of Men*, both discussed here, started life as novels rather than screenplays. In fact, I am very reluctant to study film to the exclusion of literature and although drawing more heavily on the former I continue to make reference to the latter throughout this chapter.

Choosing film over literature forecloses discussion of some wonderfully rich texts. The conventional figure of the stranger is well represented in literature, not least in science fiction literature where Robert

Heinlein's *Stranger in a Strange Land* would be an obvious choice as would Russell Hoban's *Fremder*. In contemporary science fiction literature China Mieville's *The City and the City* offers a compelling and original vision of the self as stranger. Beyond genre fiction, in 'classic' literature the obvious choice would be Camus' *L'Etranger*. Kafka's *The Castle* offers a paradigmatic stranger narrative, with the character K being clearly positioned as a stranger by the inhabitants of the village at which he arrives, '… you are a stranger, a superfluous person getting in everyone's way'. K also sees himself as a stranger: 'I'm a stranger here; I arrived in the village only yesterday evening'. In the contemporary context, the stranger is portrayed in various ways in novels such as Michael Frayn's *Spies* (the self as stranger), Will Self's *The Butt* and Daniel Kehlmann's *Fame: A Novel in Nine Episodes* (the stranger as migrant), J.G. Ballard's *Millennium People* (the terrorist as stranger). The cosmopolitan stranger is also well represented. In addition to Palahniuk's *Fight Club* and James' *Children of Men* (both discussed in detail below) we can include W.P. Kinsella's *Shoeless Joe* (also made into a film – *Field of Dreams),* Magnus Mills' *Three to See the King*, and James Hawes' *Speak for England*. So well does this novel depict the figure of the cosmopolitan stranger, as outlined in this book, that it almost deserves a chapter of its own.

Having established that film is the focus of attention here I need to say something about the way in which film will be approached in this chapter before proceeding to explore the figure of the stranger in westerns, a rich source of representations over many years.[1] First it will perhaps be useful to say something about what I am not intending to do. I do not wish to discuss movies in order to justify positions and understandings which have been arrived at independently of studying film. I see many examples in the literature of films being used to illustrate a point or to 'prove' the applicability of theories developed in another context, or demonstrating the extent to which films 'fit' with off-the-peg interpretations. My approach is different, as I hope will be clear, as what I want to do is to treat the film in the same way as any other text, academic or non-academic, and approach it as a source of information and knowledge, an interpretation of events, or as a resource for theory-making. My view is that films, like any other text, can tell us things we were not previously aware of. I should point out that my approach to film and television is a narrative approach, and I will not deal with aspects of visual style. The point then is not to demonstrate how a particular film illustrates a sociological insight but to understand the world slightly differently, and hopefully better, as a result of a particular reading of a film. The key then is not the extent to which the

film illustrates sociological 'truths' but how it can be interpreted, and how on the basis of this interpretation we are able to make more sense of the world. Approached in this way, it is believed that films can demonstrate how little we know about the contemporary stranger and how strange the world can be, and also how we might go about establishing a better understanding.

In developing this framework I have drawn upon the work of several scholars (while deliberately avoiding approaches employed by certain others). Particularly influential has been the work of Nikos Papastergiadis, both in understanding the figure of the stranger and in developing an approach to understanding film. Papastergiadis does not write much on film – his interest lies with art (Papastergiadis, 2012) – but I hope that some of his insights can be usefully incorporated into my approach to interpreting film. He writes, '[w]hat knowledge does art offer?' (Papastergiadis, 2012: 13), and before answering his own question reminds us how sociologists (and others) tend to look at art. 'Sociologists have frequently turned to art in order to glimpse the rise of emergent practices and marvelled at the capacity of artists to morph vague ideas into comprehensible forms' (Papastergiadis, 2012: 13). His own approach begins with the recognition that artists' engagement with politics normally takes the form of 'revealing the flawed means by which the politics of fear are defined'. More constructively, artists have opposed divisive politics by 'initiating new modes of exchange between strangers and generating alternative conceptual frameworks for organizing collective action … art has become a medium for reconstituting the social' (Papastergiadis, 2012: 14). This is an important contribution which takes us a long way beyond drawing upon art (or literature) in order to 'glimpse an emergent practice', valuable though this might be.

When I look at film and literature I am particularly interested in the ways in which books and movies offer an alternative conceptual framework for viewing collective action and the connectivity of strangers. Attempts at the reconstitution of the social, a task with which the 'cosmopolitan stranger' is charged (see Chapter 6), is also centrally of interest. Walter Mignolo (2000b: 223) has also influenced my approach, particularly his idea that literature generates theoretical knowledge. By this he means that we should judge literature less as a representation of society, 'but as a reflection in its own way about issues of human and historical concern' (Mignolo, 2000b: 223). I applaud this approach, which I believe can be transferred to the study of film: a source of new understanding and interpretations which may not yet be formulated clearly in the academic field. Moreover, literature or film not only gen-

erates theoretical knowledge it also generates multiple perspectives. This means that not only can film offer a new understanding of processes of social change but can generate many perspectives on them. This is important, as Walter Benjamin recognized; 'knowledge claims are necessarily embedded in particular subjective understandings of how the world works' (quoted in Lewis et al, 2008: 199).

## The classic stranger: The western

The figure of the stranger newly arrived in town, possibly a threat, possibly a saviour, possibly both, is a staple of a great number of Hollywood westerns. These are films which often depict a frontier society in which the rule of law is precarious or largely absent, and in which settled community or family life is shown to be difficult, insecure, provisional, and possibly undesirable. Against this background the stranger represents an alternative lifestyle and/or an alternative set of values. On the one hand, the stranger stands for the possibility of protection in a lawless world, escape from a life of subsistence, novelty in a life of routine and predictability. On the other hand, he can represent a fundamental threat. The stranger is by no means always benevolent and can act to undermine family values and community cohesion. The strangers represented in films such as *Shane*, *The Pale Rider*, and *High Plains Drifter* are all versions of Simmel's stranger; coming today and staying tomorrow. They are marked off by their obvious difference from the relatively stable communities which host them. They are men who live alone and have a high degree of self-sufficiency. They are loners with no ties to community (and often prefer things that way). However, they do possess skills/knowledge that the locals do not possess and which are highly prized, most obviously gun-fighting skills, and often organizational and/or motivational skills. Sometimes the stranger is a source of hope and inspiration for a community, galvanizing the locals into action that they would not otherwise take (*The Pale Rider*), at other times the stranger is a less beneficial figure protecting the community while disrupting, and even undermining, their normal state of affairs (*High Plains Drifter*). In these films the community is changed for the better or for the worse as a result of the stranger, but at least its existence is secured.

Will Wright, in his structuralist reading of the western, points to a list of common features which form the narrative structure of the classical western (Wright, 1975: 49). The stranger is central to this narrative structure. The films concerned tell the story of a hero 'estranged

from his society but upon whose ability rests the fate of that society' (Wright, 1975: 40). *Shane* is one such film. The structure of this film comprises the following elements (simplified from Wright's account): (i) the hero enters a social group, unknown to society. Shane is a total stranger when he enters town. In fact, he 'is so much a stranger that he has no last name and no past' (Wright, 1975); (ii) the hero is revealed to have an exceptional ability. 'Shane is an unknown quantity at first but quickly reveals himself to be a gun-fighter. Society recognizes him as a different and special kind of person (Wright, 1975: 42); (iii) he is given a special 'hero' status but society does not fully accept the hero. In the case of Shane, he is distrusted by other characters because of his decisions, taken at various points in the narrative, about whether to fight or not fight; (iv) there is a conflict of interest between the villains and society (society is weak but the villains are strong); (v) the hero fights/defeats the villains thereby making society safe; (vi) society accepts the hero who then loses or gives up his special status. Shane leaves the community after ridding it of bad guys, although he could have stayed and enjoyed the gratitude of the farmers he has protected. To stay though would have meant giving up his special role as a gun-fighter. To stay would mean becoming a farmer. In the western, the stranger is also caught in the opposition between wilderness and civilization, 'the wandering unsettled life contrasted with the domestic, established life' (Wright, 1975: 49–50). As we will see, the figure of 'the fugitive' faces very similar dilemmas.

## Contemporary figures of the stranger

Contemporary film portrays four figures of the stranger. The first two are fairly predictable and familiar, the second two far less so. The first figure of the stranger is the migrant, a key figure in the popular imagination and in the domestic politics of many countries (Loshitzky, 2010). The second is the stranger-as-terrorist, particularly popular since 9/11 and the 'war on terror'. The other figures of the stranger are less familiar, and less frequently written about. They are however of equal if not greater significance and both are of particular interest in the context of this book. The first figure is the 'self as stranger'. Films in this category may portray two versions of the same character, as a result of cloning, for example, or reveal a hidden dimension of a character hitherto seen from only one perspective. In either case, people are revealed as, or discover themselves to be, strangers to themselves The final figure of the stranger is the cosmopolitan stranger who emerges

from within society, stands apart from existing forms of community while representing an alternative vision of social solidarity, and connects with distant others. The cosmopolitan stranger does not 'come today and stay tomorrow, rather s/he is often 'here today and gone tomorrow'.

In this chapter I will focus primarily on the 'stranger as terrorist' and the 'self as stranger' before moving on to consider representations of the cosmopolitan stranger. It is argued that introduction of the cosmopolitan stranger allows for an alternative and ultimately more satisfactory interpretation of a range of contemporary films, including *Fight Club*, perhaps one of the most heavily studied of all recent films, and one which has been the subject of multiple interpretations (Diken and Laustsen, 2008; Schuchardt, 2008). *Fight Club* is best understood as a film which portrays many manifestations of the stranger: the 'stranger as terrorist', the 'self as stranger', and ultimately, the cosmopolitan stranger. Before moving to a discussion of this film it is first necessary to say something about the 'migrant stranger', a familiar figure which fits more closely with a conventional, Simmelian interpretation of the stranger.

## The migrant stranger

For Loshitzsky, the migrant is the paradigmatic stranger, who never really loses his/her strangeness no matter how long s/he has been resident. In this sense the stranger is very much Simmel's someone who 'comes today and stays tomorrow'. 'The first- or second-generation migrant may hold British or French citizenship, eat fish and chips or baguettes, but he is still the dangerous "stranger", "alien", and "foreigner"' (Loshitzky, 2010: 6). Loshitzky sets out to understand how films dealing with migration and diaspora challenge existing notions of Europeanness, and explores the crisis of identity 'through the emerging discourse of anxiety regarding its [i.e. Europe's] new strangers and others within' (Loshitzky, 2010: 9), an investigation which is preempted somewhat by her labelling of Europe as 'Fortress Europe'. However, she advances the idea that film allows us a valuable perspective on European society's 'struggle to forge a collective identity at the expense of plural identities' (Loshitzky, 2010: 11).[2]

In this section I will explore Loshitzky's treatment of the 'migrant stranger' by focusing on the third of the three 'evolving genres of films about immigration' that she identifies. The three genres correspond to different stages of the migratory experience: 'journeys of hope' (the

journey from homeland to host country); 'in the promised land' (the migrant's encounter with the host society), and 'second generation and beyond' (the marginalization of the children of migrants) (Loshitzky, 2010: 15). The particular focus of my consideration of this 'third genre' will be Loshitzky's treatment of 'the camp', an increasingly important theme across the social science literature (Vaughan-Williams, 2009; Diken and Laustsen, 2005). I will explore the camp via a reading of two films, the first of which is *Code 46*, the second *Children of Men*. In my readings of these two films I seek to problematize the figures of the camp and the migrant, thereby offering a different interpretation from that advanced by Loshitzky. The camp, rather than being easy to position in respect of inside/outside is in fact more ambiguous, the boundaries between the camp and 'society' often being blurred. Equally, the camp can be a prison but can also exist as a political resource for the migrant, whose journey is not necessarily uni-directional and predetermined. Crossing boundaries may involve travelling large distances but equally it may involve negotiating the borderlands of 'everyday difference'.

Loshitzky (2010: 118) situates Michael Winterbottom's film *Code 46* within what she calls his 'camp trilogy', which also includes the films *In This World* and *The Road to Guantanamo*. In her view, Winterbottom represents the camp 'as a space of exclusion, punishment and torture to which people are exiled …' (Loshitzky, 2010: 119). In my view this is an impoverished reading of the camp, both in Winterbottom's film, and more generally of a key motif in films which deal with the 'reconstitution of the social'. My reading of *Code 46* (and of the film *Children of Men,* which also offers a representation of the camp, see below) is juxtaposed with the figure of the (cosmopolitan) stranger, which I argue is a (hitherto unacknowledged) feature of both films. On my reading the camp is a far less simple and more ambivalent institution which raises important questions about the nature of inside/outside.

*Code 46* is a science fiction film set in the near future where human cloning is commonplace. The title refers to a law which is intended to prevent incest between genetic relatives in a world where knowing exactly who might be your biological progenitor is not a simple matter. In the film's dystopian vision of the near future the population is divided between those who live 'inside' heavily regulated cities, replete with securitization, physically separated from the 'outside' world, where the poor and unruly live. Travel between cities is highly restricted, requiring permits known as 'papelles'. The central character is William, a fraud investigator, who is sent to Shanghai to interview employees of 'The

Sphinx', the company which manufactures the papelles, in order to find out which employee is responsible for smuggling papelles out of the building and selling them for profit. He identifies Maria Gonzalez as the guilty party but because he becomes attracted to her points the finger of blame at another employee. William and Maria begin an affair and shortly afterwards Maria falls pregnant and is sent by 'The Sphinx' on what is euphemistically referred to as a 'happiness break' occasioned by 'body issues'. In reality, she has been convicted of a Code 46 violation and her pregnancy is terminated and her memory of 'the man, the sex act, and the pregnancy' are erased. William returns to Shanghai and searches for her, finding her in the clinic but with no memory of him. He discharges her from the clinic to discover that she has been infected with a virus, designed to prevent a future Code 46 violation, which induces physical revulsion in her when he attempts to touch her. Moreover, William discovers that the reason for the Code 46 violation (of which he was completely unaware) is that she is a clone of his dead mother. In order to be together, and away from the surveillance that is ever-present in the city, they travel to Jebel Ali in the Middle East where Maria, under the influence of the anti-Code 46 virus, reports another Code 46 violation after they make love and the couple are forced to go on the run. However, the car they are escaping in crashes. William awakes in a hospital with his wife and child in attendance but with no memory of Maria or the Code 46 violation. Maria's punishment is to be exiled to the 'al fuera' lands in the desert.

Mobility is a key theme in this film, and in particular the relationship which exists between outside and inside (and the transition between them). As well as the key themes of mobility, bordering and access, the film also has interesting things to say about the stranger, not restricted to a discussion of the 'migrant as stranger'. Before turning our attention to the stranger we should first address the issue of inside/outside, as represented in the film. There is a strong differentiation between those living in the protected areas of the city and those living in the 'al fuera' lands beyond. These two realms are separated by heavily monitored borders which require the traveller to possess a 'papelle'[3] travel document, which in turn requires that the traveller is eligible for 'cover', a form of biometric travel insurance.

> The global enclaves of affluence are "Inside," within the metropoles that are ringed by checkpoints. To be Inside, one must have papeles – papers or documents – that encode one's genetic information and

> enable one's movement between cities. Life on the Outside, without papeles, is often dire (Goss, 2007: 65).

The world is divided between 'the global elite on one side [of the border] and the global refugee on the other' (Loshitzky, 2010: 131). Loshitzky (2010: 130) likens life in the Shanghai of the movie to a 'gated community', fortified against undesirable migrants from the outside. But in the 'gated community' life is 'inhospitable to its own inhabitants, who live under the constant scrutinizing gaze of the panopticon world city turned into a ghetto of insecure transience' (Loshitzky, 2010: 130). Yet it is not clear which of these binary opposites is in fact 'the camp'. The city is a space of 'exclusion, punishment and torture' – Maria's 'happiness break' could be construed as containing all three elements – while the 'wilderness' aspects of 'al fuera', while appearing to contain 'camps', as conventionally understood, are clearly viewed as positive in certain respects by William and Maria. The extent to which the 'inside' resembles 'the camp' is summarized by Marks (2005: 232).

> [T]hose inside dread the possibility of being ostracised to the dystopian outer world. Furthermore, those 'inside' are also subject to restriction about where, and for how long, they can remain in restricted locations. Papelles provide the means to travel, but they are programmed to allow only access for designated periods; when that time expires, it is possible to be trapped in the space you currently inhabit, unable to move without authorisation.

What is interesting about the inside/outside divisions rightly highlighted by Loshitzky as a key theme in the film is that despite the borders being very heavily securitized William and Maria cross and re-cross from inside to outside and back again with some regularity. Before examining this mobility further we need to explore the ways in which both William and Maria are at different times in the film constituted as strangers (to each other). At one level the film concerns two people who meet and fall in love and despite difficult personal circumstances – he is already married and lives in Seattle while she lives in Shanghai (and, as we later find out, she is a clone of his mother) – they attempt to be together. However, there exists a much more formidable barrier to them being together than mere distance. They are rarely 'together' even when they are physically with each other. When they first meet (on Maria's birthday) she falls asleep while William is with

her in her apartment. When they next meet Maria's memory has been erased so that during their time together she does not recognize him. Subsequently, when they travel to Jebel Ali in order to be together in a more conducive environment the anti-Code 46 virus severely inhibits their physical intimacy (this mirrors the first time they meet at which time William's interest in her is in part stimulated by the 'empathy virus' which he has contracted in order to better interview the suspects in the case of the stolen papelles). After the accident which results in them being apprehended and Maria exiled to 'al fuera' William's memory has been erased and so they are unable even to share memories of their times together. They are almost always strangers to each other; there exists a series of disjunctures which divide their time together and mean that physical contiguity does not equal 'being together'. The result is that they are hardly together in any meaningful sense. They are forever meeting each other across barriers every bit as imposing as the border between 'al fuera' and Shanghai. Their journey from memory to forgetting is another complication in crossing from the city to 'al fuera'. On this basis the film develops an interesting interpretation of the idea of 'migrant as stranger', with Maria and William's attempts to be together, and their need to cross borders in order to do this, thwarted by their punishments for the Code 46 violation. Despite their attempts to be together they are rarely anything but strangers and at the end of the film are once again fundamentally estranged.

In order to further challenge Loshitzky's thesis on the migrant and the camp I will offer a reading of the film *Children of Men*, a film which in fact contains elements of all three of her genres, but is not a film to which she gives consideration. Focusing on *Children of Men* also allows me to introduce the figure of the cosmopolitan stranger, represented in the film by the character Theo Faren.

*Children of Men* (2006), directed by Alfonso Cuarón, is a 'journey of hope' film as well as containing elements of Loshitzky's 'promised land' and 'second generation and beyond' genres. The film does more than portray the 'migrant stranger'; it is also a commentary on the growing securitization of society and offers a critical perspective on the 'moral panics' generated by the construction of immigration-as-threat. It confounds many expectations associated with the 'journey of hope' genre and contains many themes which resonate with the strangeness thesis advanced in this book. The premise of the film, set a few years in the future (in 2027), is that society is in crisis resulting from the fact that no children have been born in the world for 18 years and the

human race faces extinction. The cause of this mass infertility remains mysterious. Around the world governments have collapsed leading to the UK becoming a destination for many would-be refugees (or 'fugees' as they are termed in the film). The UK is a police state in which security forces target illegal immigrants and suspected sympathizers who are rounded up and housed in camps, which are both sites of oppression and resistance and rebellion.

The narrative focuses on the life of Theo Faren whose ex-wife is involved with a group of rebels (viewed as terrorists by the autocratic authorities) called 'The Fishes' whose struggle is aimed at securing 'equal rights of immigrants'. In the Britain portrayed in the film fugees are very much second class citizens: a poster in Theo's office demands 'Jobs for the Brits'.

Contact with his wife leads him to meet a woman, Kee, living under the protection of his ex-wife's group, who is – miraculously (and mysteriously) – pregnant. The group believe that if made public, knowledge of Kee's pregnancy will be manipulated by the government for propaganda purposes. The leader of 'The Fishes', Luke, states that 'the government would never acknowledge the first human birth in 18 years from a fugee'. The group pressurizes Theo into helping them because they wish to exploit his good connections with his cousin, a top bureaucrat. They need him to use his connections in order to obtain the necessary travel documents which would enable the group to get the pregnant fugee, Kee, out of the country in order to rendezvous with the 'Tomorrow', a ship belonging to the 'Human Project', a humanitarian organization existing beyond the reach of the UK authorities and which represents a source of hope in the (under)world, but the existence of which is somewhat uncertain (and possibly mythical). The travel permits which Theo is able to obtain stipulate that he must accompany Kee on her journey. His friend Jasper arranges (via his contact, a security guard) for them to illegally enter the Bexhill refugee camp on the coast, calculated to be the best place from which to rendezvous with the ship. While in the camp Kee gives birth to her baby which Theo attempts to keep secret from the authorities. However, during a protracted battle between the security forces and 'The Fishes' (who have also broken into the camp) and other rebel forces Kee reveals her baby in front of troops who momentarily cease fighting and allow her safe passage, so amazed (and respectful) are they at the sight of a baby, which, for a brief moment, trumps the conflict in which they are engaged. Theo and Kee take a rowing boat out to the buoy where they are supposed to rendezvous with the boat, which eventu-

ally arrives. Theo discovers that he is wounded and dies shortly before the boat arrives.

This film is interesting for many reasons, not least for its depiction of the detention camp and for the way that Kee's escape is planned via gaining access to a securitized zone (the camp) and across borders which are designed to keep unwanted immigrants out. In this case the mechanisms of securitized bordering provide the resources by means of which escape can be engineered. Loshitzky (2010: 27) in her discussion of the film *Last Resort* talks of the location of the camp near the sea as being a juxtaposition of the prison and the 'false promise of freedom and escape'. In *Children of Men* the sea does not offer false promise but the very mechanism of escape. Indeed, the camp itself, and its location, on the border (the camp forms part of the border) is the chosen route for the 'journey of hope'.

The status of immigrants in the film is also worthy of note. At the start of the film, in the streets of the city where Theo works there are posters exhorting members of the public to report all illegal immigrants; one of them reads, 'Suspicious? Report all illegal immigrants'. The police seem intent on not just rounding up 'illegal immigrants' but also anyone who is suspected of having sympathies with their plight. The oppositional stance of the 'The Fishes' is defined by their humanitarian, pro-immigrant politics. In a country (and world) where no children have been born for 18 years it is likely that immigration would be necessary for the host country for a number of reasons including medical care, skills shortages, domestic labour etc. However, in the paranoid UK of *Children of Men* the 'threat' posed by immigration is mobilized by the authorities as the primary security concern and the means of dealing with this threat is the detention camp. The representation of the camp is significant as on display there are many of the techniques made (in)famous by the Abu Graib photographs and stock footage from Guantanamo Bay; people tortured and humiliated in their cells, no concern for the human rights of prisoners, lack of basic levels of welfare provision etc. But the unruliness of the camp, the sense that the security forces are not really in charge, that many of the prisoners are not contained in cells but free to roam the area of the camp and organize armed rebellion (supported by forces on the outside) makes possible the escape. Rather than forming a secure barrier to the outside world the border is portrayed as porous, with people and armaments clearly able to pass through its security perimeter. Rather than being a site of state authority the camp is a dangerous site of resistance and insurrection.

The journey of the 'migrant stranger' is a familiar theme in film, often coupled with a portrayal of an unwelcoming or hostile host society. *Children of Men* spans the genres identified by Loshitzsky but does not conform to the expectations of 'journey of hope' films even though one of the central themes is 'hope', represented most obviously by both the figure of the pregnant woman (and later her baby) in a world where no-one has given birth for 18 years, and the vessel 'Tomorrow' belonging to the 'Human Project' which offers the hope of a better future. The theme of 'hope' is also central to Theo's experiences living in an authoritarian society which is characterized by a heightened fear of immigration and suspicious of its own people for being sympathetic to illegal immigrants, and also suspicious of women who fail to have fertility tests (one billboard carries the message 'Avoiding fertility tests is a crime') and people who are not accepting of state-sponsored euthanasia (as a solution to the despair felt by those who have reached the conclusion that a world without youth is a world without hope). Theo Faren is a character who faces a crisis of hope early in the film; he is disturbed by the public reaction to media reports of the death of the world's youngest man, and also more directly disturbed by a terrorist attack on a cafe which he has just visited. His crisis of hope has its roots in the death of his young son some years earlier during a flu epidemic, and the subsequent breakdown of his marriage to a woman who became involved with 'The Fishes'. Theo is portrayed as a former political activist – 'that was 20 years ago' – who has since lost his commitment to the struggle for an alternative, better society.

My reading of the film revolves around Theo being a cosmopolitan stranger. He is a man whose lack of involvement in community (a retreat from social life following the breakdown of his marriage and accidental death of his only child, cut off from his friends) make him something of a 'loner'. Although these qualities make him something of an outsider in his own society they contribute to his usefulness for the role which falls to him. He serves as guide and guardian to the pregnant Kee, acting not out of idealism (like members of 'The Fishes') but out of a sense of renewed hope and a desire to help another human being. However, it is not these qualities which make him a cosmopolitan stranger.

The cosmopolitan stranger is not one who 'arrives today and stays tomorrow'. The cosmopolitan stranger originates from within society but remains in distant orbit from the various groups and communities which attempt to claim his/her allegiance. The cosmopolitan stranger

has not been captured by the groups claiming to work on his/her behalf: the cosmopolitan stranger is not committed to someone else's political project. Theo has contacts with both the authorities (through his cousin, a highly placed bureaucrat) and the rebels, via his ex-wife, but owes allegiance to neither. The cosmopolitan stranger works to connect people to distant others, connecting not just to proximate states, regions, communities but globally. Theo's residual personal networks make it possible for a pregnant woman on the run from the authorities to connect with a global movement working on behalf of humanity, 'The Human Project'. The cosmopolitan stranger also betokens new forms of social solidarity, and although a vision of a future society is not advanced by representatives of 'The Fishes' or anyone else in the film, Theo offers the possibility of a new beginning by taking responsibility for Kee and sacrificing himself for the 'greater good'. The cosmopolitan stranger is also adept at moving through the social and political landscape formed by a global crisis, at once open and inviting (to elites) and also tight and constricting (for the majority). Theo has much of the mobility accorded to the elites in his society and has the ability to move across zones which are designed to prevent such mobility. He is a 'trusted traveller' in a world where global forces (securitization of immigration) lead to extreme constraints on mobility.

## The 'stranger as terrorist'

Of the various genres of contemporary stranger movies, the 'stranger as terrorist' is the one which chimes most obviously with the important political issues of the day. Fear of 'The Terrorist Next Door', the title of a recent TV movie, is a real social issue in the aftermath of terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid, London, Istanbul and elsewhere during the past decade. The anxiety generated by these terrorist attacks is exacerbated by the fact that the attackers were mainly 'homegrown' terrorists (see Chapter 5 for a critique) who emerged from within communities that had no idea that they lived alongside people who were committed to causing death and destruction. Over the longer term this is in fact what is most unsettling about these events: the person sitting next to you on the bus may be a terrorist about to explode his homemade bomb.

The film *Arlington Road* is an excellent example of the 'terrorist as stranger' film, and is particularly prescient given that it was made in 1999. The film tells the story of an academic, Michael Farraday, who teaches terrorism studies at a university in the United States, and who

suspects that his new next door neighbour, Oliver Laing, is a terrorist. His suspicions, at this stage, are founded upon nothing more than a curiosity about certain aspects of his new neighbour's personal history, particularly that they are apparently contradicted by small pieces of evidence in the domestic setting (letters arriving in the post addressed to someone of another name, for example). Despite her initial scepticism, Faraday's girlfriend, Brooke, finally believes him after herself discovering evidence that the neighbour is indeed a terrorist. In order to prevent Brooke from confirming Faraday's suspicions she is killed by the terrorist's wife and her death is made to look like an accident. After following the terrorist in the hope of preventing him plant a bomb Faraday realizes too late that he has been tricked into carrying the bomb (in the boot of his car) to a federal building. The bomb explodes killing himself and 180 others. Post-mortem, the evidence points to Faraday's guilt and he is held responsible for the atrocity. Meanwhile, Laing and his wife, who have attracted no suspicion (save that of Faraday and his partner, both now deceased), and having completed their mission, are free to move on to a new location and continue their work. This is the film's chilling denouement.

The film deals with pre-9/11 terrorism and therefore is not tempted to opt for portrayal of a jihadist threat. Instead, the terrorist activity has more in common with the 1995 Oklahoma bombing than with 9/11. Nevertheless the film does address the issue of the 'terrorist as stranger' in an interesting way based on the central dilemma of a 'good man' discovering that his neighbours are terrorists but not having the hard evidence with which to convince others. When he first tries to ascertain the likelihood of his new neighbours being terrorists Faraday doubts himself, and others doubt him too. Their role as new neighbours in a suburban neighbourhood is almost the perfect cover for terrorists who wish to blend in and prevent discovery. Faraday learns the truth of the idea that 'neighbours are the nearest strangers'. In a society characterized by 'strangeness' a terrorist finds it easy to disguise himself. Outwardly, there are precious few signs of terrorist activities (although the signs are sufficient to arise the suspicions of Faraday, but then he is an expert on terrorism) and Laing and his wife are able to pass as regular citizens.

*Fight Club* can also be considered to be a 'terrorist as stranger' film (as well as falling into the category of 'self as stranger,' and indeed the cosmopolitan stranger) but I will not consider it further in this section, despite its great relevance to an understanding of 9/11-type terrorism. Instead, I will turn briefly to the film *Four Lions* which explores the

theme of jihadist terrorism from the perspective of the terrorists themselves. Surprisingly perhaps, *Four Lions*, a film which explores so-called home-grown jihadist terrorism in the UK is a comedy film and this, as much as anything else, was the reason it was considered controversial on its release in 2010. The film aims to explicate, to the extent to which this is possible, the mindset of the amateur jihadist, and depicts the journey of young, radicalized men from the north of England who aspire to become suicide bombers. There is a clear parallel with the four men who exploded home-made bombs in London on July 7th 2005 killing 52 commuters. We follow the 'four lions' as they get organized, learn to make bombs, go to a training camp in Pakistan, and eventually target their attack on the London Marathon.

The film appears relatively successful in penetrating the minds of the jihadists, particularly as it is explored through the relationship between Omar, the leader of the group, and his wife. Significantly, and perhaps contrary to expectations, she gently encourages his aspiration to become a terrorist even though both are well-established in the community, having jobs, children, extended family, friends etc. Terrorism, on this reading, is not something dreamt up by conspirators in back streets and darkly-lit alleyways. In this film jihadism develops in a domestic setting, being discussed around the kitchen table and with friends in social contexts: jihadism is a lifestyle choice and a social bond. It is also domestic in the sense that their bomb making activities are carried out in their own homes. Omar has an ambivalent relationship with his work colleague who he wants to dismiss as representative of the enemy but whose good nature, practical assistance, and general life skills he comes to rely on. Even fueled by jihadist anger Omar finds it difficult to determine exactly who is the enemy and who should be the target of their terrorist attack.

It is this vulnerability and uncertainty coupled with ineptitude and fallibility which makes the jihadists into somewhat sympathetic characters. They are likeable, yet totally misguided. Their human qualities and the sense that they are very ordinary guys also makes them more strange. This of course is what is most threatening about 'homegrown jihadists'. They are so remarkably ordinary, and like 'us' in so many ways that they pose a grave threat not just to selected targets but to sociality more generally. If such ordinary people can be terrorists then it is entirely possible that your next door neighbour really could be one of them.

## The 'self as stranger'

Possibly the most interesting category of films about the stranger are those in which people come to see themselves as strangers. Such films chime with one of the core themes of this book which is that strangeness as a generalized social condition is replacing the stranger as a social figure. A key aspect of this strangeness is that we come to see ourselves as strange, which is in effect what 'self as stranger' films also do. Films falling into this category include *The Island* and also *Fight Club*, but as indicated above I have chosen to give full consideration to the latter film later in the chapter. This is not only because *Fight Club* can be considered as representative of several categories but because it is offers a wonderful illustration of the cosmopolitan stranger. The other film given consideration in this section is *Moon*, possibly the best cinematic example to date of the 'self as stranger'.

*The Island* (2005) is an action-adventure movie which devotes little screen time to reflection on what could have been its core theme; the ethics of human cloning and the consequences of a cloned human meeting his/her clone. The 'risk society' themes of the dangers inherent in human attempts to dominate nature are certainly not developed to their fullest extent, yet the film succeeds in capturing at least one element of the 'stranger as self'; the cultural encounter between two selves who are not reconciled and have very conflicting interests. Lincoln Six Echo discovers himself to be a clone of Tom Lincoln. Lincoln's purpose in life is to provide 'spare parts' if Tom's organs should ever fail. Lincoln Six Echo lives with other clones in an underground facility where the residents are unaware that they are cloned and believe that they are members of a small group surviving the aftermath of some catastrophic event which has left the earth's surface uninhabitable. In fact, they have been created as genetic back-up in the event that their rich human 'sponsors' should require a new heart, kidney, liver etc. The cloning facility, located under the desert, is highly illegal and the sponsors are not aware that their cloned body parts are 'grown' inside live human clones. The island of the title is the place to which the unsuspecting clones believe they will go if they win the lottery. It is supposedly the only part of the earth's surface not contaminated. In reality, a trip to 'the island' only occurs when it is time for the organs to be harvested. Lincoln Six Echo enters a restricted part of the facility by accident and witnesses the murder of two 'lottery winners'. When he learns that his friend Jordan Two Delta has won the lottery he resolves to protect her and they escape together into the

outside world (uncontaminated, as it turns out), the existence of which he has only recently become aware of. Approaching his sponsor in the (naïve) expectation of help and support results in Lincoln's betrayal and the security forces attempt to capture and kill him. He manages to escape however and – cutting a long (and explosive) story short – Lincoln and Jordan eventually return to the underground facility and release their fellow clones.

The relationship between Lincoln Six and Tom is particularly interesting from the perspective of the strangeness thesis. Rather than showing deep concern or attempting to establish common cause, Tom, although not being aware of Lincoln Six's existence until that point, shows little concern for his physical double (they are identical in appearance but speak with different accents, conveniently for viewers). In fact, Tom is only concerned for himself and attempts to double-cross Lincoln Six after pretending to agree to expose the truth about the illegal organ harvesting business. Unknown to Lincoln Six Tom alerts the authorities to his whereabouts. However, in an act of self-preservation Lincoln Six tricks the security forces into killing Tom, fooling them into believing that he rather than Lincoln is the escaped clone.

Not only are Lincoln Six and Tom strangers to each other in the sense that they are not aware of each others existence until Lincoln Six's escape, but they are strangers in the sense that they discover no shared basis of solidarity. Any potential for the exploration of common cause is undermined by Tom's self-interest. He is after all a very rich man who can afford to invest in a process designed to generate replacement organs (and a man who did not look too closely into the ethics of the service that he was paying a huge sum for). Tom sees his other self as a threat. Lincoln Six stands to undermine his status and ruin his lifestyle if the truth about the cloning operations becomes public knowledge. From Tom's perspective then Lincoln Six is the bearer of some very unwelcome news about himself. Tom and Lincoln Six are strangers in yet another sense: each reveals aspects of the other which lead to greater insecurity and a potential loss of self. Lincoln Six is forced to confront the fact that he is completely disposable, and much less valuable to his sponsor as a 'whole person' than he was when he was assumed to be no more than a collection of body parts. On meeting Lincoln Six Tom discovers himself to be a (unwitting) harvester of organs and guilty of a crime against humanity. If Lincoln Six had no idea who he really was (during his life underground) Tom has been no less ignorant of his true self.

The 'self as stranger' theme of self confronting self (or being confronted by another self) is common to *Moon* (2009), where Sam Bell's

discovery of another version (clone) of himself leads to initial conflict followed by cooperation and mutual understanding. Rather than confronting each other with unpalatable truths, as was the case in *The Island*, the two Sam Bell's together discover the truth about themselves and they devise a plan to confront the authorities who have misled and exploited them.

Sam Bell is a lone worker on a largely automated lunar mining station, extracting 'Helium 3' and sending it to earth for use in fusion energy generation. He is contracted for a three year period and although lonely (he has only a talking computer for company) he spends his free time exchanging communications with his wife and daughter on earth, a task made more difficult by the fact that the direct communications link with earth is malfunctioning and has been for some time. While away from the mining station in his moon vehicle Sam has an accident, crashing the vehicle. He wakes up back in the sick bay not knowing how he managed to return to the mining station. Despite being confined to quarters for health reasons Sam's suspicions concerning what really happened to him lead him to drive back to the site of his accident. In the crashed vehicle he finds an unconscious figure who turns out to be (the 'original') Sam Bell.

The two Sams are forced to confront the fact that one is a clone of the other. This leads to some tensions between the two. The 'original' Sam, who has almost completed his three year stint is unwell and deteriorating physically. The other, newer, Sam is fit and healthy. Each is searching for answers as to the true nature of their existence. Eventually they discover a hitherto hidden part of the base containing a host of Sam clones who are designed to be awakened in the future. They then realize that they are both clones, two in a long series of Sam Bells. The three year posting on the base is in effect the total lifespan of each clone who is designed to be disposed of at the end of his 'shift' and replaced by a new clone. The trip back to earth promised at the end of the shift is in fact a fiction, each clone being destroyed at the end of its useful life. In addition, the two Sams realize that their common memories of a family back home are in fact implanted.

Armed with this knowledge they devise a plan to expose their plight to the world. Aware that the imminent arrival of the mining corporation's 'rescue crew' will result in their deaths if more than one Sam is found on the station, they decide that the healthy Sam should travel to earth in one of the pods designed to transport 'Helium 3', while the unhealthy Sam is to return to the crashed lunar vehicle to die and be discovered by the 'rescue crew' so as not to arouse their suspicions.

In addition, they awaken another Sam clone to take over the running of the station. The film ends with a voice-over news story reporting that the mining corporation has been accused of criminal practices. It appears that the Sams' plan has been successful.

The theme of cooperation between strangers in order to accomplish a difficult task is a key theme in the film. The two Sams are initially disturbed by the presence of the other and their shared discomfort leads to some squabbling and conflict between them. In this period of their relationship they are a threat to the other's sense of self. They realize that they are not unique and the self-possession and capacity for choice that they believed that they had is revealed as a cruel fiction. Even their memories are not unique to them, and any hopes and dreams about their future lives are meaningless. In the film's most ironic moment, Sam's alarm clock wakes him to the sound of Chesney Hawkes' song 'I am the one and only'.

*Moon* displays many core strangeness themes, which is remarkable given that the events in the film take place in a closed and restricted environment and that there are essentially only two characters in the film (or more accurately, two versions of the same character), and a third if you count Gertie the talking computer. All reference points concerning self and others are shown to be unstable and unreliable. Sam's deeply held beliefs about himself – that he is a company man, a family man – are discovered to be fictions. Moreover, he discovers that he is programmed to expire after three years of useful work and therefore has no past and no future. Any sense of self which he can sustain under these circumstances comes from the relationships that he is able to develop with the other Sam, and Gertie the computer. One consequence of this is that there are no collectivities which sustain and support Sam, save for the partnership established with the other Sam. He cannot rely on family or community 'back home' (he has none, and has never been 'home') and he has no social or professional networks to sustain him. In fact, all the conventional support networks are hostile to him. When he manages to make a phone call to what he believes to be his family on earth he is confronted by the fact that his 'daughter' is not a child but is in fact an adult, and that his 'wife' died some years before. His 'daughter' (who of course is not his daughter at all but the daughter of the real Sam Bell from whom all the clones are derived) is perturbed by his call and seeks the intervention of her real father before Sam rings off. Making a phone call to earth reveals to Sam that he is a stranger to those people who he previously believed were family, and as such more of a stranger to himself. Likewise, Sam

discovers that the company for whom he works have no loyalty to him, viewing him either as a tool to be deployed, or as a problem to be solved. Rather than offering solidarity with a co-worker the 'rescue crew' are likely to terminate him (and the other Sam) when they arrive on the moon (in fact it is likely that this is their real mission).

In keeping with the strangeness thesis it is clear that connections and divisions in social life are contingent and unstable. This can be seen in Sam's relation with Gertie who at times is helpful towards Sam, at other times more antagonistic. When Sam has his crash in the lunar vehicle Gertie is not able (or willing, perhaps) to recover him from the site of the accident and instead activates a new cloned Sam. Gertie leaves him to die in his crashed vehicle and has no plans to tell the new Sam of the existence of the injured Sam. Gertie also engages in covert discussions with the company's earth base (while pretending to Sam that such communications are not possible). On the other hand, Gertie does support the two Sams' plan to send the new Sam back to earth. Gertie offers to help by erasing her memory, thereby denying important information to the 'rescue crew'. Under conditions of strangeness relationships need to be made and re-made and nothing can be taken for granted.

## *Fight Club* and the cosmopolitan stranger

The theme of conflict and cooperation between strangers is also to be found in *Fight Club*, where the narrator, Jack, and Tyler Durden fight each other (leading to the establishment of the titular club) and are regularly in conflict, for example over the attentions of Marla, who becomes Tyler's girlfriend. At the same time, working together they establish a string of fight clubs across the US and appear to cooperate effectively in organizing the supporters of 'Project Mayhem', at least in the early days.

But the themes of cooperation and conflict only explain so much of *Fight Club*. The film has been subject to many interpretations and in fact is one of the most widely written about of contemporary films. Many of the papers written about *Fight Club* focus on the portrayal of masculinity and violence, the 'Jeckyl and Hyde' nature of the central character (Stirling, 2008), and the turn to terrorism revealed towards the end of the film. To my knowledge, *Fight Club* has never been interpreted as a stranger movie, which is more than a little surprising. The argument here is that *Fight Club* is best understood through the lens of the cosmopolitan stranger. Indeed, the figure of Tyler Durden is a fine

example of the cosmopolitan stranger (at least up to the point where his terrorist tendencies are revealed): he connects people with distant others; he advocates an alternative form of social solidarity; he remains free of attachments from dominant ideologies and major societal groupings; and he is adept at manoeuvring in the restricted spaces created by globalization: the freedom represented by Tyler Durden in *Fight Club* is more than the 'freedom to consume' (Diken and Laustsen, 2008: 74).

The stranger is a key motif in *Fight Club* both in conventional terms, and also in relation to the strangeness thesis advanced in this book. The central characters are all strangers, in one sense or another. Jack, the movie's narrator, is an insomniac who, as a form of therapy, joins a number of self-help groups (for cancer sufferers etc.). Not surprisingly perhaps he remains something of an outsider in these groups, even though he pretends he is a fellow sufferer. His attendance at these groups leads him to meet Marla who also pretends to be a victim and attends because she finds it therapeutic. Jack and Marla come to an agreement and divide the meetings between them so as not to be both present at the same time. While on a business trip Jack meets Tyler, a soap manufacturer, and upon returning home and discovering that an explosion has destroyed his flat, asks Tyler if he can stay with him. Thus far the film revolves around meetings between strangers.

Tyler's condition attached to Jack staying with him is that they fight each other. During one of their fist-fights a crowd of enthusiastic spectators forms, providing the origins for the fight club which thereafter meets regularly. Tyler and Marla become involved, to Jack's annoyance. Tyler and Jack establish fight clubs in a number of cities and out of this network they form 'Project Mayhem', an anti-establishment, underground militia group. Tyler goes missing and after one of their number is killed in a botched operation Jack attempts to track Tyler down in order to close down 'Project Mayhem' which he fears is running out of control. On his travels he is surprised to discover that members of various fight clubs know him as Tyler Durden and it dawns upon him that he and Tyler are the same person: the personality of Tyler taking control of his body when he is asleep. Knowing that he and Tyler share the same body, Jack shoots himself, causing Tyler a fatal blow whilst only wounding himself. However, Jack is unable to prevent Tyler's plan to destroy several buildings housing credit card computer data from coming to fruition. At the end of the film Jack and Marla watch as a number of buildings collapse after Tyler's bombs are detonated.

Chuck Palahniuk, author of the novel upon which the film is based, has stated that his books are about 'reconnecting with community': 'all my books are about a lonely person looking for some way to connect with other people' (quoted in Kavadlo, 2008: 16–17). Tyler Durden is a cosmopolitan stranger, in part because he represents a new form of community, a clandestine group which gives meaning and a sense of purpose to the members of 'Project Mayhem'. Cosmopolitan strangers make connections with (and between) distant others. Tyler and Jack's string of fight clubs create new networks of communication and allow for new solidarities across large distances. The establishment of fight clubs across the USA allow for the possibility of reconnection for strangers who previously felt disconnected. 'Project Mayhem' represents an alternative form of social solidarity which engenders its own commitment, loyalty, sacrifice etc.

Tyler Durden is able to promote this alternative community, in part, because he is free of the constraints of conventional society; he is critical of social values founded on consumerism, private ownership, and aspirations for a comfortable life. Tyler Durden's values are not circumscribed by mainstream norms. Tyler is also adept at manoeuvring in the tight spaces created by globalization weighing heavily on community. He works at the margins of consumer society, creating exclusive soaps for rich customers (in fact, recycling human fat to make some of the soap). He circulates in the dark spaces, the underbelly of society, close to/crossing over to illegality and criminality. He is familiar with the world of commerce, on the one hand, and grass-roots social mobilization, on the other. He is of society but not in it; he is a stranger. But whereas Simmel's stranger 'comes today and stays tomorrow', Tyler Durden is 'here today and gone tomorrow'.

*Fight Club* has been interpreted as a critique of the commodification of life under conditions of 'postmodernity' (Diken and Laustsen, 2008), leading to the sense (mentioned above) that freedom is reduced to the 'pseudo-freedom' of the consumer. This leads in turn to the problem of 'being oneself' attempts at which 'results in the exact opposite, i.e. the feeling of the inauthenticity of all acts'. On this reading *Fight Club* allows for the reconnection of individuals through violence, fighting allows for a form of direct physical connectivity and sense of purpose that liberal society will never provide. *Fight Club* offers the promise of visceral solidarity, in an age of fragmented consumer society. According to Diken and Laustsen (2008: 76) '*Fight Club* is a film about mobility and mobilization'. This is not quite accurate; in my view it is a film about the trade-off between mobility and mobilization. Tyler and Jack's 'Project

Mayhem' is made possible by their own relative mobility and indeed Jack finds that it is Tyler's (apparent) mobility that prevents him shutting down 'Project Mayhem'. But 'Project Mayhem' is not about enhancing mobility, it is about creating a form of social mobilization that is fast disappearing in our societies. We live in an age of enhanced personal mobility (for the few) but in which mobilization on the basis of class, race, workers rights etc. are seldom seen. As Diken and Laustsen (2008: 77) argue, our political culture encourages us to act as individuals (consumers) or as members of highly-specific interest groups (such as Jack's sufferers' support groups. '*Fight Club* is a response to this impossibility of collective action, offering the possibility of "relief" on the basis of social change and criticism'. Ultimately, the balance between mobility and mobilization cannot be sustained. Mobilization shades into uncontrollable terrorism while personal mobility is selective and limited. The cosmopolitan stranger can catalyse social change, but the direction that this change can take is beyond the control of a social figure whose chief characteristic is the 'nanostory' (Wasik, 2009) of a 'here today and gone tomorrow' stranger.

This all-too-brief survey of representations of the stranger in film corroborates the claim made by Papastergiadis (2012) – a claim made originally in respect of the world of art and here transposed to film – that it is a medium for 'reconstituting the social'. Many of the films discussed above, particularly *Code 46*, *Children of Men,* and *Fight Club* suggest either 'new modes of exchange between strangers' or 'alternative conceptual frameworks for organizing collective action' (Papastergiadis, 2012: 14), or both. The chapter has explored the ways in which the stranger can be represented in film, and four main filmic categories of the stranger have been identified: stranger-as-migrant, stranger-as-terrorist, self as stranger, and the cosmopolitan stranger. It was suggested that the latter two categories are particularly interesting (in the context of this book) in that they also help to illuminate the strangeness of society, which it is argued is a defining social condition in the contemporary period, but as yet poorly understood by social scientists.

## The cosmopolitan stranger: Fugitives and homecomers

In this final section I will deal with a couple of examples of the stranger found in television fiction, demonstrating both that the figure of the cosmopolitan stranger is not necessarily a recent addition to cultural narratives, and that it is possible to represent strangeness in television drama. An excellent example of the cosmopolitan stranger is to be

found in the 1960s US TV series *The Fugitive*. In the series, which ran for more than 100 episodes between 1963 and 1967, Dr. Richard Kimble, an innocent man convicted of the murder of his wife, is both on the run from the police and trying to find the real killer, a one-armed man who Kimble witnessed committing the crime. Stanley Fish, in his excellent treatment of the series, *The Fugitive in Flight* (Fish, 2011)[4] reads Kimble as a 'perfect representative of mid-twentieth century liberalism that above all values independence, personal integrity and the refusal to surrender oneself to obsessions or causes',[5] or, expressed in slightly different terms, Kimble is the embodiment of 'civilizing liberalism' (Fish, 2011: 106). These are also qualities that facilitate his role as the cosmopolitan stranger. In the discussion that follows I draw heavily on Fish's excellent assessment of *The Fugitive* while reaching a different conclusion as to the sort of figure that Kimble represents. Fish does not talk about Kimble as a stranger, nor does he discuss cosmopolitanism. Nevertheless, I believe that Kimble is the cosmopolitan stranger par excellence, a conclusion that I am able to draw because of Fish's exegesis. Expressed slightly differently, I believe that Fish takes the reader 95% of the way to an interpretation of Kimble as a cosmopolitan stranger and his account only needs the subtlest of tweaks to reveal it in this new guise.

The core value promoted by *The Fugitive,* according to Fish (2011: 11), is 'the primacy of freedom … freedom from attachments that own you and circumscribe your will' – itself a defining feature of the cosmopolitan stranger. Kimble is very much 'his own man' but this comes at a price, socially, as 'he is alone even when surrounded by other people' (Fish, 2011: 12). The 'big theme' of *The Fugitive* is 'not issues or big political questions' but 'the struggles of ordinary men and women to find their place (and not someone else's) in an often hostile and indifferent world' (Fish, 2011: 15). *The Fugitive* portrays 'the transition from community to individuality, with all of its attendant gains and loses' (Fish, 2011: 148).

Episode by episode, as Kimble continues his quest, he encounters many people and during their encounters these people are confronted with choices about how they wish to live their lives. Kimble catalyses their 'life-changing decisions' (Fish, 2011: 116) in part by providing them with a dilemma about himself: between what is established as a matter of legal fact (Kimble's guilt in the eyes of the court) and 'what is really true, despite the weight of evidence' (Fish, 2011: 37). People are obliged to choose between 'believing what the world tells them or believing in Kimble' (Fish, 2011: 40). After spending some time with

him most people tend to believe Kimble. But his impact on people's sense of self runs deeper; 'he talks to people; he tries to appeal to their better natures; he helps their better natures emerge' (Fish, 2011: 77).

Kimble is the paradigmatic cosmopolitan stranger: he is of society but he strives to be free of all attachments. He spends a lot of time and energy avoiding capture by Detective Gerard the police officer whose task it is to arrest him but this is not the limit of his ambition for freedom.

> Kimble doesn't want to be captured by Gerard; he doesn't want to be captured by *anything*. Clearing his name is his immediate goal, but his long-term, life-project goal is to be independent, to be without obligations burdening him. To be without entanglements he cannot step away from, to be without attachments – persons, things, vocations – he can't leave behind (Fish, 2011: 53).

His mobility cannot completely be attributed to being on the run. He embodies a form of sociality which is free from commitments to causes and social entanglements; the principle of solidarity is based on mutually-supporting individual self-containment. In a society where the majority of people are 'tied down' with jobs, relationships, political commitments and consequently lack mobility Kimble is relatively mobile, despite (or perhaps because of) his fugitive status.

Kimble is an 'inner-directed' individual (to employ a term used by David Riesman in *The Lonely Crowd*) (Mestrovic, 1997). He relies upon his own moral compass to tell him what is right and wrong, and this sense of justice is more fundamental than the justice handed out by the legal system. His sense of right and wrong comes from within, and he judges himself according to his own sense of worth, not someone else's. Kimble is a self-sufficient individual. For Fish, Kimble represents a novel form of social organization, the civic (individualist) liberalism which is replacing older forms of communitarianism. In Fish's terms, he represents the replacement of community with (assertive) individuality. In his desire to remain unattached he engages with people in such a way as to promote the 'destruction of entangling relationships' (Fish, 2011: 61).

Fish's analysis of Kimble's social role is extremely perceptive but he stops short of identifying him as a stranger per se, and of course does not extend to him the status of cosmopolitan stranger. But Kimble is so very much the cosmopolitan stranger, and at the core of this is his ability to evade the claims of various communities, causes and other

networks of attachment that routinely ensnare us all. Kimble is reluctant to become too involved with the people he encounters (and in many cases helps) not because 'he may be found out and betrayed … but that he may become so identified with those others that he would allow himself to be defined by them and their causes' (Fish, 2011: 12).

Fish makes some interesting points about Kimble's character, particularly that circumstances do not change him. 'Richard Kimble never *becomes* anything. He is what he is from the first episode to the last, and what he is is severe, uncompromising and … even more implacable than the obsessed policeman who haunts him' (Fish, 2011: 9–10). But there is one sense in which he changes fundamentally. On the run, Richard Kimble is *The Fugitive*, a cosmopolitan stranger. At the very end of the series after he has finally cleared his name Kimble loses the independence and freedom (from attachments) that he had while escaping legal justice.

> [H]e will settle into his old life, a respected doctor, a devoted brother, a pillar of the community, a member of civil organizations – a suburban bore burdened by the same attachments he was able to shed because of the fortunate fact that he could never stay long enough to accrue them (Fish, 2011: 123).

Fish is very aware of what this means for the ex-fugitive; he can no longer escape the ties that bind society. Moreover, in becoming the pillar of the community he was destined to be Richard Kimble has ceased to be a cosmopolitan stranger.

To conclude this chapter I would like to explore briefly a representation of the terrorist-as-stranger, from the recent TV series *Homeland*, and the way that it challenges some assumptions about the figure of the stranger, on the one hand, and the task of 'reconstituting the social' on the other. Bude and Dürrschmidt (2010: 493) in a recent paper introduce the figure of 'the homecomer' to represent the ambivalence between the lure of global options and the need for commitment to lasting bonds. 'The homecomer' is someone who has sampled the 'global life' but who has now opted to live a more 'down to earth' existence and commit to the dense entanglements of locality. Many aspects of Bude and Dürrschmidt's critique of 'flow speak' in their paper align with the themes of this book, particularly the need to recognize divergent experiences of globalization. However, 'the homecomer' can be interpreted as a stranger-like figure but a rather conventional one in that it relies very heavily on both the existence of a

clearly demarcated society to which 'the homecomer' returns, and a rather simplistic polarization of 'the global' and 'the local' (see Chapter 4). Nevertheless, the figure of 'the homecomer' speaks to the problem of engagement with community and commitment to a place which is also central to understanding the cosmopolitan stranger.

On Bude and Dürrschmidt's (2010: 493) account, 'the homecomer embodies the realization of the limits of global omnipresence … caught between the lure of travelling the field of global options and the need to structure them into a life-trajectory'. This reflects Bude and Dürrschmidt's view that the limits to existence are not spatial but human: global mobility is a tangible reality for many of us, the more challenging task is to construct meaningful and fulfilling lives for ourselves out of this global raw material. 'The homecomer' is a response to an experience of globalization. '[T]he "homecomer" stands for social authorship in that, in the midst of global opportunity, s/he is prepared to get entangled in local networks of commitment and responsibility' (Bude and Dürrschmidt, 2010: 493). In the discussion that follows we will apply the idea of 'the homecomer' to an interpretation of the TV series *Homeland* and look at the ways that this figure is in many ways a mirror-image of the cosmopolitan stranger.

The central character in *Homeland* is US Marine Sergeant Nicholas Brody who is rescued from a prison in Afghanistan after being missing in action for eight years, presumed dead. Upon his return to the US Brody is considered a hero by the military but is suspected by CIA agent Carrie Mathison of having been 'turned' by Al Qaeda. Intelligence she has received, while not specifically implicating Brody, points to a former US prisoner of war now working as an Al Qaeda agent and posing a threat to US security. Brody is 'the homecomer', as imagined by Bude and Dürrschmidt, a man whose formative experiences have taken place in the 'global frontierlands' associated with the 'war on terror' and who now has the desire to become 'entangled in local networks of commitment and responsibility'. His family are at the heart of these networks and much of his early life 'back home' is concerned with re-connecting with his family after an eight year absence. His teenage children barely know him and his wife, on the assumption that he was never returning, has embarked on a relationship with Brody's best friend. However, the figure of 'the homecomer' does not adequately capture Brody's entanglements with community, family and colleagues.

'The homecomer' only tells us so much about Brody, and he is better characterized as a 'fugitive' (or perhaps a 'reverse fugitive') in the sense

that he shares many qualities with Richard Kimble's character of 'The Fugitive' (discussed above). Like Kimble, Brody stays one step ahead of the authorities (in this case those investigating the impending Al Qaeda attack on the US) by living on his wits in order to evade detection (he is able to pass a polygraph test even when lying). Brody is 'on the run' even though he must give the impression that he is 'back home'. Whereas Kimble possesses no obsessions and does not identify with causes Brody is committed to the Al Qaeda cause as the result of his experiences in Afghanistan, particular his witnessing of the bombing of a school in which a lot of children were killed (an attack denied by the US), including the young son of his captor, Abu Nazir, to whom Brody acted as a teacher. Brody is also a convert to Islam, praying at home in secret, but his Al Qaeda sympathies are driven by a desire to avenge the 'war crime' he witnessed rather than any ideological conviction.

In order to achieve his aims it is important that Brody re-integrates into family life as well as professional networks. While the former is a struggle, finding intimacy with his wife difficult and having different degrees of success with his children, the latter is much more successful. Brody is utilized by the US Marines as a motivational speaker and this leads to him being offered the chance to run successfully for a vacant congressman's seat in the House of Representatives, a role which affords him the opportunity to get close to the Vice-President of the US, who becomes the target of Brody's (unsuccessful) assassination attempt. Brody does utilize his family life to good effect, for example collecting his strap-on bomb vest from the Al Qaeda bomb maker while on a family outing. Brody shares with Kimble the fact that people believe in him and trust him (the only dissenter being the CIA agent Carrie Mathison who finds it difficult to get her colleagues to share her concerns. The tag-line used in promotional material for the series reads, 'The nation sees a hero: she sees a threat'). His credibility as a former prisoner of war tortured by Al Qaeda, an apparently patriotic US Marine, and a loving family man mean that he is trusted to a degree that gives him privileged access to people and places which would otherwise be denied him. In this sense he has the status and mobility of an 'insider'.

Like Kimble, Brody has his nemesis. For Richard Kimble it was Detective Gerard, for Nicholas Brody it is CIA agent Carrie Mathison. The latter pair have the more complex relationship. In her desire to stay close to Brody, after being ordered to cease the unauthorized video surveillance of his house, Carrie concocts a meeting with Brody, and

this leads to the two embarking upon an affair, which they both require, for different reasons, to remain a secret; Brody because he needs to portray the image of a good family man, particularly when running for office, Mathison because she has infringed her professional code of ethics. Carrie is the one who is ultimately more vulnerable as a result of their liaison and Brody eventually uses it against her, reporting the fact to her superiors, a disclosure calculated to ensure that she is taken off the case. Despite her long-running suspicions Carrie is unable to prove that Brody is a terrorist, and her colleagues are not aware of the threat he poses: to them he is simply a 'homecomer'. It is this tension, between Brody 'the homecomer' and Brody 'the fugitive' that creates the dramatic heart of the series, the drama being further enhanced by Carrie's precarious mental health which causes many to doubt the soundness of her suspicions. For the viewers of the series Brody's status as a terrorist is only established beyond doubt in episode 10 of 12. Until this time, so effectively does Brody exploit his military celebrity and a range of networking opportunities that other explanations for his activities are still possible.

Whereas Kimble was evading the commitments which stem from ties and relationships Brody is actively seeking them, in order to exploit their potential. Attachments to family and other emotional entanglements allow Brody, by successfully harnessing their possibilities, a high degree of freedom and an enhanced mobility. If Kimble could only be free by remaining alone, Brody's freedom accrues through his ability to manipulate the people who trust him. Fish (2011: 12) says of Kimble that he is reluctant to become too involved with the people he encounters because he does not want to be defined by their causes. Brody has no such worries; he is happy to become entangled with a range of others because they help obscure his true purpose. He has no worries that he might become too closely associated with other peoples' causes; he is already heavily committed to his own extremist course of action which he cleverly conceals from a range of others.

I have chosen to discuss *Homeland* in this concluding section because of the way in which it confounds the conventions of terrorist-as-stranger films and indeed because of the way it cuts across and blurs many categories of film, including ones discussed above. The idea that Brody can best be characterized as an alternative 'fugitive' figure takes us beyond the boundaries of 'the homecomer' and challenges the ideas associated with the figure of the cosmopolitan stranger which were crystallizing in the discussion above. Indeed discussion of *Homeland* confronts the filmic categories for understanding representations of the stranger

advanced earlier. Moving forward, perhaps a more valuable task is to identify emerging depictions of strangeness in contemporary drama and establish to what extent, if any, depictions of generalized strangeness are replacing representations of the stranger in film and television. That of course is not an easy question to answer, as identification of strangeness depends upon a number of assumptions and an acknowledgement that different perspectives will likely reveal differing degrees of strangeness. One assumption that needs to be confronted is that sci-fi is the genre in which depictions of strangeness are more likely to emerge. A case could be made for a TV series such as *The Walking Dead* constituting an attempt to depict a more generalized strangeness, where in a post-apocalyptic social environment familiar reference points have been eroded and it is not clear who 'we' are any more, and where neighbours are revealed as strangers. *The Walking Dead* is a TV show depicting the aftermath of a disaster which results in the majority of the population being turned into zombies (who feed on human flesh). But I would argue that this falls some way short of depicting a world of strangeness, giving that the human/zombie relationship is very much one of 'us versus them' and the small band of survivors depicted in the film are unable (as a result of technological shortcomings) to attempt to connect with distant others. They are less occupied in generating community than dealing with their fate, a small group thrown together by circumstance. The argument here then is that a better case can be made for *Homeland* depicting a world of strangeness, not least because it generates multiple perspectives on common issues in a way that *The Walking Dead* does not, the only perspectives depicted coming from within the sometimes disunited group of survivors. However, the different perspectives on the ethics of survival which lead to conflict between Rick and Shane, on the one hand, and Daryl and the rest of the group, on the other, are particularly important sources of tension and worthy of note.

A case can certainly be made for *Homeland* offering a path-breaking interpretation of strangeness. Not being sure who our friends are and who constitutes our enemies – the vacillation of 'us and them' markers – is at the centre of *Homeland*, not least because we as viewers are positioned so as to be sympathetic to Brody as he re-adjusts to life at home after eight years of captivity, and also as we learn what motivated him to become a Muslim, for example, and even what leads him to identify with Al Qaeda (he blames the US Vice-President for an unprovoked attack on a school in Afghanistan). Even when we are aware that Brody plans a terrorist attack (a suicide bombing) we become concerned that

he will be discovered before he can carry out his attack (for example, when his daughter almost discovers his bomb vest in the back of the family car). Having a US television audience identify with a (sympathetic) terrorist figure plotting against the US is no mean achievement. The friend/enemy, us/them distinction is also blurred in respect of Brody's relationship with Tom Walker, another former US prisoner of war and former personal friend, who Brody believed he killed (at the instigation of Al Qaeda) some years before. Brody discovers that Walker is also working as an Al Qaeda operative (in other words they are on the same side) but he kills Walker in order to demonstrate his loyalty to Abu Nazir after his (Brody's) suicide bombing mission is unsuccessful (due to a malfunctioning bomb vest). In fact, many of Brody's relationships are characterized by an extremely blurred friend/enemy distinction: in addition to his relationship with Tom Walker mentioned above it is possible to add Mike Faber (former best friend who has been having an affair with his wife), Afsal Hamid (captured Al Qaeda agent and supposed torturer of Brody's who Brody helps commit suicide by slipping him a broken razor blade), and Carrie Mathison (lover, who suspects his true identity) to the list. Interestingly, the friend/enemy, us/them distinction is also blurred in respect of Carrie's relationship with her CIA superiors, most painfully with Saul, her mentor. Saul cannot/will not back her sufficiently to prevent her being taken off the case and adjudged a liability after her dependence upon medication is revealed (she suffers from a bipolar disorder). To a degree Saul covers up her obsessive behaviour towards Brody but cannot protect her when Estes, their boss, dismisses Carrie from the CIA.

The blurring of these dichotomous positions produces a multiplicity of perspectives on events; another significant dimension to *Homeland's* strangeness. We are offered Brody's perspective, complex as this is, which unfolds over the 12 episodes. We also have (to a much lesser degree) the perspective of Jessica, his wife, particularly on the disruptions to family life occasioned by Brody's return. Significantly, there are also a range of CIA perspectives, including that of Carrie – she alone intuits Brody's real purpose. There is also the divided perspective of Saul who struggles to understand Carrie's interpretation of Brody and, although he remains open minded, at least to the point where he discovers they are having a relationship, is unable to grasp with 'bigger picture' that Carrie is about to reveal. The 'official' CIA perspective, as represented by Estes, is different from both Saul and Carrie's perspectives and revolves around managing risk perceptions. There is also the perspective of the terrorist Tom Walker, the other US Marine prisoner

in Afghanistan, who is denied the privileges of 'the homecomer', condemned to live on the margins of society and denied (by his mission) access to the family and professional contacts which Brody makes such good use of.

So what does *Homeland* tell us about the task of 'reconstituting the social' which, following Papastergiadis I have suggested is a central concern of film? The answer would appear to be that those things which work to inhibit 'connectivity between strangers' or disrupt 'frameworks for organizing collective action' are equally important research agendas. A world of strangeness is a world where communication and connectivity are by no means guaranteed. In a world where 'homecoming fugitives' such as Nicholas Brody exist the creation of a purposeful and cohesive community will be undermined. *Homeland,* it could be argued, is an exceptionally accurate portrayal of the world we live in. Understanding the dimensions of strangeness are vital if we are to discover a way of investing again in collective solutions to a fragmented and hostile world.

# 8
# Conclusion

Understanding the stranger, it has been argued throughout the book, requires us first to understand the nature of the society upon which the strangeness of the stranger is projected. The tendency to assume that strangers are thrown into relief by the societies in which they are relatively new arrivals is a real weakness in many attempts to understand the stranger. The argument developed here is that under conditions of globalization we need to rethink the nature and dynamics of society, community, and neighbourhood. One outcome of this rethink is that inside/outside markers are revealed to have been eroded and, more importantly perhaps, indicators of 'we-ness' are no longer reliable. Indeed the edges of society are increasingly blurred. Even on this basis the stranger still exists and this book has focused on one particular contemporary expression of strangerhood: the cosmopolitan stranger.

It has been argued that the cosmopolitan stranger is the definitive stranger of the Global Age, the characteristics of which are very different from the classical sociological stranger. The cosmopolitan stranger both possesses different qualities from the more conventional stranger and also occupies a different social role. The existence of the cosmopolitan stranger is not dependent upon an inside/outside social structure, as with many other contemporary manifestations of the stranger the cosmopolitan stranger emerges, as if from hiding, and exists in many instances only for a short duration. Because strangerhood is relative any one of us can, by changing position or as a result of others shifting their positions, become a stranger (even without necessarily being aware of this). For these reasons, I term this type of stranger the 'here today, gone tomorrow' stranger.

The existence of this type of stranger can only be properly explained, it is argued, by placing the stranger in a new context, that of societal

strangeness. Not only do new types of strangers exist but that we all live in a generalized state of strangeness, one consequence of globalization, the characteristics of which are that we can no longer rely upon reassuring reference points such as knowing where our community ends and another one begins and being able to make assumptions about who the other members of 'our' group are, and where we might find them. Strangeness means that we must recognize that 'we' are probably also strangers (to somebody) and that familiar places, close to us in our daily existence, may no longer feel entirely 'ours'; in our local communities and neighbourhoods we get the sense that we are living side-by-side but also living apart from people who we might otherwise be tempted to believe comprise our local community. At the same time, we can find community with remote others who we may network with. Strangeness means recognizing that the familiar is at the same time unfamiliar. To my mind explicating the condition of strangeness and theorizing its relation to globalization is the most important contribution that this book makes. It is as such primarily a Global Studies book which aims to contribute something important to the way that cultural globalization is understood. But the account of the stranger on offer here is also innovative, and because of this the book makes its own contribution to the literature on the stranger.

I wish to develop two main points by way of a conclusion. These are framed in terms of questions that could be the basis for future research. Firstly, what does the discovery of new kinds of strangers tell us about power relations in society? In many ways contemporary strangers contradict expectations based on older assumptions of difference and hierarchy. In circumstances where we can all be positioned as strangers, who then are the stranger-makers? The question of power relations is of course an important one. For those who continue to focus on strangers as migrants, foreigners and outsiders – the usual suspects – the situation has changed little. Elites and powerful individuals, in government for example, have the power to make strangers. Minorities, ethnic and religious collectivities, and other groups that celebrate their difference will continue to be positioned as strangers by policymakers and government officials thereby circumscribing their life chances and structuring the ways in which they are viewed by other groups.

The issue at hand is what kind of power relations exist in respect of the new strangers identified in this book. Do these strangers contradict expectations based on conventional assumptions of difference and hierarchy? The answer really depends upon the importance with which we view the cosmopolitan stranger and the other figures of the stranger

identified in a world of strangeness. If they are only of marginal interest because they are believed to be numerically insignificant or because they are tangential to the 'bigger picture' then the overall situation will not change very much. If on the other hand the shift towards the 'here today, gone tomorrow' stranger is deemed much more fundamental then the consequent power shifts will also be greater. We have seen how under conditions of strangeness all of us can be positioned as strangers at some point. This means that many more people have stranger-making powers. It is no longer tenable to hold to an us/them view of strangers; we are strangers too, both as judged by others and also by ourselves. Perhaps this points to a 'micro-politics' of stranger-making where it is possible to gain advantage by making strangers out of our neighbours. This is one way of dealing with the issues certainly. But there are other factors that need to be in the forefront of our considerations. Take for example the Chinese cockle-pickers discussed in the Introduction. The point made in respect of this tragic case was that a group of people were effectively invisible to mainstream society and therefore not positioned as strangers in any sense. To be a stranger, conventionally understood, you have to be seen to 'come today' whether you 'stay tomorrow' or not. The cockle-pickers were never seen to arrive and hardly anyone knew that they had stayed, up to the point when their bodies washed up on the beach. The issue here then is not who has the power of stranger-making so much as the power relations involved in making strangers (in)visible, and as such points to a whole new agenda for the study of the stranger.

The figure of the stranger has travelled quite a distance. No longer simply an inbetweener or undecidable the stranger is increasingly both a social resource and a lifestyle choice. The voluntarism associated with the idea of milieu, for example (see Chapter 4), where individuals can appropriate meaning in a world which otherwise escapes their control, feeds directly into strangerhood. There are many examples of contemporary strangers where the role of stranger is embraced by individuals for the opportunities or potential that it offers: rent-a-friend, the citizen detective, mystery shoppers, flash mobs, secret cinema goers. These are not strangers that emerge by simply crossing in-group/out-group boundaries (cf. Kendall et al, 2009: 94).

Of course migrants, foreigners, and outsiders are still considered as strangers by many and there is a degree of social inertia at work which means that for many the stranger will always denote those who are visibly different in some way, those that do not fit, those whose recent arrival means they are poorly integrated. Strangers are those deemed

strange by others, and the power of stranger-making still rests with the majority, those that consider themselves to be the in-group, community gatekeepers, or simply those wishing to not have to share scarce resources with others. But if the traditional forms of strangerhood and stranger-making still exist (although they have not been explored to any extent in this book) they have certainly been supplemented by a range of other stranger positions which are not easily understood within conventional sociological categories.

The second issue concerns the concept of strangeness. What contribution can the idea of strangeness make to an understanding of globalization? Its utility would appear to rest upon (i) its ability to capture a particular aspect of global processes, i.e. when such processes fail to deliver connectivity, and (ii) its usefulness in helping to understand our experiences of globalization.

Are we about to witness an explosion of books outlining the centrality of strangeness to our understanding of cultural globalization? Perhaps not, but strangeness is on the Global Studies agenda, being used already (in relatively minor ways, admittedly) by Beck, Robertson, Turner and others. To my mind strangeness – particularly in the way sketched by Beck – is a valuable addition to the lexicon of globalization. It deals squarely with an issue – the gap between global awareness and global expectations – that no other concept even broaches. Many scholars of cultural globalization work with a definition of globalization which relies upon Robertson's now classic formulation: 'the compression of the world and intensification of consciousness of the world' (Robertson, 1992: 8). As I have shown there is a deep-rooted assumption which follows from this which is that the compression or interconnectedness of the world is the element of this equation that is relatively unproblematic; Robertson generally viewing the globe as an 'open book' to those prepared to search the world looking for inspiration, ideas and a sense of purpose. The consciousness of the world as whole is generally thought to follow from the technical interconnectedness of the world, but not in a linear fashion. Interconnectedness might not be matched by a comparable degree of global awareness.

However, it is possible that these assumptions are incorrect, or at least that the priority should be reversed. Global consciousness is in many ways an everyday phenomenon, the globality of the world being understood implicitly by many people. As such, the formation of global consciousness does not require long periods of reflection. Indeed, the global consciousness of many people is finely tuned to the point where they are aware of any shortcomings in 'the compression of the world'.

Rather than the assumed relationship between compression and consciousness I believe that we have to be open to the possibility that global consciousness outstrips compression/connectedness to the point where a person's experience of globalization is one of failed promises and global disconnect. In such cases, globalization is not experienced as an opening up of the world but a closing down of options and a lack of mobility. Thus strangeness is the experience of globalization which is somehow not delivering upon its promise of new vistas, mobilities, opportunities etc. Strangeness is the experience of disconnectedness for people well aware that other global citizens are better connected and better resourced. In other words, global consciousness is another 'genie let out of the bottle'[1]: people are aware both of global compression (and the need to be on the right side of this process) and possess a heightened sense of disconnect. On this basis, we need the concept of strangeness both to fill this particular conceptual gap, and also to capture the experience of globalization, which, it has been argued, has somehow fallen away from the Global Studies agenda. How we experience globalization(s) should be a major focus for all scholars of cultural globalization.

There are two subtle registers of strangeness, one draws on the global aspect of the experience, the other on the stranger dimension. In the first case, strangeness denotes the experience living in a very strange world, as Beck expressed it. Part of this experience is that globalization impacts on peoples' lives by making unrecognizable 'the city they are living in, maybe even the street because of all kind of globalizations'. In other words, strangeness is a direct result of our engagement with globalization. The other register is derived from the work of Simmel. The more global something is, in the sense that it is understood to be universal, the less unique or personal it becomes. Strangeness then stems from a particular form of global consciousness: where we become aware that what we thought was 'ours' is in fact not unique but global. For Simmel, this form of strangeness penetrates to the heart of our existence. We can use this insight to re-interpret Beck's ideas discussed above. The street and the city we are living in can appear strange to us as a result of an awareness that the street and the city are in fact just like thousands of other streets and cities in the world. What we thought was 'ours', understood in terms of local distinctiveness, is in fact not ours because it is also readily available to millions of others. It is perhaps appropriate that a book on the subject of the stranger ends with an insight from Simmel, particularly one which has not yet been explored in sufficient depth.

# Notes

## Preface

1 Try typing 'strangeness' into an Amazon.com or Amazon.co.uk book search. Examples of 'high strangeness' include 'time and space distortion, bizarre synchronicities, strange states of consciousness, beings that act absurd, strange "creatures" associated with the sighting, but not necessarily part of the sighting, anomalous phone calls, electronic glitches, paranormal events including poltergeist type activity …'. 'The High Strangeness of Dimensions, and the Process of Alien Abduction' by Laura Knight-Jadczyk http://www.cassiopaea.org/cass/high_strangeness.htm
2 These ideas were first developed in a paper entitled 'Social policy beyond fear: The globalization of strangeness, the "war on terror", and "spaces of wonder"' published in *Social Policy and Administration* (Rumford, 2008a), and later incorporated into my book *Cosmopolitan Spaces: Europe, Globalization, Theory* (Rumford, 2008b). In this Preface I have paraphrased some passages from the journal publication.
3 To introduce briefly a figure considered in great detail later in the book (Chapter 6) we can say that the cosmopolitan stranger possesses some or all of the following characteristics: s/he remains detached from existing forms of community, is networked with remote others, manoeuvres in the gaps opened up by globalization, presages or heralds a new type of social solidarity, and, importantly, is 'here today and gone tomorrow', emerging from within society, briefly, only to fade away again very quickly.

## Chapter 1 Introduction: When Neighbours Become Strangers

1 Scott Rosenbaum quoted in 'Is a rented friend a real friend?' by Claire Prentice, BBC News 5th October 2010 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-11465260
2 'Would you rent a friend?' by Tim Dowling, *The Guardian* 21st July 2010 http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/2010/jul/21/friends-rental-service
3 Only 21 bodies had been recovered at the time of the court case.
4 'Viewpoint: The poignant video of the bad Samaritans', BBC News http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-14487982
5 'Viewpoint: The poignant video of the bad Samaritans', BBC News http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-14487982
6 Esther Addley 'London riots: "A generation who don't respect their parents or police"', *The Guardian* 9th August 2011 http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/aug/09/london-riots-kids-parents-police
7 An appeal launched after the attack on Rossli was shown on TV quickly raised £22,000. Rossli stated that he planned to give away half the money. 'Asyraf Haziq: Student to give half of raised money away', BBC News 18th August 2011 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-14583636

## Chapter 2 The Unchanging Stranger: A Critical Survey of the Literature

1 It should be noted that Mendieta's interpretation of alterity is not the same as that of Sennett referred to earlier. In fact, Mendieta is using alterity in much the same way as Sennett uses difference.
2 Meaning that a thing can take two forms, such as carbon.

## Chapter 3 Ulrich Beck: A Perspectival Account of Strangeness

1 One section of the quote was also discussed briefly in the Introduction, in a slightly different context.
2 It is generally believed that Simmel's perspective on the stranger assumes a nation-state context but in my interpretation of Simmel's classic essay on 'The Stranger' advanced in the previous chapter I argue that Simmel can be read as a proto-sociologist of globalization.
3 This is of course the liberal position that Amin (2012) is so critical of in *Land of Strangers* (see Chapter 2).
4 'Pizza firm defends halal outlet', BBC News 12th February 2009 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/west_midlands/7885311.stm
5 'Domino's Pizza outlet bans pork in favour of halal', *Daily Telegraph* 11th February 2009 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/foodanddrink/foodanddrink-news/4590251/Dominos-Pizza-outlet-bans-pork-in-favour-of-halal-menu.html
6 A year later, Domino's reviewed the decision to sell halal pizzas and decided that on commercial grounds they should resume selling pork products. 'Domino's halal-only pizzas off the menu', Sky News 16th August 2010 http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/Business/Dominos-Pizza-Scraps-Halal-Only-Branches-In-Birmingham-Blackburn-And-Bradford-After-Poor-Sales/Article/201008315687-686? f=rss
7 It is worth noting that when a similar decision was made by the French fast-food chain Quick, in this case to sell halal burgers, critics made charges of 'Islamization'. 'French fast food chain Quick sparks halal burger appeal', BBC News 19th February 2010 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/8524056.stm
8 But see Chapter 6 where I develop a different account of cosmopolitanism and account for the emergence of the 'cosmopolitan stranger'.
9 'Trendfear: Do you ever feel you're being left behind?' by Tom de Castella, BBC News 30th January 2012 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-16789155

## Chapter 4 The Global Context: Rethinking Strangers and Neighbours

1 'Patrol watches Texas-Mexico border-from pub in Australia' by Richard Luscombe, *The Guardian* 23rd March 2009 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/23/texas-mexico-patrol-webcam-australia

2 I am grateful to Anthony Cooper for bringing this to my attention.
3 Eliot Shapleigh, state senator from El Paso, Texas, quoted in Luscombe, op cit.
4 For my critique of Beck's cosmopolitanism see Rumford (2008b), especially Chapters 1 and 6.
5 On the (Japanese) origins of the term glocalization see Giulianotti and Robertson (2009: 45–6).
6 One thrust of Ritzer's argument is that sociologists have been distracted from apprehending the full import of globalization because of a costly dalliance with postmodernity. Whereas grobalization emphasizes transnational expansion and global conformity to common cultural codes, glocalization suggests diversity, hybridity, irreverence and pastiche, all themes associated with postmodernity. Ritzer writes, 'it should come as no surprise that grobalization and glocalization offer very different images of the impact of transnational processes. After all, they tend to stem from the antithetical bases of modern and postmodern social theory' (Ritzer, 2004: 75).
7 On the rise of cricket in Afghanistan see Albone (2011).
8 In the film *Code 46*, discussed in Chapter 7, there is a scene in a karaoke bar in which someone sings a version of The Clash song 'Should I Stay or Should I Go'. The singer is in fact Mick Jones, formerly guitarist with The Clash. This is only a minor diversion within the film but it is an interesting one however, particularly from the perspective of the argument being developed in this chapter. The Clash was arguably the punk band most 'open' to reggae influences and most able to articulate the translation of Jamaican culture into their West London locality. Songs such as 'White Man in Hammersmith Palais' and 'Safe European Home' being excellent examples of this. Thirty-odd years on the film *Code 46* treats 'Should I Stay or Should I Go' as a 'global artefact', now disembedded from geographical locality and socio-political context and sung in a bar in Shanghai, portrayed in the film as a global city celebrating a multiplicity of cultural influences. This points to the possibility of the recycling of the local (and the global), and perhaps an answer to the question posed by Robertson (2007); what happens after globalization? In 'sifting the global scene' and appropriating elements of Jamaican musical style The Clash helped create a glocal musical form (punk rock), which subsequently became a global commercial phenomenon. Some years later 'Should I Stay or Should I Go' has been appropriated as an artefact of global culture – now no longer signifying the experience of disaffected white youth in West London. It has been disembedded from its original spatial and temporal coordinates and employed in the film to signify retro style, the sound of 'classic rock', or as a signifier of 'global cool'. This is not the first time the song had been disembedded: as early as 1991 it was used in a global advertisement for Levi jeans. From this we might (tentatively) conclude that an object is never fixed as global or local (or glocal); over time it may traverse these categories, and something which came into being as a result of the 'sifting of the global scene' is unlikely to ever be free from further sifting and future recycling.
9 Paul Lewis, 'Birmingham stops Muslim CCTV surveillance scheme', *The Guardian* 17th June 2010 http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/jun/17/birmingham-stops-muslim-surveillance-scheme

## Chapter 5 The 'Cricketing Stranger': The London Bombings and the 'Homegrown Terrorist'

1 The other bombers were Mohammad Sidique Khan, the leader of the group, Hasib Hussain, and Germaine Lindsay.
2 In the 2009 film 'Four Lions', which displays much genuine insight into the culture of the 'homegrown terrorist', the leader of the jihadist group, Omar, is shown at his home talking with his wife and child. Behind the kitchen table at which they are sat, leaning against the wall, are a pair of cricket pads. I take this to be both a reference to the 'cricketing connection' established in the media and a key signifier of the embeddedness of Omar and the other jihadists in their local community.
3 Mystery over London bomber's '£120,000 estate', *Daily Telegraph* 7th January 2006 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1507195/Mystery-over-London-bombers-120000-estate.html
4 'Suicide bomber profile: The cricketer' http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-355620/Suicide-bomber-profile-The-cricketer.html
5 *The Washington Post* 15th July 2005.
6 *The Independent* 31st October 2005 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/july-7-tube-bomber-argued-with-cashier-shortly-before-blast-513288.html
7 Icons of England http://www.icons.org.uk/theicons/collection/cricket
8 *The Independent* 25th April 1993 http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/leading-article-what-a-lot-of-tosh-1457335.html
9 Quoted in Hamilton, I. 2011 'Cricketers in the hood', *The Guardian* 9th October http://www.guardian.co.uk/sport/2011/oct/09/compton-cricket-club-homies-la
10 Hamilton, op cit.
11 'Amla dragged into another controversy', *Cricinfo* 13th August 2006 http://www.cricinfo.com/southafrica/content/story/256329.html
12 Referring to an incident some years earlier, Shafayat recounts another occasion when he had been labelled a jihadist. 'I had just grown a beard because the Prophet Mohammed had a beard and I wanted to look like him in a way. But I play in English cricket and I'm a little bit in the public eye, so I did worry about any adverse reaction. I was out with my family one day and heard someone say, "Here come the suicide bombers"'. 'Lack of shame will forever tarnish Zidane's legacy', *Daily Telegraph* 14th July 2006 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/othersports/2340543/Lack-of-shame-will-forever-tarnish-Zidanes-legacy.html
13 'Bilal Shafayat to be paid damages over slur', *The Dawn* 21st August 2009 http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/cricket/07-bilal-shafayat-to-be-paid-damages-over-slur-ha-07
14 http://www.comptoncricketclub.org/about.html
15 http://www.comptoncricketclub.org/is-or-is-not-cricket.html
16 Raffles, the character created by E.W. Hornung, is a literary case in point. Featuring in adventures set in Victorian England, Raffles is a gentleman cricketer who plays the game for the excellent cover it affords for his real vocation, burglary. 'Gentleman thief Raffles is daring, debonair and devilishly handsome – and a first-class cricketer … the master burglar indulges his passion for

cricket and crime: thieving jewels from a country house, outwitting the law, stealing from the nouveau riche, and, of course, bowling like a demon …' (Cover blurb, Penguin Classics edition).

17 Quotes in this chapter from the books by Young and Croft are from Kindle editions for which page numbers are not available.

18 The 'Keep calm and carry on' slogan, originally from a poster produced by the Ministry of Information at the beginning of the Second World War, was designed to contribute to the ontological security of the British people under threat of a German invasion. In the past decade or so the slogan had been used widely in merchandising, particularly on posters, mugs, and t-shirts. Interestingly, it has been widely appropriated and adapted by producers of cricketing memorabilia and merchandise. Slogans on mugs and t-shirts include: 'Keep calm and cricket on', 'Keep calm and bat on', 'Keep calm and follow on', 'Keep calm and play cricket', 'Keep calm and Trott on' (after England batsman Jonathan Trott), and 'Keep calm and smash it', the name of Kevin Pietersen's online batting tutorial. It is not difficult to draw parallels between the original intention of the wartime slogan and the 'Spirit of the Game' of cricket, which disapproves of excessive displays of emotion and demonstrative behaviour generally. For example, it is against the Spirit of the Game, 'to dispute an umpire's decision by word, action or gesture' and to 'direct abusive language towards an opponent or umpire'. 'Keep calm and carry on' is a phrase which highlights, in the sense indicated by Neville Cardus (quoted earlier in the chapter), an aspect of Englishness that could be constructed from 'the theory and practice of cricket'.


19 Norman Tebbit, a minister in Mrs Thatcher's government, criticized a multicultural approach which did not care whether Britons of Indian or Pakistani descent cheered for India or Pakistan when they were playing cricket in England. The 'cricket test' is, according to Tebbit, a test of national loyalty (which, by implication, many members of Britain's ethnic minorities would fail).

## Chapter 6 The Cosmopolitan Stranger: A Thesis

1 'Superman "may end US citizenship", says Action Comics', BBC News 29th April 2011 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-13237795

2 The author of the present volume has contributed to both of these collections.

3 All references to Delanty (2009) are to a Kindle version for which page numbers are not available.
4 This is made more problematic when the appropriateness of the term community is considered, particularly in the context of the discussion of 'milieu' and 'socioscapes' in Chapter 4.
5 Not wanting to bring an us/them distinction in through the back door I want to resist describing the cosmopolitan stranger as an 'insile', that is to say, an exile from within.
6 Tony Travers, quoted in 'Why are towns un-twinning?' by Jon Kelly, BBC News 5th January 2012 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-16408111
7 Knight Owl, another self-styled superhero, talks of the problems of adopting a name. 'It's a general faux pas – anything with the words *night, shadow, phantom* … Those dark-vigilante-type-sounding names tend to get snapped up pretty fast' (quoted in Ronson, 2011).
8 '"Superhero Phoenix Jones": "I'll keep Seattle safe"', BBC News 14th October 2011 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-15301830
9 Seattle police spokesman Detective Mark Jamieson quoted in 'Seattle "superhero" Phoenix Jones arrested over pepper-spray allegations', *The Guardian* 11th October 2011 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/11/seattle-superhero-phoenix-jones-arrested?INTCMP=SRCH
10 There is also a degree of real-life superhero activity in the UK. See for example, 'Real life British superheroes find crime hard to find' by Richard Alleyne, *The Telegraph* 3rd August 2011 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/howaboutthat/8679664/Real-life-British-superheroes-find-crime-hard-to-find.html
11 http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/flash+mob
12 The Wikipedia entry is better (although the English is not): 'a group of people who assemble suddenly in a public place, perform an unusual and sometimes seemingly pointless act for a brief time, then disperse, often for the purposes of entertainment and/or satire'. Wikipedia emphasizes that flash mobs are organized via telecommunications, social media, or viral emails, and that the term is not usually applied to events and performances organized for the purposes of politics (such as protests), commercial advertisement, publicity stunts that involve public relation firms, or paid professionals (although of course the imagery of flash mobs has been appropriated for advertising mobile phone networks etc) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flash_mob
13 All quotes from Kindle version.
14 Official website blurb: http://www.gretnalandmark.com/
15 'Urban Realm' 5th July 2011 www.urbanrealm.com/news/2996/_%E2%80%98-Star_of_Caledonia%E2%80%99_to_adorn_border_with_England.html
16 Balmond quoted on BBC News 5th July 2011.
17 Jan Hogarth, Dumfries & Galloway Arts Association's Public Art Manager, quoted in 'Star of Caledonia artists host Scottish identity debate', BBC News 11th October 2011 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-south-scotland-15256514
18 website blurb www.gretnalandmark.com/
19 http://www.gretnalandmark.com/uploads/downloads/Landscape_Brief2010.pdf

20 'Giant horse to become £2m artwork', BBC News 10th February 2009 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/kent/7880889.stm. 'The Angel of the South' is a reference to Antony Gormley's 'Angel of the North' near Gateshead possibly the most famous of Britain's contemporary monuments. According to *The Guardian* newspaper, '[w]hether viewed as a spiritually uplifting icon or a phoenix rising from the ashes of the abandoned coal mine beneath it, the Angel of the North has been a joyous addition to the northern landscape'.
21 The mistrust of the people shown by the political elites was even more evident in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, and according to Solnit represents 'the worst case of elite panic in the history of the United States' (Solnit, 2009: 235).

## Chapter 7 Representing the Stranger: Film and Television

1 I will not deal with the classic figure of the stranger in sci-fi movies in this opening section, choosing instead to look at the diversity of representations of the stranger in contemporary science fiction in the sections that follow. However, it must be recorded that science fiction has long enjoyed a relationship with the classical sociological figure of the stranger in movies such as *The Day the Earth Stood Still*, *ET*, and *Starman:* the stranger as redeemer or messiah being a particularly strong theme (Ruppersberg, 1990).
2 Loshitzky (2010: 9) acknowledges that the majority of films depicting the 'migrant stranger' are made by film-makers drawn from the 'host' community rather than by 'the strangers' in their midst.
3 Amongst commentators on the film there is no consensus on the spelling of papeles/papelles.
4 I am extremely grateful to my colleague Michael Bacon for bringing this book to my attention.
5 Jacket blurb.

## Chapter 8 Conclusion

1 'Ethnicity, once a genie contained in the bottle of some sort of locality (however large), has now become a global force, forever slipping in and through the cracks between states and borders' (Appadurai, 1996: 41).

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