

# **NATIONALISM, GLOBALIZATION, AND AFRICA**



**MICHAEL AMOAH**



# Nationalism, Globalization, and Africa


**Also by Michael Amoah**

*Reconstructing the Nation in Africa: the Politics of Nationalism in Ghana* (2007)

# Nationalism, Globalization, and Africa

Michael Amoah

palgrave  
macmillan



NATIONALISM, GLOBALIZATION, AND AFRICA

Copyright © Michael Amoah, 2011.

Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2011 978-0-230-10284-2

All rights reserved.

First published in 2011 by

PALGRAVE MACMILLAN®

in the United States—a division of St. Martin's Press LLC,

175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the World, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.

ISBN 978-1-349-28731-4

ISBN 978-1-137-00216-7 (eBook)

DOI 10.1057/9781137002167

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Amoah, Michael.

Nationalism, globalization, and Africa / Michael Amoah.

p. cm.

1. Africa—Politics and government. 2. Nationalism—Africa.  
3. Globalization—Africa. 4. Africa—Foreign relations. I. Title.  
JQ1875.A76 2011  
320.54096—dc23 2011031574

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.

Design by Integra Software Services

First edition: December 2011

# Contents

List of Maps	vii
Preface	ix
Acknowledgements	xiii
1 Theorizing on Nationalism	1
2 Supranationalisms and Globalization: The Contours and Subcontours of Power and Trade Alliances	17
3 Global Governance and the Politics of Handling Conflict: Sudan, Kosovo, and South Ossetia	27
4 Africa and China	41
5 Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, and Cote d'Ivoire	47
6 South Africa, Angola, Zimbabwe, and Kenya	97
7 Guinea, Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, Cameroon, and Egypt	133
8 Tanzania, Botswana, and Ghana	175
9 Union Government of Africa	201
10 International Politics of Africa	209
Notes	219
Bibliography	245
Index	257

# List of Maps

Map of Sudan	49
Map of Somalia	65
Map of Uganda	72
Map of South Africa	98
Map of Angola	107
Map of Cameroon	151
Map of Egypt	167
Map of Tanzania	177
Map of Ghana	190
Political Map of Africa 2010	202

# Preface

This book presents an overview of global politics and discussions on international political economy vis-à-vis Africa. The content includes an in-depth discussion of Africa's identity-related conflicts of supranational import, and their handling by the institutions of global governance such as the United Nations Security Council and the International Criminal Court, amidst the competing interests of supranational entities across the globe. Nationalism is always at play in the ensuing national and international politics, and supranationalism has demonstrated itself to be the most potent force against global governance and globalization. Supranational expressions, as well as hegemonic nationalistic expressions, and their competing interests, counteract the aims of global governance in politics, economics and trade. Hence, this book has devoted Chapter 1 to the Theories of Nationalism. In addition to setting the scene, the chapter debates to what extent the Theories of Nationalism are applicable to the realities of national and international politics, globalization, and Africa. The chapter discusses why and how the theorizing has assumed, and among other things examines the work of Hans Kohn, who sparked off the controversial ethnic versus civic dichotomy of nationalism that has bogged debates on nationalism to date, including what constitutes a nation, and when nationalism began.

Subsequently, Chapter 2 identifies the supranationalisms within the mesh of globalization, their contours and subcontours of power and trade alliances in global politics. Consequently, Chapter 3 deals with global governance, the United Nations system, and what happens when the rubber hits the road, using the handling of the Sudanese conflict as a case study. The chapter includes discussions on the unilateral declarations of independence by Kosovo and South Ossetia in 2008 to reflect on some supranational polarizations in global governance. Almost tangentially, but relevantly, Chapter 4 handles the development of the relationship between Africa and China, and discusses this new relationship, which is in competition with the existing postcolonial partnership with the West.



In 2008, I drew up a list of African countries with identical political issues, long-running problems, or increasingly difficult political circumstances, ridden by or driven to conflict, some of which I termed as ticking time bombs, in order to examine their internal political problems plus the interface with the international system, global governance, and globalization. Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, Cote d'Ivoire, South Africa, Angola, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Guinea, Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, Cameroon, and Egypt, which are discussed in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, featured on that list. I subsequently adopted Tanzania, Botswana, and Ghana as three counterbalancing cases, which feature in Chapter 8. The bombs that were ticking in Egypt, Ivory Coast, Guinea and Uganda exploded in the course of authoring; these countries are of course featured in detail, in the same measure as those yet to explode.

It became clear that all of the countries with serial political difficulties, including those termed as time bombs ticking, are more or less one-party states. This was such a common phenomenon that even the safest country on the continent, Botswana, which is consistently at the top of the Ibrahim Index on African Governance, is effectively a one-party state. The comparative analyses from the economic, peace, and human development indicators, as well as the ensuing security challenges, demonstrated that the state of governance reeling from these one-party states, which also had long-duration Presidents in some cases, was the root cause of the poor indicators, even if Botswana had escaped this negative aspect. The smooth development of nationalism has been affected in all of the countries with governance problems. It is recognized that forms of nationalism, particularly supranationalism, constitute the bane of globalization. However, in all of the case study countries, the state of the national political economy has been borne by the state of national governance, or that the exact political context has led to the current economic and social state of affairs, even if international politics cannot be taken out of the equation.

More often than not, the head of state was too long in power, and had exceeded their terms of office constitutionally or unconstitutionally, but the other trend is that most of such countries in Africa are francophone. Indeed, the political time bombs that were ticking in Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire, Niger, and Mauritania have already exploded, even if Mauritania and Niger, where coups occurred in August 2008 and February 2010, respectively, are not discussed in this book. Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville and Cameroon which feature in Chapter 6 are still ticking.

We also find that unresolved constitutional crises led to political disasters. Kenya's constitutional debacle was resolved in August 2010, and Kenya can expect clear-cut elections in 2012. The continual lack of resolution to a Zimbabwean constitution, even under a power-sharing government, is the

recipe for the imminent trouble at the next elections. The discriminatory concept of *ivoirité*, which was not fully resolved in Cote d'Ivoire's constitutional development, contributed to the decade-long political chaos that culminated in the postelectoral deadlock in December 2010. Even where secular nationalism had kept the lid on religious fundamentalism, the December 2010 popular uprising in Tunisia that ousted President Ben Ali, created a domino effect in Algeria, and particularly Egypt, where President Mubarak had been in power for 30 years, and yet preferred his son to be his replacement. Mubarak was subsequently ousted in February 2011 by popular revolt.

The current of International Political Economy runs through the whole book, and for each country case study, the global or international indicators of governance, human development, peace, corruption, and terrorism are discussed using the respective Ibrahim Index on African Governance, the Global Peace Index, the Corruption Perceptions Index, the Human Development Index, and where relevant the Maplecroft Terror Risk Index. The discussions on national political economies, international political economy, and the rankings on global indexes do bring out both the national and international perspectives and implications. The discussions also include the analyses on the security situations facing each country, including the new security challenges in the areas of health, food, energy, climate change, or natural and artificial disasters.

The book then swings back to what remains of the global discussions, including the road map toward the United Government of Africa in Chapter 9. Subsequently, Chapter 10 discusses economic partnership agreements, and other politics of trade in the arena of the World Trade Organization, such as the DDA, the development of the Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) new cartel within world trade, and of course the global market slump that followed the raising of the United States debt ceiling on August 2, 2011.

# Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Palgrave Macmillan, and I am very pleased to acknowledge the staff for their part in getting this book on to the shelves: particularly Sarah Whalen, for her professionalism to customer service, and the editor, Chris Chappell, for extending the text limit in order to accommodate further discussion on certain countries that were constantly in the news and had assumed such a high profile that excluding their update would have been a disservice to analysis.

I am also grateful to Joel Breuklander and the production team who meticulously handled the copy-editing process behind the scenes.

I acknowledge the acquisitions, the art and design, and the marketing and sales staff who have worked together to bring the book, and its jacket design, to a perfect finish and as an international sales product.

Many thanks to Laurie Harting for overseeing the process of signing the contract at the beginning.

Michael Amoah

## CHAPTER 1

---

# Theorizing on Nationalism

### Introduction

This chapter sets the scene for this book's argument that despite globalization being a process by which the people of the world are unified into a single society to function together, and the advantages thereof, the contours and the distribution of nationalism across the globe, and the identity interests associated with these contours, do undermine or operate against the aims of global governance, globalization, and the potential coherence of the global political and economic landscape. Globalization is defined as "a process of interaction and integration among the people, companies, and governments of different nations, a process driven by international trade and investment and aided by information technology. This process has effects on the environment, on culture, on political systems, on economic development and prosperity, and on human physical well-being in societies around the world."<sup>1</sup> Against this context, the identities from nationalism ensure that identity-related interests frustrate rather than promote globalization. In other words, nationalism competes against globalization.

The chapter also leads the book with a comprehensive discussion on the forms and theories of nationalism, and debates the path that the theorizing on nationalism has charted, by examining the work of Hans Kohn, one of the most notable contributors to the theories of nationalism. The debate in this chapter highlights to what extent the theorizing is applicable to the realities of national and international politics, globalization, and Africa.

### Introduction to Nationalism

Nationalism is a natural occurrence among humanity, just like the five senses of speech, sight, taste, smell, and touch. It is the phenomenon whereby people of similar persuasion or origins, and the identities derived thereof, express and

act together in pursuit and maintenance of their common aims and interests, resulting in political manifestations, whether psychologically or territorially defined. As highlighted by notable scholars on the subject of nationalism, it is a “naturalistic attribute of humanity.”<sup>2</sup> Since there are various identity groups, and several nations across the globe, each tending to bond and express its interests on the basis of that identity, a natural competition has been raging, and will continue to rage.

In this and the following five paragraphs, I present brief definitions or descriptions of the types or kinds of nationalism across the globe, a precursor for the subsequent mapping of the contours of their distribution that also highlight the political groupings resulting from the manifestations of nationalism in international politics. Nationalism, as an expression of identity, could be ethnonational, subnational, national, consociational, international, transnational, multinational, or supranational. Supranationalism could also have essentialist linguistic or religious elements, such as for the supranational League of Arab States (Arab League), which has Arabic as its common denominator, and the supranational Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which has Islam as its common denominator. I therefore begin with the basics of nationalism, and progress to the wider and more complex manifestations of nationalism such as supranationalism, which matters most to globalization, and to the argument of this book.

We should note that the various identity expressions or forms of nationalism listed, do evolve in character and magnitude, and can range or mutate, from the basic levels of tribe and ethnic group, to their multiple and cross-national manifestations such as supranationalisms.<sup>3</sup> However, each form of nationalism (even including supranationalisms) would satisfy some, if not all, of the following checklist:

- a large centralized government (or state);
- a common territory;
- a collective proper name;
- common myths of ancestry or origin or shared historical myths;
- a common language;
- a common economic life and policy;
- common rights and duties for all citizens, plus a common mental makeup (that all citizens belong to the same nation/state);
- evidence of some sort of ideology or doctrine serving as guidance to leaders of the nationalist movement and that contributed to the emergence of the nation;

- evidence of cohesion between the masses—the common people—and the aristocracy, that is, no class barriers in politics;
- a common public culture or education system.<sup>4</sup>

### **Definitions, Forms, and Types of Nationalism, Nation, and State**

The contours of nationalism across the globe define themselves, or can be identified, in any (or a combination) of the following manifestations of the forms and types of nationalism, nation, and state.

Ethnonationalism is simply the form of nationalism that has a shared tribal, ethnic, cultural, national, or linguistic basis. A multinational state is where the state has jurisdiction over more than one nation or ethnonational identity group. For example, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) governs the four nations of England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. A nation-state is one in which the state presides over a single nation, where the political and national units are coterminous, or where they are congruent;<sup>5</sup> in other words where a particular national or identity group solely resides within a single state, for example, modern Israel or Egypt. Evidently, true nation-states are hard to find; however, multinational states can evolve into nation-states where the conditions are favorable and the citizens cohere. Hence, there are a number of states that view themselves as nation-states, even though they have multinational constituents. This occurs particularly where these multinational constituents have resided together over a reasonable period of time under a single state jurisdiction, and cohere under common citizenship, laws, rights, and duties (e.g., the United States, Botswana, Ghana, and Germany after the collapse of the Iron Curtain that divided the east and the west of the country).

However, for the sake of political accountability, all the states recognized under the United Nations (UN) system are generally considered as “nation-states,” even if there are serious divisions, threats of secession, or active secessionist movements within them. Hence, the UN recognizes the UK as a state, but not England, Scotland, or Wales separately, regardless of the potential for devolution, and regardless of England’s status as a single state in international football competitions. Consociationalism is where a federal mechanism is an equal (or nearly equal) power sharing organ of the constituent parts that have agreed to this mechanism of state, and incorporates guaranteed representation. Switzerland and the Netherlands are consociational states.

Supranationalism is an overarching form of nationalism that overruns state boundaries, and manifests as an intergovernmental political community made up of individual states in their own right. The supranational body would govern itself by a mechanism of representative decision making and agreed

constitution that binds equally on all member states, and with a presidency that rotates among member states. Whereas some supranational bodies do have clearly defined geographical and continental bases (such as the European Union [EU] and the African Union [AU]), other forms of supranationalism rely less on geographical distinction, and have resulted from linguistic and/or religious foundations, even if such supranationalisms also have geographical, political, and economic implications for globalization and international politics. For example, the Arab League, which stretches across North Africa and the Middle East, is a supranational entity of Arabic-speaking peoples that operates its own Greater Arab Free Trade Area. Moreover, the Arab League has observer countries that are non-Arab. Another supranational body, the OIC (also referred to as Political Islam), cuts across the Middle East, Africa, Asia, South America, and parts of Europe such as the Balkans; the OIC also has a permanent delegation to the UN.

Supranational bodies, by their sheer transnational and complex nature, are the ones that constitute or pose, the most enduring threat to globalization, international politics, and the existing systems of global governance, not least because competing international interests are intertwined, but also because their interests are difficult to define and monitor, if and when such interests are not that geographically aligned. I will use the Sudanese conflict to explain this point. The conflict was between President Omar Hassan al-Bashir's Arabic northern Sudan, governed by the Sudanese National Congress Party (also known as the National Islamic Front), and an African (or non-Arabic) southern Sudan, governed by the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). In July 2008, the International Criminal Court (ICC) indicted Omar al-Bashir for presiding over genocide and crimes against humanity. The main supranational bodies that have lobbied against this indictment are the OIC and the Arab League, which have also manipulated the AU in temporary support. To compound the international politics further, we should note that previous U.S. strategies motioned at the UN Security Council (UNSC) to resolve the Sudanese conflict were vetoed by China, which drills and imports oil from northern Sudan, and has heavily industrialized the region. This is an example of how the contours of (supra)nationalism and identity interests converge to politicize issues and agendas, and compete against the established systems or mechanisms of global governance and globalization. Nationalism operates in such a way that the bond of identity or unity in each peculiar case becomes fundamental for negotiating everything else.

### Theorizing on Nationalism

Delving into a debate on the theories of nationalism or engaging in some theoretical dialogue around the ten-point checklist set out earlier would benefit

the remainder of discussions in this book. The list reflects the collated summary of issues arising from the controversial ethnic versus civic dichotomy of nationalism that was sparked off by Hans Kohn, and has bogged debates on nationalism to date.

Kohn (1891–1971) is one of the most influential contributors to the theories of nationalism, and is known to have written (or edited) some 50 books and hundreds of articles and book reviews. In the *American Historical Review* alone, Kohn had published 45 reviews between 1944 and 1965, and in the same period wrote numerous pieces for the *Encyclopedia Britannica*,<sup>6</sup> aside from the dozens of addresses that he delivered in his lifetime. The Hans Kohn Collection is in the repository of the Leo Baeck Institute at the Center for Jewish History based in New York.

The generation of this vast amount of work was underpinned by several factors. One was his linguistic proficiency in German, English, French, and Hebrew. He engaged in both voluntary and paid activity in areas related to the order of the languages listed—Prague, London, Paris, and Palestine—until he finally settled and died in the United States. The second factor was that his coverage of nationalisms had a broad geographical bandwidth, including Europe, Africa, the United States, and the Middle East. Third, the period within which he lived and wrote witnessed the world wars, which by themselves produced many hot issues of nationalism that could not have been ignored by a personality of Kohn's caliber. His gross interest in the burning issues of the time, such as Fascism, Communism, Colonialism, and Zionism, generated both motivation and a global remit.

A fourth factor is that Kohn personally engaged with the political context, and some of his addresses were delivered to political audiences, so that what he spoke and wrote stemmed from firsthand experience rather than from being a *rapporteur*. Indeed, at one point, he was a prisoner of war (WWI), as a result of which he became interned in the Soviet Union until 1920. A fifth, and not least among the factors, is that he began his trade quite early—at least right from his student days, including when he was a member of the Bah-Kochba Zionist student group at the German University in Prague where he received his doctorate in Law. Last, we should note the location of his activity within Zionism. The Zionist movement was very strong during Kohn's time, as it had to deal with the host of events leading to the Holocaust of the 1940s and the repercussions afterward.

Kohn has therefore been labeled severally as publicist, historian, academic, opinion-molder, and author, a list to which I would add two further accolades—political activist and busybody. His broad interest in the unfolding history and politics of his era, coupled with his love for debate and the dissemination of ideas, made him the prolific writer who produced many outputs, one of which<sup>7</sup> became very popular for the study of nationalism, chiefly



because in this *magnum opus*, he tried to propound what in his view was a civic versus ethnic distinction between the nationalism of Western Europe and that of Eastern Europe, where he then lived. The two most common criticisms of the dichotomy are: first, geographically “different versions of nationalism did not fall into neat east-west and north-south divides,”<sup>8</sup> and second, conceptually, civic and ethnic nationalisms have not always been mutually exclusive.<sup>9</sup> I will discuss this second point in detail later.

### ***Kohn's Equating Nationalism with Imperialism***

*En route* to the core of Kohn's ethnic/civic dichotomy, we should note that there have been countless reviews of Kohn's outputs. An interesting trend is that, as in the case of the various commentaries and reviews on Max Weber, and of course other well-known figures in the sociological and political canon, it is those having an intimate knowledge or understanding of the personal context of the author (for one reason or another) who are able to make the not-so-obvious contributions that liven up the debate. In this regard, Andre Liebich, who claims to know the “historical circumstances in which Kohn wrote,”<sup>10</sup> and precisely in what “circumstances that the premises of the Kohn Dichotomy were set,”<sup>11</sup> has made a good attempt with his exposition on Kohn's personal itinerary.<sup>12</sup> No doubt, therefore, that Liebich has the right to pontificate that Kohn “came late to the view that there were two types of nationalism.”<sup>13</sup> In appreciation of Liebich's article, we manage somehow to peek into the mind and world of Kohn, and with the extensive bibliographical coverage of the article, one is almost tempted to feel fully assured, until the revelation that Liebich curiously omits Kohn's very important publication of 1932<sup>14</sup> from his list of references. Whether this is circumstantial or not is not important. What really matters is that it is in this omitted work of Kohn that we find, that all along, what Kohn meant by nationalism was Western imperialism. In his mind and descriptions, the two were one and the same phenomenon, a monotony. One could begin to observe some allusions to this monotonous trend in a previous publication<sup>15</sup> also omitted from Liebich's references; however, it was in 1932 that Kohn published what amounts to his “struggle between imperialism and nationalism,”<sup>16</sup> a struggle that was both conceptual and real.

Kohn's alibi was that “the two concepts are hard to distinguish in their origin and essence.”<sup>17</sup> Hence, even when he put out some distinctions between the two, for example, that “imperialism is for the most part a later phase in the process begun by nationalism,”<sup>18</sup> or that “imperialism acted as the awakener of nationalism,”<sup>19</sup> the conclusion from the truth of his mind was that “It like nationalism, is an expression of the collective egotism and love of

dominion of the social group which is the active political unit of the present day, namely, the nation.”<sup>20</sup> Kohn would confirm in his subsequent work that the nationalism of Western Europe and the imperialism by Western Europe are the same phenomenon, so that

European civilization led and shaped the world through—and to—the very form of social cohesion which it had found in nationalism. Its leadership resulted in nationalism becoming in the twentieth century the common form of life all over the earth<sup>21</sup>

We already know that Kohn knew too well what nationalism was: he is notable among those who have shaped the theorizing. But if anyone doubts whether Kohn understood imperialism, his following definition should erase that doubt:

The hall-mark of imperialism in the narrower sense is association with economic penetration and the opening up of large areas, the domination of regions and populations, direct or indirect, political or merely economic, and the attempt to organize them so as to ensure permanent possession or influence<sup>22</sup>

That fusion of nationalism and imperialism in Kohn’s mind is real and significant. Hence Western imperialism was the nationalism he wrote about. This monotony, compared with nationalisms in other parts of the world, became a dichotomy of west versus east, civic versus ethnic, or even north versus south, because in his view, the one flowed or transmitted to the other, or that, the latter responded to the former. For Kohn, the nationalism then demonstrating in Eastern Europe was an extended concomitant or a product of the imperialism of Western Europe, so that when Western Europe sneezed imperialism, Eastern Europe caught a cold of nationalism. Of course, the West had experienced its nationalism(s) that had now grown into imperialism, but had not ceased to be Western nationalism, to which the East was then responding.

### ***How Universal is Kohn’s Dichotomy?***

The application of Kohn’s dichotomy, whether between the east-west geography or its north-south variant, can hardly be universal, not least because the dichotomy was “predicated upon social and economic differences.”<sup>23</sup> For example, the Western nationalism Kohn utilized in his analogy emerged in areas that had a strong middle class, with individual liberty as a sign of progress and with a tendency to limit state power, whereas Eastern nationalism arose among a weak middle class, where the group or collective unit was the basis of progress and there was a tendency to glorify state power.<sup>24</sup>

Also mitigating the universality of the dichotomy is the fact that the threshold of periodization underpinning the dichotomy's formulation restricts making meaningful comparisons between modern and premodern eras. Indeed, more than enough has been discussed in the literature over the past decades to discount and dispel Kohn's periodization that "modern nationalism originated in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in north-western Europe and its American settlements,"<sup>25</sup> to the extent that even the caveat "modern" has been unable to save the notion from the torrent of evidence and analysis that has ensued post-Kohn.

Something fundamental about the theorizing of Kohn's dichotomy stipulates that nationalism was original and indigenous only to Western Europe, until a historical scan across the globe would throw up numerous examples that counter Kohn's premise, and from a wide range of perspectives. The Age of Enlightenment, which is at the core of the seventeenth century that initiated Kohn's dichotomy, is the period when the intellectual development of Western European society became revolutionized, with very positive implications for all spheres of the society, particularly the political and educational institutions that hosted, and still host, the symbols of pride, culture, and nationalism. Using educational and cultural institutions as an example, we know that Oxford University, the oldest English-speaking university in the world, became an established seat of learning as early as the eleventh century. But as the global scan would reveal, a review of the British higher education system published in 2007 by experts of the field<sup>26</sup> recognizes that the European system has come a long way from its original mission of just teaching, to its second mission of research and the production of knowledge, which was ushered in by the Humboldtian revolution, and to its third and most recent mission or "third leg" that focuses on the application of knowledge through strong commercial links between universities and industry "to add value and to diffuse it to the benefit of the economy and wider society."<sup>27</sup> This third mission has resulted in heightened innovation and the creation of many blue-chip companies. You would think that the Western European system is original and indigenous, until the 2007 review states that

The University of Al Karaouine, founded in 859 at Fez in Morocco, is said to be one of the earliest recognisable universities. Its faculty apparently extended to a broad range of subjects, particularly the natural sciences. Among the disciplines taught were not only the trivial staples of grammar, rhetoric and logic but also medicine, chemistry, astronomy, mathematics, geography, history and music. It seems reasonable to assume that the potential for application of knowledge was implicit and perhaps explicit in the institution, rather more than it was in Europe for another ten centuries<sup>28</sup>

Hence, the threshold of periodization set by Kohn's dichotomy would prevent useful comparative studies that span beyond the seventeenth century. Whereas it is not the aim of this book to rehash the debates about periodization, we should note that stemming from the logic of Kohn's monotony is also the notion that nationalism in other parts of the world, for example, nationalism in Africa, was essentially anticolonial nationalism; after all, this was the fight against imperialism or colonialism. But I would argue that there were nations and nationalisms in Africa prior to the modernist threshold of periodization set by Kohn, and prior to the colonial era too, and furthermore that anticolonial nationalism was only a phase of nationalism in the evolution of global history. Judging by the full ten-point criteria listed in this chapter,<sup>29</sup> which has assumed from the theoretical debates on nationalism about the attributes of a modern nation,<sup>30</sup> the Fanti and Ashanti nations in the contemporary multinational state of Ghana were nations in their own right, and experienced their own nationalisms, prior to, or at least around the same period as, the modernist threshold; the Fanti had already emerged as a nation by the beginning of the seventeenth century, and the Ashanti certainly by 1701.<sup>31</sup>

Ethiopia has also long been known and recognized as an ancient nation, with some of its greatness dating from when Aksum in its apogee (third-sixth century A.D.) became the greatest market of northeastern Africa, and its merchants traded as far as Alexandria and beyond. Although it was the Aksumite Empire that adopted the name Ethiopia in the fourth century, the Ethiopian dynastic history is traced to Emperor Menelik I in 1000 B.C., with unbroken continuity to the Empire of Aksum. Emperor Menelik II, Menelik I's successor, stated in 1889 that

We cannot permit our integrity as a Christian and civilized nation to be questioned, nor the right to govern our empire in absolute independence. The Emperor of Ethiopia is a descendant of a dynasty that is 3,000 years old—a dynasty that during all that time has never submitted to an outsider. Ethiopia has never been conquered and she never shall be<sup>32</sup>

The Italians struggled with accepting this image portrayed by the Ethiopians, and after unsuccessful efforts and tricks at subverting or subjugating them, Italy acknowledged in 1896 that Ethiopia was an existing independent sovereign nation that it could not conquer. The Italians would, however, strike again in 1935, and the ruling Emperor, Haile Selassie I, would be forced into exile in England, but would subsequently return to his throne in 1941 when British and Ethiopian fighters defeated the Italians as part of WWII, until the emperor would be deposed by the military *Derg* of 1972 that ended

the line of dynastic rulers. Despite Ethiopia's checkered history (and I am not aware of any country without a checkered history), the country's status as a nation dating from ancient times is well established.

Another more emphatic reason why the ethnic/civic dichotomy cannot attain universality is that ethnonationalism equates with civic nationalism in nation-states, and I should say that this also challenges the rationality of the dichotomy, a point that I explore in the following section. Hence, it appears that Kohn's dichotomy was too tight, and is limited in its application or comparability to the wide variety of scenarios across the globe, for reasons including geographical, socioeconomic, chronological, and philosophical.

### *To What Extent is Kohn's Dichotomy Rational?*

A journey through the existing discourse does generate the question of to what extent Kohn's civic/ethnic dichotomy can be rational. I introduce this quest because the dichotomy has over time mutated itself into a polarity of a rational civic nationalism and an irrational ethnic nationalism,<sup>33</sup> and with the cascading mutations and renditions, it becomes easy to lose sight of their source as well as pertinence. We know that the issue of what is rational is never conclusive, and is always subject to the nature of the issues at stake, and from which perspectives. I won't start that debate here, as I won't finish it! However, in a nation-state, the civic nationalism is the ethnonationalism<sup>34</sup> in both theory and reality, simply because both the political and national units are congruent;<sup>35</sup> and, this is one reason why the ethnic/civic divide is not always rational. Furthermore, the two types of nationalism (ethnic and civic) do not have to be geographically apart—whether east-west or even north-south—in order to be different; indeed, in a multinational state, they can coexist, and this is a second reason why the dichotomy cannot always be rational.

What is also new to the debate is the paradox that in some multinational political contexts, the ethnic and civic notions of nationalism do actually synchronize, because of a phenomenon known as the "rationalization of ethnonationalism" (ROE),<sup>36</sup> which demonstrates itself through electoral behavior in multinational states. The case of Ghana has been fully documented.<sup>37</sup> Hence, rationalized ethnonationalism can be defined as

an observed electoral behavior whereby ethnonationalism synchronizes with patriotism; whereby citizens demonstrate ethnonationalism as the most rational way of rendering their civic loyalties to the state; with the firm conviction that, for their own purposes, voting along the lines of ethnonational identity is in the best interests of the state, given the realities of the overall political context<sup>38</sup>

Rationalized ethnonationalism creates a synchrony whereby, instead of the dichotomy of a “rational” civic nationalism and an “irrational” ethnonationalism,<sup>39</sup> citizens within a multinational state can, and do demonstrate, ethnonationalism as their civic loyalty within the realities of the local political rationality, by making voter choices to best serve the calculated interests of their ethnonational group. ROE is a rational response to the state of figuration<sup>40</sup> within the estimation of the ensuing politics. This proven characteristic of Ghana applies to most of Africa, and indeed, to several other multinational states across the globe. In the case of Ghana, the traditions of origin and other comprehensive evidence<sup>41</sup> of the contemporary multinational state prove that some 79 percent of the country (who are of Guan ancestry) are directly traceable to the Old Ghana Empire of the Western Sudan.<sup>42</sup>

Incidentally, the stability of interactions between ethnonationalisms within the modern Ghanaian state, in contradistinction with other troubled African examples such as Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe, can be explained from this common Guan ancestry that birthed the predominant and core Akan ethnîe of the contemporary Ghanaian population. At the same time, the 13 percent who are not of Guan ancestry, but whose affiliation and citizenship derive from when geographical boundaries officially drawn at the time of Modern Ghana’s independence in 1957 placed them within the jurisdiction of the new state, see themselves as Ghanaian citizens, and most importantly, are accepted as so by the other 79 percent. Hence, both the ethnic and civic notions of nationalism are of similar importance to how citizens view themselves or respond to civic duties, and even to policy making at the relevant levels of governance.

The evolution of the modern Ghanaian national consciousness is rather peculiar in that it seems to have kept focus and survived even during the tenure of military regimes, perhaps due to the enduring Akan core ethnîe, and more directly due to the painstaking efforts undertaken by even the military governments to nurture this national consciousness. During the regime of General Acheampong, who overthrew the elected Progress Party of Dr Busia in 1972, he instituted a national Charter of Redemption into the civic culture; a charter within which the phrase “one nation, one people one destiny”<sup>43</sup> featured very strongly. To complement this, he instituted a National Pledge that was sung<sup>44</sup> by school children at the morning assembly, instilling patriotism and nationalism at an early age.

But perhaps a part of the art of capturing and maintaining the corporate national consciousness among adults of voting age has been the ability of the various regimes to demonstrate some appealing ethnic arithmetic among its representation. Hence, a significant trademark from the Acheampong era is that the Regional Commissioners he appointed were of similar identity group

to each subregion: an Ashanti was appointed to the Ashanti Region; a Fanti to the Fanti Region; an Ewe to the Volta Region; and a Northerner to each of the three Northern regions. Obviously, the ethnic equation would never balance squarely in the hearts and minds of all citizens, but it is important to note, that out of this balancing act has emerged some unwritten rules such as giving the vice presidential slot to a candidate from the northern part of the country if the presidential candidate is from the south. This rule has survived from the elections of 2000.

It is revealing to note that the presidential speech delivered at the 2007 golden jubilee anniversary of independence was devoid of the one nation, people and destiny mantra; this points to a display of confidence, that at this stage, when the nation was already formed, the mantra needed no drumming, as compared with 35 years prior (in 1972) when the national consciousness might have been fragile with a military regime. The state of Modern Ghana, which began as a multinational state, has served as the incubator for gestating a single national consciousness and a new nationhood.<sup>45</sup> It can be argued therefore that ethnonational heterogeneity is not an absolute obstacle to the attainment of a single national identity for the multinational postcolonial state,<sup>46</sup> or any multinational state for that matter.

From the existing discourse, as well as in contemporary political studies, we have no choice but to conclude that the Kohn dichotomy is neither universal nor rational, as it was from its inception. The ethnic versus civic typology is legitimate for analyzing the two valid types of nationalism in their own right, but the typology is not attributable to Kohn within the geographical and psychological falsities of east versus west, or imperialism, both of which underpinned his thought. Kohn's sense of the dichotomy has therefore outlived some of its applicability, particularly as its theoretical scope is unable to deal fully with contemporary complex political scenarios such as the ROE. Liebich has already labeled it as a "rhetorical construct."<sup>47</sup>

Judging from what is unfolding in contemporary international relations, a further interesting challenge to the east/west aspect of the dichotomy has to do with the western EU, which has fast expanded to incorporate countries geographically related to the former Eastern bloc, such as Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria, plus Croatia, which is a candidate country, plus officially recognized potential candidates such as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo, which staged a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) from Serbia on February 17, 2008. It is interesting to note that all of these countries have been shaped by or can be considered as not-so-remote antecedents of the Hapsburg Monarchy, whose political context shaped Kohn's theorizing on nationalism. Indeed, Kohn was born and bred in Hapsburg Prague. In effect,

that east/west distinction has almost disappeared right under the geographical nose from which Kohn theorized. Perhaps then, it was with great foresight that Kohn described the region as “Hither East,”<sup>48</sup> although geographically true, in another (posterior) sense, these countries won’t be that politically far removed from the West, and could now almost be considered as part of the West. It is not just the EU that has experienced the crossing of carpet from East to West, or from behind the Iron Curtain. Over the years, the cross-continental North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has also enlarged to include the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, and there are deliberations about including states as thither east as Ukraine and Georgia. On January 1, 2011, Estonia became the seventeenth EU member state to join the eurozone.

### ***Kohn’s Contributions to the Ten-point Checklist for Modern Nationhood***

As already noted, some of Kohn’s blanket statements have contributed to the elements of confusion, or the lack of clarity and precision, within the theorizing on nationalism. Kohn suggests, for example, that before nationalism (before the sixteenth century, that is),<sup>49</sup> language was not such a big deal for the national consciousness, prestige, power, and pride of a people.<sup>50</sup> According to Kohn, “it was in no way regarded as a political or cultural factor,”<sup>51</sup> even though we observe that in 1362, the English Parliament began to hold its sessions in English because “the French language was little understood by the people.”<sup>52</sup>

In another blanket assertion, Kohn states that “nationalism was unthinkable before the emergence of the modern state in the period from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century,”<sup>53</sup> and by the state, he means “a centralized form of government over a large and distinct territory,”<sup>54</sup> even though we know that such forms of government have existed in history, such as the Ottoman Empire (1299–1922). Even the Hapsburg Monarchy (1526–1867) in which Kohn was born and bred<sup>55</sup> can be extended from 1278, by when the Hapsburgs had accumulated the Hapsburg Hereditary Lands that founded the Hapsburg Empire; after all, the period 1276–1918 was precisely when the Hapsburgs ruled in the monarchy centered in present-day Austria.

However, we owe to Kohn the attribute about cohesion between the masses and the aristocracy. Kohn set out how the development of nationalism and nationalist movements in Europe also heralded the changing economic groupings of society, from the nobles and the priests of the first and second estate, respectively, to the third estate that comprised professionals, intellectuals, and the intelligentsia, and subsequently, to the fourth estate made up



of the lower classes, with opportunities of ascent for members of the fourth estate to the third, in the modern era of nationalism.<sup>56</sup> Kohn seals this contribution with a subsequent exposition that modern nationalism is incomplete without the integration of the masses (the fourth estate) into the political culture. This, coupled with the preceding establishment of the third estate, is the development from cultural (or ethnic) nationalism to civic nationalism.<sup>57</sup>

Another key contribution from Kohn toward the ten-point checklist is the presence of ideology or doctrine as a part of the process of nation formation. Some navigation through the nationalism jungle reveals that all what Kohn meant by this was the revival of Old Testament doctrine by Oliver Cromwell, the statesman, and John Milton, the poet, who were both leaders of the nationalist movement of the English or the Puritan Revolution, which preached liberty to the consciousness of the English as a chosen people whom Cromwell had identified with ancient Israel.<sup>58</sup> As discussed elsewhere, “any society that experienced nationalism and was religious at the same time, had a nationalist ideology so long as the torchbearers of the nationalist movement sought guidance from within the religious matrix of the said society.”<sup>59</sup> This can certainly be said of the Fanti nation in Modern Ghana.<sup>60</sup>

It is equally important to discuss which of the ten-point checklist do not originate from Kohn, but were endorsed in his work, and it is useful to discuss from the top of the checklist and progress downward, beginning with the first two (a large centralized government, and a common territory). According to Kohn, nationalism “presupposes the existence . . . of a centralized form of government over a large and distinctive territory.”<sup>61</sup> By this, he had in mind the realm and rulership of the first estate by the absolute monarchs. This form of the state was modified by the French Revolution,<sup>62</sup> and has subsequently been revised by the socioeconomic evolution of each society to suit its progress and context. The largeness of the territory is not an issue, and in my view would constitute any size of territory that is wieldy enough for the control of the said state, for the simple reason that once the state loses control of a territory, it no longer governs it. Indeed, Kohn endorses territoriality as “the most important outward factor in the formation of nationalities.”<sup>63</sup> The territorial area of Kosovo, for example, is as little as 4 percent the size of the UK, and has a population that is just a quarter of Greater London, but this is a clearly defined territory, even if it is one of the least important reasons why member states of the UN have been divided about recognizing Kosovo’s UDI from Serbia. As of March 28, 2008, 36 foreign states had recognized Kosovo’s declaration, but 31 others had officially denied recognition, while 23 more had expressed concern and were advocating for more negotiations.<sup>64</sup> Hence, for Kosovo, territoriality was not so much an issue as the bargaining power tussles within the polarized UNSC,<sup>65</sup> the very organization that was supposed to

be refereeing Kosovo's status, as well as the shifting sands of relationships and solidarities that subsequently positioned themselves around Kosovo's status. In other words, it was politics as usual. Kosovo is discussed in further detail in Chapter 3.

Kohn also alludes to common descent as part of the state of mind that is necessary for national consciousness,<sup>66</sup> and affirms the view that common language has a significant role to play, as one of the natural elements from which nationalism can assume. Furthermore, he agrees with common rights and duties for all citizens as inherent of political nationalism, popular sovereignty, and the provisions of the state.<sup>67</sup>

Despite the usefulness of the ten-point criteria in assessing political entities for what they are, or aspire to be, the debate gives a clear indication that satisfying the criteria alone, or ticking the right boxes as the case may be, is not always sufficient to guarantee a safe passage to independence, without the due recognition from political peers, not least the sovereign state from which the aspiring state is seceding. More importantly, the secession needs a form of legitimacy such as UN sponsorship of the process leading to the UDI, as was with Kosovo, and as also applied to East Timor's secession from Indonesia in 1999, Montenegro's secession from Serbia and Montenegro in May 2006, and South Sudan's secession from Sudan in January 2011. Nor can it really be said that all the existing old recognized states really satisfied the criteria when they claimed nationhood status at the time they did, or were recognized by peers. Whereas Kohn tries to make a point of citizenship rationality, individual liberty, and common rights and duties as chief characteristics from the Enlightenment that underpinned Western civic nationalism, Walker Connor has pointed out that women did not have the same rights as men in eighteenth-century England, and there were no equal rights among males for quite some time. Before 1832, only landlords were allowed to vote; following the Reform Bill becoming an Act in 1832, just over 3 percent of English males could vote; then in 1867, when the electoral franchise was extended, some 80 percent of adult males could vote; and in 1918, when it was further extended to all males, only women over 30 years of age could vote.<sup>68</sup> So it appears that England, for example, was not quite up to the mark against which Kohn compared the Eastern or Central European counterparts. It appears that Kohn's zeal in making use of Western nationalism generated some over-generalizations. As aptly put by one commentator, "Kohn's commitment to Western liberalism caused him to overreach himself."<sup>69</sup>

Whatever the end result, we should note that Kohn's work goes some distance to shedding light on how the phenomenon of nationalism develops, with relevant examples, and in this regard, his contributions to the theoretical

canon are enduring. But we should also point out that his coverage of Africa was less benign, and the eighteenth-century threshold he imposed on the theorizing restricted his dichotomy to a Western European baseline. Obviously, the use of Western nationalism as a benchmark for all other global comparisons was not the most ideal way of dealing with such a diachronous subject (nationalism), an approach that portrayed him as an apologist sometimes. No doubt his Zionist background contributed to this posture. Ken Wolf would actually have it that “despite his disclaimers, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Kohn over-idealized both American and modern Western civilization.”<sup>70</sup> Noticeably, it was the Zionist training that generated Kohn’s awareness that the English Puritan nationalist movement had symptoms of the revival of Old Testament doctrine by Cromwell the statesman and Milton the poet, who were leaders of that revolution. Suffice it to say that the concept of referring to the respective torchbearers (or spokespersons) and poets of nationalist movements as prophets and minstrels—prophetic singers—<sup>71</sup> derives from Zion.

Considering the state of the art of global communications during Kohn’s lifespan, I would suppose that keeping up with events across the globe was quite a chore even for someone as keen as he was, someone who had regional interests that spread over four continents. Arguably, theorizing on nationalism “has improved not least because of increasing awareness and debate about the phenomenon and its recurrences, but also because this dynamic has challenged scholars to revisit their perspectives.”<sup>72</sup> Moreover, media reporting during the period of the two world wars, and the Cold War afterward, has been fraught with severe restrictions and censorship. Hence, it can be understood how Kohn could be incoherent over time, as he blazed the trail. The debate sheds some light on the nature of the minefield when dealing with the theories of nationalism, and the pitfalls to look out for when matching theory with reality. Tackling the real political scenarios on the ground, reveal how the contours of nationalisms manifest, and where the nexus of conflicting interests converge in the murky world of international politics.

The next chapter will flesh out the global contours of nationalism, particularly supranationalisms and their interaction or interface with each other as well as with the existing systems of global governance, the resulting international contours and subcontours of nationalism, and the ensuing contours and subcontours of trade and politics.

## CHAPTER 2

---

# Supranationalisms and Globalization: The Contours and Subcontours of Power and Trade Alliances

### Introduction

This chapter identifies key supranationalisms across the globe, their interactions with each other, as well as with systems of global governance, and the resulting complex contours and subcontours of power and trade alliances and politics. It continues with the scene-setting from the previous chapter, that forms of nationalism and identity interests (chiefly supranationalism) operate against the aims of globalization (and global governance for that matter), and ensure that there are always separate forms of identity, and their related competitive or conflicting interests separating the globe, even if globalization portends to be a process by which the people of the world are unified into a single society that should function together. Consequently, the rules of engagement are never set in stone, and precisely when and how constructive engagement occurs is left to be dictated by mutuality, seniority, or the party with the advantage, whichever attribute is practicable for the moment.

### EU, NATO, and Russia

As touched on briefly in Chapter 1, the EU is a supranational body with a distinctive geographical designation (Europe) established by the February 1992 Maastricht Treaty that took effect in November 1993. The organization is run by operative bodies such as the European Council, and of course the Council of the European Union (both separate but reinforcing), the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Court of Justice, and the European Central Bank, which supervises the monetary policy of the eurozone currency union even if not all currently 27 EU member states have

adopted the Euro as their currency, or are members of the European Monetary Union. The UK has not joined the eurozone, and still operates sterling as its currency. Estonia became the seventeenth EU member state to join the eurozone—on January 1, 2011.

The EU's foundations can be traced to the six original member states: (France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands).<sup>1</sup> But the organization has evolved from its original Western European geography to annex member states from Eastern Europe. Hence, the EU presidency, which prior to the Lisbon Treaty rotated half-yearly among member states, was held by the UK from July to December 2005, by Slovenia from January to June 2008, and by the Czech Republic from January to June 2009. After the Lisbon Treaty that took effect in December 2009, the European Council appointed its President for a two-and-a-half-year term, with the possibility of a subsequent and only second term. Herman Van Rompuy of Belgium became the first to hold the position from December 1, 2009, and should last till May 31, 2012.

The EU's expansion has now included Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria, all of which either belonged to the Russian-led Warsaw Pact, are located close to the border of the Russian-led former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or were chief allies of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. As it transpires, the NATO as a military alliance involving the United States now consists of EU members, including the aforementioned states from the former Soviet Union, which joined the NATO in 1999 and 2004. Russia has felt threatened by the evolving geopolitique, including the further possible EU annexations to include Serbia, and Ukraine, which is a former staunch ally of Russia.

In order to avert potential strikes against Western or NATO skies, the George Bush administration proposed to site an anti-missile defense (AMD) shield in Poland, which is next door to Russia. This proposal became extremely sensitive and infuriating to the Russians, until the thawing of relations between the two countries, which led to the symbolic "resetting" of the diplomatic button when Barack Obama became U.S. President in 2009. Subsequently, at the Third NATO-Russia Council of November 20, 2010, the two countries agreed to "work towards achieving a true strategic and modernised partnership based on the principles of reciprocal confidence, transparency, and predictability, with the aim of contributing to the creation of a common space of peace, security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area."<sup>2</sup> Under this rubric, it became clear that Russia wanted an equal defense role. It also became agreeable to both parties that any AMD system to protect Western skies should not aggravate Russia's sense of security, but would need

a Russian (AMD) shield to avert potential strikes against Western targets. Russia and the United States therefore “endorsed the first ever Joint Review of 21st Century Common Security Challenges, outlining shared views of Russia and Allies on key security questions and ways to address them through practical cooperation.”<sup>3</sup> In addition, Russia agreed to assist U.S. operations against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, with helicopters, supply lines, and training shields.

But at the operational level, tensions remained as to who does what and finances which bits, et cetera, of the appropriate AMD systems. The Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, made it clear in his State of the Union address on November 30, 2010, that Russia and the United States should “create a full blown mechanism for co-operation,” or if they failed to reach an agreement, create the commencement of a new arms race to cater for each other’s insecurities. On the same day, President Obama also made a last-ditch attempt to get the existing U.S. Senate to ratify before Christmas 2010 what was on the table as the nuclear arms reduction deal that had been agreed with Russia; failure to do so would have meant facing a newly composed Senate<sup>4</sup> in January 2011 that could oppose the already negotiated deal. The proposal to the Senate included an expenditure plan of \$85 billion over the next ten years that would assure U.S. defense capabilities. Consequently, the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which was signed between Obama and Medvedev in April 2010, was ratified by the United States on December 22, 2010, to replace the 1991 START, which had expired in December 2009. START was first proposed by President Reagan in 1982 and signed by President Bush in 1991. The Russian Duma ratified the 2010 START on January 25, 2011, by a vote of 350 to 96, with one abstention.

The 2010 START further reduced the nuclear stockpiles target from 2,200 warheads to 1,550: the United States had 2,252 remaining and Russia had 2,600. Although Russia aims to keep a strategic nuclear parity with the United States, we should note that it has been officially impossible to trace stockpiles unaccounted for in the previous STARTs, which did not allow for official verification by opposite sides of the treaty. But this has been cushioned by the 2010 START, which is more intrusive and lends more weight to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that took effect in March 1970. We should also note that, apart from the five UNSC members that are officially recognized as nuclear weapons states, North Korea, Israel, India, and Pakistan have also tested nuclear weapons. The emerging Russian-NATO defense cooperation leaves the future of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) rather ambiguous and awkward.

### **The African Union, the Maghreb Union, and the Mediterranean Union**

The African Union (AU) is a supranational body with a distinctive geographical designation (Africa), consisting of 54 African states, and established in July 2002 as a successor to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) that previously existed from May 1963. The AU is run by operative bodies such as the AU Assembly (AUA) and the Executive Council, which reinforce each other, the AU Commission (AUC), the Pan African Parliament (PAP), the African Peace and Security Council (PSC), the African Court on Human and People's Rights, and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The organization is currently working toward a political and economic integration of the continent, or a Union Government of Africa. The African Development Bank plays a key role in development on the continent but does not control currencies, which is the preserve of individual member states.

The EU and the AU were pitted against each other at the historic December 2007 Africa-EU Summit held in Lisbon, during which the African bloc flexed its muscles as an equal partner with the EU on Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between AU member states and their EU counterparts. EPAs were meant to reflect the ensuing world trade negotiations within the Doha Development Round (DDR) of talks.

The Maghreb Union is a pan-Arab group for the economic and political union of North Africa, and consists of Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Mauritania, which are also AU member states.

The Mediterranean Union (MU) was initiated in 2008. Although it suggests a community of states along the border of the Mediterranean Sea, its proposed membership includes non-Mediterranean member states within the EU, the AU, and the Middle East, and has met with a variety of concerns from sections of all three relevant blocs. The concerns summarily amount to the destabilizing potential of the MU to the regional coherences of the three blocs. Among other things, the MU is viewed as French President Nicolas Sarkozy's strategy to find a political space within which to deal with immigration from North Africa, as well as a means of tapping into the latter's gas and solar energy potential on the Sahara Desert, among other things.

### **The Arab League and the OIC**

The Arab League is a supranational body with a distinctive linguistic designation (Arab societies); its current membership (22 states) cuts across Southwest Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa to emphasize its geographical incoherence. The Charter of the Arab League embodies a principle of an Arab

homeland, at the same time recognizing the sovereignty of the member states. The organization was established in Cairo in 1945 with six original states: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Lebanon.

The OIC is a supranational body with a distinctive religious designation (Islam). As all supranational bodies are political, the OIC is widely known as Political Islam, and most notably, has a permanent delegation to the UN. Incidentally, all members of the Arab League are also OIC members, which dramatically politicizes (and almost synonymizes) Arab unions with Islam. With religion much less able to confine itself to geography, the OIC has membership on all the continents with the exception of North America and Australia. Among other interesting phenomena, the OIC's membership runs along the contours of the "tan" suffixed countries of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan.

Something about the invisible bond between these Islamic and "tan" suffixed countries speaks for itself, in that, a few days after Robert Gates, the former U.S. Secretary of Defense, had visited Afghanistan, the President of Iran also visited Afghanistan on March 10, 2010 amidst the biggest military surge to date by NATO forces operating against the Afghan Al Qaeda, and amidst growing tensions between the United States and Iran because the former leads the global sanctions regime against the latter. Against this context, President Ahmadinejad's speech contained taunts that questioned the U.S. presence in Afghanistan, some 12,000 kilometers away from the United States.<sup>5</sup> President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan announced at the event of Ahmadinejad's speech that Afghanistan will not be used as a base for attacking next door Iran. That was very telling of the bond between Afghanistan and Iran, in view of the effort and resources the United States had invested in Afghanistan toward the fight against Al Qaeda. Suffice it to say that President Karzai's speech of May 2, 2011, which attempted to jubilate over the killing of Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda's founder, by U.S. special forces on the same day, was not authentic to the West, as was the predicament of the Pakistani authorities for failing to notice that bin Laden resided in Abbottabad, just a short distance away from the Pakistan Military Academy in Kakul.

### **World Trade, Russia, OPEC, GAFTA, MEFTA, and China**

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the globally recognized international organization that attempts to supervise and liberalize global trade, even if Russia (i.e., the last member to join the Group of Eight Nations [G8], and a veto holding member of the UNSC) was not in the WTO until 2011, and even though Russia has consistently been among the world's largest exporters of natural resources, and was indeed the largest exporter in 2008 with exports



of \$341.2 billion or 9.1 percent of world natural resources trade.<sup>6</sup> On December 7, 2010, Russia signed a deal in Brussels with EU partners toward accession to the WTO in 2011. Among other things, the EU took a position that accession to the WTO would bind Russia to rules. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev had also announced in his State of the Union address on November 30, 2010 that Russia was to form a Common Eurasia Economic Area stretching from the Arctic to the Pacific. Incidentally, Russia rated 146th out of 180 in the 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index, and 154th out of 178 in 2010, as well as 143rd out of 149 on the 2010 Global Peace Index.

The WTO's foundations can be traced to the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was superseded by the Uruguay Round of 1994 that actually established the WTO and subsequently evolved into the DDR of 2001 that established the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) to date. The DDR was effectively the WTO's Fourth Ministerial Conference held in Doha in November 2001, and had a strong development focus to it, because it proposed to fix or patch up the most pertinent differences between developing countries and developed nations as far as trade rules were concerned, particularly in areas most sensitive to developing countries' interests. The areas included agriculture and remedies to tariff and nontariff barriers, and there was a broad aim to ensure the universal goal of liberalizing trade across the globe. This agenda became the DDA. The two camps, trade cartels, or blocs that pitted against each other were represented by the EU, the United States, and Japan (for the developed countries) versus Brazil, India, China, and South Africa (for the developing countries).

Horse trading within the DDA (or the negotiations between the relevant trade blocs within the DDA, or the WTO for that matter) is handled by the Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC). The DDA's turbulent evolution drew to a collapse on July 29, 2008 when out of 20 topics (of which 18 had already been agreed), an insoluble disagreement struck up between the two camps (notably the United States versus India) in connection with the nineteenth topic—a special safeguard mechanism (SSM). The SSM was designed to protect poor farmers by allowing their countries to impose a special tariff on the imports of specified agricultural products in case their prices fell or there was a surge in imports; there could be no collective agreement on the threshold to allow this SSM to operate. The United States said that the proposed threshold was too low, even though within the same period the U.S. Congress had passed a five-year program of farm subsidies, which was viewed as a betrayal of the fundamentals of the DDA.

Subsequent to the collapse of the DDA in 2008, there were moves to revive negotiations and lead the DDR to a successful conclusion, with a strong

undercurrent of diplomacy led by Brazil, which at the same time disagreed (on the side) with India in 2009 about the SSM, and also has an ongoing dispute with the United States over cotton subsidies and other tariffs between them. Brazil happens to be a member of both the Group of 20 (industrialized and industrializing) Nations and the Group of 77 Developing Countries. The September 3–4, 2009 mini ministerial meeting held in India, however, gave an assurance to aim to bring the DDA to a successful conclusion by the end of 2010. Judging from the politics of trade, it is perhaps as a result of the quest to break out of the mold of the existing supranationalist contours of cartels that the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) group of nations emerged. The emergence of a BRICS cartel at this stage in global politics very well serves the interests of its members (not least Russia, which had been seeking to enter the WTO fray) in gaining further leverage to handle the trade politics of its Western competitors.

It appears that petroleum (the world's chief energy raw material) has been kept out of the WTO's remit. To compound the scenario, Russia, which was yet to access the WTO (earliest from 2011), operated major oil and gas exports to several European countries that depended on Russian supplies for their economic survival; but Russia is also not a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the cartel of 12 countries that officially led on global trade in petroleum.<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, as OPEC countries are mostly Islamic and/or Arabic (with the exception of Angola, Ecuador, and Venezuela), the organization has more or less assumed a political image as an instrument of the Arab League. As the contours and subcontours of trade and political power evolve, the Arab League also has its own Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement (GAFTA) that operates out of symphony with the WTO, to the extent that both the United States and the EU have had to create special and parallel trade agreements with the Middle East and the Maghreb, which host most of OPEC; subsequently, we have the US Middle East Free Trade Area (US-MEFTA) and the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EU-MEFTA). China, on the other hand, operates within the WTO but has strategic and bilateral petroleum deals with key exporters, including Angola and Sudan on the African continent.

We should not discount the shrewd and veiled politics of observer statuses. For example, India and Venezuela have observer statuses on the Arab League, with Venezuela's interest based mainly on the Arab-controlled OPEC, of which it is a part. Similarly, Russia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Thailand, Northern Cyprus, and the Central African Republic have observer statuses on the OIC, with Russia's interest firmly fixed on the several "tan" suffixed Islamic states close to its borders.

### **The Impact of Supranationalisms on Handling Humanitarian Crises (Sudan)**

As the complex contours and subcontours of the murky world of supranationalisms and political interest groups evolve, the impact on strategic global efforts to combat and manage conflict-led humanitarian disasters, such as genocide in Sudan/Darfur, cannot be missed. As touched on briefly in the previous chapter, it now becomes somewhat easier to see why the Sudanese political landscape has seen so much global interference and intervention. In all of its manifestations, the Sudanese political landscape is occupied by a stark conflict between an Arabic North Sudan led by the Sudanese National Congress Party, which doubles as the National Islamic Front, and an African South Sudan governed by the SPLM. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in Nairobi by both sides detailed a power sharing agreement that had the North Sudan party in control of government. The sheer scale of mortal casualties from this conflict and the crimes against humanity caused global concern and prompted the international effort led by the UNSC to resolve the crisis.

The bottomline is that the existing President of Sudan (Omar al-Bashir) should bear individual responsibility for presiding over the Sudanese genocide, with sufficient indicting evidence submitted to the UN-sponsored ICC, which has called for al-Bashir's arrest and prosecution. Casting the scenario within the context of the web of supranationalisms already described, two main problems arose: (a) for the UNSC, and (b) from the Arab League and the OIC.

First, in the light of China's extensive and strategic industrial and commercial investments in North Sudan, which is the majority partner of the Sudanese CPA, previous efforts at the UNSC to secure agreements for taking forward solutions toward resolving the conflict and ending the genocide had been vetoed by China, and Russia. Condoleezza Rice, the then U.S. Secretary of State, stated in 2008<sup>8</sup> that it was due to increased U.S. diplomacy with China that varied the latter's stance on issues. Subsequently, China agreed for the UNSC to take forward UNSC Resolution 1769 to establish an AU cum UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), and furthermore lent a hand by providing military engineers to prepare the ground prior to the embarkment of the UNAMID forces.<sup>9</sup> Russia objected to the independence of Darfur, and is opposed to the ICC's indictment of President al-Bashir. Russia also favors the cancellation of the Sudanese Government's debts with international creditors.

The second hiccup is that two notable supranational bodies, the Arab League and the OIC, are vehemently opposed to the indictment of President

al-Bashir. Through the Arab Maghreb Union, which geographically sits within the confines of the AU, and the OIC, which has a permanent delegation to the UN, the Arab League and the OIC have manipulated the AU to contend against the ICC's indictment of Omar al-Bashir. Chapter 3 will discuss in detail precisely how this has occurred, and the roles played by all parties, including the United States, China, the Arab League, the OIC, the Maghreb Union, and the AU.

As Chapter 3 is devoted to conflict zones and international politics, it will conclude with some discussion on the 2008 unilateral declarations of independence by Kosovo and South Ossetia, and the geopolitical bearings to these events.

## CHAPTER 3

---

# Global Governance and the Politics of Handling Conflict: Sudan, Kosovo, and South Ossetia

### **The Evolution of Global Governance—the United Nations System**

The Treaty of Versailles, signed on June 28, 1919 or symbolically at the end of WWI, was a peace treaty to end the state of war between Germany and the Allied Powers. The chief precipitant of this treaty was of course the League of Nations, which emerged in 1919–20 as an international mechanism to prevent any further wars, through collective disarmament and security among the enjoined states pertinent to the agreement at the time. This meant a duty to undertake and endure a course of negotiation and arbitration, as the means available to prevent the stage of war. Other countries would later join this league, and the remit would also expand to include the conceivable antecedents of war that needed to be curtailed, such as trading in arms; the unjust treatment of identity groups, minorities, and prisoners; harsh economic and labor circumstances; and the movement of persons and drugs. But the original aim of the Versailles Treaty was a peace treaty to stop and prevent war. The League of Nations evolved into the larger and more sophisticated United Nations Organization (UN), which was also formed at the end of WWII, to stop wars among member states, and try to deal with the causes of war before they degenerated into war.

Clearly for the UN and its antecedent League of Nations, war and its prevention became the reason for the world to unite. To be more comprehensive, therefore, the UN as an organization adopted to deal with any conceivable causes of war, and assumed responsibility for the governance of all aspects of war—in the original areas of (a) peace and security; (b) economics; (c) justice; and (d) hosting a General Assembly of its member states with a Secretariat based at the headquarters. These four pillar aims led to the formation of

the respective subdivisions or specialized agencies of the organization: (a) the UNSC; (b) the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC); (c) the International Court of Justice (ICJ); and (d) the UN General Assembly. It is therefore not surprising that the permanent and veto holding members of the UNSC were those states (apart from Germany) that had attained top warmongering potential, in terms of nuclear capability and superpower potential—the United States, Russia, China, France, and United Kingdom (UK). At a later stage, a second tier of UNSC membership was created, comprising ten elected non-permanent members with two-year terms. The UNSC is therefore the established umbrella body or mechanism of global governance for peace and security.

Subsequent to its four original organs, the UN has evolved to include the following specialized agencies: the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO); International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); International Civil Aviation Organization; International Fund for Agricultural Development; International Labour Organization (ILO); International Maritime Organization (IMO); International Monetary Fund (IMF); International Telecommunication Union (ITU); United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO); Universal Postal Union (UPU); World Bank; World Food Programme (WFP); World Health Organization (WHO); World Intellectual Property Organization; World Meteorological Organization; and World Tourism Organization.

The continual evolution of the global stage, the global economic structures, and the strife-torn issues have been accompanied by serious agitation for a variation of the UNSC membership, and for a geographically inclusive and strategic arrangement that should incorporate significantly emerging economies at the table of permanent membership. One reason is that most of the long-standing strife-torn issues are located and embedded in the geographical areas not represented at the permanent table. Also, the new security challenges facing the globe are not only reflected in nuclear capabilities and superpower potential, but in other pertinent issues of trade, health, and international political economy, in the era of globalization. But as one UN member state's representative put it, the veto-wielding members of the UNSC "are resisting the democratization of the United Nations Security Council . . . Africa is the only continent not represented . . . and the historical injustice must be corrected."<sup>1</sup> This echoes what the AU has been advocating—two permanent and two non-permanent seats for Africa at the UNSC.

The remainder of this chapter will discuss how the UNSC's operations manifest when the rubber hits the road (in real circumstances), using Sudan,

Kosovo, and South Ossetia as examples. The discussion is extensive with Sudan, followed by brief notes on Kosovo and South Ossetia.

### Global Governance and Sudan

To put it starkly, the conflict in Darfur (and by extension Sudan) is one of Arabs against Black Africans, rooted as far back as when the Arabized Tunjur displaced the Daju in the fourteenth century, introduced Islam, and established their sultanate. Darfur is a region of Sudan popularly inhabited by the Fur tribe. Hence, Darfur translates as the realm of the Fur, and is unique because it had been an independent sultanate for many hundreds of years. This sultanate or dynasty carried on, together with the restiveness of its inhabitants, until a joint Anglo-Egyptian dominion of Khartoum ended it in 1875. Darfur was then granted some autonomy until it was formally annexed to Khartoum in 1916. However, during the brief period of autonomy, as well as the subsequent period of colonization under the British, the politics of underdevelopment (from the British colonialists) worked against Darfurians, until Sudan gained independence from the British in 1956. Throughout that period, most of the developmental resources were directed toward the Arabs dwelling around the Nile near Khartoum, contributing to the relative neglect and economic hardship of Darfur. This agenda or trend of relative underdevelopment did not cease even after Sudan's independence. Ideological pundits no less than Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi also preached a doctrine of Arab supremacy that poisoned the psychology of the landscape and injected superiority versus inferiority complexes that divided Darfurians, particularly when it led to the actual identification of who was Arab and who was African.

In the midst of this acculturation, geopolitical proxy wars between Libya, Sudan, and Chad added fuel to the forms of instability that quickly became politicized (between Arabs and Africans), with flames fanned further by the famine of the mid-1980s that undermined the existing social structure, leading to the taking up of arms by Darfurians against Darfurians. From this point, the Khartoum government contributed by lending military support and ammunitions to the Arabs who had evolved into militias. The simultaneous development or establishment of a counter resistance or rebel movement became the recipe for a systematic armed conflict, until the world woke up to the full-scale explosion of the conflict in 2003, by which time it had already reached genocidal proportions. From this point, further politicization and officialization of the conflict became natural for both sides of the conflict, which had by now become officially recognized as the National Islamic Front—the religious face of the Khartoum-based Arab Sudanese National Congress Party (NCP) that represented Arabic North

Sudan—versus the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)—which pretended to represent the African rebel groups, and indeed South Sudan.

International attention toward the conflict became highlighted when a member of the UNSC (the United States) shouted it out. Secretary of State Colin Powell gave a testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 9, 2004 and outlined the whole scenario, calling it genocide. It took a while before the international community acknowledged, and later agreed with the claim. However, the Powell revelation led the UN to act immediately, and UNSC Resolution 1564 of 2004 authorized an International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur. Ironically, this Commission's report, issued in January 2005 to the Secretary-General, stated that "the Government of the Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide";<sup>2</sup> the report nevertheless admitted that war crimes and crimes against humanity had occurred. It stated:

The conclusion that no genocidal policy has been pursued and implemented in Darfur by the Government authorities, directly or through the militias under their control, should not be taken in any way as detracting from the gravity of the crimes perpetrated in that region. International offences such as the crimes against humanity and war crimes that have been committed in Darfur may be no less serious and heinous than genocide.<sup>3</sup>

Some two months after the inquiry report, the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was established under UNSC Resolution 1590 of March 24, 2005. As usual, the mandate for an arm of the UN was typical not to upset local arrangements, and aimed at supporting the existing CPA, which was presided over by the Khartoum-based Sudanese government, as well as carrying out humanitarian duties, promoting and protecting human rights. UNMIS was supported militarily by an AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), also formed in 2004 to monitor the genocide, and at best liaise with and coordinate UNMIS activity, including the prevention of abuses against civilians and aid workers. Although its original 150 troops had increased to 7,000 by mid-2005, the AMIS force was clearly insufficient for the Darfur situation; AMIS was also cash-strapped and ill-equipped. Hence, the UNSC unanimously resolved<sup>4</sup> on May 16, 2006 to endorse the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) decision of May 15, 2006 to translate AMIS into a UN peacekeeping force to follow up on the UN operation in Darfur. Subsequently, on August 31, 2006, UNSC Resolution 1706 was passed, which called for 20,600 UN troops and police officers to support the 7,000-member AMIS. In the conflict of interest that ensued, Sudan refused to participate in this particular UNSC session, and vehemently rejected Resolution 1706. The resolution was passed with



12 votes in favour, and three abstentions, namely, China and Russia (UNSC veto-holding members) and Qatar (a close ally of Sudan and a member of both the Arab League and the OIC).

AMIS, therefore, had to remain in Sudan in its shape and form, even after the expiration of its mandate on September 30, 2006. A meager 200 UN military support personnel were initially garnered to AMIS. On October 2, 2006, the AU chair announced that the PSC would extend the AMIS mandate to December 31, 2006, in the light of the failure to implement the UN peacekeeping force outlined in Resolution 1706, due mainly to opposition from the Khartoum-based government of Sudan, and China's veto. At this stage, China's security and economic interests in Sudan tended to influence its behavior and decisions at the UNSC, not to mention China's supplies of arms and ammunition to the Sudanese government. In 2004 and 2005, Chinese crude oil imports from Sudan constituted 18 and 19 percent, respectively; this was second only to Angola, from which China imported 51 and 50 percent, respectively, of its crude oil.<sup>5</sup> In 2004, Sudan was the top destination for Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows to Africa.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, out of the three major oil consortia operating in Sudan—(1) the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC); (2) the Petrodar Operating Company Ltd (PDOC); and (3) the White Nile Petroleum Operating Company Ltd (WNPOC), the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and China Chemical and Petroleum Corporation (Sinopec Corp) have major stakes in GNPOC and PDOC. CNPC owns 40 percent of GNPOC that operates blocks one, two and four oil fields. CNPC also owns 41 percent of PDOC that operates blocks three and seven oil fields, and Sinopec Corp owns 6 percent of PDOC. As regards any potential for the Khartoum government to compromise on its lucrative relationship with China, let alone take international advice to play by the rules, the 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index, which ranked Sudan 172nd out of 178, and China 78th,<sup>7</sup> can serve as a guide.

AMIS had to extend its mandate further to June 30, 2007. Prior to this deadline, however, the AU gave ample and stark warnings about the dire situation. Rwanda and Senegal had, in particular, sent out a strong message that their forces would be withdrawn from AMIS for reasons including unpaid salaries. Promises made by the United States and the EU to provide funds had not been kept, as was reported in an article on the AU and money supplies.<sup>8</sup> There was a clear impression that the funds and other support were not forthcoming because the AMIS force was African: from Rwanda, Nigeria, Ghana, and Gambia among others. A colorful international politics ensued over the establishment and composition of the UN-cum-AMIS force, particularly about who should provide the forces and who should lead. As was

to become clear, two European countries (Norway and Sweden) that had been publicly forward about their interest to supply troops were uncomfortable about placing their troops under an African leadership. The Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister, Raymond Johansen, said: "We are not members of the African Union; we are members of the United Nations . . . It will not be easy for our troops to report to an African Union commander,"<sup>9</sup> as if the AU was not a part of the UN.

UNSC Resolution 1769 finally approved on July 31, 2007 the mandate for UNAMID, to replace AMIS, even if UNAMID did not take effect until December 31. The UNAMID force was to "consist of up to 19,555 military personnel, including 360 military observers and liaison officers, and an appropriate civilian component including up to 3,772 police personnel and 19 formed police units comprising up to 140 personnel each."<sup>10</sup> Subsequently, on July 31, 2008, UNSC Resolution 1828 extended the UNAMID mandate a further 12 months to July 31, 2009. Resolution 1881 was passed on July 30, 2009, extending the UNAMID mandate to July 31, 2010, with an approved budget of \$1,598.94 million.<sup>11</sup> Despite the brouhaha on who should lead, UNAMID was headed by Rodolphe Adada, the former Foreign Minister of the Republic of Congo, who then resigned on August 31, 2009. He was temporarily replaced by his deputy, Major General Henry Anyidoho (Rtd) of Ghana, who also quit the role on May 19, 2010. Ibrahim Gambari became the new joint head from January 2010 with special responsibility for Darfur, while responsibility for delivering the 2005 CPA remained with the other joint head, Haile Menkerios. As of February 28, 2010, UNAMID had exceeded its mandated troop level, to a total 21,800 uniformed personnel.<sup>12</sup> More recently, the Joint AU-UN Chief Mediator for Darfur, Djibril Bassole, resigned on April 30, 2011.

### *The ICC and Sudan*

Two months after the inquiry report on Darfur, the UNSC formally referred the situation in Darfur to the Prosecutor of the ICC through Resolution 1593,<sup>13</sup> which was passed on March 31, 2005, taking into account the report but not mentioning any specific crimes. The press release<sup>14</sup> for the vote on Resolution 1593 indicated that the United States and China had abstained from the voting for this referral, together with Brazil, and Algeria, which was the next African representative among the non-permanent membership of the UNSC and an ally of the Arab League and the OIC. Algeria and Benin became elected as the African non-permanent representatives to the UNSC, their mandate taking effect from October 2005 and ending in 2007.

A fourth report to the UNSC from the ICC Prosecutor pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1593 also claimed not to have found enough evidence

for genocide, and only pointed to what was already known—crimes against humanity and war crimes. This led the ICC’s judges to issue arrest warrants against Sudan’s former Minister of State for the Interior Ahmad Harun, as well as a Janjaweed leader, Ali Kushayb, in April 2007—for crimes against humanity and war crimes. The process at the ICC led Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo to indict Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir on the basis of the ICC claim that the latter had “masterminded and implemented a plan to destroy in substantial part” three tribal groups in Darfur because of their ethnicity. Ten charges of war crimes, three counts of genocide, five of crimes against humanity, and two of murder were filed against al-Bashir on July 14, 2008.

While a tug-of-war ensued as to whether the ICC has the powers or means to arrest al-Bashir, the OIC used its permanent seat at the UN, as well as its Islamic brothers in the Maghreb, to prevail upon the AU to take a position against the arrest of al-Bashir, but both the AU and the OIC failed to get UN support, as their strategy to invoke Article 16 of the ICC statute to suspend al-Bashir’s arrest failed—they simply did not get enough votes to win. Reasons for the delay between the indictment and the issuing of the arrest warrant included intense lobbying from the AU against the arrest. The main argument was at least to defer the arrest to a future period, as the AU alleged that pursuance of the arrest would further endanger lives in the already volatile situation in Darfur, and Sudan, for that matter. Indeed, at the July 2009 AU summit in Sirte, Libya, which was chaired by Muammar al-Gaddafi (who also belongs to the Arab League and the OIC), a position was adopted for AU member states not to cooperate with the ICC’s arrest warrant, based on the excuse that the ICC had ignored the AU’s request to defer the arrest.<sup>15</sup> The progress report<sup>16</sup> on this issue was hot on the agenda of the Seventeenth Ordinary Session<sup>17</sup> of the AU’s Executive Council of July 22–23, 2010 at Kampala, Uganda, which immediately preceded the Fifteenth AU Summit of July 25–27, 2010.

It must be noted that, despite the indictment, the ICC depends on other partners. Hence, part of the problem about the means to arrest relates to the political will of the member states that ratified the ICC statute. It is noticeable since the ICC indictment that al-Bashir’s foreign trips have been to friendly destinations, or at least where there was no political will to conduct his arrest. A trip to Ankara, Turkey, on November 8, 2009 was cancelled. His successful trips are as follows:

- Accra, Ghana, to attend the Ninth AU summit in October 2007. President Kufuor of Ghana did not want to risk upsetting the AU gathering, even if Ghana’s foreign policy supported the ICC indictment for the genocide, and even though Ghana had ratified the ICC statute;

- Accra, Ghana, to attend the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group (ACP) meeting from October 1–3, 2008; the same Ghanaian President was in office;
- Egypt, from February 21 to 22, 2009 to meet with President Hosni Mubarak;
- Ethiopia on April 21, 2009;
- Nouakchott, Mauritania, on December 21, 2009;
- Qatar, in January 2010, for the signing of an agreement with Sudan's Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) brokered by the Qatari head of state;
- Ndjamena, Chad, to meet with President Idriss Deby from July 21 to 22, 2010. The global media campaign for al-Bashir's arrest became intensified from this point;
- Nairobi, Kenya, on August 27, 2010, to attend the signing into law of Kenya's new constitution, along with other African leaders who were also invited. The intensified global media campaign continued. The Kenyan Foreign Minister, Moses Wetangula, defended the decision to invite al-Bashir, as something in the interest of regional stability, security, and justice. He made a press statement that "Kenya sought to have security, peace, and prosperity with neighbors instead of the ICC's warrant for al-Bashir,"<sup>18</sup> even if Kenya was also signatory to the ICC statute.

With regard to the coalition of supranational resistances against al-Bashir's arrest, the prevailing hand of the Arab League and the OIC on the AU, was strengthened by the strategic resumption of Brother Muammar al-Gaddafi as Chair of the AU from February 2, 2009 to January 31, 2010. The ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo made it public when interviewed by France 24 on March 6, 2009, that there are three ways to effect arrest: (a) by the government of Sudan; (b) for UNSC to ensure compliance of the arrest warrant by all UN member states, and by which the arrest could be effected anyhow, anytime, and anywhere; (c) or to intercept his flight whenever he entered international airspace. At the ACP meeting in October 2008, the group called for the suspension of any ICC warrant, and a deferral of the ICC sanction. When the ICC issued an arrest warrant in March 2009, there were large demonstrations in Sudan protesting the decision, even if it was obvious that most of these protests were organized by the state. In response to the arrest warrant, al-Bashir expelled aid workers from 13 aid agencies—which amounts to 80 percent of humanitarian aid capacity required for the situation in Darfur and Sudan. Two human rights organizations based in Sudan

were also expelled. The UN decided to append these charges to the existing catalogue of charges against al-Bashir at the ICC.

### *The ICC and the AU*

Africa Confidential has made clear that two consecutive bids (in 2006 and 2007) by Omar al-Bashir for the AU Chair, with overt support from Egypt and the Arab League, were snubbed by the AU.<sup>19</sup> This indicates, at least, that crimes against humanity, and impunity, are not always condoned in Africa. But, at the same time, the AU was utterly disgusted by what it considered as the ICC's tactic to ignore the PSC's better judgment of deferring al-Bashir's arrest, the failure of which the AU alleged could intensify the already precarious security situation in Sudan. As already mentioned, the African body resolved to an official position in July 2008 not to cooperate with the ICC's (then potential) arrest warrant for al-Bashir, despite this position being contrary to both the statutory obligations of ICC signatories and the AU's own Constitutive Act, which discourages impunity for the crimes of the Darfurian case. These reservations were duly registered by Botswana and South Africa. The purported ICC position that "its interest of justice does not include the interest of peace"<sup>20</sup> also became ammunition for the AU to formulate another position against the ICC, that the latter could not pursue justice at the expense of peace.<sup>21</sup>

Quite frankly, the argument that pursuing al-Bashir's arrest will further endanger lives in an already volatile situation is controversial because the opposite (not pursuing his arrest) has not necessarily stopped or curtailed the human violations either. Atrocities under the watch of al-Bashir have since continued, including unprovoked attacks against even UNAMID forces. On June 21, 2010, the UNAMID Team site in Nertiti, Sector West of Darfur, was attacked, resulting in the death of three Rwandan peacekeepers and serious injury for another. A press release issued the next day detailed fierce condemnation from the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Jean Ping. Renewed and escalated violence was reported on July 31, 2010.<sup>22</sup> UNAMID was also building a new headquarters in Darfur, which strongly suggests that UNAMID was in for a long haul, being starkly aware that violence in Darfur would not cease in the foreseeable future.

Apart from Botswana and South Africa, other countries that harbored dissent about the AU decision to defer al-Bashir's arrest deftly or foolishly supported the decision for a variety of reasons, including politics, diplomacy, and timidity. We should also not downplay the arm-twisting tactics of the Maghreb Union members of the AU to influence the African body to adopt positions in tandem with those of the Arab League and the OIC, which had

already made clear, and continually make clear, their strong objections to al-Bashir's arrest. The Maghreb Union, the Arab League, and the OIC (or Political Islam) have been staunch allies in this cause. With the OIC having a permanent delegation to the UN, Political Islam has waged and staged strong protests at UN deliberations and proceedings on the matter. It was also no sheer coincidence that Muammar al-Gaddafi, with the support of Maghreb allies, plus other African states under the influence of Libya's oil money, lobbied his way into the position of AU Chair at the strategic period when al-Bashir's head was in demand. It has been difficult to differentiate between the AU's decisions on the matter and those of the Maghreb Union, the Arab League, and Political Islam, even if the legal department of the AU would insist that the AU positions are not necessarily the same as those of the supranational organizations mentioned. Against this background therefore, some analysts became bewildered when Qatar, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates, which are OIC and Arab League members, joined the team of nations that strongly supported and enforced UNSC Resolution 1973, which tightened sanctions against Gaddafi's regime and imposed a no-fly zone over Libya on March 17, 2011, as part of dealing with the Libyan internal conflict of 2011.

That said, the AU has had its own beef about the noises emanating from particular key Western partners as regards the ICC and Africa: notably France, which had alleged the current Rwandan President Paul Kagame's complicity in generating the immediate cause of the Rwandan genocide, when indeed it was France that stood accused of complicity in the genocide,<sup>23</sup> and the United States, for not ratifying the Rome statute that established the ICC. Therefore, according to AU Decision 221<sup>24</sup> of the AU's Twelfth Ordinary Session held at Addis Ababa during February 1–3, 2009, the AU reiterated the recurrent controversial view and expressed deep concern over the ICC's indictment of al-Bashir, and further cautioned with the pervasive line that pursuance of the ICC's plan, as it stood, "would seriously undermine the ongoing efforts aimed at facilitating the early resolution of the conflict in Darfur."<sup>25</sup>

The African body is not the only international source of advocacy against the double standards of UNSC veto-holding members that had not signed the ICC statute, such as the United States, Russia, and China. Hence, on May 26–27, 2010, Human Rights Watch (HRW) urged all members of the G20, particularly the United States, Russia, and China, to sign up to the ICC. HRW expressed the view that there appeared to be a global deficit of justice, as well as double standards, and that the UN Human Rights Council had failed to follow up with HRW's directions on certain matters of international justice.<sup>26</sup> The ICC's previous successes at indictments and

arrests include Charles Taylor of Liberia and Slobodan Milosevic of the former Yugoslavia. Previous special tribunals include the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and lately, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon set up in March 2009 to investigate members of the Hezbollah for the assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Baha El Deen Al-Hariri.

At the Kampala Fifteenth AU Summit (July 25–27, 2010), Bingu wa Mutharika, President of Malawi and AU Chair at the time, repeated the recurrent AU position not to cooperate with the ICC's arrest warrant for al-Bashir, on the grounds that the charges undermined the peace effort in Sudan/Darfur. The subterranean hand of the Maghreb Union, Arab League, and OIC elements within the African body were not far from play; Muammar al-Gaddafi also granted separate television interviews and made additional statements on July 26 that "Africa did not recognize the ICC."

At the Sixty-fifth UN General Assembly of September 2010, special sessions were held about Sudan, Darfur, and of course al-Bashir and the ICC warrant for his arrest. The AU firmly advocated the position that the ICC (and the UN for that matter) should stay the hand on al-Bashir's arrest. The sensitivity of the issue was heightened because the referendum for the independence of South Sudan scheduled for January 2011 was imminent, along with the ensuing controversial argument that ruffling al-Bashir's feathers would, for example, empower him to carry out the veiled threat he issued against the South Sudan referendum during his general election campaign on April 1, 2010.<sup>27</sup> Furthermore, the unresolved issues of the Abyei border and oil revenues would be harder to resolve after South Sudan's independence, let alone the ominous matter of bringing an end to the conflict in Darfur.

### Global Governance and Kosovo

As regards globalization and global governance (and of course the UNSC), Sudan is not the only case that demonstrates the rivalry of the Western supranationalist influences (the United States, NATO, the EU) against the Eastern counterparts of Russian *geopolitique* and Chinese interests, and the related surrogate relationships to these power blocs across the globe. The controversy surrounding Kosovo's independence and the international polarization over the issue were broached in Chapter 1. Kosovo is one of the "eastern bloc" countries that has been officially recognized by the EU as a potential candidate to become an EU member state. Over the years, the EU has gradually enlarged to include several "eastern bloc" states. The East versus West politics over the status of Kosovo, which unilaterally declared its independence on February 17, 2008, has demonstrated how the international surrogate

community and UN member states could either support the case, oppose it, or sit on the fence, as well as the precedent this has set for the case of South Ossetia. The Republic of Kosovo is also known as the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija by Serbia, which did not recognize Kosovo's secession because it considered Kosovo to be a UN protectorate within Serbian territory. As of May 21, 2010, Kosovo's UDI was recognized by 69 UN member states and eight non-UN member states but not by 93 UN member states. The Republic of China (Taiwan) was then the only non-UN member state that recognized Kosovo's UDI,<sup>28</sup> as the UDI attracted widespread controversy across the globe.

On October 8, 2008, the UN General Assembly resolved to seek advice from the ICJ on the legality of Kosovo's UDI. At the completion of the exercise, ICJ Judge Hisashi Owada announced the result at a press conference on July 22, 2010, that Kosovo's UDI "did not violate" international law. Judge Owada also announced that this court ruling was "not binding." The decision, however, had implications for the international community, including the fact that 100 UN member states were required for UN recognition of Kosovo as an independent state. As already implicated, there were 31 UN votes outstanding, as of the day of the ICJ ruling. The Serbian Foreign Minister, Vuk Jeremic (present at the ICJ press conference), responded immediately to the ICJ announcement, declaring that Serbia will "never under any circumstances" recognize Kosovo as independent. Experts have made it clear that the ruling was pro-American and did not reflect international law, which suggests that a ruling to the effect that Kosovo's UDI was illegal but did not matter, might have been more realistic.

As the surrogacy of smaller and less powerful states in international politics would show, Kosovo's UDI, which was supported by the United States, UK, and France against China and Russia, is also supported by the majority of EU (22 out of 27) and NATO member states (24 out of 28). Of the five EU member states that were not in support (Spain, Romania, Greece, Cyprus, and Slovakia), each had its own set of issues. For example, Spain does not wish to support a ruling that sets a precedent for Basque and Catalan secessionist nationalism, something Spain has been contending with for many years; Romania is within the neighborhood of Serbia and shares borders; and Greece also shares borders with Albania. The EU, however, worked very hard to get these five countries on board, as Kosovo's accession to the EU was potentially imminent.

Kosovo had so far been more or less governed by the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) on the basis of UNSC Resolution 1244, which introduced the international rule of Kosovo in 1999<sup>29</sup> after the NATO air campaign ended the 1996–1999 war between Serbs



and Albanians. EULEX plans to remain in Kosovo until June 2012. Of the two million population of Kosovo, 90 percent are ethnic Albanians, and 10 percent are Serbs, who also do not recognize Kosovo's UDI.

Following the UN sponsored ICJ ruling that Kosovo's UDI was legal, the UN drafted a resolution to recognize Kosovo's independence, and invited Serbia's comments. In September 2010, Serbia declared that it will not challenge the UN with regard to Kosovo's independence, but will not recognize it either. This was seen as a strategic move by Serbia to also access EU membership, as it appeared that the number of EU countries recognizing Kosovo's independence had increased to almost total. Serbia submitted a formal application to join the EU on December 22, 2009, and subject to successful procedures, would gain accession in seven years.

On September 27, 2010, Fatmir Sejdiu resigned as President of Kosovo, a position he had held since January 2006 at the same time as the leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo (DLK), which was the leading political party. Although the role of President is ceremonial, the subsequent alliance of the DLK with the Democratic Party of Kosovo (DPK) made it untenable for the Chair of this coalition to remain President of the country, as this infringes with the constitution. Sejdiu was replaced by Jakup Krasniqi as Acting President.

### Global Governance and South Ossetia

In a tit for tat measure to reflect superpower and surrogate rivalries, Russia, alongside Abkhazia, fought against Georgia from August 7 to 16, 2008 to liberate South Ossetia, and as a result proceeded to recognize the UDIs of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia on August 26, 2008. As of May 21, 2010, South Ossetia's UDI was recognized by four UN member states, but not by 66 others.<sup>30</sup> South Ossetia's UDI is very pro-Russian. However, the South Ossetian case appears to have a preceding record, in that, unlike Kosovo, South Ossetia declared its UDI from Georgia as far back as 1990, and none of the subsequent three attempts by Georgia to regain the entity—whether in 1991–92, 2004, or early 2008—were successful, until the final showdown in August 2008 that concluded the matter.<sup>31</sup> As expected, Russia's unilateral declaration of South Ossetian independence was immediately condemned by Western powers, including the OSCE, NATO, and the European Council. However, the EU's immediate response and official position became obfuscated by feet dragging from the “eastern bloc” EU members<sup>32</sup> (that could include Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Romania, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, or Slovenia) as they did not know whether to show their hand or go along with Western politics.

Meanwhile, South Ossetians celebrated their 20 years of independence from Georgia on September 20, 2010. While the independence of South Ossetia lives on, the ICJ declaration of July 22, 2010 that Kosovo's UDI was legal, has further implications, or sets a precedent, for both live and latent separatisms, secessions, and of course irredentisms. The potential long list would include whether the case of the Falklands versus the UK<sup>33</sup> could now be referred to the ICJ if Spain, Argentina, and the UK would be willing for that kind of development to follow suit.

## CHAPTER 4

---

# Africa and China

### Introduction

We can deduce from the discussions in the previous chapters that the manifestation of globalization is not always intended to benefit all global players, but rather to meet the desired needs of the actors, as each seeks to advance its own agenda to perpetrate and perpetuate its advantage over the other global players. Hence, the ensuing scramble for competitive advantage over the global distribution of opportunity and resources, even by those who claim to be in favour of globalization, “had accepted the [African] continent’s marginalization rather unscrupulously,”<sup>1</sup> simply because the end justifies the means, given that the aims of gaining the global(ized) advantage overrides or supersedes any concerns over Africa’s marginalization. Hence the African continent has experienced exploitation from the globalized and competitive scramble for resources.

While a negative precedent of globalization, such as the marginalization of the African continent, was being acknowledged as a matter of concern at the 2007 World Economic Forum (WEF), new and emerging competitors<sup>2</sup> were taking advantage of the emerging opportunities to compete in the same global space, and advance their own advantage at the expense of the African continent, thereby intensifying the contested territory status of the marginalized African “backyard.”<sup>3</sup> China is in the fray with a number of guises: as (1) a superpower; (2) a comrade to developing countries; and (3) a candidate that carries the strategic imprint to disregard corruption, bad governance, and human rights violations by African partners—the very opposite of the mantra for the Western franchise. China does not have a brilliant human rights record, and furthermore has been rated 78th out of 178 on the 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index.<sup>4</sup>

### The Policy and Diplomatic Route

Consequently, China's inroads into the African trade and political arena, reinforced by the establishment in 2000 of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum (CACF), compete with equivalent Western structures such as EPAs with EU member states, and the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) with the United States, even if the United States and the EU do not always share the same policy interests when it comes to dealing with Africa. For example, the thrust of U.S. agreements is on full American control of the deal, whereas the EU emphasizes a relational arrangement, even if it is tacit within both agendas that the African partner should be the loser.

China's structural rivalry is also not without intense diplomatic underpinnings. In what can be described as the modern watershed of Sino-African relations, China hosted the First Heads of State Summit of the Forum on China-African Co-operation (FOCAC), which attracted delegations from 48 African states, including 42 heads of states and some 1,500 business leaders, to Beijing in November 2006; a whopping US\$1.9 billion worth of business and investment deals were signed at this event. The FOCAC series, founded in 2000, has become a regular occurrence. The extraordinary FOCAC 2006 was preceded by two ministerial level meetings; hence, it was dubbed as the "Third Ministerial Meeting," as the African heads of states were accompanied by their respective foreign and trade ministers, even if not all 48 states present in November 2006 were represented in the two preceding ministerial encounters. Although FOCAC 2006 took place as late in that year as November, the indicators had already shown that trade between Africa and China was on a sharp rise, a 25 percent increase over the previous year—from US\$40 billion in 2005 to US\$50 billion in 2006.<sup>5</sup> The volume of China-African bilateral trade had, by 2008, escalated to US\$106.8 billion.<sup>6</sup>

On another diplomatic front, we note that whereas the United States complained and portrayed China as uncooperative with UN resolutions to address the global humanitarian concern in Darfur, and indeed China (together with Russia, and Qatar on the sidelines) did not support Resolution 1706 passed on August 31, 2006 that called for 20,600 UN troops and police officers to support the 7,000-member AMIS, China however sought to give the impression that it had been playing a serious positive role. Ambassador Liu Guijin, the Chinese Government Special Representative on Darfur, said in a speech<sup>7</sup> on February 22, 2008 at Chatham House:

Thanks to China's vigorous mediation, and the efforts of other parties, the Sudanese government agreed to engage in dialogue and consultation with the United Nations and the African Union, leading to the agreement on the

deployment of the hybrid mission in Darfur. The international community has also come to recognize the tripartite negotiation mechanism among the UN, the AU and the Sudanese government as the main channel to address the Darfur issue<sup>8</sup>

We should note, however, that it was after China had cooperated on UNSC Resolution 1769, which finally approved on July 31, 2007 the mandate for UNAMID to replace AMIS,<sup>9</sup> that Chinese diplomats could talk like this. The Chinese also fulfilled their promise to further support Resolution 1769, by deploying their multifunctional engineer unit to go and prepare the ground for UNAMID's work to commence, and by offering subsequent humanitarian assistance. Chinese companies undertook water supply and transmission projects in Darfur; built 20 power generation plants and 46 wells; made donations for multiple local training centers; and contributed equipment to local schools.<sup>10</sup>

It is deductive from the analysis on China's investment offensive in Sudan, why China would not be too keen about international efforts to address the humanitarian situation in Darfur and the remainder of Sudan, particularly if such efforts ruffled the feathers of the Sudanese government with which China was in close cooperation about crucial Chinese oil imports, in exchange for Chinese infrastructural development and arms and ammunition. Previous allegations of ammunitions sourced to China were refuted with the excuse that the evidence constituted manufactures prior to the 2004 embargo. But further refutations from China became difficult and impossible when a UN panel of experts reported in October 2010 that bullets and other rounds of ammunition being used against UNAMID forces had come from China.

Almost all African countries (with the exception of a few such as Algeria, Libya, Sudan, Eritrea, and Liberia) and China are members of the WTO, and have therefore had their tariffs set on the most favored nation (MFN) basis, which is nondiscriminatory. This means that African exports to China face higher tariff rates than to the United States and the EU. But China's liberalized market has placed zero tariffs on its most desirable raw materials, which of course include crude oil and minerals.<sup>11</sup> Added to this equation is the persistent rise of oil prices, which has contributed significantly to the GDPs of the 19 Sub-Saharan countries that have demonstrated annual GDP growth of 4.5 percent or more since the mid-1990s.<sup>12</sup> Furthermore, Chinese oil imports from Africa have been on a consistent rise as follows: \$3 billion in 2002; \$4.9 billion in 2003; \$9.3 billion in 2004; and \$13.2 billion in 2005.<sup>13</sup>

China's hunger and thirst for Africa is demonstrated in the quest for oil, minerals, and international diplomacy, all of which are aimed at China's international strategic interests. The chimes of China's international relations

rhetoric include that a more politically and economically developed Africa (with Chinese help) would benefit China because of a potentially stronger African voice in international affairs, which tended to synchronize with Chinese positions at various platforms of global governance such as at the UNSC and the WTO. More importantly, China has been looking to feed its consumption of energy and other natural resources that has been growing at an alarming rate, thanks to the burgeoning Chinese economy. In 2000–2004, China's contribution to world imports was 23 percent for crude oil, 17 percent for metallic ores, and 7 percent for precious stones.<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, in 2004, 62 percent of Africa's total merchandise exports to China was in oil and natural gas, and 17 percent in ores and metals.<sup>15</sup>

From this perspective, plus the zero tariff trade policy on crude oil and minerals already mentioned, China has been conscientiously laying the groundwork for its energy resource for at least two decades, and has subsequently constructed an elaborate structure of state ownerships and regulatory oversight. From 1998, China subjected most of its state-owned petroleum infrastructure to its State Energy Administration, and under it, established the CNPC and Sinopec Corp. While the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) remained, the State Petroleum and Chemical Industry Bureau (SPCIB) was established under the SETC to oversee CNPC and Sinopec. Meanwhile, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), which has been around since 1982, simultaneously intensified its operations abroad, particularly in Africa. To complete the jigsaw, the China State Construction Engineering Corp (CSECE), which was also formed in 1982 but reorganized in 2007, assumed the role of undertaking the construction of infrastructure related to China's oil prospecting abroad. The following examples in Angola, Sudan, Nigeria, and Ghana illustrate the forms of activity commandeered by the Chinese state-run network of oil and related companies. Their prospecting for oil business tends to go hand-in-hand with securing Chinese loans for other or non-oil businesses in the prospective countries. Meanwhile, the policy and diplomatic route continued to chart its course. The Fourth China-Africa Strategic Dialogue opened on May 4, 2011, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

### China and Africa Trade

Angola is the second largest petroleum producer in Sub-Saharan Africa. At a strategic stage in the wooing process for Angola, just two years after the end of the Angolan civil war in 2002, when the country needed to rebuild its devastated infrastructure but preferred to look elsewhere and avoid capitulation to the IMF and the West, China's Exim Bank approved a \$2 billion

line of credit for Angola in 2004. Consequently, in 2004 and 2005, Angola became the largest source of Chinese crude oil imports from Africa—51 and 50 percent, respectively.<sup>16</sup> Angola emerged as the second largest supplier of crude oil to China in 2008.

In 2004 and 2005, Chinese crude oil imports from Sudan constituted 18 and 19 percent for each respective year. This was second only to Angola.<sup>17</sup> In 2004, Sudan was the top destination for Chinese FDI outflows to Africa.<sup>18</sup> Out of the three major oil consortia operating in Sudan—(1) the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC), (2) Petrodar Operating Company Ltd (PDOC), and (3) White Nile Petroleum Operating Company Ltd (WNPOC), the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and China Chemical and Petroleum Corporation (Sinopec Corp) have major stakes in GNPOC and PDOC. CNPC owns 40 percent of GNPOC that operates blocks one, two and four oil fields; CNPC also owns 41 percent of PDOC that operates blocks three and seven oil fields; and Sinopec Corp owns 6 percent of PDOC. Sudan currently produces half-a-million barrels of oil per day. As of 2010, China had more than \$10 billion worth of investments in Sudan, almost all of which were in North Sudan.

In both 2004 and 2005, Nigeria supplied 4 percent of Chinese crude oil imports from Africa.<sup>19</sup> In 2004, Nigeria was the second top destination for Chinese FDI outflows to Africa.<sup>20</sup> In July 2005, as an improvement on the 1998 securing of two oil blocks in the Niger Delta, the CNPC secured four oil blocks (in consortium with other companies) in return for the construction of the 1,000 megawatt capacity Mambila hydroelectric power project. The CNPC also secured a solely managed block in exchange for a controlling stake in the 1,100,000 barrels per day Kaduna refinery. In Nigeria's 2007 oil licensing round, the CNOOC also secured four oil blocks in return for a US\$2.5 billion Chinese Exim Bank loan for upgrading the Lagos/Kano railway. On May 13, 2010, the CSCEC and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) signed an agreement for China to fund the construction of three refineries in Bayelsa, Kogi, and Lagos states, respectively, plus a petrochemicals complex, all worth \$23 billion. This project aims to provide 750,000 barrels per day of additional refining capacity, and is expected to be funded largely through credits provided by a consortium of Chinese banks and China's Export and Credit Insurance Corp.<sup>21</sup>

On September 20, 2009, the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) announced plans to collaborate with the CNOOC, to provide the GNPC with financial and technical support in oil exploration activity. On December 30, 2009, China granted Ghana two concessional financial facilities worth approximately \$14.65 million or 100 million Chinese Yuan: a grant of 60 million Chinese Yuan and an interest-free loan of 40 million

Chinese Yuan. At the end of a six-day visit to China by Ghana's President John Atta Mills in September 2010, China and Ghana signed deals and project loans worth \$16 billion. As also reported,<sup>22</sup> Ghana signed a \$6 billion contract with the Chinese National Machinery Import and Export Corporation (CMC) for the construction of rail lines across the country, from Nsawam in southern Ghana to Yendi in northern Ghana.

We should note that China's cooperation for UNSC resolutions to address the situation in Darfur/Sudan was not forthcoming, particularly in the crucial 2004–2006 period when Chinese investment in Sudan was being intensified and solidified, and certainly not in the period during, and reasonably after UNSC Resolution 1764 that resulted from the Powel revelation to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 9, 2004.



## CHAPTER 5

---

# Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, and Cote d'Ivoire

### Introduction

This chapter discusses four states: Republic of the Sudan, Republic of Somalia, Republic of Uganda, and Republic of Cote d'Ivoire, selected because of serial political difficulties or strong indicators of a ticking time bomb. This is the first of four consecutive chapters, each of which discusses a cluster of countries with long-running problems, in case study format. Each case study has four sections: an initial concise summary that is a snapshot of the pertinent issues; a section that examines the background leading to the state of relevant domestic and international affairs; a section that discusses international political economy using key governance, economic, peace, and human development indicators; and a section on new security challenges in areas including conventional security, health, food, energy, climate change, or natural and artificial disasters. An attempt is made to point out factors of nationalism and supranationalism vis-à-vis the state of affairs, plus how each country fits into globalization and international politics, as an assessment of their international profile and potential.

### Sudan

The historical and political context of Sudan has already been discussed in Chapter 3. The discussion here is on Sudanese politics.

#### *The Chaotic Politics in Sudan*

The Sudanese government has encountered several rebel groups in both Darfur and South Sudan. The most visible Darfurian movement is JEM,

a coalition of some of the rebel groups. South Sudan is represented by the SPLM.

Over time, JEM attained recognition with the Khartoum government through a variety of moves, including attacking Khartoum in 2008. Consequently, the Darfur Peace Talks began with JEM, brokered by the government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), in Doha, Qatar. JEM met with the Khartoum government in Doha on February 14–15, 2009, to discuss concessions. JEM placed demands on the table, including the release of prisoners, and seemed to be playing the statesmanship card of “representing” Darfurians, and pontificated that the Khartoum government should cease impunities against citizens. The government retorted that JEM’s demands were unreasonable and absurd. Both sides knew too well what they had against each other, and accused the other of refusing to make sufficient concessions, if at all, although in JEM’s view, meeting with the government was itself concessionary and an improvement in relations. However, observers became cynical that the meetings were a façade, or at best, a part of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir’s strategy to be seen as doing something to address impunity, and offset the ICC’s arrest warrant against him. As these observations framed JEM as a part of the strategy of deception, both JEM and the Sudanese government eventually agreed a Memorandum of Understanding to be of good behavior toward each other, and release prisoners from each other’s camp.

The ensuing ground politics assumed a propaganda war, including some false statements that 90 percent of people in Darfur were living a normal life, or that what remained was a “low intensity conflict,” to generate a false impression that the conflict was over. JEM responded that it was fighting for the whole Sudanese problem, and not just Darfur.<sup>1</sup> Animosity at official levels seeped to the grass roots. For example, although the referendum on the independence of South Sudan was to proceed as planned, the mere fact that people of southern descent living north could also vote, displeased North Sudan citizens. At the January 2010 meeting in Qatar between representatives of North and South Sudan, both sides failed to reconcile.

However, the brokerage in Qatar paid some dividend(s) because JEM went on to sign a deal with the Khartoum government on February 23, 2010 that was brokered by the AU and the UAE. In this deal, JEM was given political and military power in Darfur. But Abdul Wahid Nur, then leader of the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) previously known as Darfur Liberation Front, refused to sign the deal. Some rebel groups would not negotiate before Darfur’s problems were largely solved, making it obvious that the deal signed by JEM was not agreeable to some 15 other rebel groups (including the visible SLA), all of which had equally committed crimes against humanity.



Map of Sudan

Ridiculously, the February 2010 deal did not include the disarmament of the Janjaweed Militia, the proxy group responsible for carrying out the Khartoum government's genocide. Suliman Minnawi, leader of the Nur faction of the SLA, signed a deal in Doha, Qatar, in early December 2010. But President al-Bashir's Sudanese government formally withdrew from the Darfur Peace Talks on December 30, 2010.

The UN estimates that some 300,000 have died from the Darfurian/Sudanese crises, while 200,000 have fled to neighboring Chad. Another 2.7 million have been displaced from their homes. In addition to the widespread displacement, the war has prevented other human developments from taking place. For example, endemic diseases such as guinea worm could not be tackled. During Jimmy Carter's visit to Sudan in February 2010, the Carter Centre announced Sudan as the last frontier for the international guinea worm disease eradication effort, largely because of the long civil war, and continuing insecurities in the region, which made many endemic areas inaccessible to health workers.

The internal saga continued unabated. In a classic story, the BBC reported on April 25, 2010<sup>2</sup> that troops in unmarked land cruisers mounted with machine guns and wearing uniforms of the northern army had clashed with the southern army (the SPLA), and also that the Darfuri Rezeigat tribe of Arab nomads, who had been seeking new pastures near the border with South Sudan's Western Bahr al-Ghazal province, had clashed with the SPLA, during which 55 tribesmen were killed and 85 were wounded. There are often clashes about grazing rights and water points in this area. In the spate of episodes and events over the years of conflict, during which the northern army allegedly and regularly used local tribesmen as pawns of agitation against the south, the volatility of the political terrain and the complexity of the counter-reporting brings home the simple reality that the recurrent provocations that spark the renewal of conflict, come easily, yet without firm trace of who to blame. The Sudanese army (Khartoum) confirmed that it had two clashes with JEM troops in the week of July 11–17, 2010. It was reported that 300 JEM troops and 75 government troops had died as a result of that surge in violence.<sup>3</sup>

### *The 2010 Sudanese Elections*

The April 11–13, 2010 general elections happened to be the first fully contested elections in Sudan for 25 years. Barely two weeks to the elections, Aljazeera English television reported on March 31 that JEM would like the elections delayed. The JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim raised concerns that the census for the electoral register was flawed, because most of Darfur, including

over one million internally displaced persons who missed the census, could not participate in the election. In a tactical ploy to buy time or reposition JEM and place the movement in further political advantage, Khalil Ibrahim announced<sup>4</sup> that he would like JEM eventually converted into a political party, and to occupy the Vice President's post, plus control of local government positions in Darfur. President al-Bashir insisted on the electoral schedule, and revealed JEM's other ambitions—a five-year transitional period and rule of Darfur. JEM had genuine cause to fear that retaining al-Bashir's government, particularly his electoral victory in the Darfur region, would spell out further wars and bloodshed, especially in Western Darfur.

On April 1, 2010, the SPLM candidate Yasir Arman withdrew his candidacy in Darfur for a variety of reasons, including the continued conflict and emergency situation in Darfur that could not guarantee an atmosphere for free voting. Other general concerns included fears of rigging, as it appeared that the framework for rigging had already been laid. Some election materials such as the presidential ballot papers had been printed in Arabic, even though South Sudan is predominantly English-speaking. The contracts for printing election materials went to government-appointed printing companies that did not see anything wrong with communicating in a language incompatible with voters in South Sudan, and generated speculation as to whether this was an act of government or sheer oversight. These companies were also charged with printing the electoral register. The Deputy Chair of the Electoral Commission, Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah, admitted that the electoral process was challenging and intense, but could not vouch if the procedures in place were adequate.<sup>5</sup> The SPLM announced its pull out from the elections in Darfur, followed by a group of other opposition parties in Sudan, in what was perceived as a last minute ploy to pressurize al-Bashir to accede to cross-party requests to postpone the elections. At a rally on April 1, 2010, al-Bashir threatened that if the opposition parties boycotted the elections in Darfur, he would refuse to hold the January 2011 referendum on the independence of South Sudan.<sup>6</sup> This threat was viewed internationally as serious: victory for al-Bashir was obvious, but any threat to a successful referendum for the independence of South Sudan was too high to risk.

In what appeared to be a breath of fresh air, Fatima Abdelm Mahmood was allowed to enter the race as a female presidential candidate, after she had been previously rejected by the Electoral Commission. This became welcome news, since 64 percent of registered voters in Sudan were female, and females had borne most of the brunt of the crimes against humanity committed during the Sudanese crises. But the breath of fresh air was very short lived, as both the Umma Party and the Communist Party threatened to pull out of the elections on April 7, 2010, and the EU also withdrew its observers from Darfur on

April 8, 2010. It became clear that the scale of opposition boycotts could not guarantee a legitimate election, with implications for the legitimacy of the Khartoum government that won it.

On April 9, 2010, former Ghanaian President John Kufuor led a 50-member AU Observer Mission in Sudan to cover the elections. Most of the nine official parties participating originally had pulled out, but there were 450 National Assembly seats to be contested for. Other logistical problems included the fact that a quarter of registered voters could not read and write. Kufuor met with Thabo Mbeki, the former South African President who was also Chair of the AU High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) on Sudan, and Ibrahim Gambari, the head of UNAMID. On voting day, April 11, 2010, the AU mission toured some ten voting centers in Khartoum, as well as Omdruman, the largest city; the contingent reportedly encountered a peaceful atmosphere. Kufuor held meetings with leaders of all the observer missions, including Jimmy Carter, General Scott Graton (the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan), and Torben Brylle (the EU Special Representative to Sudan). On April 17, 2010, both the Carter Centre and the EU observer mission made the ridiculous declaration that the five-day election, in which 16 million votes were cast, did not meet international standards, even though it was pretty obvious that al-Bashir would win amidst the widespread boycott by opposition parties.

Irregularities were expected, and the fact that there were significant problems in 3 percent of polling stations in Darfur, or that some results in Darfur were still being contested two weeks after the elections, did not surprise anyone, let alone the outcome that al-Bashir won 68 percent of the overall vote. We should note that compared with Kenya's December 2007 elections, Zimbabwe's March 2008, or Nigeria's April 2008, the Sudanese elections had a much better record, and indicated that the potential for a political solution at least existed. For example, Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of the autonomous government of South Sudan and leader of the SPLM, won 93 percent of votes cast in South Sudan. This became the clearest indicator that the impending January 2011 referendum to decide on the independence of South Sudan was clear cut. Mayardit, however, continued in his role as the First Vice President to al-Bashir as agreed in the 2005 CPA, which granted semiautonomous status to South Sudan and guaranteed half of the overall Sudanese cabinet to the SPLM until the South attained independence, when of course Mayardit would be President of South Sudan. The Second Vice President of Sudan became Ali Osman Taha of President al-Bashir's NCP.

Meanwhile, certain outstanding issues of the north-south conflict that had been raging since 1955 needed to be resolved, such as a definitive demarcation of the Abyei border line across North and South Sudan; Khartoum support

for dissident forces in South Sudan; and of course Darfur. There were also other issues with neighboring countries, including Egypt, which was worried about the Nile Water Agreement, which was not concluded at the April 2010 meeting in Sharm-El-Sheikh, and remained inconclusive at the subsequent July 2010 meeting in Alexandria, Egypt.

Al-Bashir was sworn in as President on May 27, 2010, and became the only sitting head of state facing an arrest warrant from the ICC, for presiding over the crimes of mass murder, rape, and torture. On July 1, 2010, the Sudanese opposition figure and leader of the Popular Congress Party (PCP) Dr Hassan al-Turabi was freed from jail. He had suffered a series of arrests and jail sentences at the hand of President al-Bashir: he was (1) imprisoned in 1999 and freed in October 2003; (2) sent to Khartoum's Kober prison in March 2004 and released on June 28, 2005; (3) arrested on May 12, 2008, and detained for 12 hours; (4) arrested and imprisoned on January 14, 2009 and released on March 8, 2009; (5) arrested in May 2010 and released on July 1, 2010. Apart from falling out with al-Bashir as far back as 1999, and for which reason he was imprisoned then, al-Turabi's opposition portfolio lists him as directly holding al-Bashir responsible for the Darfurian war crimes and genocide.

### *The 2011 South Sudan Referendum and the Abyei Plebiscite*

The January 9, 2011 referendum was for the national self-determination of predominantly African South Sudan, from predominantly Arabic North Sudan that hosted the seat of Sudanese government in Khartoum. Citizens of North Sudan were excluded from participating. Citizens of South Sudan living in the north could vote in polling stations located in the north. As argued earlier, the outcome of the referendum was already clear (from the April 2010 general elections)—that South Sudan would head for independence. However, three issues that were impossible to resolve, and could carry over into the post-referendum period, were (a) the Abyei border; (b) the division of oil revenues between North and South Sudan; and (c) Darfur. Some southerners living in the north migrated southward before the referendum, for fear of being lynched during a postindependent South Sudan, or if their ballot in the plebiscite became known.

Quite apart from the threat issued by al-Bashir during his election campaign broadcast on April 1, 2010 to abort the referendum, there was sufficient cause for concern to warrant the UNSC to visit Sudan from October 6 to 9, 2010 to promote a fair referendum, ahead of voter registration that was scheduled from November 14 through to December 2010, barely 100 days to the referendum. The UNSC first visited Juba, the capital of South

Sudan, before going to Darfur. Within the immediate context of the UNSC visit, al-Bashir's government rolled out an elaborate face-saving plan to either stall for more time to evade the ICC arrest that loomed over his life or at least be seen as part of the solution (instead of the problem) to the incessant crises in Darfur. Khartoum unveiled in early October 2010 a "peace plan" that included: providing security to Darfurian citizens; voluntary repatriation of the two million internally displaced Darfurians; a joint partnership of Sudanese forces with UNAMID; and organizing a consultative forum to include armed rebel movements in Darfur blamed by the government for past failures to reach peace agreements.<sup>7</sup> According to presidential adviser Ghazi Salahuddin Atabani, these rebel groups could not be allowed any veto in the process, and would be left out if they failed to show readiness for a settlement.<sup>8</sup> No doubt the UNSC viewed this incredible "peace plan" coming from the historically incredible al-Bashir as a waste of time. The risks were too high, and so was the importance of the UNSC visit.

The UNSC team was in Juba on October 6, and in the Darfur region from October 7 to 9. Unlike the welcome at Juba, the members received a hostile reception in West Darfur, from supporters of President al-Bashir. More importantly, four events occurred in the course of the UNSC tour that escalated the threat to the political situation. First, an expatriate UN worker who resided just outside the main UN camp in North Darfur was abducted by four gunmen. Not long before the UNSC visit, government forces had fought an intense battle with JEM forces in Darfur, in which 300 JEM troops were reportedly killed.<sup>9</sup> This, among several other instances, determined the government's hard-line guidelines set out for rebel forces being invited to the "peace plan" unveiled in October 2010.

The second event, which became a direct threat to the referendum, was the amassing of troops on both sides of the north-south border of the fertile and oil-rich Abyei region. Hence, in the week commencing October 10, Salva Kiir Mayardit persuaded UNAMID to consider deploying more of the existing 10,000 troops designated for South Sudan to Abyei immediately, because the small UNAMID contingent in the immediate Abyei area could not intervene decisively if a clash occurred. A buffer zone ten miles north and south of the Abyei border region where no North or South Sudan troops would be present was ideal. However, Salva Kiir requested for the most vulnerable areas along the 2,000 kilometer border, or where civilians were most at risk, to be considered. Quite apart from the relative shortage of conventional troops, UNAMID had other tactical problems that limited its capabilities, such as the lack of air power. Ensuring security in Abyei was utmost: Vice President Ali Osman Taha had announced that unless the Abyei impasse was resolved, Khartoum would not arrange a referendum for the south.



The third event, which further compounded the security situation, was the red herring that emerged with the nomadic Messeriya Arabs in Abyei, who had become anxious about their potential exclusion from the voting exercise. It was agreed in the 2005 CPA that the referendum, plus a separate plebiscite for citizens of Abyei to remain with South Sudan or join North Sudan, would be held simultaneously. But at the last minute, officials could not agree on who in Abyei were eligible to participate in this plebiscite, principally because the Messeriyans had traditional grazing and travel rights only,<sup>10</sup> which are inferior to the primary voting rights of indigenous Abyeians such as the Dinka. The specific Abyei area under plebiscite was finalized by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague on July 22, 2009, and more or less reflects a demarcation historically curtailed to South Sudan. The text of the CPA makes it clear that Abyei residents were to vote specifically on whether to remain part of Bahr el Ghazal (which is in South Sudan), or retain their traditional administrative and citizenship rights in Kordofan (which is in North Sudan).<sup>11</sup> This problem came about, in part, because in 1905 the Abyei territory that belonged to the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms was transferred to Kordofan, and since then, political participation and administration of this Dinka (South Sudan)-dominated territory have involved both the Dinkas, and the Kordofans of North Sudan. We should note that the Hague tribunal viewed Abyei as historically curtailed to South Sudan.

Abyei is the only territory in Sudan that had this special administrative status, hence the reason for the plebiscite asking residents to decide whether to retain this status or choose total separation from North Sudan. In the special administrative status that existed, Abyei residents were citizens of both North and South Sudan at once, and Abyei was governed by a local Executive Council elected by Abyei residents. But the prerogative of South Sudan was evident, in that 50 percent of oil proceeds went to the National Government (of both North and South), and 42 percent to the Government of Southern Sudan solely. Although the CPA required the Abyei Referendum Commission to work out the criteria of residence,<sup>12</sup> the CPA also stated that Abyei "residents . . . shall cast . . . ballot."<sup>13</sup> Hence, the bone of contention became whether the Messeriyans actually resided, or were nomads. South Sudan insisted that only Dinkas should vote on the Abyei plebiscite, and North Sudan insisted that the Messeriyans should also vote.

The Messeriyans are pro-North Sudan, and preferred the special administrative status, not least because they had grazing and nomadic (mobility) rights across the Abyei territory, which they feared could not be guaranteed for ever if Abyei became controlled solely by South Sudan. The Messeriyans had been used by NCP forces during the previous civil war, and could not be fully trusted by the indigenous Dinka Abyeians (or South Sudan for that

matter) to vote to join the South. Despite assurances from the SPLM, the nomads demanded guarantees regarding their status, just as the SPLM were also anxious about the Messeriyen propensity to vote against retaining Abyei with South Sudan. This Messeriyen insecurity resulted in sabotage attempts, such as holding hostage a 1,000 strong convoy in Southern Kordofan in December 2010. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights also complained in December 2010 that Khartoum had blocked the visa applications of 1,000 human rights observers to the elections. Finally, the Meseriyans promised a full-scale rebellion if the Dinka Ngoks voted Abyei for South Sudan.

The Khartoum government threatened to postpone the Abyei plebiscite on the basis that agreement could not practically be reached before voting day. Intelligence revealed that NCP forces had asked their families in Abyei to evacuate the area, and South Sudan had quite rightly pointed out their concerns that North Sudan was gearing up for war. Any prospect of postponement spelled disaster for the international effort, as peace was not yet guaranteed for Abyei in a postindependent South Sudan without South Sudan jurisdiction over Abyei. For example, potential difficulties in reaching future decisions could be foreseen with two permanent UNSC members (China and Russia) who abstained from UN Resolution 1706 that was passed on August 31, 2006. China had huge investments with the Khartoum government and supplied the latter with arms. Russia, also an arms supplier, was already opposed to the independence of Darfur and the indictment of President al-Bashir, and favored the cancellation of North Sudan's debts with international creditors, a position that runs counter to the sanctions regime against al-Bashir. China's investments with the Kharotum government amounted to some \$10 billion worth. Furthermore, China had become infuriated at being exposed by a UN panel of experts, who issued a report in October 2010 about the evidence of Chinese-manufactured rounds of ammunition in Darfur.

The fourth event was the extraordinary Arab League Summit in Sirte, Libya, on October 9, 2010. This summit was originally and principally to discuss Palestinian-Israeli talks over the freezing of Israeli settlements and the stalled U.S.-led negotiations, plus whether to incorporate Turkey and Iran into the Arab League. As had become typical of Libya and the eight other member states<sup>14</sup> of the Arab League in Africa (which were simultaneously members of the OIC) to use arm-twisting tactics to gain AU support for Arabic (and Islamic) causes such as resisting the ICC arrest warrant for President al-Bashir, the original plan evolved to include an AU-Arab League Summit slated for October 10. This summit was also the second of its kind for the two blocs in over 30 years; the first was in 1977, when the AU was

the Organization of African Unity. Both Arab and African Foreign Ministers had convened in Sirte on October 7 to prepare for the October 10 meeting. As of October 9, the clear-cut political and arm-twisting agenda of the Arab League was summed up on Libyaonline as follows:

The Afro-Arab summit in Sirte . . . aims to forge common policies and strategies for mutual benefit . . . The vehicle is the proposed Strategic Plan of the Afro-Arab Cooperation 2011–2015. A preparatory meeting and recent events suggest the African Union could also seek help from the Arabs in reining-in Islamic extremists, while Arab League countries could press for additional AU support in their long-standing issues with Israel.

Against the context of losing Abyei, Omar al-Bashir became clearer and more difficult that an agreement over Abyei, and oil dividends, should be reached before the referendum. But al-Bashir hypocritically undermined talks to reach an agreement by stating emphatically that he “won’t accept alternative”<sup>15</sup> to the unity of North and South Sudan. The Khartoum government also objected to any role for UNAMID forces in the border hotspots of Abyei, and maintained that any such move would be borne out of ignorance or interference. Nevertheless, UNAMID complied with South Sudan’s requests in the best way possible. Omar al-Bashir did not attend the November 29–30 Third EU-Africa Summit in Tripoli, Libya.

South Sudan also had its own issues to deal with. There were as many as 20 political parties. But since the referendum was not on multiparty politics (but simply for the independence of South Sudan), there was no contest among these parties. Hence Salva Kiir Majardit’s leadership was both uncontested and indisputable. However, a meeting held on October 13, 2010 to patch up differences and unite all political forces behind the independence movement, which was scheduled to last for three days, instead lasted for five days because participants wanted some agreement on how a transitional government would be set up after independence, as well as how multiparty elections would be conducted. Faultlines and fissures of long-standing grievances among southerners resurfaced in 2011. Meanwhile there were apprehensions for both North and South Sudan: in December 2010, the SPLM announced its determination to operate as an opposition party in North Sudan, after South Sudan’s independence in 2011, to encompass and cater for marginalized groups and peoples in the north, and especially rebel groups in Darfur, as part of the solution to the unresolved issue of Darfur.

The prospects of a southern-oriented opposition group in North Sudan that should take sides with rebel groups in Darfur infuriated President al-Bashir, and ignited an onslaught on Darfur by North Sudanese

government troops during December 23–24, 2010, in which some 40 people were killed by the government forces. This new onslaught then motivated the splintered rebel groups in Darfur to join forces, to include: JEM, which consists of African Muslims, and the SLA, which consists of African farming communities, including the Nur faction of the SLA now led by Sulliman Minnawi. The renewed government attacks on Darfur confirmed the UNSC's skepticism of the so-called al-Bashir peace plan that was unveiled at the beginning of October 2010 when the UNSC toured Sudan. Not long after the successful independence referendum of January 2011, al-Bashir's government in North Sudan drew unpopularity, amidst a simultaneous rise of opposition from among the NCP's rank and file, over issues of ethnic diversity, including the imposition of Sharia law.

Meanwhile, it appeared that South Sudan may have overplayed their hand by their motivation to operate an opposition party in North Sudan. Not only did North Sudan resume attacks in Darfur, but also warned South Sudan not to interfere in northern politics, and more importantly withdrew from the ongoing Darfur Peace Talks in Doha, Qatar, on December 30, 2010. This formal withdrawal reset the stage for the resumption of confrontations between North Sudan and Darfur. It also meant that Darfur would not be resolved by the time of South Sudan's independence. Darfur country could then become a new frontline for attacking South Sudan's sovereign positions if the latter assumed protective roles for Darfurian rebels, or became the official opposition to North Sudan politics. Opposition to al-Bashir's northern politics became his headache, about political advocacy from South Sudan, plus opposition from his formidable northern arch-rival Dr al-Turabi who had begun galvanizing a northern political movement for a post-referendum North Sudan.

On January 4, 2011, Omar al-Bashir delivered a speech in Juba and promised to honor the results of the referendum that was also allowed to take place in other countries, including Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Australia, Canada, and the United States. The 60 percent voter threshold needed to validate the referendum was reached within Sudan itself on January 12, and rendered the remainder of the vote a moot point as far as South Sudan's independence was concerned. Nevertheless, the total count after January 15 indicated that 99 percent of voters supported South Sudan's independence, and South Sudan became the newest country on the globe.

### ***International Political Economy***

As is indicative of the war-torn and devastated country, Sudan was ranked 146th out of 149 on the 2010 Global Peace Index (GPI) issued by the

Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP).<sup>16</sup> This move up the ladder is not an improvement on 2009, when Sudan was ranked bottom or 140th out of 140, but only because security in Afghanistan, Somalia, and Iraq had worsened over the one year period. Sudan was rated 120th out of 121 in 2007, and 138th out of 140 in 2008. Furthermore, the 2011 position of 151st out of 153 on the peace index showed no improvement. Sudan was also listed among countries that were least peaceful during the 2007–2010 compilation years of the peace index, and topped the list of “countries ranked according to their combined number of refugees and IDPs.”<sup>17</sup> According to the UN Development Programme (UNDP), Sudan ranked 150th out of 182 on the Human Development Index (HDI) of the 2009 Human Development Report (HDR); and 154th out of 169 on the 2010 HDI.<sup>18</sup> The 2009 HDR also stated that “In 2007, Sudan . . . had more than 500,000 crisis-affected people who were beyond the reach of any humanitarian assistance”<sup>19</sup> and that 4,900,000 people had been internally displaced by the end of 2008.<sup>20</sup>

The Khartoum government has been thriving on the back of a booming economy. Sudan’s crude oil exports (the top commodity) that began in 1999, pushed the country to a GDP growth of over 10 percent in 2006 and 2007. The GDP purchasing power parities for 2008, 2009, and 2010 were estimated at \$90.12 billion, \$93.91 billion, and \$98.79 billion respectively, irrespective of the global credit crunch that began in 2008. As at 2010, Sudan produced 500,000 barrels of oil per day. Agriculture may be subsistent and unsophisticated, but it engages some 80 percent of the population, and contributes to around one third of the recurrent GDP.<sup>21</sup> Apart from petroleum and related products, the country also gains revenue from a myriad of minerals including aluminium, asbestos, chrome, cobalt, copper, gold, granite, gypsum, iron, kaolin, lead, manganese, mica, nickel, silver, tin, uranium, and zinc. Such an endowed country was expected to be developed, but clearly, these appalling indicators contributed to the characteristically low HDI rating.

Furthermore, the 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranked Sudan 172nd out of 178—not much movement from its 2009 ranking of 176th out of 180 (Transparency International). The 2010 Ibrahim Index on African Governance (IIAG) also ranked Sudan 47th out of 53.<sup>22</sup> Sudan’s ranking on this governance index had more or less hovered around the same spot since compilation began: 46th in 2000/01, 2001/02, 2004/05, and 2005/06; 47th in 2002/03, 2006/07, and 2008/09; 48th in 2003/04; and 51st in 2007/08.<sup>23</sup> The 2010 IIAG data showed that Sudan was at the bottom of the list both in domestic armed conflicts, and government involvement in armed conflicts.<sup>24</sup> In addition to infrastructural devastations, some 4.9 million Sudanese were

internally displaced in 2009 alone,<sup>25</sup> and 300,000 had died since the conflict in Darfur began in 2003.<sup>26</sup>

### *New Security Challenges*

Security challenges in the aftermath of the successful 2011 referendum, and indeed life in a postindependent South Sudan will be a recurrent issue. As already argued, the outcome of the referendum was not in doubt. However, the key issues that were impossible to resolve in the short term, carried over into the post-referendum and postindependence period: (a) the Abyei border; (b) the division of oil revenues between North and South Sudan; and (c) Darfur—where al-Bashir overtly supported Arab militias. The period between the successful referendum of January 2011, and July 9, 2011, the official date of South Sudan's independence, recorded armed confrontations between North and South Sudan in the Abyei region, against the CPA, as both sides sought to gain advantage before all pre-independent issues were resolved. AUHIP was to facilitate the resolution of all remaining CPA and post-referendum issues, and reach a political solution before July 9, 2011.

Additionally, famine and severe drought still constitute some of the key challenges in the region. In Akobo, severe drought had caused internal displacements, and conditions on the ground made it nearly impossible to transport aid to those who needed it most. Other means of transporting aid, such as by helicopter or light planes, was costing up to \$10,000 to fund, and unattractive to the UN. UNAMID itself had no air power. Furthermore, restrictions against the movements of Messeriyan herdsmen amidst the complexities of the Abyei region's disputes and hostilities, meant that several cattle died from insufficient water and fodder.

There were other recurring security issues, with neighbors, particularly Chad and Uganda. A joint Chadian-Sudanese force of 3,000 troops under Sudanese command was unveiled on September 23, 2010 to patrol the common border between the two countries.

### *The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)*

Operations of the LRA that originated from Uganda is a security issue for South Sudan. The LRA have operated mainly from northern Uganda and parts of South Sudan. Therefore, Ugandan military forces have been stationed in South Sudan for the past six years as a check to the LRA's advancing tactics in the subregion. Neighboring countries such as Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Republic of Cameroon, and Central African Republic (CAR) have also experienced their share of LRA encroachment, and atrocities toward their citizens. The LRA turned their attention to South Sudan for hosting

the Ugandan army, and has persistently raided the Nzara County of South Sudan over time, with reports dating from May 2009.<sup>27</sup> Nzara became part of a particular subregional perimeter of LRA operations including southeast CAR and northeast DRC, and experienced a subsequent raid the following November 2009,<sup>28</sup> for hosting the logistical base of the Ugandan Army.<sup>29</sup> Nzara suffered another raid during August 19–20, 2010 that resulted in the displacement of some 25,000 people from Nzara. The LRA had been hiding out in northeast DRC that is only 30 kilometres from Nzara.<sup>30</sup> From September 2010, the authorities in South Sudan and the Ugandan forces agreed to arm the Arrow Boys (traditional local warriors who fight with bows and arrows) with more sophisticated weaponry and cash, to assist with the war against the LRA.

### *HIV/AIDS*

In 2006, the adult (15–49) prevalence rate was 1.6 percent within a population of 36.2 million, among whom 34,000 died of the pandemic amidst a life expectancy of 56 years for men and 60 for women, in a country that received a HDI rating of 141st for that year. The prevalence rate for 2007 was 1.7 percent, and life expectancy depreciated to 54 years in 2010.<sup>31</sup> As part of the international effort to combat the pandemic, in 2008, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) “conducted sentinel surveillance in refugee settings that included host populations in . . . South Sudan.”<sup>32</sup> The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) also provided technical assistance to the authorities and civil society organizations in South Sudan.<sup>33</sup> Sudan is one of the countries that require declaration of HIV status for entry or stay, and deport individuals once their HIV status is discovered.<sup>34</sup>

### *Food Security*

Data from the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) show that although agriculture contributes a good chunk (34 percent) of GDP, some 40 percent of the population are undernourished, 41 percent of children are malnourished and underweight, and 43 percent are malnourished with a stunted growth.<sup>35</sup>

## **Somalia**

Somalia is one of just two countries (including Afghanistan) that wears the “failed state” tag, and has consistently demonstrated the symptoms—a territory for unfettered terrorist activity including piracy, and under a weak transitional government. Hence, the Somali-based Islamist terrorist groups have challenged the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) that

protects the transitional government. Somalia topped the 2010 Maplecroft Terrorism Risk Index, and has consistently rated the worst on other governance indicators. There is very little or almost nonexistent economic relations with the rest of the world. Food is very scarce, but HIV/AIDS is also much less prevalent.

### *Analysis of the Failed State*

Somalia is designated in official circles as a failed state.<sup>36</sup> The failure of the Somalian state began a long time ago and stretches back two decades. The successful secession of Somaliland from Somalia on May 18, 1991 was due to the collapse of the Somalian state, even if the self-determined Republic of Somaliland is also yet to be formally recognized by the UN. The unending saga of intimidations and clashes against the fledgling Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) continues, and the following chronology of events from January 2010 portrays the incessant violence and terrorism.

- On January 29–31, 2010, at least 20 people, including civilians, were killed as a result of heavy militant attacks on government and AMISOM bases in Mogadishu.
- In January 2010, two weeks of sustained clashes in central Somalia between the terrorist and Wahabbist Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam militias on the one hand, and the pro-government Sufi Islamist militia Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a (ASWJ) on the other hand, resulted in at least 138 killed and 63,000 displaced.<sup>37</sup>
- From February 7 to 11, 2010, at least 21 civilians were killed in Mogadishu as a result of shelling by Al-Shabaab, which subsequently proclaimed an "all out war" against the TFG from February 12, 2010.<sup>38</sup>
- On February 11, 2010, five people were killed during a shootout in Mogadishu between security forces over nonpayment of salaries.<sup>39</sup>
- On May 1, 2010, at least 30 people were killed and many dozens injured during blasts in Mogadishu. There was a UN-sponsored Somalia conference in Istanbul on May 22, 2010, during which the UNSC urged international support for the TFG. On May 23, 2010, at least 14 were killed when Al-Shabaab attacked the presidential palace.<sup>40</sup>
- On June 3, 2010, at least 17 people were reportedly killed in Mogadishu during fierce fighting between TFG soldiers supported by AMISOM troops, and Islamist militias; two AMISOM peacekeepers were killed. In subsequent days, at least 24 were reportedly killed during fighting between Al-Shabaab and ASWJ in central Somalia. The ASWJ said that it had recaptured the key town of Dhusomareb. Three TFG Ministers,



including the Defense Minister, resigned on June 8, 2010. The saga of clashes continued between Al-Shabaab and government troops: another 13 people were killed on June 13, and 12 more were killed on June 18, 2010.<sup>41</sup>

- It was reported on July 5, 2010 that the 6,000-member AMISOM force in Somalia was to be increased.<sup>42</sup> Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the July 11, 2010 bomb attack in Kampala, in which 85 people who were watching the World Cup died.
- August 23, 2010 saw a renewal of Al-Shabaab clashes with government (TFG) troops and AMISOM forces in Mogadishu, which saw 35 people, including eight members of Parliament, reportedly killed in a bomb explosion at a tightly guarded hotel near the seat of government. The two bombers detonated themselves after the attack. The attacks, however, continued into their third day on August 25, 2010.<sup>43</sup>
- Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for a suicide bomb blast at Mogadishu airport that killed at least nine people and injured several others on September 9, 2010.
- Heavy shelling by AMISOM in Mogadishu against Al-Shabaab forces in the Bakare market area killed at least 20 civilians and injured several others on September 23, 2010. AMISOM was defending a street popularly used by TFG officials and Ministers in Mogadishu's government district.
- From October 2 to 5, 2010, at least seven people were reportedly killed when AU forces and palace troops clashed with Al-Shabaab, which attempted an onslaught against the presidential palace. Intelligence revealed that Al-Shabaab was operating from the Bakare market, and rockets from the palace troops directed at the market hit civilian targets, including a bus. Mogadishu Hospital was among the targets defended and won by AMISOM and TFG forces. Bakare market became deluged with sufficient fire power from both sides of the conflict to render it dilapidated and uninhabitable.
- On October 16, 2010 Al-Shabaab seized control of a key Somali town from ASWJ. Al-Shabaab had extended its assault toward ASWJ for assisting TFG troops against Al-Shabaab in exchange for key roles in the national security apparatus as well as control of five government ministries; this agreement was signed between ASWJ and the TFG on March 15, 2010.
- On October 19, 2010, a captured British charity worker for Save the Children was freed.
- On October 22, the UN and AU imposed a no-fly zone and naval blockade over Somalia.

- The chronology of events is typical. Warfare and violence between armed rebels and government forces became the order of the day, and escalated from mid-2010.

To further demonstrate the TFG's lack of control, on April 3, 2010, Hizbul-Islam issued an ultimatum that all radio stations should stop playing musical tunes, including tunes used in commercials, or face a shut down within ten days. Hizbul-Islam deemed the general trend of music on the Somalian airwaves as un-Islamic and violated Islamic principles. By April 13, the majority of radio stations in southern and central Somalia had complied. The issue became a matter of insecurity for the radio stations, who could not protect themselves. Out of the 16 FM stations in Mogadishu alone, the only two that resisted the order were Radio Mogadishu that is government-owned and protected by AMISOM, and Radio Bar-Kulan that is located in Nairobi and is funded by the UN. A week before the ultimatum was issued, Al-Shabaab had banned the BBC and VOA under a similar pretext.<sup>44</sup> On May 2, 2010, the Hizbul-Islam group took over the Harardhere coastal pirate haven, ostensibly to introduce Sharia law and put an end to the pirate trade.<sup>45</sup> Furthermore, friendly fire between the legitimate police and government troops, for example on June 13, 2010, left 13 dead and 15 wounded,<sup>46</sup> and demonstrated the state of the fledgling governance apparatus.

### *The President and the TFG*

President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the man at the helm of affairs over the vestiges of the failed state, was previously the head of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU)—a union of Sharia courts that united to form an alternative system of government to mainstream secular administration. He became head of the TFG or President of Somalia, even if his jurisdiction in real geographical terms is just a fraction of Mogadishu. Due to his background, he was branded as a terrorist by the West and dismissed from useful focus. Hence, his comeback as head of the TFG indicates a strategic rethink of the West, particularly the United States. The TFG, which assumed its name in November 2004, was originally known as the Transitional National Government (TNG), which was formed in 2000 at the Somalia National Peace Conference (SNPC) held in Djibouti (popularly known as the Djibouti process), the aftermath of which paid the dividend for President Sharif's resumption of office on January 31, 2009.

On assuming office, Sharif, who obviously considered or portrayed himself as a moderate Muslim, wanted to reach out to those considered to be outside the Djibouti process (such as Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam). Sharif



Map of Somalia

also wanted to reiterate another version of Islam, and what was thought by the West to represent the moderate Islam that he had portrayed himself to espouse, even if the majority of Somalians could not see him as a moderate. This lack of definition paved way for Al-Shabaab to invade and occupy the political space in Somalia, and in the diaspora.

It is widely acknowledged that Sharif's knowledge of Islam is far superior to that of Al-Shabaab clerics and other militants. Hence, it was popularly viewed as a failure on his part for not articulating that moderate version of Islam to which he is correctly or falsely accredited. In the absence of an ideology, or his ideological statement, new security recruits of the state did not know precisely what they defended or supported. This conundrum suggests that Islam, and Islamization for that matter, are ideologically based, which also underpins the notion of jihad. Whatever the case may be, the popular mantra remains that over 24 months in government, Sharif had failed to produce a document or articulate a vision of where he was heading, even though the February 2004 Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) that was agreed in Nairobi existed, and was in operation.

At some stage, Sheikh Mukhtar Robow, a leader of Al-Shabaab was invited to join the government, but he turned down the offer. It is difficult to ascertain the seriousness of this invitation on the part of Sharif, and precisely what he had on the cards for Robow, as well as why the latter refused to join the TFG. It is widely known that Somalian nationalists are amenable to join a government of national unity, but whether there existed a realistic or practical strategy for reconciling Islamic jihadists with non-others remains to be seen. As the Somalian crisis cannot be resolved militarily, it has become imperative for the TFG to have a strategy for reconciliation. To compound the problem, it appears that foreign (non-Somalian) jihadists, have a stake in the continual instability of Somalia, which makes it ever more difficult for the TFG to handle the international coalition of hard line and radical Islamists. Furthermore, not only has the TFG lost the political space and so cannot offer political education, but the TFG is unable to provide the basic social services, and Al-Shabaab has been filling this gap too. The systematic adeptness of Al-Shabaab over a sustained period has aided in their ability to occupy the relevant political and social vacuum, hence they have a captive Somalian population.

The question therefore arises as to what Somalians want outside of the currently operational TFC, the absence of which Sharif has been tarred with the brush of not espousing a vision or ideology. Wahabbism resonates with Somalian nationalists, as it is conservative (not violent or militant). However one cannot expect the TFG to turn itself into wahabbism. In the absence of an alternative to what Sharif has failed to offer (whatever that might be), the

popular allegation that he is not making the tough decisions also seems idealistic. There is an underlying dialectic that the local clans prefer autonomy or localized administrations (such as within the ICU), and obviously do not like the so called interfering and manipulative hand of secular central government. The obvious practical answer to this dialectic is a federal system, which is what that TFC was itself about, even if it was understandably not exactly the same as the draft national constitution that was also yet to be approved.

Hence, many Somalians are in a dialectical frame of mind that is simultaneously caught up in a vicious psychological cycle in terms of what is required. Furthermore, the vicious cycle does not just reverberate in a simple quest for devolution (however less important that might be) but also in other spheres such as national security. For example, the officer class from the old Somali National Army has almost died out as a result of old age and annihilation through raging and incessant battles. Hence, President Sharif has been religiously pursuing security sector reforms (SSR), as a fulfillment of the TFC. But due to the relative weakness of the TFG, and the insufficient AMISOM force, the result is that a lot of effort and resources are channeled into training new recruits who are subsequently positioned, in relatively defenseless fashion at valid checkpoints (in comparison with their Al-Shabaab counterparts), and left at the mercy of the ferocious militant groups.

Some of the TFG's energies were consumed by feuding between President Sharif and Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke over the draft constitution that the President wished to present to Somalians in a referendum, and which had been fiercely opposed by the Prime Minister on the basis that incessant wars across the country could not ensure sufficient security on the ground to guarantee a safe and efficient referendum. As there is no realistic chance of wars ceasing in Somalia in the foreseeable future, the President was worried that a referendum on the draft constitution could never take place, and attempted to get rid of the Prime Minister, but did not obtain sufficient votes from the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP). With the ensuing impasse, the President became handicapped because the Prime Minister carried substantial executive powers, and rendered the strife with the President untenable, especially as this issue divided the parliamentary body into factions at a time when unity and support were desperately needed to fight more obstinate adversaries such as Al-Shabaab, and at a crucial time when the TFG's mandate was ticking to a close. Parliament was scheduled to vote on a "no confidence" motion against Sharmarke, but he resigned on September 21, 2010.

On October 14, 2010 President Sharif appointed Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed as the new Prime Minister, after gaining 297 out of the 391 votes. A new cabinet was approved on November 27, with the next obvious task of

conducting the referendum that would approve the draft constitution, and subsequently conduct elections before the TFG's mandate expired in August 2011. On January 1, 2010, parliament asked the new Prime Minister to suspend the funding for two security firms: SKS Dubai in charge of the airport; and Sardeen International in charge of soldier training.

### *International Political Economy*

Somalia was bottom of CPI rankings in both 2009 (180th out of 180) and 2010 (178th out of 178), and had consistently been at the bottom of this index since 2005. Also, the IIAG has consistently ranked Somalia at the bottom since this African governance index began in 2000,<sup>47</sup> which is not a surprise if Somalia is a failed state, or has practically been without a nationally recognized government throughout that period. The 2010 IIAG data showed that Somalia was at the bottom of the list (together with Sudan) in domestic armed conflicts, and was also among the bottom countries in connection with government involvement in armed conflicts; and Somalia was also the chief supplier of refugees.<sup>48</sup> According to the UNDP, at the end of 2008, some 1,300,000 people had been displaced as a result of the numerous conflicts,<sup>49</sup> and in 2010, Somalia placed second among "countries ranked according to their combined number of refugees and IDPs per 100,000 people."<sup>50</sup> As is consistent with its prolific war-torn status, Somalia's GPI rankings have been deteriorating: 139th in 2008; 142nd out of 144 in 2009; 148th out of 149 in 2010, and bottom again at 153rd in 2011.

As a failed state in an unfertile geographical region, Somalia has survived on an informal economy comprising of mainly livestock agriculture and remittances. Hence, the export commodities merely consist of livestock and hides, bananas, fish, charcoal, and scrap metal to neighboring Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates just across the Gulf of Aden. The few imports consisting of sugar, sorghum, corn, and other necessities such as petroleum products, some manufactured goods, and construction materials are sourced from the mainland neighbors of Kenya and Djibouti, or otherwise across the Gulf of Aden. Ironically, the country's very minimal participation in the international economy has saved it from the impact of the global economic and financial downturn, so that, real GDP has remained at 2.6 percent since 2006.<sup>51</sup> The 2010 HDR rated the incidence of multi-dimensional poverty in Somalia as high as 87 percent.<sup>52</sup> Somalia also ranked bottom in terms of civil liberties on the 2010 IIAG. It is not a surprise that Somalia experienced famine in 2011, which displaced 250,000 Somalians, rendered 10 million at risk, and caused 1,300 to migrate daily to the Dadaab refugee camp in neighboring Kenya. Jacques Diouf (FAO Director-General)

issued a press statement on July 25, 2011 that the UN needed \$1.6 billion in donations to tackle the problem in the Horn of Africa.

### *New Security Challenges*

It is interesting to note that what pertains in the other countries as an extra set of security challenges, is the norm in Somalia. As from November 15, 2010, Somalia that used to be fourth place on the Maplecroft Terror Risk Index, had beaten Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Columbia to first place out of 196 countries.<sup>53</sup>

#### *Piracy*

The international impact of Somalia as a failed state is enormous, most notably because of its strategic location in the internationally renowned Gulf of Aden shipping route. The International Maritime Bureau reported that attacks in the Gulf of Aden dropped by nearly two-thirds in the first half of 2010 compared to 2009, but rose in the Somali basin and the wider Indian Ocean. There had been a total of 123 attacks on marine vessels, and 33 seizures by the end of September 2010, all due to Somali piracy, and costing as much as £300 million in ransom payments and insurance.<sup>54</sup> Next door Kenya that is a law abiding state agreed with EU partners to trial Somali pirates, but this international resistance was set further back when a Kenyan court ruled in November 2010 that Kenya had no legal powers against the arrested pirates.

#### *HIV/AIDS*

In spite of being a failed state, the ravages of incessant wars, and perhaps the prospects of Sharia law, have not nurtured the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Somalia, nor made room for local or international authorities to target what exists of the pandemic. In 2006, the adult prevalence rate was as low as 0.9 percent, and 4,100 people died in a country that had an average life expectancy of 44.<sup>55</sup> Life expectancy has since improved to an average 49.63 years.<sup>56</sup> However, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is frustrated that targeting young people for HIV/AIDS treatment is impossible without the cooperation of a formal education sector, and has found it more appropriate to operate next door in the self-declared Republic of Somaliland instead,<sup>57</sup> even if the UN does not yet recognize Somaliland's 20 year old unilateral declaration of independence, despite the polity holding a peaceful presidential election on June 26, 2010 in which the incumbent lost, and an equally peaceful transfer of power five days afterward. Hence, the poor health care under the ineffective governance in Somalia

means that citizens who contract any high risk disease are at the mercy of nature.

## Uganda

Uganda is named after the Buganda Kingdom, whose people (the Baganda) make up 18 percent of the population. The current President, Yoweri Museveni, who is not of the Bugandan ethnonational identity group, has been head of state for over 24 years, and would not retire soon enough, especially as in his third successive (and excessive) term, he amended the constitution and removed the limits to the presidential terms of office. Museveni was therefore reelected for a fourth five-year term in February 2011, and ignited a spate of protests since then. There have been historical clashes between government and the Buganda Kingdom that has still maintained its unique ethnonational identity within the larger Uganda. Museveni's political capital originated from his "savior" status by deposing Idi Amin, and rebelling against Amin's successor Milton Obote. But this accrued capital has been eroded by other factors including economic hardship. Uganda's postindependence history is littered with internal wars and devastations that leave little comfort for a stress-orientated population with many bad memories. The peace indicators are not favorable, amidst the ongoing threat from the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), the threat from the Somali-based Al-Shabaab terrorist group, and internal protests.

### *Historical and Political Context*

Uganda's traditions of origin reveal polities such as the Kitara Empire, the Bunyoro-Kitara Kingdom, the Buganda Kingdom, and the Ankole Kingdom, and stages of development ranging from simple gatherers, to levels of sophistication and skill development, social, and political organization. The common factor is that Ugandans are mostly Bantus, irrespective of their origins.

Contact with non-African peoples began with the Arabs in the 1830s from the East African coast, and subsequently the British sailors in the 1860s, the missionaries in the 1870s, the trade administration of the British East Africa Company in the 1880s, and formal British political rule over some geographical parts in the 1890s. The process of British annexation and integration continued until the current geographical boundaries were finalized in 1914. Milton Obote emerged as leader of the anticolonial nationalist movement, and founded the Uganda People's Congress (UPC) in 1955. Obote led the majority coalition of the April 1962 National Assembly elections and



became Prime Minister; he subsequently led Uganda to independence on October 9, 1962.

The complications of Uganda's postindependence history, and in some sense the root of the ensuing government versus Buganda clashes, began in 1963 when the UPC-amended independence constitution had to create a UPC alliance with the King of Buganda, which established him and his paramount chief as President and Vice President, respectively. It is not clear what amount of loyalty to tradition that Obote wanted to create or prove, however these ceremonial appointments paved the way for a political toehold that would never disappear entirely. The stresses of this top-heavy power-sharing deal began to show when differential sentiments from the masses pitched support for traditional kingdom versus centralized government. Obote overthrew King Edward Muteesa II, and got his UPC to amend the constitution to upgrade himself from Prime Minister to President. The September 1967 constitution that made Uganda a republic also abolished traditional kingdoms entirely.


### *Idi Amin*

The downgrading of traditional kingdoms upset the traditionalists, and army commander Major General Idi Amin staged a coup that overthrew Obote on January 25, 1971. Analysts have always wondered why Amin, who was Obote's chief henchman in deposing the Buganda presidency (by attacking the Buganda King's palace and forcing him into exile) should turn against Obote in this way. The seeds lie in Amin's backroom Buganda connections. His mother Assa Aatte (1904–1970) was a Lugbara fetish priestess, practitioner, and herbalist, whose clientele included the Buganda royalty.<sup>58</sup> It is also alleged in the obituary of Idi Amin that the Lugbara and Buganda were ethnically related.<sup>59</sup> Amin's coup was therefore an ancestral manifestation of her mother's rituals in revenge for Buganda royalty; and what better means than for it to manifest by the hand of her own son.

Amin went further than the tradition of amending the constitution to suit. His new constitution abolished the National Assembly and made him President with absolute powers. In the years that followed his coup, the blood thirsty and power hungry head of state terrorized his own country folk, and neighbors. A move by Amin against Tanzania in October 1978 generated a reprisal from the Tanzania Peoples' Defence Force and Ugandan exiles, which toppled him on April 11, 1979.

### *Post-Amin*

A few months after Amin's incursions into Tanzania, a Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) was formed at Moshi in Tanzania during



Map of Uganda

March 24–26, 1979. Consisting of anything and everything that was anti-Amin and exiled in Tanzania, it included 28 different groups and an interesting cast of leadership personalities such as: (1) Milton Obote and his Kikosi Maalum; (2) the current President, Yoweri Museveni, and his Front for National Salvation (FRONASA) that was formed in Uganda in 1973; (3) General Tito Okello and David Oyite Ojok both of whom were commanders of Kikosi Maalum (and subsequently the UNLA—the military wing of the UNLF); and of course (4) Yusuf Lule who became the first Chair of the 11-member Executive Council of the UNLF. The UNLF formed a parliament of sorts—a National Consultative Council (NCC) of 28 members each representing the NCC's constituent groups, which together with Lule's cabinet, governed Uganda immediately after Amin's exit in April 1979. Although it was more or less a government-in-waiting, and its standing army (the UNLA) became the official Ugandan Army, the hastily formed UNLF was plagued with leadership tussles, to the effect that Lule was ousted by the UNLF after just over three months (68 days) in office on June 20, 1979. Lule was replaced with Godfrey Binaisa who also became President for just under a year and was removed by the UNLF's Military Commission on May 20, 1980.

Clearly, any leader would come under the common threat, hence a Presidential Commission consisting of the likely contenders to the throne (Paulo Muwanga, Yoweri Museveni, Oyite Ojok, and Tito Okello) governed together and organized elections in December 1980, of which Obote, the former President, and his UPC became triumphant, and Paulo Muwanga, the Chair of the Presidential Commission that supervised the election, became Vice President in Obote's second presidency. This outcome of convenience did not sound right to certain elements of the UNLF/A led by Museveni, which subsequently splintered from the movement to form the National Resistance Army (NRA) and became the main opposition group to the government's UNLA. This ushered Uganda into another round (after Amin) of brutalities between government and whatever was the opposition, over a six-year period in which some 100,000–300,000<sup>60</sup> Ugandan lives were lost.

During the sparring between UNLA and NRA, a UNLA unit composed mainly of troops from the Acholi tribe and led by Lieutenant General Basilio Olara-Okello, captured the Ugandan capital Kampala on July 27, 1985, installed a military government, and forced Obote into exile in Tanzania, and later to Zambia. Olara-Okello also continued with the devastation of the NRA support base, but somehow let down his guard and agreed to a ceasefire brokered between him and Museveni by Kenyan President Arap Moi toward the end of 1985. But Museveni's NRA did not honour the ceasefire, and fought to cease Kampala in January 25, 1986, thereby causing Olara-Okello

to seek exile in Sudan. Museveni was sworn in as President three days later, by the NRA, and has remained President ever since.

For the next 19 years, the country had a one-party state until the ban on multiparty politics was lifted in July 2005. There was an initial referendum in March 2000, on whether Uganda should retain the movement system of politics that imposed restrictions on presidential candidates to contest elections as individuals but not on their party ticket. This referendum was poorly patronized and the results did not have much credibility. In March 2001, Museveni was reelected as President for another five-year term. Although the National Assembly elections that followed in June 2001 ushered in many fresh faces (50 percent of seats), the National Resistance Movement (NRM) maintained their lead in the legislature.

In December 2003, a Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) presented a proposal report, which was counterbalanced in September 2004 by proposals from the Museveni government to remove the limits to his presidential terms of office. The resulting compromise was a referendum held in July 2005 that ushered the country into proper multiparty politics, and subsequently the first multiparty elections in February 2006, even if there were irregularities. Museveni won 59.3 percent of the vote and assumed his third and excessive term of office. Kizza Besigye, the leader of the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)—who also stood in 2001—won 37.4 percent of the vote, and the remaining 3.3 percent was shared by the other insignificant candidates.

Uganda now has a two-party system, but the FDC face regular intimidation from government. For example, on June 30, 2001, after the March 2001 elections, Besigye was detained and questioned by police for alleged treason. Following the February 2011 elections, he was arrested and beaten many times. Although both the 2001 and 2006 elections were contested as fraudulent by the Opposition, the Supreme Court ruled on both occasions against nullifying the results, a suggestion that the independent judiciary was not that independent from government. The February 18, 2011 presidential and parliamentary elections took place on over a highly unlevel playing field; Museveni won 68.38 percent of the votes, and opposition leader Besigye won 26.01 percent.

### *International Political Economy*

On the list of 53 African countries, Uganda's governance rating is about midway on the IIAG: 24th in 2000/01 and 2008/09; 26th in 2001/02 and 2002/03; 28th in 2003/04; 27th on 2004/05; 25th in 2005/06; 19th in 2006/07; and 22nd in 2007/08.<sup>61</sup> But peace is a rare commodity in a country

with a long-term presidency that has perpetuated unconstitutionally. Data from the 2010 IIAG show that Uganda is among the second tier of bottom countries (together with Somalia, Rwanda, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad, Angola and Algeria) in terms of the “government involvement in armed conflict” indicator, as well as the “domestic armed conflict” indicator (together with Nigeria, Niger, Mauritania, Ethiopia, Cote d'Ivoire, Comoros, and Chad).<sup>62</sup> Consequently, Uganda’s GPI rankings over the years are as follows: 104th out of 121 in 2007; 114th out of 140 in 2008; 103rd out of 144 in 2009; 100th out of 149 in 2010; and an improvement of 96th out of 153 in 2011 as a result of the country’s efforts of 2010 which placed it among countries that “demonstrated the largest move towards peacefulness.”<sup>63</sup> As is generally the case with long term regimes, the corruption of both power and resources becomes the rule rather than the exception, and Uganda has not been an exception: the country was 130th out of 180 in the 2009 CPI; and 127th out of 178 in the 2010 CPI. Data from the 2010 IIAG report also show that Uganda’s already poor performance for the “transparency and corruption” indicator had deteriorated by 6.3 percentage points from the previous assessment.<sup>64</sup>

We should note that Uganda has made some phenomenal strides to emerge from the doldrums of many years of wars, atrocities, and obviously bad governance. When the dust settled and Museveni became President in January 1986, he inherited an economy that was way out of control. Inflation reached an astonishing 240 percent in 1987, became 42 percent in 1992, and miraculously got down to 5.1 percent in 2003, and inched slightly upward again to 7.7 percent in 2007. The new upward trend continued to 12 percent in 2008 and 13 percent in 2009.<sup>65</sup>

Uganda relies heavily on a few cash crops, and has a very low industrial base. Agriculture occupies 82 percent of the 15 million labor force, and contributes 22.5 percent of GDP. Although industry also contributes 25.1 percent of GDP,<sup>66</sup> because most of industry is agro-based, industry itself provides for just 5 percent of the labor force overall. Uganda is the world’s second largest producer of coffee, which accounts for 23 percent of foreign exchange earnings. Cotton, tea, tobacco, and fish are among the main export crops, just as the related sugar, brewing, tobacco, and cotton textiles form the main (and obviously agro-based) industries. As a landlocked country with a lackluster list of export crops to offer, Uganda’s main export partners (as at 2009) were: Sudan 13.47 percent; Kenya 9 percent; UAE and Rwanda 7.5 percent; Switzerland 7.4 percent; DRC 6.85 percent; Netherlands and Belgium 5.7 percent; Germany 5.2 percent; and Italy 4.3 percent.<sup>67</sup>

With little income from the unimpressive list of exports, and imports of mainly capital equipment, vehicles, petroleum, medical supplies, and

food (cereals), the import bill always outstripped export earnings, for example \$3.844 billion versus \$2.7 billion in 2009, and \$4.474 billion versus \$2.941 billion in 2010.<sup>68</sup> Subsequently, government is always short of cash for development, and Uganda's HDI rating was 157th out of 182 in 2009, and 143rd out of 169 in 2010. FAO data showed that 20 percent of children are undernourished and underweight, and 32 percent are undernourished with stunted growth, while at least four million suffered from undernourishment.<sup>69</sup>

The 2009 HDR made an interesting point that Uganda was "the only one of six countries where refugees were legally allowed to move around freely, to accept work and to access land."<sup>70</sup> The HDR also stated that "at the end of 2008, some 869,000 had been internally displaced"<sup>71</sup> as a result of conflicts, and listed Uganda as one of the countries where "remittances helped entire war-affected communities to survive,"<sup>72</sup> as well as having a life expectancy of 51.9 years.<sup>73</sup> The 2010 CPI rated Uganda as 17th among "countries ranked according to their combined number of refugees and IDPs."<sup>74</sup> Despite the gloomy outlook, the economy grew by 8.7 percent in 2008, 7.2 percent in 2009, and 5.8 percent in 2010.<sup>75</sup> The discovery of oil and natural gas in the Albertine Rift in 2008 could well be a source of hope.

### *New Security Challenges*

As at 2006, military expenditure was taking 2.2 percent<sup>76</sup> of the country's meager GDP, and high for a cash-strapped state. The security challenges of Uganda are internal and external, conventional and unconventional. In the wake of the ensuing wind of popular protests against long-serving heads of states that swept across North Africa from December 2010 and destabilized Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, and Morocco, both the longevity of Museveni's presidency and the timing of Uganda's February 2011 presidential and parliamentary elections, made Uganda an obvious candidate to also catch the political wave of protests. The strong arm tactics by the Museveni regime to prevent political assembly, generated innovative protests of walking to work instead of traveling in vehicles. These "walk-to-work" protests generated crowds just by the sheer numbers of commuters refusing to use vehicles. Hence, a series of popular protests gathered momentum in the months of April and May 2011, usually over the high prices of food, petrol, and other obvious excuses from the general political discontent. By April 28, 2011, Kizza Besigye had been already arrested and beaten four times by the Museveni apparatus, as he had become the obvious rallying point for opposition against the government.

The most serious conventional security threat is from the Al-Shabaab Islamic terrorist group based in not-so-distant Somalia, and Joseph Kony's Lord's LRA that was founded in northern Uganda, and which has now gained regional notoriety.

### *Al-Shabaab*

The terrorist threat from Al-Shabaab is the price Uganda is paying for hosting AMISOM that has kept Somalia's TFG in power. It was reported on July 5, 2010 that the 6,000 AMISOM force in Somalia was to be increased<sup>77</sup> as part of a move to contain Al-Shabaab, if not destabilize it. On July 11, 2010, Al-Shabaab responded by detonating two explosions in Kampala: one in a restaurant; and the other in a sports club, as customers had gathered to watch the 2010 Football World Cup final between Spain and The Netherlands. The explosions killed 85 people. There was initial speculation that they were aimed at Westerners and the middle class, particularly as both targets (the rugby club and the restaurant in Madagala) were patronized by the expatriate community, mostly Americans.<sup>78</sup> However Al-Shabaab owned up to it, and made clear this was Uganda's punishment for hosting and supporting the AMISOM force that props up the fledgling TFG of Somalia. On July 30, 2010, the Al-Shabaab agents were extradited from Kenya to Uganda to face trial for the July 11 bombings. Meanwhile, on July 28, 2010, AMISOM troops stationed in Mogadishu clashed with Al-Shabaab insurgents, during which 17 people reportedly died.<sup>79</sup>

It was obvious, from the extent to which the toothless Somalian TFG were intimidated by Al-Shabaab, that the AMISOM force had to be augmented on a serious scale, and by at least 20,000 troops as estimated by the AU. A few days before the Fifteenth AU Summit was to convene in Kampala, the Ugandan government announced a 2,000 troop surge to join AMISOM in Mogadishu; Guinea promised to make available a battalion immediately; and Djibouti confirmed they were to send troops within a few months; while Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, and Zambia decided to send fact-finding missions in the course of the summit, before committing themselves to troop contributions. But the highly publicized promissory notes from the listed countries failed to materialize. President Museveni, therefore, announced on October 7, 2010 that Uganda could contribute a further 12,000 to 20,000 troops to join AMISOM if the UN would fund it. Museveni touted that Uganda's long-standing history of engaging in fighting (obviously from the Amin era to the LRA) gave the Ugandan army both the edge and urge to engage Al-Shabaab. On December 23, 2010, the UN authorized 4,000 Ugandan troops to augment the AMISOM force.

*The LRA*

As regards the LRA and security challenges, particularly insecurity in Northern Uganda where the group originates, experts and analysts have concluded that the solution is for government to deal with the roots and fix the north, by addressing “northern perceptions of economic and political marginalization, and ensure the social rehabilitation of the north.”<sup>80</sup> But the Juba peace process that was to end the northern Uganda conflict and disarm the LRA reached a dead end when Kony refused to turn up at the Ri-Kwangba assembly point on November 29, 2008 to sign the Final Peace Agreement (FPA). Subsequently, with the initiative of Ugandan President Museveni, Operation Thunder Lightning was launched in Kampala in December 14, 2008 jointly by the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF), DRC’s armed forces, and the SPLA, and complemented by diplomatic support from the United States, plus intelligence backup from the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), to attack the LRA strongholds in north-east DRC, and more specifically Garamba where the National Park designated in the dense forest provided natural and befitting bases for the LRA.

In addition to disbanding and disarming the LRA, the prime target of Operation Thunder Lightning was to capture Joseph Kony dead or alive. But even if Camp Swahili<sup>81</sup> was fire-bombed, Kony had escaped (thanks to leaked intelligence), and is believed to be hiding between the routes to and from southern Darfur and the CAR where the bulk of the LRA have relocated.<sup>82</sup> CAR is non-signatory to Operation Thunder Lightning. Uganda withdrew its troops from Garamba on March 15, 2009 and left Congolese partners of the Operation to pick up the pieces. The failure of the Operation and the subsequent relocation of the LRA’s scattered forces in CAR, as well as many other positions within the territories of the signatories to the Operation, have generated a regional conundrum for both neighbors and the international community. Subsequently, experts and analysts advised to revisit the drawing board and devise an innovative, comprehensive and coordinated effort by all parties concerned, including the governments and armies of Uganda, DRC, CAR, South Sudan, the UN Mission in Congo (MONUC), the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), the UN mission in the CAR and Chad (MINURCAT), the UN Security Council, AFRICOM, the local authorities, and civilian populations of all the affected and relevant areas, and finally donors, according to a long list of recommendations cited in the International Crisis Group’s Africa Report No 157.

*Other Internal Conventional Security Challenges*

Museveni’s government is occupied with other internal political challenges. The Buganda Kingdom has maintained its unique state and identity, and is



always a candidate for clashes with government. For example in September 2009, some 40 people were killed in riots that ensued over Museveni's refusal to allow the Buganda king to tour Kampala. Hence, a March 16, 2010 attempt by Museveni to visit the Kasubi Tombs, which are both a burial site for Buganda royals and a UNESCO World Heritage Site, also encountered Buganda demonstrations. In the ensuing scuffle, three people were reportedly killed by security forces, and five others were wounded.<sup>83</sup>

### *HIV/AIDS*

In 2004–05, the adult prevalence rate was 6.4 percent. This increased slightly to 6.7 percent in 2006, among a population of 29 million, from which 91,000 died from the pandemic, amidst a life expectancy of under 50 years average, in a country that received a HDI rating of 144th for that year.<sup>84</sup> The adult prevalence rate decreased to 5.4 percent in 2007 and fewer people (77,000) died. Life expectancy also improved to average 53 years in 2010.<sup>85</sup>

As part of cooperating with the international effort to combat the pandemic, Uganda was one of the destination countries where “the UNAIDS Secretariat undertook several high-level advocacy missions . . . to elicit stronger political, financial and programmatic commitment to the AIDS response by engaging with people living with HIV groups and civil society as well as soliciting both bi- and multilateral support, including with the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.”<sup>86</sup> The Ugandan health ministry also collaborated with the UNHCR for the conducting of “sentinel surveillance in refugee settings that included [the] host population in . . . Uganda.”<sup>87</sup> The UNODC provided technical assistance to the Ugandan authorities and Ugandan civil society organizations.<sup>88</sup> The International Labour Organization (ILO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) supported the Ugandan Medical Association in workshops on “prevention of mother-to-child transmission, antiretroviral therapy and tuberculosis care.”<sup>89</sup> The Ugandan government also participated in the UNAIDS-partnered Millennium Villages project to help create mother-to-child transmission-free zones.<sup>90</sup>

Despite the decreases in prevalence, there are insufficient facilities to cope with the pandemic. The 2010 UNAIDS Outlook Report stated that “many clinics are waiting for people currently on treatment to die before they can provide treatment to new people,” however the health centers are making good use of whatever technology is available to them. The Outlook Report highlighted a pilot project whereby “Ten health centres in rural Uganda are using SMS to send the HIV results of babies born to HIV-positive mothers back to their doctors within three to five days” as opposed to ten weeks

without mobile phone technology. If successful, this system would be rolled out in the rest of the country.

It became evident that HIV prevalence among homosexual men in Sub-Saharan Africa was highest in Uganda,<sup>91</sup> hence activists and legislators pushed hard for an anti-homosexuality bill to punish homosexual men with life or death sentences. The Ugandan Parliament debated this bill in 2009,<sup>92</sup> and some Ugandan tabloid newspapers including *Red Pepper* and *Rolling Stone*, have since been publishing against homosexuality. In October 2010, *Rolling Stone* twice published lists of alleged homosexuals including leaders of homosexual associations. *Rolling Stone* only commenced business on August 23, and had already published on October 9, an edition that contained the photographs of 20 alleged “generals” of the gay community.<sup>93</sup> It therefore became clear that this newspaper had a forthright but notorious agenda against the sexual minorities. On November 1, 2010, Ugandan High Court judge Vincent Musoke-Kibuuka placed an injunction against the newspaper on the basis that its campaign constituted an “invasion of the right to privacy,”<sup>94</sup> following a petition from the human rights organization Sexual Minorities Uganda. The Executive Director of the organization Frank Mugisha thought that “criminalization is increasing homophobia. It is also driving homosexual acts underground and making it risky for people to engage in safe sex [and] that the absence of protection by the law makes it difficult for sexual minorities to access the kind of rights available to straight people.”<sup>95</sup> On January 27, 2011, David Kato, the advocacy officer for Sexual Minorities Uganda was bludgeoned to death in his home near Kampala. He had sued *Rolling Stone* for outing him as homosexual, and won a court victory earlier on January 3 when a Ugandan High Court judge issued a permanent injunction against the newspaper to prevent it from identifying homosexuals.

We should note that almost half of respondents to a survey conducted by UNAIDS and the polling company Zogby International, felt that “stigma and discrimination towards people living with HIV . . . were significant barriers,” even if 78.7 percent also “ranked availability of funding as the top obstacle.”<sup>96</sup> Some 56.5 percent had a view that AIDS could be stopped by 2015,<sup>97</sup> which was rather optimistic, judging from the fact that only 1 percent of government revenue was spent on HIV, whereas the share of the pandemic in the Ugandan economy was 13 percent,<sup>98</sup> and donor countries had begun to reduce funding, which led some clinics to send people away without diagnostic or substantial treatment

### **Cote d’Ivoire**

Cote d’Ivoire is a mixed bag of ethnic tensions and nationalism issues that form the basis for the political turmoil over the last eleven years. Most

African countries have multiple ethnonational identity groups, and multiple languages. However, out of the current population of 22 million,<sup>99</sup> over five million non-Ivorian Africans residing in Cote d'Ivoire see themselves as Ivorians, but are viewed by "indigenous" Ivorians as foreigners, especially those from Burkina Faso. The concept of *ivoirité* became the constitutional bone of contention about who was qualified to receive voting or identity cards, or to stand for elections, which led to six consecutive postponements of the election that eventually occurred on October 31, but superseded by a November run-off that became inconclusive. Both the economy and democratic governance drifted, and were weakened by ten years of conflict that impacted against human development and internal security.

### ***Historical and Political Context***

#### *Pre-independence*

It is easy to see why the fingers are pointing at the Burkinabe Ivorians. From 1637 when the French missionaries settled at Assinie near the border with Ghana, the subsequent French incursions encountered two main groups: the Akans; and the Ouattaras who occupied the geographical area spanning northeastern Cote d'Ivoire and a significant portion of Burkina Faso. The Ouattara Empire (also known as the Kong Empire) was Islamic, and existed from 1710 until the city of Kong was destroyed by Samoure Touré in 1895.

Among other things, the French foothold in Cote d'Ivoire became more established in 1843–44 when Admiral Bouët-Willaumez signed treaties with the kings of the Grand Bassam and Assinie regions, and placed their territories under French protectorate. Subsequently, the French influence expanded gradually inland, amidst fierce skirmishes with Samoure Touré, who was eventually captured by the French in 1898. We should note that the period of French colonial rule involved dealings with neighboring Burkina Faso (formerly known as The Upper Volta), and indeed the borderlines between The Upper Volta and Cote d'Ivoire were not determined until 1947 because the French were still grappling with attaching parts of that country to Cote d'Ivoire. Around this period, the leader of the independence nationalist movement, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, surfaced fortuitously for nonpolitical reasons, by forming the first agricultural trade union in 1944, as a cocoa farmer.

Clearly the beef with Burkinabes did not begin recently. It has an established precedent from the geographical and economic relevance of ethnic Ouattaras to the development of Cote d'Ivoire. Seeing the agricultural potential for Cote d'Ivoire, the chief aim of colonial France was to boost agricultural exports in cocoa, coffee, palm oil, and bananas, the production of which required large plantations, and was labor intensive. The peripatetic pedigree of the pre-independence history of Cote d'Ivoire generated a settler (migrant)

population that was harnessed for the labor requirements of the economic aims of the French colonial powers, and which distinguished the country from others in French West Africa. This policy was pursued with vigor and success, so that at independence in 1960, Cote d'Ivoire was the most prosperous country in French West Africa. But the Ivorian settler population were chiefly Ouattaras.

### *Postindependence*

The independence nationalist from the plantation background, Felix Houphouët-Boigny, managed to treat the settler population with respect and dignity; hence, they became part of Cote d'Ivoire. The agricultural base of the country flourished in a notable way, and by 1979, it became the world's leading producer of cocoa, and subsequently Africa's leading exporter of pineapples and palm oil. But without a diversified economic base, climate change (adverse weather conditions) and global economic adversities from the 1980s to the early 1990s took their toll on both the national Exchequer and individual livelihoods, leading to agitations and strikes. When Houphouët-Boigny died in 1993, his favorite, Henri Konan Bédié, who was then President of the National Assembly, became President, after a brief power struggle with Alassane Ouattara, who was then Prime Minister, leading to the latter's resignation from the post, and government, on December 9, 1993.

### *The Chaotic Spate of Politics*

Konan Bédié became leader of Houphouët-Boigny's Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI), putting him in poll position for the October 1995 elections. Somewhat unconventional, in comparison with his contemporary African heads of states who led anticolonial nationalist movements to independence, Houphouët-Boigny took Côte d'Ivoire along the path of a one-party state for the longest period of 30 years, but without recourse to experimenting with socialism, Marxism, or developing close ties with the Soviet Union and China. Although the first multiparty elections were held in 1990, the long period of one-party rule is not the bane of the political turmoil, in that, Houphouët-Boigny kept this multiethnic country very well together, by not antagonizing minorities. Instead, I would trace the roots of the recent turmoil firmly to Konan Bédié's treatment of Alassane Ouattara as a foreigner who was unqualified to stand for the October 1995 presidential elections, a designation that tarred the ethnic Ouattara population, regardless of the coincidence of namesakes. Judging from the pre-independence history of Cote d'Ivoire, the view that Ouattaras were not Ivorianne is despicable. Understandably, Konan Bédié's despicable concept of *ivoirité* that ostracized

many populations as “foreigners,” has not bode well; and this concept from a fellow African is more despicable than the colonial concepts of assimilation and association that designated Francophone Africans as subjects (within the Francophonie) without rights to representation. Subsequently the military, itself a victim of Bédié’s exclusionary politics, staged a coup d’état and overthrew him on December 24, 1999, replacing him with General Robert Guei.

The *ivoirité* virus of discrimination went beyond Bédié, and became institutionalized. The Ivorian Supreme Court that worked on the constitutional reform failed to get rid of the clauses that underscored *ivoirité*, or for that matter the divisions between ethnic Ouattaras from the north, and other groups from the south. The north-south divide also assumed a Christian versus Islamic gloss. Institutionally, the *ivoirité* concept disqualified Allassane Ouattara to be presidential candidate for the October 2000 elections, alleging him to be of Burkinabe descent or nationality. The Supreme Court’s members were handpicked by Guei who was operating under the guise of a government of national unity. But it is not exactly clear whether Guei had Ouattara strategically eliminated because he thought the latter was a formidable opponent, or that he considered all ethnic Ouattaras to be foreigners. Article 35 of the Cote d’Ivoire constitution that passed the July 23, 2000 referendum and which is still in vogue, states that the candidate:

Must be Ivorian by birth, born of a father and of a mother themselves Ivorian by birth. He must never have renounced the Ivorian nationality. He must never have had [prévaloir] another nationality. He must have resided in Cote d’Ivoire continuously during the five years preceding the date of the elections and have totaled ten years of effective presence.

The venom of Bédié’s *ivoirité* concept penetrated the popular conscience, and generated a strong constituency of protests from the Ouattara-dominated north of the country. The Guei-appointed Supreme Court also disqualified the presidential candidates of the two main parties (PDCI and Rassemblement des Republicaines—RDR) that boycotted this election. General Guei’s attempt to rig the election failed to win him any favors, and although he tried to present himself as winner, civilians responded with demonstrations, and were soon joined by the armed forces, eventually forcing Guei to disappear into exile. Laurent Gbagbo and his Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI) therefore became the obvious winners, with the active support of the Young Patriots or the Congrès Panafricain des Jeunes et des Patriotes (COJEP) youth movement led by Charles Blé Goudé, which formed a significant fan base, largely from the south of the country.

But the country would never remain the same again, since the *ivoirité* concept had damaged the fragile national coherence carefully nurtured by Houphouët-Boigny. In an effort at national reconciliation, in August 2002, President Gbagbo formed a government of national unity that included the RDR. But this was obviously insufficient. A military coup on September 19, 2002 (now known as Black Monday) when President Gbagbo was on holiday in Italy, set in train what led to the remainder of the political crisis. The rebellion culminated in rebel forces under the rubric of the Patriotic Movement of Cote d'Ivoire (MPCI) securing the northern half of the country for themselves, with a capital at Bouake. The country's capital Abidjan would have been captured, were it not for the timely intervention of French troops deployed to assist government troops. Subsequently, the rebel troops were kept at bay by French and UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) troops who maintained security at several makeshift ceasefire boundaries. In the course of the rebellion, other armed militias (warlords and fighters from Liberia and Sierra Leone) capitalized on the ensuing instability and occupied some territories in the west of the country. The first ceasefire boundary agreement was brokered and signed between government and the MPCI in the middle of October 2002. The French troops took responsibility to monitor this agreement, which soon became complicated, because the Ivorian Popular Movement for the Great West (MPIGO) and the Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP), emerged as new military forces to be reckoned with, in the west of the country.

It is not clear what forgers or mergers exist(ed) among MPIGO, MJP, and the invader Liberia and Sierra Leone militias, or if the latter were themselves Ivorians, however MPIGO and MJP joined the MCPI, to form the New Forces (or Forces Nouvelles) that became the Opposition movement to government. ECOWAS acted swiftly and garnered 1,500 troops alongside the existing 4,000 French troops, who were given the task of commandeering peacekeeping operations over a Zone of Confidence spanning the makeshift boundaries and multiple east-west and north-south border lines that existed between government and the New Forces. This relative peace paved the way for the January 2003 Linas-Marcoussis Accord (LMA) brokered by France, between the New Forces and President Gbagbo, effectively a power sharing government of national reconciliation that included representatives from both sides.

Reconciliation was a non-starter without getting rid of the despicable *ivoirité* law that prevented ethnic Ouattaras from electoral candidacy, hence the LMA rightly settled on the prime agenda of modifying national identity, eligibility for citizenship, and land tenure laws. This LMA agenda had a UN-mandated committee to monitor its implementation, plus an appointed

Prime Minister to recruit for the reconciliation cabinet. Seydou Diarra, the new Prime Minister in March 2003, formed the cabinet of 41 Ministers representing the two opposing sides of government and the New Forces. A month later, this cabinet signed a cessation of hostilities between the two sides. Further advantages of a working government were soon realized when Gbagbo successfully consulted with the cabinet and appointed two Defense and Security Ministers agreeable to cabinet. On February 27, 2004, the UN authorized the establishment of UNOCI, to work along the French forces.

The fragility of the peace soon tested the LMA with eruptions of violence, and more importantly political deadlock, which led to the Accra III agreement signed on July 30, 2004 that stipulated legislative reform and disarmament of the New Forces by September and October 2004 respectively, even if both were later not complied with. The frustrated Gbagbo government retaliated by bombing targeted rebel positions on November 6, 2004, and in the process hit a French base in Bouake. The UN Security Council issued an arms embargo on Cote d'Ivoire on 15 November, 2004 and a call for the resumption of reconciliation. A subsequent Pretoria Agreement sponsored by the AU and signed on April 6, 2005, and a subsequent agreement in June 2005, incorporated elections into the LMA, and brought things back on track.

In what would follow as the politics of postponements, and musical chairs to the prime ministerial portfolio, the presidential elections scheduled for October 30, 2005 was postponed mainly because the New Forces were still armed and unpredictable. Under UNSC resolution 1633, the 12-month postponement was also to allow for the appointment of the new Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny, with the assignment to reunify the country. The Banny cabinet was in place by December 2005, but in a twist of events in January 2006, government-sponsored militias opposed the UNOCI, in dissatisfaction with the role of the National Assembly that was debating and negotiating the LMA. It appeared that the government was still hung up with the despicable discrimination against so-called foreigners. Hence May 2006 saw the introduction of a pilot identification program for citizens and foreign residents lacking birth and nationality certificates. As disarmament was not effected either on the government side or that of the New Forces, the elections could not take place in October 2006, and led to UNSC resolution 1721 that effected another 12-month extension.

Gbagbo subsequently undermined Banny's portfolio, and in December 2006 invited the New Forces for direct talks, and further expressed his lack of confidence in the Zone of Confidence, by ceasing to recognize it. ECOWAS reacted swiftly and Burkinabe President Compaore brokered the March 4, 2007 Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA) between Gbagbo

and another new Prime Minister Guillaume Soro (the leader of the New Forces), with a mandate: to establish a transitional government that would supervise the formation of a joint national defense force consisting of both government forces and the New Forces; to formally enact the dissolution of the Zone of Confidence that was dissolved in Gbagbo's December 2006 speech; and subsequently conduct elections in ten months. In September 2007, mobile courts in the country picked up on the identification pilot program, and commenced issuance of birth certificates.

In January 2008, the Defense and Security Forces completed regroupment, as part of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants. Six mixed brigades of New Forces, national Gendarmerie soldiers, and impartial forces were established. In March 2008, the UNOCI withdrew from the Zone of Confidence and positioned themselves on both sides of the north and south borderlines, but allowed the mixed brigades and impartial forces to assume patrols within the zone.

### *The Constitutional Arrangements and Elections*

The 2000 Constitution provided for an administration with an elected President as head of the executive for a five-year term. The 225-member National Assembly also has a five-year cycle. To avoid future civil and military unrests, it became extremely important that the country got the next elections right whenever that took place. In particular, the exploration to rectify citizenship identification and voter registration, was to be done to the satisfaction of all ethnonational identity groups concerned. Hence quashing government tactics to subvert the operation was a step in the right direction, even if this was insufficient and rattled the government into making erratic moves such as disbanding the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI), or the constant undermining of the prime ministerial office.

The popular resolve looked forward to a state in which Allasane Ouattara, or any ethnic Ouattara for that matter, or whoever else was alleged not to have both parents born in Cote d'Ivoire, could freely compete for political office. This discriminatory requirement seemed rather far-fetched for a country to which resident generations of Burkinabe and Malian settlers had contributed significantly over many decades, not least the fact that the Ouattara Kingdom was in part geographically situated in Cote d'Ivoire for centuries. Seeing to a sound election was also crucial for a country that did not have a brilliant electoral history. President Gbagbo's FPI used to be the main opposition to Houphouët-Boigny's PDCI. There had been no proper presidential elections dating from 2000, when even the parliamentary elections were fraught with demonstrations against Allasane Ouattara's disqualification, a boycott



by the RDR, a national participation rate of just 33 percent, and outright disruption of elections in 26 districts in the northern half of the country. Although Ouattara's RDR did poorly in the 2001 legislative by-elections, the party had now assumed a definitive northern identity ever since the rebel forces took control of the north during the civil war. The RDR also had a majority Muslim support.

Perhaps Gbagbo had not appreciated the full extent to which the political situation had become precarious and volatile; he seemed to be playing with the fire. The following chronology sets out a repeated jettisoning of the electoral process, though not necessarily Gbagbo's fault.

- September 2005: the proposed election scheduled for October 30, 2005 was postponed; deadlines for the legislative reform (late September 2005) and rebel disarmament (October 15, 2005) had not been met.
- October 2005: UNSC resolution 1633 extended the election date for 12 months—to take place on October 31, 2006; new Prime Minister Banny was appointed; but the October 2006 election did not take place, for similar reasons above.
- November 2006: UNSC resolution 1721 extended Banny's premiership for another 12 months; disarmament had still not taken place.
- March 4, 2007: OPA called for elections to take place in ten months; new Prime Minister Soro was appointed. But the elections did not take place, for reasons already mentioned,
- April 2008: the government announced elections would be held on November 30, 2008, but this was postponed in early November 2008 to November 29, 2009.
- November 11, 2009: the CEI postponed the proposed November 29, 2009 elections—to allow for the completion of the registration process.
- A new election date of February or March 2010 was set at a meeting in Ouagadougou under the mediation of President Blaise Compaore; the voters registration list was to be finalized and published by end of January 2010. But this timetable became frozen after both the CEI and the cabinet were dissolved in February, and reconstituted in March 2010.
- The next election date of October 31, 2010 was when the elections finally took place.

Following the postponement of the November 2009 date, the four main political actors (Gbagbo, Soro, Bédié, and Ouattara) met with the OPA mediator President Blaise Compaore during December 1–2, 2009 in what appeared to be the sixth meeting of the Permanent Consultation Framework,

and at which meeting an agreement was reached for the election to take place at a date in late February or early March 2010, following a proposed publication of a finalized voters' list at the end of January 2010. It appeared that *ivoirité* kept rearing its ugly head in the political process, and generated a serious dispute over some one million registered voters from the northern part of the country whose identities could not be determined. Some 512,755 were later confirmed while Prime Minister Soro tried to get rid of some other 429,000 as a balancing act to diffuse tensions, but the Chair of the CEI was aghast by what he viewed as flimsy politicization of a serious electoral list, and refused to play ball. Instead, he invited UNOCI to investigate the dispute amidst a stark announcement that the UNOCI mandate would now be renewed for only four months. Hence on February 12, 2010, President Gbagbo pressed the panic button and used his constitutional veto to dissolve both the CEI and the existing government, sacking CEI Chair Robert Mambe in the process. A new CEI was formed on February 25, 2010 headed by a member of the opposition PDCI—Yousouf Bakayoko. A new cabinet that was reconstituted by Prime Minister Soro consisted of 11 Opposition members and 28 government members, who met together for the first time on March 4, 2010.

On April 11, 2010, President Gbagbo and Prime Minister Soro agreed for a proposed mechanism that can establish legitimacy of electoral lists, without setting an election date. While the clock was ticking, Gbagbo and Soro met with the PDCI's Konan Bédié on May 10, and Allassane Ouattara on May 17, 2010. The talks with these opposition leaders (mainly about the electoral process) continued in July, and appear to have included other issues such as the disarmament of the "ex-rebel" New Forces, and matters to do with how the state coffers could be used. Subsequently on June 15, 2010, 500 New Forces were disarmed in Korhogo, and it was also concluded that any further disarming of rebel troops would depend on state funding. Meanwhile, the UNOCI mandate that was earlier extended to June 30 was further extended to the end of 2010. In July 2010, there were further talks between Gbagbo, Soro, Bédié, and Ouattara about the electoral process. Eventually, October 31, 2010 was set as the date for the much postponed election.

A delegation of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) visited the country from September 28 to October 1 to meet with the government, civil society, and members of the international community in connection with the election. The PSC delegation followed on with a visit to Burkina Faso from October 2 to 4, 2010 to meet with President Blaise Campaore, OPA mediator and Chair of the Ivorian peace process. As at mid-October there were still teething problems: not all identity cards had been issued, and it seemed impossible to distribute them to every town and village, ahead of

the vote. The incumbent President Gbagbo, former President Konan Bédié, and formerly excluded presidential candidate Allassane Ouattara were the frontrunners in this election.

The October 31, 2010 election saw a formidable 81 percent turnout in an election that had some 4.5 million votes counted. The Constitutional Council (CC) and UNOCI validated and approved the results that were announced on November 21 as follows: Gbagbo 38.04 percent, Ouattara 32.07 percent, and Bédié 25.24 percent. As neither candidate won an absolute majority of 50 percent or more, the first ever run-off in the history of Ivorian politics was scheduled to take place on November 28. A live televised debate occurred between Gbagbo and Ouattara on November 25. The UNOCI imposed some conditions on both candidates: that they do not engage in any premature declaration of victory until the official results were announced; and that they accept the results of the run-off. A curfew was subsequently imposed in Abidjan.

An initial attempt by a Ouattara representative to announce the results on November 30 was disrupted by Gbagbo representatives, on the basis that they had not been validated. Gbagbo's campaign manager in the north, Ferdinand Kouassi, also made a televised announcement about the long list of severe irregularities that occurred against both the electoral process and the Gbagbo apparatus in the north.<sup>100</sup> On December 1, CEI boss Youssouf Bakayoko of the PDCI announced that Ouattara had won 2,483,164 votes that constituted 54.1 percent of the total votes cast. During the run-off, Konan Bédié of the PDCI had asked his (ethnic group) supporters to vote for Ouattara. The Gbagbo camp viewed the electoral result as a coup d'état. In the meantime, some 15 people were reportedly killed during clashes between rival camps; the curfew was also extended to December 5. On December 2, Gbagbo ordered the closure of Cote d'Ivoire's land, sea, and air borders to the international community, and suspended the broadcasting rights of foreign television stations, while the reportage from the local and government controlled media painted the picture that all was well. The Chair of the CC Professor Paul Yao N'dre, a close friend of Gbagbo, took over the process from the CEI and announced on December 3 that Gbagbo had won the election with 51.45 percent of votes. UNOCI rejected this result, reexamined the data underpinning the CEI result and the CC's result, and declared that the CC's decision "was not based on fact,"<sup>101</sup> in other words Ouattara was the winner. UNOCI's Envoy Young-Jin Choi issued a statement that, even if all the complaints from the Gbagbo apparatus were taken into account, including the numbers of tally sheets, the "outcome does not change."<sup>102</sup>

On December 4, the CC swore in Gbagbo as President, causing Prime Minister Soro to resign by tending his resignation to Ouattara (to make a

statement that Ouattara was President). On December 5, Ouattara also swore in himself as President by affidavit, and later appointed Soro as his Prime Minister, who also swiftly appointed a cabinet. Similar arrangements were then made by Gbagbo. Two rival governments were therefore in place: one in power (Gbagbo's); and the other in waiting (Ouattara's). The AU appointed Thabo Mbeki to try to negotiate, but his attempt failed, and he returned to South Africa. On December 7, ECOWAS convened an emergency summit in Abuja and declared support for Ouattara; the AU suspended Cote d'Ivoire.

We should note that each of Gbagbo's steps mirrors a well choreographed scheme that was systematically implemented according to constitutional guidelines:

- Article 32 of the constitution puts the CC in control of elections, and to which the CEI should report;
- soon after the CEI announcement, the CC took over the process, and came up with a different result, being mindful of Article 98 of the constitution, which states that "the decisions of the Constitutional Council are not susceptible to any recourse";<sup>103</sup>
- meanwhile, on the basis of Article 38 "in the case of events . . . notably of affect to the integrity of the territory,"<sup>104</sup> Gbagbo ordered Cote d'Ivoire's land, sea, and air borders to be shut to the international community;
- subsequently with Articles 38 and 39, the CC swore in Gbagbo as President within 48 hours of the CC's announcement;
- Gbagbo constantly routed that his new presidency was legal because he had followed the constitution to the letter.

We also know that:

- Article 108 stipulates the President of the Court of Cassation as President of the High Court of Justice, hence the CC that is subject to the Court of Cassation is automatically subject to the High Court of Justice;
- Article 109 directs that Gbagbo was answerable to the High Court of Justice for high treason;
- any evidence of high treason was suggested by UNOCI to the effect that the CC's announcement "was not based on fact."

However, what remained a mystery also became Gbagbo's alibi that he had been hoodwinked by international agents. A series of unanswered questions below reveal Gbagbo's frame of mind, regardless of whether he is right or wrong:

- The UNOCI were doing a fine job, so why did it become necessary for the Ambassadors of France and the United States to secure an exclusive meeting with the CEI boss Youssouf Bakayoko prior to his announcement of the results that placed Ouattara in the lead?
- What did the CEI boss think he was doing having such a meeting aside from the official election observers?
- Where were the ECOWAS, AU, and UNOCI observers when the CEI boss met with the two foreign ambassadors?
- The first person to make a public declaration after the CEI's announcement was French President Sarkozy even though he was on a state visit in India at the time; followed soon afterward by U.S. President Obama even though he was also in Afghanistan. What underpins this sequence?
- Why did it take another two to three days after Sarkozy's and Obama's declarations before the regional owners of the election (ECOWAS and AU) spoke? If the order was reversed, might ECOWAS and AU have supported the opposite—the result announced by the Constitutional Council of Cote d'Ivoire?

On December 6, UNOCI spokesperson Mohamed Touré made public<sup>105</sup> that UNOCI were “not mediators” of the crises but would “safeguard the results” of the election. Meanwhile, UNOCI provisionally evacuated some 500 nonessential staff, to another location, and on December 20, an extension of their mandate was effected by the UNSC, to the dismay of Gbagbo who wanted the UNOCI out of the country. On December 22, Gbagbo announced that he was happy for an international panel to reexamine the electoral results, but this gesture was rejected by the Ouattara camp as a tactic.

The Gbagbo apparatus determined to intimidate the Ouattara apparatus in all possible ways including the denial of rights to peaceful assembly, and the repression of public protests. Systematic atrocities against the Ouattara apparatus began from December 14 and included throwing tear gas at Ouattara demonstrators at the border of Tiébissou, and barricading the Golf Hotel location of the Ouattara government-in-waiting, and interfering with their food, medical, and water supplies. On December 23, the UNHCR reported 173 deaths, 90 cases of torture, 271 arrests and detentions, and 24 cases of abductions or enforced disappearances; and at least 14,000 displacements to neighboring Guinea and Liberia, all between December 16 and 25; the UNHCR prepared to handle 30,000 refugees. The issue of enforced disappearances had special resonance in this particular context because The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance came into force on December 23, even if Cote d'Ivoire had

signed but not yet ratified this convention. Meanwhile, the UN apparatus was prevented by the Gbagbo apparatus from investigating mass graves that had been identified by locals. A noticeable trend was that atrocities perpetrated in areas loyal to Ouattara were not attributable to Ouattara supporters, and vice versa. ICC Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo had already made clear<sup>106</sup> on December 20 that the ICC would investigate any crimes committed.

A series of international sanctions were slapped against Cote d'Ivoire: (a) the IMF froze its loans worth \$843 million annually; (b) the EU issued targeted sanctions against Gbagbo and his close allies; and (c) at an ECOWAS special meeting in Abuja on December 24, 2010, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) that is the francophone (except Guinea-Bissau) coalition of CFA franc users within ECOWAS, announced a freezing of Ivorian government funding. Government employees, including the army had been paid in December 2010, however, the freeze did not take effect immediately since \$150 million was further released to the Gbagbo government until January 23, 2011 when Philippe-Henri Dakoury-Tabley the head of the Central Bank of West African States was forced to resign over further political interference in his job.

On December 28, ECOWAS delegation made up of heads of states from Benin, Sierre Leone, and Cape Verde approached Gbagbo, and followed up a week later on January 3, 2011 with Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga as the new (though unpromising) AU mediator, whose mediation efforts consequently failed, and had to return to Kenya on January 19. Odinga's mediation transpired: (a) that it was no longer agreeable for a reexamination of ballot papers that had since been in the custody of the Gbagbo apparatus, and; (b) that Gbagbo was ready for talks without preconditions, but as Gbagbo obviously could not talk to himself, there was a tacit precondition for Ouattara to agree to talks, who was also adamant not to deal with Gbagbo until Gbagbo stepped down, hence the deadlock remained, as also became the result of the January 9–10, 2011 mediation attempt by ECOWAS envoy Olusegun Obasanjo. Meanwhile the death toll had reached 247 by January 14, and some UNOCI vehicles had been vandalized and burnt. On January 27, the Gbagbo apparatus seized the National Electric Company. On January 30, the AU set up a High Level Panel to deal with the political crisis in Cote d'Ivoire.

### ***International Political Economy***

Cote d'Ivoire's IIAG rankings deteriorated steadily over the same period of the ten year political crisis: 38th in 2000/01; 43rd in 2001/02; 41st in

2002/03; 45th in 2003/04; 44th in 2004/05 and 2005/06; 45th in 2006/07; 44th in 2007/08 and 2008/09.<sup>107</sup> Data from the 2010 IIAG show that Cote d'Ivoire was among the second tier of bottom countries that were saddled with "domestic armed conflict" (together with Nigeria, Niger, Mauritania, Ethiopia, Comoros and Chad).<sup>108</sup> Clearly, the crisis took its toll on peace, as the following GPI rankings indicate: 113th out of 140 in 2007; 122nd out of 140 in 2008; 117th out of 144 in 2009; 118 out of 149 in 2010; and 128th out of 153 in 2011, even if the 2010 GPI discussion paper also listed Cote d'Ivoire as among countries that "demonstrated the largest move towards peacefulness."<sup>109</sup> But this compliment was eroded by the troubles associated with the postelectoral impasse from December 2010. The 2009 HDR already made clear that at least 621,000 people had been displaced as a result of the conflict by the end of 2008.<sup>110</sup>

Cocoa is the mainstay of the Ivorian economy that produces 40 percent of the world's cocoa.<sup>111</sup> However, the high level of corruption "makes life difficult for the grower and those exporting into foreign markets"<sup>112</sup> despite the recent increases in the crop's world market prices. Data from the 2010 IIAG show that Cote d'Ivoire is among the chief culprits that poorly demonstrated the "accountability, transparency and corruption in rural areas" indicator; and cocoa is obviously grown and harvested in the rural areas. The 2010 CPI rated Cote d'Ivoire 146th out of 178, which is not much improvement from the 2009 rating of 154th out of 180. It is therefore not surprising that Cote d'Ivoire's 2009 HDI ranking was 163rd out of 182, and the 2010 HDI was 149th out of 169, if the little wealth accruing to the state was not judiciously accounted for, and was key to the constant ethnic strife. The world market price of cocoa reached a 33-year high of £2,368 per ton in May 2010,<sup>113</sup> but as the industry in Cote d'Ivoire suffers from limited use of fertilizers, and ageing trees mostly over 30 years old are more susceptible to disease,<sup>114</sup> the country ought to take a strategic view about broadening the base of the economy.

### ***New Security Challenges***

Cote d'Ivoire's main security challenge is the reality of the north-south divide—the root cause of decade-long marathon political problems that became institutionalized with *ivoirité*, and subsequently what becomes of the political stalemate between the Ouattara and Gbagbo camps that typify this divide. While Ouattara was trapped in Abidjan's Golf Hotel under the blockade of the Gbagbo apparatus, his northern-led apparatus initially preferred not to enact war against the southern Gbagbo government while their "king" (Ouattara) was holed up under Gbagbo's watch. Gbagbo had also (mis)calculated that Ouattara's exit from the hotel meant war from the

northerners, and was determined not to let out Ouattara without talks leading to a settlement or political agreement, which could be: either a split arrangement of President and Vice President between the two rivals; or as Ouattara could not be kept in the hotel forever, a temporary north-south divide whereby each rival presided over their portion over an agreed period of time until the next proper elections; or some combination of the two potential arrangements. Ouattara's location in Abidjan therefore became a bargaining chip, and the Ivorian political stalemate became too complex to fix, with increasing complexity as time passed.

Gbagbo's long-standing distrust of the Zone of Confidence was confirmed, in that, in March 2011, the rebel Forces Nouvelle trooped southward with ease, in what effectively commenced the Second Ivorian Civil War. The resulting inter-communal reprisals led to several massacres, in one case 816 dead over a single night in a small town called Douekoe, as reported by the International Red Cross. The capital Abidjan that was Gbagbo's stronghold became swamped with the rebel forces loyal to Ouattara, and French troops. A Chapter VII UNSC Resolution 1975 adopted on March 30, 2011, authorized the UNOCI to use all necessary means to complete their mandate of seeing to the political change which began with UNOCI's oversight of the elections in the first place. The resolution also mandated French forces to support UNOCI, but as the French took orders from Paris, the UNOCI could not define or control the nature of this support, or other actions by the French forces. The urban guerrilla warfare that ensued, with the direct assistance of French ground troops and French aerial bombardment of the presidential Palace and Gbagbo's hideout, resulted in Gbagbo's arrest by the unlikely Invisible Commandos among the rebel forces under the lead of the warlord Ibrahim Coulibaly, on April 11, 2011.

Even before the 2010 postelectoral stalemate, the 2009 HDR had already stated that "in Côte d'Ivoire, people living in northern areas controlled by rebel groups were routinely harassed and forced to pay US\$40–60 when attempting to travel south to government-controlled areas."<sup>115</sup> The 2010 GPI report aptly stated that "Cote d'Ivoire . . . demonstrated the largest move towards peacefulness. Although this is an excellent result, [Cote d'Ivoire is] in the bottom half of the Global Peace Index and as such conditions could still deteriorate under challenging circumstances."<sup>116</sup> Other security challenges include human capital flight. The 2009 HDR stated that "a doctor from Côte d'Ivoire can raise her real earnings by a factor of six by working in France."<sup>117</sup>

But the new security situation that was generated by the postelectoral impasse from December 2010, and which escalated into the Second Ivorian Civil War, is on a horrendous scale grossly unmatched by what prevailed prior. Among other things, the issue of who among the rebel forces should



be drafted into the new regular army or Republican Forces of Ivory Coast (RPCI) became messy, and even Ibrahim Coulibaly was assassinated by the RPCI on April 27, 2011. The discovery of mass graves became routine. On May 5, 2011, the same Constitutional Court that ruled the election in favour of Gbagbo, declared Ouattara as President over the messy political, refugee, and security situation. In July 2011, the UNSC voted for the UNOCI to stay in Ivory Coast for another year.

#### *Artificial Environmental Disaster(s)*

On July 23, 2010, the Dutch Company Trafigura Beheer BV was fined by a Dutch court for orchestrating the dumping of toxic wastes in Cote d'Ivoire during August 2006 that placed thousands of Ivorian citizens at the receiving end of chemical warfare. Trafigura were the owners of the ship *Probo Koala*, which among other things carried waste substances amounting to over 500 tonnes of a toxic mixture of caustic soda, fuel and hydrogen sulphide. Trafigura made a series of attempts to have the waste treated, and encountered an equal number of rejections. For example, Amsterdam Port Services BV refused to deal with the waste because their staff complained it was foul-smelling and sickening. Alternatively, the fee of 500,000 euros quoted by Afvalstoffen Terminal Moerdijk was considered too high by Trafigura who then decided that Africa must be the dumping ground where the exercise might be cheaper and undetected.

Eventually, a hastily registered Compagnie Tommy in Abidjan took on the contract for a pittance of 18,500 euros, and instead of treating the toxic material, decided to cut corners by dumping the chemical waste into landfill sites around Abidjan, for the pittance it was receiving. Local citizens around the dumping sites in Abidjan bore the brunt of the chemical attack that resulted in UN estimates of up to 30,000 cases of injuries and 17 fatalities. The hospitals in Abidjan could not cope with the sheer number of cases. Trafigura offered to pay the Cote d'Ivoire government some \$200 million in 2007, of which \$33 million was used as compensation to victims. There have been other lawsuits on this saga—a £100 million suit filed in a London High Court London by the British firm Leigh Day and Co, amidst other legal proceedings in the Netherlands. As a result of proceedings initiated by Green Peace, a Dutch court fined Trafigura \$100 million over the toxic waste scandal in July 2010.

#### *HIV/AIDS*

The adult prevalence rate that was 4.7 percent in 2005 rose sharply to 7.1 percent in 2006 within a population of 18 million, among which 65,000 died amidst a life expectancy of 41 years for men and 47 for women in a

country that received a HDI rating of 153rd for that year. In 2008, WHO organized a country mission to Cote d'Ivoire. The decreased prevalence rate in 2008 (3.7 percent) was "more than twice as high as in Liberia (1.7%) or Guinea (1.6%), even though these West African countries share national borders."<sup>118</sup> The 2009 AIDS Epidemic Update cited Cote d'Ivoire as the "home to the most serious epidemic in West Africa."<sup>119</sup> Life expectancy improved to average 56 years in 2010.<sup>120</sup>

## CHAPTER 6

---


# South Africa, Angola, Zimbabwe, and Kenya

### Introduction

This chapter discusses four states: Republic of South Africa, Republic of Angola, Republic of Zimbabwe, and Republic of Kenya. This is the second of four consecutive chapters, each of which discusses a cluster of countries with similar issues or long-running problems, in case study format. Each case study has four sections: an initial concise summary that is a snap shot of the pertinent issues; a section that examines the background leading to the state of relevant domestic and international affairs; a section that discusses international political economy using key governance, economic, peace, and human development indicators, and; a section on new security challenges including areas of conventional security, health, food, energy, climate change or natural and artificial disasters. An attempt is made to point out factors of nationalism and supranationalism vis-à-vis the state of affairs, plus how each country fits into globalization and international politics, as an assessment of their international profile and potential.

### South Africa—The Regional Power

South Africa is the political and economic leader of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and hence took the lead in handling Zimbabwe and the sparring between Robert Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai. South Africa has impressive governance and economic indicators, but the ongoing postapartheid issues of class struggles have reflected in low human development and peace indicators that also result in union strikes. South Africa hosted the 2010 Football World Cup, which raked in a lot of investments, and boosted the economy amidst the global financial downturn. The HIV/AIDS pandemic takes a significant toll on the Exchequer.



### Map of South Africa

### *Historical and Political Context*

The Khoikhoi and San peoples inhabited the current geographical territory of South Africa prior to their conquest by the Bantus from the fourth to the fifth centuries. When European contact was subsequently made, the Xhosa and Zulu, who are both Bantu, were the dominant groups on the land. The discovery of the Cape Sea Route around 1500 became strategic for the country's location at the bend on the route between European trade and India, and consequently led to the founding of Cape Town by the Dutch East India Company, at this strategic port in 1652, and its conversion into a British Colony in 1806.

The Boer and British settlements of the 1820s created competition and degenerated into conflicts such as the Anglo-Boer War, particularly when the prospects of diamond and gold on the land surfaced into prominence. The British who won this war took dominion in 1910 and became governors of the land. The struggle between the existing groups (mainly the Black Xhosa, Zulu, Boers, and British) led to an apartheid system of white, colored, and black that continued even after South Africa became a Republic in 1961. Nelson Mandela became a leader and icon of this struggle, and was imprisoned in 1962 for 27 years. The ban on Mandela's African National Congress (ANC) was lifted in 1990, and negotiations for the existing 1974 Malhabatini Declaration of Faith was also concluded between Mandela and F W De Klerk in 1993, paving the way for the first multiracial and multiparty elections in 1994, which the ANC won with a resounding victory. The estimated demographic makeup of the country as of July 2010<sup>1</sup> was: 79.4 percent African; 9.2 percent White; 8.8 percent Colored; and 2.6 percent Indian/Asian.

The postapartheid subregional leadership of South Africa is acceptable to both neighbors and the broader international community. Presidents of South Africa Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma have led SADC negotiations on handling Zimbabwe, amidst international calls for subregional sanctions against Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, to complement the ensuing sanctions from Western allies. But something about the brotherhood of Pan-Africanism, and perhaps the antiapartheid struggle, does not allow any leader of South Africa to give up on neighboring Zimbabwe, or Robert Mugabe who personifies the African nationalist struggle. Hence, South Africa's leadership of SADC has supported what is amicable to Mugabe without breaking his political backbone, to the disappointment of Western allies. Among other things, Jacob Zuma would rather be interested in getting the West to remove the ensuing sanctions on senior political leaders of Mugabe's Popular Front of the Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU-PF). However, South Africa is now keen on deportations of illegal Zimbabwean immigrants.

*Post Apartheid Issues*

In the era of Black majority rule, South Africa has crossed the first phase of correcting the ills of apartheid. But the majority of wealth, business, industry, the education system, and land, are still in the hands of a white minority. Black peasants are increasingly frustrated that 17 years since Mandela, restitution is slow in coming for the basics of life such as employment opportunities, living conditions, and land distribution. The police responded with water canons and rubber-coated bullets during August 18–19, 2010 when 1 million citizens in Johannesburg took to the streets, in strikes for wage increases. The initial demonstrations were concentrated in Soweto that is renowned for the antiapartheid struggle, mainly with teachers, and spread over time and space to include other public sector workers such as health care workers, miners and others, to the disruption of schooling and health services.

The police that were supposed to keep law and order wanted to join the strikers, but had to back down when government gained a court interdiction that the police were not allowed to stage strikes. However, the Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union (POPCRU) expressed determination to challenge the court order and join comrades. The POPCRU belong to The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) that also forms the bedrock of the ruling ANC. COSATU made clear on August 26, 2010 that its full 2-million-strong membership would join the strikes if their demands (an 8.8 percent pay rise) were not met. The government initially offered 7 percent because it claimed the extra \$700 million to meet the full demand was both unavailable and unaffordable, as there were other equally urgent government priorities besides funding salaries.

There was a perception that the very government that had provided billions of cash for the just-ended 2010 Football World Cup, could provide 8.8 percent but was unwilling. In the run-up to the World Cup competition that occurred from June 11 to July 11, other professions, chiefly construction workers, took advantage of the impending international games, and staged demonstrations over what was considered to be rip-offs and low wages from large companies profiting from the construction boom of the games. However, these industrial actions wound down at the same time as the strikers did not wish to jeopardize the peace and image of the country amidst the games and festivities. Hence the August 2010 strikes by public sector workers became a resumption of the pre-World Cup agitations over poor living conditions and low wages generally. The strikes from the wider COSATU and the government increased the package to 7.5 percent, at which stage the strikes were temporarily called off on September 6, 2010. Meanwhile on November 30, 2010, the Clothing and Textile Union also demonstrated

against manufacturers for paying them well below the minimum wage of 46 dollars per day. Two local clothing manufacturers had been shut down, and manufacturers ordered to pay up the difference or face action. Textile laborers complained that some manufacturers paid them “slave wages” as low as 16 dollars per day, and called for the authorities to enforce the minimum wage.

There are simmering issues in other spheres of life. Agriculture is still very segregated in the country; only 10 percent of the farmland is in the hands of Blacks, and the postapartheid land redistribution process is taking too long to take off. As at June 2010, just 5 percent of white-owned land identified for redistribution had been handed over to Black farmers<sup>2</sup> and “new schools of thought are holding that the South African land restitution issue will end up in the same soup as Zimbabwe’s, but travelling different routes to get there.”<sup>3</sup> The Expropriation Bill to handle the redistribution was in progress, and should get to parliament at some stage.

In addition to the gripes about land ownership, the broader battle for an unfettered media also rumbled in the political underbelly. A group of media strikers led by the opposition Democratic Alliance staged a protest march on September 23, 2010 against what they saw as ANC attempts to muzzle the media, through an impending government legislation to regulate the sector. The party and civil society groups viewed the government move as a route toward censorship, against a backdrop of corruption among politicians.

### ***International Political Economy***

South Africa is a big player on the global scene. The country is heavily industrialized, since industry contributes around 31 percent of GDP, and 26 percent of employment.<sup>4</sup> Industrialization is mainly grounded in the mining, automobile and energy sectors, where the country is the world’s top producer of gold, chromium, and platinum, and where platinum finds top use as a catalytic converter in automobiles, while playing other catalytic functions in the petroleum industry.

Chief exports are gold, diamond, platinum, machinery, and equipment. Imports are mainly capital and scientific equipment, petroleum and allied chemical products. South Africa’s biggest trading partner is China, with trade between the two countries amounting to at least 17 percent of South Africa’s import bill in 2009, and exports to China amounting to 10.34 percent in the same year.<sup>5</sup> China-South Africa trade increased tenfold since 2001, and stood at over \$16 billion at August 2010 when President Zuma visited China with an entourage of 300 people.<sup>6</sup> This visit saw the signing of several agreements in areas of trade, mineral exploration and agriculture on August 24, 2010, and

strengthened South Africa's bid to join the Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC) trade cartel within the World Trade Organization (WTO).

From the inception of the Ibrahim Index on African Governance (IIAG) in 2000, South Africa has consistently been ranked second to Botswana among countries on the African mainland, or fifth overall including the "island" countries of Mauritius, Cape Verde, and Seychelles.<sup>7</sup> Working hard at good governance is an ethos that has accrued from the hard lessons of apartheid and the legacy of Mandela's presidency. But the country is yet to enter the phase of settling all the inequalities of apartheid, or completely eliminating the few but notable instances of corruption among a handful of top politicians. South Africa ranked 55th out of 180 on the 2009 Corruptions Perception Index (CPI) compiled by Transparency International, and 54th out of 178 in 2010's CPI.

On July 2, 2010, Jacob Jackie Selebi, the former head of the South African police and President of Interpol, on whose shoulders and tenure fell the challenge to stem the rising crime rate in the country, was convicted of corruption as a result of his association with the South African crime underworld. He allegedly received 1.2 million rand (the equivalent of \$156,000 or £103,000) from the convicted dealer Glenn Agliotti. Four months after the National Prosecuting Authority issued the warrant for his arrest on September 10, 2007, his role as police chief became untenable, leading to his suspension as National Police Commissioner by President Thabo Mbeki on January 12, 2008. He subsequently resigned his Interpol position while he had to fight his corruption charges. On August 3, 2010, Selebi was sentenced to 15 years in jail.

South Africa's rating of 118th out of 153 in 2011, or 121st out of 149 on the 2010 Global Peace Index (GPI) published by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)<sup>8</sup> does reflect the recent disturbing and increasing symptoms of the apartheid past: crime, unrest, discrimination, poverty, and strikes. South Africa's peace rating has not been improving in the last few years: 99th out of 121 in 2007; 116th out of 140 in 2008; and 123rd out of 144 in 2009. In 2010, the peace ratings depreciated by 2.6 percent (among the G20 countries) since the peace index began in 2007.<sup>9</sup> This deteriorating peace trend was simultaneous with the deteriorating GDP real growth rate that was 5.5 percent in 2007, but depreciated to 3.7 percent in 2008,<sup>10</sup> and plummeted to minus 1.8 percent in 2009 because of the global economic downturn.<sup>11</sup> The GDP real growth rate used to be 5 percent in the 2004–2006 period.

The stark inequalities and related stress factors are notable: despite being a high earning country with a huge GDP of \$354.4 billion in 2010, a purchasing power parity of \$527.5 billion in the same year,<sup>12</sup> and a big player among



business and industrial peers across the globe, the 2009 Human Development Report (HDR) rated South Africa as 129th out of 182 on the Human Development Index (HDI). The 2010 HDI rating was 110th out of 169, even though the incidence of multidimensional poverty was just 3 percent.<sup>13</sup> The IEP's discussion paper published alongside the 2010 CPI stated that

a huge proportion of South Africa's potential gains come from internal peace, 79% to be precise. South Africa is in the bottom quartile of the 2010 GPI, at rank 121 and if internal peace improved then some of the additional economic output from these key industries could be used to provide much needed health, education and other vital infrastructure.<sup>14</sup>

### *The Football World Cup*

South Africa is not new to hosting world games, having hosted the Rugby World cup in 1995, and the Cricket World Cup in 2003. The Football World Cup, which generally overshadows all other games globally, was a big economic booster. Grant Thornton International's<sup>15</sup> 2008 report estimated that hosting the football games could have injected up to \$7.6 billion into the South African economy, and created at least 400,000 jobs,<sup>16</sup> even if unemployment in 2010 at the time of hosting the World Cup was 25 percent<sup>17</sup> or 1 million jobs fewer at the time than in January 2009.<sup>18</sup> Further reports at the close of the competition<sup>19</sup> stated that £680 million was spent upgrading airports, and £460 million on improving road and rail infrastructure, which created some 159,000 jobs for the poor. World Cup investments from national and provincial governments totalled \$5.2 billion. The total expenditure from all sources, including government spending on infrastructure, and cash from international visitors, tourists, and fans amounted to some \$12.4 billion. This eventually boosted GDP by 0.5–3.5 percent in 2010, according to Grant Thornton's 2010 report.<sup>20</sup> Hence, the economy that contracted into negative 1.8 percent in 2009 was forecasted by the Finance Minister to experience real GDP growth of 2.4 percent in 2010, 3.2 percent in 2011, and 3.6 percent in 2012.<sup>21</sup>

### *New Security Challenges*

South Africa faces problems in areas that contend with the country's human capabilities, and which challenge the security of the country in the economic and social sphere. The most severe is the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Two-thirds of the 33 million people affected by the pandemic globally are in Africa and "nearly one in six people living with HIV in the world today lives in

South Africa.”<sup>22</sup> Out of the 49.99 million South African population (July 2010 estimate), 17 percent of adults aged 15–49 were HIV positive, and life expectancy from birth was estimated at 53.3 years for males and 55.2 years for females.<sup>23</sup> Some 350,000 people died from HIV in 2007—the highest figure for any country in the world. The impact of the pandemic has been relentless, and prevalence among young people (age 15–24) has more or less stayed at the same level “from just over 10% in 2005 to about 9% in 2008.”<sup>24</sup> The adult (15–49) prevalence rate was 18.8 percent in 2006<sup>25</sup> and 16.9 percent in 2008.<sup>26</sup> The total number of people living with HIV was estimated at approximately 5.24 million in 2010. New HIV infections for 2010 were also estimated at 410,000, of which an estimated 40,000 would be among children.<sup>27</sup> Although the 2010 birth rate (19.61/1000) is greater than the death rate (16.99/1000), the former is 98th in the world (out of 223 countries) and the latter is 4th in the world (out of 222 countries). This represents a colossal loss in population terms, in relation to the rest of the world, particularly for a country that has 28.9 percent of the population under 14 years of age, and another 5.4 percent over 65.<sup>28</sup> Also, “Nearly one-third (31 percent) of the population was aged younger than 15 years, and approximately 7.6 percent (3.8 million) was 60 years or older.”<sup>29</sup>

Although the 2009 adult prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS (18.1 percent) is less than that of neighboring Botswana (23.9 percent), South Africa’s total 5.7 million HIV population is greater than the total population of Botswana that is just 1.9 million. Hence “South Africa’s high HIV prevalence, combined with its population size, makes it the country with the most people living with HIV.”<sup>30</sup> This was already the situation in the 2008 UNAIDS reports. New infections among children aged 0–14 also reached 60,000 in 2008, second to Nigeria that had 70,000 in that same year.<sup>31</sup> The debacle to tackling the impact on female vulnerabilities continues, as the 2010 report highlighted that “HIV prevalence among females between the ages of 15 and 19 in South Africa and Kenya, is three times higher than among males in the same age group”<sup>32</sup> and furthermore that “one in three women in the 25–29 age range is estimated to be infected with HIV.”<sup>33</sup>

It appears that South Africa has overcome the political process of denial that lingered, and impeded local and international efforts at dealing with the pandemic in the subregion. The Treatment Action Campaign has been successful, with a positive impact on the sociological processes downstream. According to the UNAIDS 2010 Outlook Report, “after South Africa showed the lead, many other countries followed. With the disappearance of social stigma, it is common place to know one’s HIV status.”<sup>34</sup> The incentives are enormous in South Africa “where every person who comes forward and takes an HIV test will be offered 100 condoms,”<sup>35</sup> and the country is aiming to

spend \$200 million on a test campaign to reach 15 million people by 2011–12, up from 2.5 million in 2009.<sup>36</sup> The program is comprehensive, even including social networking, such that communication strategies “have reinforced HIV prevention norms, with the result that over 95% of premarital first sexual encounters are condom protected.”<sup>37</sup> South Africa is known to have “the largest antiretroviral therapy programme in the world”<sup>38</sup>—not surprising for a country where “an estimated 1.5 million adults and 106,000 children needed antiretroviral drugs in 2009.”<sup>39</sup>

But government is struggling with the financial commitment to tackling the pandemic, because “the total resource needs for 2010 are about US\$ 3.2 billion, about 1.2% of its economy and 3.7% of its government revenue. In sheer size, the US\$ 1 billion investment by the country is the largest ever, but is still only one third of the total need, and less than the rate of spending in other countries with similar or lower prevalence levels”<sup>40</sup> The health economics are equally revealing and decisive. Experts have noted that:

By 2012, an estimated 2.75 million South Africans will need antiretroviral drugs. If 50% of those eligible for treatment were diagnosed and started treatment, around 600 000 deaths could be averted (cutting the AIDS related death rate by one third), and health spending would rise by a net US\$ 1.1 billion over five years. In the event of 100% diagnosis and treatment, about 1.5 million deaths would be avoided at an additional cost of US\$ 1.5 billion over five years—an additional cost of about US\$ 1000 per patient . . . With moderate economic growth over the next five years, and if public health spending increases from the current 3% to 5% of gross domestic product, an antiretroviral therapy programme with 80% coverage would absorb about the same share of the health budget as at present (12–14%)<sup>41</sup>

There is also the complication with tuberculosis. As per the 2010 Outlook Report, “more than a quarter of all people with tuberculosis globally live[d] in South Africa. High rates of drug resistance and HIV co-infection are aggravating the tuberculosis epidemic: nearly three in four (73%) new tuberculosis infections are among people who are also infected with HIV.”<sup>42</sup>

### **Angola—The Co-regional Power**

Angola is a member of the SADC and the closest competing power to South Africa in terms of wealth, military might, and influence in the subregion. The country has huge oil reserves, along with the secessionist bid by Cabinda province that has most of the oil. The ten year civil war and its aftermath have reflected in very poor governance and corruption indicators, even if the

oil revenues are helping to rebuild the country. The heavy Chinese influence has reflected in Angola's poor relations with the West that dates back from the international politics of the civil war. Angola has less issues with HIV/AIDS.

### *Historical and Political Context*

Angola was a Portuguese colony that gained independence on November 11, 1975, but was immediately plunged into civil war until 2002. Angola's western border is by the sea; northern border is with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); eastern border with Zambia; and southern border with Namibia. As a former Portuguese colony, contact with Portugal dates back to the fifteenth century when Angola became a link to the trade between Europeans and South East Asia. The Angolan capital Luanda, was originally known as Sao Paulo de Loanda by the Portuguese explorer Paulo Dias de Novais, who in 1575 settled there with 100 families and 400 soldiers.

Like all Portuguese overseas territories in Africa, Angola fought an anti-colonial war of independence from 1961, during which process three main local political movements or parties emerged: the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) founded in 1956; the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA); and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The MPLA existed in 1956 and prepared the anticolonial war; the FNLA emerged with the commencement of the anticolonial war; and UNITA came along in 1966.

### *Civil War*

In 1975, the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA were jointly ushered into independent Angola as a transitional government, thereby setting the stage for clashes against each other, which plunged the whole country into civil war and divided the country into three zones controlled by each group. The question about the source of arms and funds to sustain each group was answered by a twist of events that saw the global Cold War postures extended to Angola, so that the Soviet Union and Cuba supported the MPLA, and the U.S. and Portugal (flanked by South Africa and Brazil) supported the FNLA and UNITA (even if FNLA and UNITA were rivals originally). This civil war lasted until the Constitutional Law of 1992 became a temporary truce to enable the first democratic and multiparty elections during that year. However, this process became inconclusive because the main Opposition UNITA refused to accept the results of the elections. The civil war resumed, and took a decade to wind down in 2002, by which time even the fertile countryside was intractable because of land mines, and farmers had vacated the farmlands for the cities. A ceasefire was reached following the execution



of UNITA's leader Jonas Savimbi during combat with government troops on February 22, 2002. UNITA laid down arms, assumed civilian robes, and became a political party.

### *Cabinda and Secession*

Angola includes the exclave of Cabinda, a province that has a border with both Republic of the Congo and the DRC. We should note that the reason for this exclavity that is now politically enclaved with Angola, is that 65 percent of Angola's oil comes from this province that also hosts an active rebel and guerrilla movement known as the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC). Over the years, FLEC has split and regrouped into various factions. Just how little ground control Angola has over this exclavist arrangement demonstrated itself in January 2010 when one of the numerous FLEC factions—FLEC-Military Position (FLEC-PM)—attacked the Togolese football team en route by coach to a stadium in Cabinda while Angola hosted the 2010 African Cup of Nations. Two stadium venues for the tournament were located in Cabinda because of the obvious (oil) contribution to the tournament's funding. The August 2006 peace treaty that was signed between FLEC-Renovada and the Angolan Government could not prevent an assault on the Togolese players by FLEC-PM. Two men face trial over the assault, even if these suspects have denied any link with any FLEC. We ought to bear in mind that some other faction known as FLEC Forças Armadas de Cabinda (FLEC-FAC) has petitioned the African Union's (AU) Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, even if this petition is also pending for a decision.

It is easy to see why the exclave did not escape the clutches of Luanda at independence in November 1975; the scent of oil had long been picked up. As early as 1954, oil exploration was conducted by the Cabinda Gulf Oil Company, and the firm discovery that was confirmed in 1967 signaled a huge oil field. Therefore, even though the Treaty of Simulambuco in 1885<sup>43</sup> established Cabinda as a Portuguese protectorate independent of Angola, the 1974 leftist military coup in Lisbon (Portugal) that led to the blanket independence of all Portuguese overseas territories (at least those in Africa) changed all else. One would have thought that Cabinda should have been granted independence on its own, but the post-1974 negotiations leading to the January 15, 1975 Treaty of Alvor that granted independence to Angola, hoodwinked the independent Cabinda Province and integrated the exclave into Angola, by sidelining the Cabinda FLEC movements from the negotiating process, to the point where FLEC refused to sign the Treaty, but had already been stitched up nevertheless. Although Angola can currently be described as being in peace time, the Cabinda province is an exception to this peace.

### *International Political Economy*

As a previously war-torn country that is still reeling from the devastation of ten years of civil war, Angola's IIAG ratings have consistently been among the lowest ten states in Africa, until it crept out of that position in 2009. Angola was ranked 52nd in 2000/01 and 2001/02; 50th in 2002/03 and 2004/05; 49th in 2003/04, 2005/06, and 2006/07; 43rd in 2007/08; and 42nd in 2008/09.<sup>44</sup> Peace has been a rare commodity in Angola, but the situation has been improving steadily. The country's GPI rankings have been: 112th out of 121 in 2007; 110th out of 140 in 2008; 100th out of 144 in 2009; 86th out of 149 in 2010; and 87th out of 153 in 2011 (IEP). The 2010 GPI report stated that the improvements in GPI rankings was due to "greater respect for human rights."<sup>45</sup> The cessation of the civil war became an automatic resumption of peacetime activity. The 2010 GPI report states that:

Eleven of the 21 Sub-Saharan African countries measured recorded an improvement in peacefulness over the four years [2007–2010] with the key changes being attributed to a decrease in ease of access to weapons of minor destruction and the number of conflicts fought as well as improved relations with neighbouring states. Angola, Côte d'Ivoire and Uganda demonstrated the largest move towards peacefulness.<sup>46</sup>

Angola's CPI rankings of 162nd out of 180 in 2009, and 168th out of 178 in 2010 (Transparency International), indicate that corruption is not a rare commodity. The 2010 IIAG also rated Angola among the bottom five (49th out of 53) African countries in terms of accountability and corruption. President José dos Santos has refused to hold a presidential ballot. We should note that three decades of armed conflicts have created a humanitarian situation, whereby living in anxiety comes naturally. Some 4 million internally displaced people have been resettled onto their homelands, 450,000 refugees have gone back to their neighboring countries, and 300,000 combatants have been immobilized, yet Angola was 29th out of 149 among "countries ranked according to their combined number of refugees and IDPs."<sup>47</sup> Something about the stress of living in a country that was peppered with civil strife and currently has presidential insecurity, demonstrates itself in the fact that although Angola is very rich, the country's mortality and life expectancy rates are among the worst ranked in the world—average 38.5 years according to the 2010 estimate.<sup>48</sup> Against this background, the country had a 2009 HDI rating of 143rd out of 182, and a 2010 rating of 146th out of 169. The 2010 IIAG also rated Angola among the bottom five (49th out of 53) African countries in terms of the human development category.

On September 5, 2008, Angola held parliamentary elections, the first of its kind since the 1992 multiparty elections. Even if the ruling MPLA gained 81 percent of votes, and UNITA only 10 percent, national reconstruction has been top of the agenda, and thanks to the oil, diamond, and other sources of wealth, the country has not been short of cash. Furthermore, in 2004, China's Exim Bank extended a credit of 2 billion dollars to the Angolan government. Among other factors, this famous Exim Bank loan explains why Angola is currently China's biggest supplier of oil. In 2004 and 2005, Angola became the largest source of Chinese crude oil imports from Africa—51–50 percent respectively<sup>49</sup> and has now “overtaken Saudi Arabia and Iran to become China's biggest supplier of oil.”<sup>50</sup> The Chinese loans have continued to flow ever since, and the country “signed three new credit lines with China at the end of 2009 worth ten billion dollars, according to the World Bank”<sup>51</sup>

Angola joined OPEC in 2006, during which year the country's oil wealth was estimated to generate US\$14 billion,<sup>52</sup> and is now competing with Nigeria for the top spot as Africa's biggest oil producer, with the production of 1.82 million barrels per day in 2009, and potential to produce 1.9 million barrels per day in 2010.<sup>53</sup> Angola's oil reserves of 13–19 billion barrels ranks third on the African continent, after Libya's 40–45 billion barrels and Nigeria's 35–40 billion barrels.<sup>54</sup> The real GDP growth rate for the Angolan economy was 18 percent in 2005 and 26 percent in 2006,<sup>55</sup> 21.1 percent in 2007,<sup>56</sup> and 16 percent in 2008<sup>57</sup> that was more or less maintained in 2009.<sup>58</sup> The World Bank has forecasted between 6.5 and 7.5 percent growth in 2010 and up to 8.5 percent in 2011.<sup>59</sup> It is estimated that “oil accounts for over half of GDP, eight percent of government revenues, and 90 percent of export revenues,”<sup>60</sup> and agriculture accounts for 9.6 percent of GDP.<sup>61</sup> Next to oil, diamonds are the second highest source of wealth in the country's extractive industry, and with estimates of some 200 million carats, Angola is “the world's fifth biggest producer.”<sup>62</sup>

### *Relations with the West*

The closest involvement Angola has had with the West is naturally with Portugal the colonial power. Further dealings with Western powers assumed an unfortunate precedent, in that, western allies backed the wrong horse during the country's civil wars. Although the MPLA was the majority group from independence in 1975, Portugal and the U.S. (plus South Africa) overtly supported the MPLA's opponents (UNITA and FNLA) throughout the civil strife of the postindependence period, until the Opposition finally lost out and capitulated into submission in 2002. Western allies became consequential



enemies. Thanks to its wealth from oil, diamonds and other sources, the hard line leftist government with lots of cash to splash, managed to escape the clutches of the IMF and World Bank until November 2009 when it requested and was granted \$1.4 billion from the IMF.<sup>63</sup> This loan represents a 27-month Stand-by-Agreement to buffer the effects of the global economic crisis, and more importantly because of “increased Angolan efforts to make oil revenues more transparent.”<sup>64</sup>

The MPLA authorities are firmly in control of oil production through the government owned Sonangol Group. Furthermore, the famous 2 billion dollar loan from the Chinese in 2004 for the national reconstruction effort, bolstered the government’s philosophical stance to avoid western influence and control. There is also a lot of labor in supply for the current infrastructural boom. As of 2008, there were an estimated 400,000 migrant workers from the DRC,<sup>65</sup> at least 30,000 Portuguese,<sup>66</sup> and up to 100,000 Chinese.<sup>67</sup> One key reason for the explosion in the numbers of Chinese migrant workers is that, China has a number of huge projects, including the Benguela railway<sup>68</sup> and the Chinese policy has been to specify the employment of 70 percent Chinese and 30 percent locals in their contracts.<sup>69</sup>

Angola’s ability to keep away from western influence, caused the West to be very worried about their lack of influence in a powerful African country, and particularly in a postapartheid era when neighboring South Africa was no longer a western stooge. But the West (particularly U.S. and UK) have kept knocking on the door, and U.S. policy makers concluded that U.S.-Angola relations had to be prioritized. Policy experts at the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations concluded in diplomatic terms that “the United States should firmly and clearly state that nurturing U.S.-Angola relations is important to the United States.”<sup>70</sup> As the United States is determinedly hungry for sources of crude oil, relations with the second largest oil producer in Africa was worth pursuing.<sup>71</sup> But the frustration of the Angolan question to U.S. interests, and the futility of U.S. efforts showed in the ambiguity to defer the ball into Angola’s court: that the relationship should “depend more on action by the Angolan government than by the US government.”<sup>72</sup> Nevertheless, the Independent Preventive Action Commission set up by the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations with specific reference to Angola concluded in its report that “U.S. strategic interests in energy and security in the Gulf of Guinea would be served by strengthening the ties between the United States and Angola as part of a broad energy policy and a strategic approach toward Africa.”<sup>73</sup> It is not only in the United States where the policy community have advised key western governments to engage. The September 2006 report published by the UK’s All Party Parliamentary Group on Angola

also recommended that the UK government should engage with the Angolan government.<sup>74</sup>

Angola's potential threat is not only to the West, but also to South Africa the co-regional power. The subregional competition is in military and other influences. Speculation has it that Angola patronizes the personal guard of DRC's Joseph Kabila, while South Africa patronizes the DRC regular army. In 2009, Angola devoted 3.6 percent of GDP on military spending, in competition with South Africa that tends to devote comparatively less—1.7 percent of the 2006 GDP.<sup>75</sup>

### *New Security Challenges*

The 2010 GPI report stated that "relations with Angola deteriorated in 2009 because of a dispute between the two countries [DRC and Angola] over their maritime border and offshore oil" (IEP 2010).<sup>76</sup> The 2010 GPI was happy with Angola's move toward peacefulness, but was concerned that the country is "in the bottom half of the Global Peace Index and as such conditions could still deteriorate under challenging circumstances."<sup>77</sup> Angola's relationship with the DRC had not improved by the time of publication of the 2011 peace index.

### *HIV/AIDS*

Astonishingly, the HIV/AIDS pandemic that has hit the southern Africa sub-region the hardest, has not impacted significantly in Angola despite being located in the area. Angola shares no borders with Botswana and South Africa, the two most infected countries in the subregion, and perhaps being sealed off from these two countries, coupled with the fact that prospects of livelihood in Angola is comparatively less inviting, has saved the country from a higher incidence and spread of HIV/AIDS. In 2006, the adult prevalence rate was 3.7 percent among a population of about 16 million. Obviously, the low life expectancy of average 40 years and the HDI rating of 160th in the world<sup>78</sup> were not due to the HIV/AIDS pandemic, but rather to the harsh war-torn environment, because life expectancy has been worsening (average 38.5 years in 2010) at the same time as HIV prevalence was reducing. The adult prevalence rate for the pandemic further reduced to 2.1 percent in 2007,<sup>79</sup> even if it was thought at some point afterward that HIV incidence was on the rise in rural Angola.<sup>80</sup> However, Angola benefited from the UNAIDS enhanced program for combating the pandemic just by being located in southern Africa.<sup>81</sup> Angola suffers from high risks of cholera, malaria, typhoid and tripanosomiasis.

*Food Security*

FAO 2010 data show that 44 percent of the total population are undernourished. Some 31 percent of children are malnourished and underweight, while 45 percent of children are malnourished with stunted growth.<sup>82</sup>

## **Zimbabwe**

Zimbabwe has had a difficult political history, and became a one-party state from independence in 1980, until 1999 when an opposition party emerged from the woodwork. In addition to the peculiarly difficult pre-independence history, Zimbabwe has achieved notoriety on the world stage, principally because of land issues that sparked racial conflict, plus the subsequent British government failure to honor the pledges of the Lancaster House Agreement, a regime of sanctions imposed by the West, and the role of the SADC to mitigate the sanctions and negotiate a power-sharing deal between government and opposition. The Zimbabwean context is one of poor governance, economic, human development, and peace indicators that are a direct result of the political spat between Zimbabwe and the colonial alliance, even if the long-term autocracy of Zimbabwe's independence nationalist leader is also an issue. Zimbabwe has been grappling with the HIV/AIDS pandemic alongside the lack of resources within the country.

*Historical and Political Context*

Zimbabwe, formerly Southern Rhodesia, is largely made up of Black ethnonational identity groups who make up 98 percent of the population. The Shona make up 80–84 percent; and the Ndebele 10–15 percent. Other Bantu groups such as the Venda, Tonga, Shangaan, Kalanga, Sotho, Ndau, and Nambya, could make up 2 percent. The rest are white Zimbabweans who make up 1 percent or less, and consist of mostly British and a handful of Afrikaner, Greeks, Portuguese, and Dutch settler families.

Southern Rhodesia was a self-governing British colony in October 1923, and fought for the British in WWII, through the East African Campaign against the Axis Alliance<sup>83</sup> in what was then Italian East Africa. Rhodesia itself consisted of Malawi (formerly Nyasaland), Northern Rhodesia, and Southern Rhodesia. But African nationalist movements tore apart this union in 1963. Ian Smith who was Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia from April 13, 1964 took local advantage and issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on November 11, 1965 that imposed white minority rule, and subsequently declared Southern Rhodesia as Republic of Rhodesia in 1970. Southern Rhodesia's UDI was recognized only by apartheid South Africa

(a fellow racist regime). By this move, Ian Smith had scuttled any potential British agenda to execute a multiracial democracy in Rhodesia.

From 1970, the local opposition comprising of Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), and Bishop Abel Muzorewa's United African National Council (UANC) ushered politics into a civil war that toppled Ian Smith. In March 1978, Ian Smith signed a deal with the three African Opposition Leaders. Muzorewa who appeared to guarantee the safety of white Zimbabweans became a favorite, and agreed with Smith to conduct an election in April 1979. Muzorewa won this election and became Prime Minister for a very brief period, during which the country was renamed Zimbabwe. A marathon conference that took place in Lancaster House in London from September 10 to 15 December 1979 produced a Lancaster House Agreement that saw to the end of the civil war and the disarmament of opposition guerrilla movements, as well as the elections in 1980 that brought Robert Mugabe into power as Prime Minister. The subsequent Matabele massacres of 1982–1985 caused ZANU and ZAPU to merge into a "Popular Front" of ZANU (or ZANU-PF) in 1988. Another landslide victory for Mugabe in March 1990 made him President.

#### *Land Issues and the Lancaster House Agreement*

The core of Zimbabwe's current crises stems from a major disagreement about the implementation of the Lancaster House Agreement, in connection with land. We should note that Mugabe almost refused to sign the agreement because of the land issues, but was pressured to sign the fragile agreement at the last minute, because of a deal brokered with the UK and U.S. governments. At the time when the agreement was signed, the best farmlands were owned by large commercial white farmers with land areas of at least 1,000 hectares each. In contrast, Black Zimbabweans had land holdings of less than one hectare each, often resulting into over-crowded and less productive communal settlements. It was obvious to all parties during the marathon 47 plenary sessions of the Lancaster House meetings that land reform was necessary, however, it was also clear that the white farmers would be unwilling to give up the existing and unfair land arrangements, and some wanted compensation for any land lost. Hence in the deal that Mugabe and the British Government signed, both the UK and U.S. governments agreed to purchase land from willing white settlers who could not accept reconciliation, or what became known as the "Willing buyer, Willing seller" principle. For this purpose, a fund was established, to operate from 1980 to 1990.

Given the nature of the existing land arrangements already outlined, the "willing seller" principle was nonsense, because it was obvious that land

should change hands in a Black majority Zimbabwe. It was implicit from the start, and became subsequently obvious, that the political will (or commitment) for the land fund was not that solid, because further to that, the British Government sought to garner finances from international donor organizations to establish the fund, instead of setting aside a solid government fund from the British Exchequer. Subsequently, there was a Zimbabwe Donors' Conference (ZIMCORD) for reconstruction and development in March 1981 that raised only £17 million, and pledged £630 million of aid that was not really fulfilled. An initial phase of the 1980 land reform program (partially funded by the UK government) resettled some 70,000 landless Zimbabweans onto a land area of at least 20,000 square kilometers. From 1980 to 1985, the British Government directly provided £47 million for the land reform program, after which the commitment waned. To complicate matters, the communications between the Zimbabwean and British governments were not upbeat enough to buoy the delivery of the agreement. Had the funds been forthcoming from the British as agreed, the flavor of communications would not have been an issue.

Along the line, a British general election in May 1997 brought in the New Labour government headed by Tony Blair that whipped up an excuse that the deal for the land fund was not signed by the "New" Labour party. Furthermore, instead of fulfilling their part of the Lancaster House Agreement to make funds available, the British government kept pushing toward the international donors route, resulting in a September 1998 Land Conference in Harare hosted by the Zimbabwean Government, with major international donors and multilateral institutions in attendance. At this stage, the continual hypocrisy of the British government generated a situation whereby tempers degenerated from the Zimbabwean government quarters, to the level of ordinary Zimbabwean citizens, who subsequently took it upon themselves to commence occupying the lands of white farmers. With the deterioration of matters, the British government, with the help of the U.S. and other western partners, issued sanctions against Zimbabwe. It is against this hypocritical background to the land issue that South Africa, as leader of SADC, has consistently refused to exacerbate Zimbabwe's problems, such as contributing to sanctions against Zimbabwe.

### *Sanctions*

The history of sanctions against Zimbabwe dates back to 1970 when the British government pushed for UN economic sanctions against Rhodesia, after Ian Smith's UDI. This first round of sanctions ended on June 12, 1979 when the U.S. Senate voted for their cessation against what had now become Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe is landlocked and relies heavily on neighbors,

particularly South Africa that shares Zimbabwe's southern border, for survival. The country is bordered on the east by Mozambique, on the northwest by Zambia, and the southwest by Botswana. The current set of sanctions have been imposed by western nations<sup>84</sup> allegedly because of Zimbabwe's human rights abuses, and aims at Mugabe and his ZANU-PF elite,<sup>85</sup> but to the detriment of ordinary Zimbabwean citizens. Among the SADC, political commitment to the sanctions have varied from issue to commodity.

The sanctions have also generated stronger relationships with other partners of the international community, such as China and Russia that are both veto holding members of the UN Security Council. In a famous example, the BBC website reported<sup>86</sup> that a tip off had generated sufficient campaigns by human rights organizations based in South Africa to prevent the An Yue Jiang, a Chinese cargo ship that was carrying 3 million rounds of ammunition, 1,500 rocket-propelled grenades, and 2,500 mortar rounds destined for Zimbabwe via South Africa. The international uproar was sufficient to deter South Africa from allowing the ship to dock at any of its ports. But the ship eventually returned to China without that cargo, and the Zimbabwean government confirmed receipt of the cargo, although it is not clear what specific roles were played by Angola, DRC, and Mozambique in getting the cargo delivered to its final destination.

The sanctions from 2001 included forbidding senior ZANU-PF officials to travel overseas. Hence there was western pressure to prevent Mugabe from attending the December 8–9, 2007 European Union-Africa Summit in Lisbon. The AU insisted that a meeting without Mugabe was impracticable, since he was attending as an AU member and not in his personal capacity. Mugabe attended the meeting, but the UK Prime Minister did not. Russia's relationships with Zimbabwe have also grown stronger, and on July 12, 2008, Russia vetoed the UN resolution to impose further sanctions on Zimbabwe that was proposed by the U.S. and the UK. In what seems to be a chicken-and-egg argument, Mugabe has always maintained that the imposition of sanctions by the West is the cause of the current state of the Zimbabwean economy. The statistics are quite dire for Zimbabwe: according to GeoHive, life expectancy in Zimbabwe is currently 46 (45.77) among a population of 11,392,629. Data from the 2006 World Health Organization (WHO) Report, which states 37 years for men and 34 for women, happened to be the worst in the world during that year.<sup>87</sup>

#### *The Global Political Agreement (GPA): Power-sharing Deal*

Although ZANU-PF has remained the dominant political party, a formidable Opposition emerged in the form of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) that was founded in 1999 and is led by Morgan Tsvangirai. The

MDC was formed out of a broad movement of political activists and civil society groups that variously campaigned against the constitutional referendum of 2000. In 2005, the MDC suffered a split into MDC-T led by Tsvangirai, and MDC-M led by Arthur Mutambara, however, the majority kept faith with MDC-T, which now forms the main Opposition to ZANU-PF. Over the years, the MDC have faced many acts of intimidation from the ZANU-PF apparatus, including several beatings of Tsvangirai: in 2000 he was arrested and charged with treason but released; in 2003 he was arrested for allegedly inciting violence; and on March 11, 2007 he was arrested and severely beaten, shaved, and tortured in prison by the Zimbabwean Special Forces at Cranborne Barracks.

During the March 2008 presidential and parliamentary elections, the MDC-T performed substantially well enough to become the largest party in the Zimbabwean House of Assembly, and won sufficient votes in the presidential ballot to rattle the Mugabe apparatus. The presidential vote was scheduled to have a second round failing a 51 (or 50 percent plus) majority by a candidate. The MDC-T believe they won a clear majority in the first round, and were disappointed that the official results indicated 47.8 percent for Tsvangirai against Mugabe's 43.2 percent. It took an uncomfortably long period of up to four weeks for the official results to be released by the incumbent Mugabe administration, and fuelled the allegation that the results had been rigged. Judging from years of assaults and intimidations against the MDC-T, which also intensified after the first round of the elections, Tsvangirai withdrew from the second round ballot for fears that it would not be free and fair.

The crisis that ensued generated wide international attention, and caused the SADC to step in. Led by South African President Thabo Mbeki, a power-sharing deal officially known as the Global Political Agreement (GPA) was tediously brokered between the two sides and signed on September 15, 2008. Tsvangirai became Prime Minister, Mugabe remained President, while the third presidential candidate, Mutambara, assumed the role of Deputy Prime Minister. In the power-sharing arrangement, Mugabe supervises the army while Tsvangirai controls the Police. But the ZANU-PF apparatus have made it practically impossible for the power sharing arrangement to work smoothly, not least because this was the first time that ZANU-PF was having to share political space with a formidable and legal opponent. Basic communication problems became an indomitable feature of government. For example, the regular Monday morning meetings scheduled between President and Prime Minister have not been kept, and the delivery of governance has become uncoordinated. The subsequent unilateral appointments of judges and diplomats by Mugabe have caused operational difficulties both locally

and internationally, and made it awkward to deduce whether the appointees represented Mugabe's party solely, or the coalition government of Zimbabwe.

The September 2008 GPA encountered a false start, and began operating only after the late swearing in of Tsvangirai as Prime Minister on February 11, 2009. The power sharing relationship has experienced further turbulence, reaching a deadlock around mid-March 2010 in a number of key areas including the all-important constitution that had a deadline of August 2010, and which should be in place before the next elections. Furthermore, there occurred differences between the two parties in other extremely important areas, such as what empowers black Zimbabweans to acquire shares in companies that are valued over half-a-billion dollars. The MDC still feel intimidated by the ZANU-PF apparatus. At the December 2010 ZANU-PF conference, Mugabe announced his intention to nationalize U.S. and UK firms in Zimbabwe if western sanctions were not lifted, and promised to end power sharing.

On March 17, 2010, Jacob Zuma was in Harare to try to negotiate a deal about the stalled proceedings between ZANU-PF and the MDC-T. Besides what Jacob Zuma had to deal with in Zimbabwe, he was interested in getting the West to terminate sanctions, as was first attempted by the SADC in 2007. On March 19, 2010 the MDC were able to stage a peaceful demonstration without any brutalities or harassment from ZANU-PF, and it became difficult to appreciate whether this was due to the presence of the international media such as Aljazeera television reporters leading the procession, or whether because Jacob Zuma was in town. Some placards read "Stop Zunanising the Police," which is a complaint directed at ZANU-PF's meddling with the affairs of the police that is supposed to be under the control of the MDC-T.

### ***International Political Economy***

Zimbabwe's IIAG rankings have been consistently low, and have been worsening in the last few years: 44th in 2000/01 and 2003/04; 41st in 2001/02; 45th in 2002/03; 45th in 2004/05; 47th in 2005/06; 48th in 2006/07; 50th in 2007/08; and 49th in 2008/09.<sup>88</sup> The state of governance, as well as international sanctions, have both impacted on the economic handling of the country that was deteriorating steadily over a decade. The World Bank Development Indicators over Africa showed Zimbabwe at the bottom of average GDP growth rate from 1996 to 2005, or an average growth of minus 2.4 percent during that decade.<sup>89</sup> The economy worsened further before improving. The real GDP growth rate slid to minus 5.7 percent in 2007, and further to minus 14.4 percent in 2008, before appreciating to minus 1.3 percent in 2009, and 4.1 percent in 2010.<sup>90</sup> Zimbabwe has



experienced one of the worst unemployment situations in the world, estimated at an astonishing 95 percent, even in 2009 when the economy began to improve.

The state has been consistently cash-strapped, and as of mid-2006, Zimbabwe was one of five beneficiaries (including Angola, Nigeria, Mozambique, and Sudan) of 80 percent of Chinese Exim Bank loans to Sub-Saharan Africa toward infrastructure.<sup>91</sup> The government has had no choice but to spend all the money it earns, having a poultry purchasing power parity of \$4.279 billion in 2008, \$4.223 billion in 2009, and \$4.395 billion in 2010.<sup>92</sup> This has been supported by overprinting the currency, which leads to consistent hyperinflation. Zimbabwe's main foreign currency earnings are from agriculture, tourism, and minerals such as asbestos, coal, copper, gold, iron ore, nickel, and platinum produced in commercial quantities. Agriculture contributed to 19.5 percent of GDP in 2009, industry 24 percent, and services 56.5 percent.<sup>93</sup> The Zimbabwean government is short of cash, but not corruption, which may be a contributory factor to the mismanagement, in spite of sanctions: Zimbabwe's CPI ranking was 146th out of 180 in 2009; and 134th out of 178 in 2010. Data from the 2010 IIAG also showed Zimbabwe at the very bottom of three indicators: transparency and corruption; accountability of public officials; and accountability, transparency and corruption in rural areas.

Living conditions have been consistently dire, and development has been at a very low level for some 15 years. According to the 2010 HDR, Zimbabwe is 25 percent poorer than it was back in 1970 when it was the poorest country<sup>94</sup>—the same year that it was slammed with sanctions as Ian Smith's Republic of Rhodesia. Zimbabwe was bottom of the list (169th) on the 2010 HDI, but was not ranked in the 2009 HDR<sup>95</sup> that states: "In 2007 . . . Zimbabwe . . . had more than 500,000 crisis-affected people who were beyond the reach of any humanitarian assistance,"<sup>96</sup> and reiterated that 570,000–1 million people had been internally displaced by unrest and conflict by the end of 2008.<sup>97</sup> In 2010, Zimbabwe was tenth among "countries ranked according to their combined number of refugees and IDPs per 100,000 people."<sup>98</sup> Life expectancy was at 43.4 years in 2007,<sup>99</sup> and improved to 47.55 years in 2010.<sup>100</sup> Against the above context of hyperinflation and deteriorating social and political turmoil, peace has been a very rare commodity, and Zimbabwe's GPI ratings have been telling: 106th out of 121 in 2007; 124th out of 140 in 2008; 134th out of 144 in 2009; and 135th out of 149 in 2010.<sup>101</sup> But there are now positive signs and estimated gains in "relative state of peacefulness and economic size . . . from a reduction of violence";<sup>102</sup> the 2010 GPI report estimated Zimbabwe's gains at a whopping 65.2 percent.<sup>103</sup> Nevertheless, Zimbabwe rated 140th out of 153 on the 2011 peace index.

Zimbabwe attended the Twentieth World Economic Forum held in Tanzania during May 2010, where President Mugabe announced to participants that Zimbabwe's economy was open to business, with very low political risks, including what he termed as the unjustified and irrational international sanctions that he deeply abhorred.<sup>104</sup> Diamond is not high on Zimbabwe's list of minerals, and production is only in very small quantities. Indeed Zimbabwe's involvement in diamonds is not as notorious as that of Angola, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC and Congo-Brazzaville.<sup>105</sup> Yet the June 2010 World Diamond Council meeting in Tel Aviv (one of the world's major centers of the diamond cutting trade), to discuss principally the Kimberly Diamond Certification Process, and tangentially the approval of Zimbabwe's diamond exports from the small scale alluvial diamond production in Marange,<sup>106</sup> became heavily politicized with Zimbabwe. This was precipitated by the diamond watchdog's June 18, 2010 call for the release of human rights activist Farai Maguwu who was in the hands of Zimbabwean police for publishing or circulating "false information injurious to state interests about the Marange diamond field."<sup>107</sup> It appears that the human rights activist, who also happened to be Research and Development Director at the Mutare West province where the Marange field is located, handed over sensitive and implicating documents to Abbey Chikane the Kimberly Process monitor for Zimbabwe, who then turned over the documents to the Zimbabwean authorities because "he believed the official documents had been illegally obtained."<sup>108</sup>

### *New Security Challenges*

Zimbabwe's most crippling challenges lie in bad governance and poor economics, plus a tarnished international image, and the sanctions regime that has affected almost everything about the country, as was reiterated by President Mugabe in his speech at the 65th General Assembly of the UN in September 2010. Freedom of Speech and Press (CIRI) has been a recurrent issue in Zimbabwean politics, and the country ranked bottom in terms of this indicator on the 2010 IIAG. The discussion paper of the 2011 Global Peace Index also noted the underreporting of violence. Prospects for the next elections scheduled for 2012 did not look good.

### *HIV/AIDS*

Zimbabwe suffers from a very high incidence of HIV/AIDS. In 2006, the adult prevalence rate was 20.1 percent, and life expectancy was between 35 and 36 years average for both sexes among a total population of 13 million then, in a country that received a HDI rating of 145th in that year.<sup>109</sup> According to the 2010 Aids Outlook Report, the adult prevalence rate is now

15.3 percent or 1.3 million. Life expectancy has also improved to an average 47.55 years.<sup>110</sup>

The cash strapped government has limited resources to handle the pandemic. Furthermore the international sanctions regime and blacklisting has not helped matters, and contributed to negating the overall effort to combatting the pandemic. However, Zimbabwe has promoted the female condom, with support from the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) and Population Services International (PSI). As a result, “Zimbabwe increased female condom distribution from 2.2 million (2006) to 5.2 million (2008).”<sup>111</sup> The incidence rate of tuberculosis to HIV/AIDS is about 40 percent,<sup>112</sup> meaning that 40 percent of all HIV/AIDS patients also have tuberculosis.

### *Food Insecurity*

Zimbabwe has been designated by the FAO as food-insecure and having “exceptional shortfall in food production or supplies.”<sup>113</sup> Even from the 2005–2007 period, FAO data show 30 percent “prevalence of undernourishment in the Zimbabwean population. Currently, 39 percent of Zimbabwe’s overall population are “chronically malnourished,” and 17 percent of children are malnourished and underweight.<sup>114</sup>

## **Kenya**

Kenya became a one-party state from independence in 1963, until 1992 when multiparty democracy emerged from hard and bitter political lessons. Ethnonational identity issues that characterized Kenyan nationalism since independence, evolved and climaxed into violent and irreconcilable post electoral clashes that became temporarily resolved only by a power sharing deal in 2008. Also characteristic of Kenyan politics has been the constant grappling with a constitution, until this was put to bed in 2010. Although Kenya has average governance indicators, the weak economy and high levels of corruption have resulted in poor human development and peace indicators, related inter-tribal conflicts, and investigations by the International Criminal Court (ICC), along with internal security challenges including refugees from Somalia, wildlife poaching, plus the general culture of inefficiency that poses a threat to twenty-first century disaster management. Kenya has less issues with HIV/AIDS.

### *Historical and Political Context*

Kenya, the land of Jomo Kenyatta, attracted foreign interest in 1498 when the Portuguese sailor Vasco da Gama passed through Mombassa en route to India, which trip also established the significant sea route for the Portuguese trade in

spice and slaves with the Far East. Other encroachers such as the Omani Arabs entered the fray in the seventeenth century and devastated the Portuguese influence, including their vessels, and by 1730, the Portuguese had given up on the Omani onslaught for what it was worth, considering that the trade was no longer profitable, not least because of the piracy. A further evolution of the survival of the fittest ensured that the Omanis became no match to the Royal Navy fleet that principally fought to outlaw the slave trade carried out by the Omani Arabs. The German stint from 1885 ended when they handed over their coastal interests to the British East India Company, and from this period, it became the British all the way, which sway enabled them to engage in development projects, such as constructing the Kenya-Ugandan Railway at the beginning of the twentieth century, as well as establishing coffee and tea plantations. In the process, the predominant and indigenous Kikuyu tribe became economically disenfranchized on their homeland by the British, and executed the Mau Mau rebellion of 1952 to 1960 that contributed significantly to the Kenyan independence movement, and ultimately Kenya's independence.

The ethnonational distribution of Kenya is not too skewed toward an overly significant majority: the Kikuyus currently make up 22 percent of the population; followed by the Luhya who are 14 percent; Luo 13 percent; Kalenjin 12 percent; Kamba 11 percent; Kisii 6 percent; Meru 6 percent; other African 15 percent; non-African (Asian, European, and Arab) 1 percent.<sup>115</sup> It is therefore curious that ethnic rivalries have degenerated into deep political divisions. The Kenyan African National Union (KANU) led by Jomo Kenyatta led the anticolonial nationalism to independence on October 12, 1963, and the country was declared a republic exactly a year later on October 12, 1964, with Kenyatta as the first President. Following Kenyatta's passing in 1978, Daniel arap Moi assumed leadership of KANU and became President of a country that was effectively an established one-party state, and with a single party constitution. A coup attempt on August 1, 1982 that proved abortive nevertheless became the first serious and rare incursion against the one-party system. However, Moi won the consequent multiparty elections of 1992 and 1997 until he was constitutionally barred from running in 2002, which also caused the KANU to run out of luck, because the coalition of opposition parties—the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) took advantage and won the election with an uncharismatic Mwai Kibaki as leader and President.

In the political evolution that followed, NARC became unwieldy and less attractive to the grassroots, because it garnered the following other groups: KANU; Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) that had two versions of FORD-Kenya and FORD-People; the conservative Democratic

Party; and Shirikisho Party, among others. The inefficiency and lack of appeal of this unwieldy political structure paved the way for a rival opposition movement to emerge in the form of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) whose leader Raila Odinga (the current Prime Minister) was implicated in the 1982 abortive coup attempt, together with his father Jamoro Odinga Odinga. The essential issue that divided the NARC coalition (disagreements about the constitutional referendum of 2005) also led to the splitting of ODM into two formations: the ODM Party of Kenya, now simply known as ODM and headed by Raila Odinga, and ODM-Kenya headed by Kalonzo Musyoka.

#### *Postelection Violence and Power Sharing*

Judging from the pace of the evolution of parties and affiliations, clearly the political dust never seemed to settle. It was against this messy, volatile, and difficult-to-analyze backdrop that the December 27, 2007 multiparty elections had to take place, and probably explains why at the stage of the ballot count, which was certified by both local and international observers as flawed, it was equally difficult to make head or tail of how and where to accurately skew the discrepancies, simply because affiliations were not so clear cut, rendering it impossible for even the experts to extrapolate data or demystify the murky patterns of potential alliances that could at least form an adequate basis (or proper guesstimates) for assessing claims and counter-claims in an election where the official procedures on the ground were not reliably adhered to. International intervention became necessary, at which point the AU Chair, President John Kufuor of Ghana, appointed Kofi Annan the former UN Secretary-General to broker a power sharing agreement that was signed by Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga on February 28, 2008 to represent a grand coalition government, in which Kibaki remained President and Odinga was appointed Prime Minister. The cabinet was named on April 13, 2008 and sworn in four days later.

#### *New Constitution*

An obvious milestone that the coalition aimed to achieve was an agreeable constitution. On October 4, 2009, Kofi Annan paid a three day visit to Kenya and urged the coalition government to speed up the promised reforms so as to avoid the risk of renewed clashes ahead of the next elections in 2012. The government was in denial that the reforms had delayed, and fuelled complaints from certain Kenyan quarters that Kofi Annan was dictating to them like a colonial governor. The former UN Secretary-General was not fazed, and directed Kenya to see through the implementation of the power sharing agreement, particularly the long expected new constitution, new electoral laws,

and new land law.<sup>116</sup> On November 17, 2009, a government parliamentary review committee published the draft constitution that sought to reduce presidential powers and invest the Prime Minister with executive authority. The draft also introduced the senate and supreme court, and more regional devolution, pending a 30-day public consultation prior to the proposed March 2010 referendum.

However, at the end of the consultation on December 17, 2009 that generated at least 1 million submissions, the Chair of the parliamentary review committee summarized the submissions as equally polarized toward the parliamentary system of government proposed by Odinga's ODM, and the presidential system proposed by Kibaki's PNU. Kofi Annan had already expressed serious concern over what he termed as the ethnic polarization of the politics. After nine days of deliberations, the committee agreed on January 28, 2010 a draft constitution that terminated the Prime Minister position, and increased checks and balances on the presidential executive. On April 1, 2010, the coalition parliament approved the draft constitution, and a 90-day period prior to the referendum. This event in itself became a key milestone in the power-sharing deal. As already argued, the constitution had proved to be the sticking point in Kenyan politics since independence in October 1963 when Jomo Kenyatta's KANU party began to govern with a single-party constitution.

On May 14, 2010, the Interim Electoral Commission announced August 4, 2010 as the date for the constitutional referendum for which 12 million people had already registered to vote. Although the referendum itself was a straightforward "yes" or "no" affair, in that, citizens were simply being asked whether or not they wanted constitutional change, the devil was in the detail. The draft document was obviously not in agreement with all sections of the Kenyan community and generated a "yes" versus "no" campaign, the former saying that it was politically important for Kenya to pass the draft as it stood and amend the detail later, whereas the latter camp argued that it would be difficult to agree amendments after the document was passed.

It is interesting how Odinga, the Prime Minister of the coalition government (and supposed arch rival to Mwai Kibaki the President of the coalition government), agreed to be in the "yes" camp that wished to abrogate the position of the Prime Minister. Horse trading between the two leaders is the obvious answer: Kibaki was nearing the end of his political career and was prepared to hand over to Odinga, in which case there would be no need for a power-sharing Prime Minister. In another interesting development, the "no" campaign was led by William Ruto, the Minister for Higher Education appointed in the April 2010 cabinet reshuffle, and previously one of two

deputy leaders from Odinga's ODM, who had obviously taken sides against Odinga. Another interesting figure within the "no" campaign was former President Moi who owns lots of land, and had been accused of corruption and torture during his presidency. Moi is a long-standing opponent of the Odinga political camp. He was leader of KANU when Oginga Odinga (Raila Odinga's father) was ostracized from KANU by getting rid of one of two vice chair positions that was held by Oginga Odinga.

The popular areas, or points of contention, included:

- Whether to abrogate or retain the position of the Prime Minister that was introduced into Kenyan politics by the power-sharing agreement of February 2008, and simply keep a presidential system of government; and subsequently;
- Whether to have more or less devolution than existed (in the coalition, and in the prior government), which meant retaining the presidential system of government but reducing the powers of the president by devolving some powers to the county or local government level, which also had implications for the next point;
- Land reform, and the embedded ethnic tensions and political rivalries within the reform that deeply divided Kenyan communities. There were apprehensions over the proposed downsizing of the amount of land that could be owned, and the plight of small leaseholders who were tenants to large landowners but did not have sufficient legal support within the system to guarantee proper treatment from their land owners;
- Chapter Four on human rights and individual freedoms;
- The retention of Islamic or Kadhis' courts in Chapter Ten on the Judiciary;
- Abortion and its religious flavors. Both Catholics and Protestants—including the Evangelicals formed the anti-abortion campaign that was also not too happy about the retention of the Kadhis' courts. On June 13, 2010, six people were reportedly killed and 75 injured when bombs exploded at a Christian evangelistic crusade that propounded anti-abortion views against the draft constitution. Christians blamed the bomb blast on the government.<sup>117</sup>

Quite apart from the bomb blast at the evangelistic rally that was allegedly targeted at the anti-abortion and anti-Muslim sentiments, the police on June 15, 2010 arrested three members of parliament including Assistant Roads Minister Machage, for the hate sentiments conveyed in his speech attack on rallies against the draft constitution.

However, it was abundantly clear from the onset that the draft constitution would be passed, because the “yes” campaign had already attained an irreversible momentum. There were many who simply wanted Kenya to cross this political bridge even if they sharply disagreed with the detail. Results of the referendum on August 4, 2010 was therefore a landslide victory for the “yes” campaign. Ruto quickly acknowledged the result, and moved that government should begin consultations to address the contentious issues within the newly passed constitution. The time ahead, and prior to the 2012 general elections, after which the new constitution comes into force, was to be spent on intense sparring and negotiation about the detail, to streamline the wishes of broader Kenya, even if the constitution had been signed into law on August 27, 2010.

Earlier in 2010, the rocky path of the coalition encountered a new bump over the revelations of two corruption scandals including the embezzlement of \$1.3 million of primary education funding from the UK since July 2009. President Kibaki therefore suspended eight senior government officials on February 13, 2010 while Prime Minister Odinga suspended the Education and Agricultural Ministers the next day. Both President and Prime Minister did not consult each other about their suspensions, leading to a subsequent refusal to participate in cabinet meetings by Odinga on February 16, 2010. Kofi Annan was called upon to mediate, however, the saga sparked civil unrests and protests in Eldoret, and reopened old antigovernment wounds, because on February 17, 2010, thousands of citizens who had been displaced by the 2008 postelection violence marched from the Rift Valley to Nairobi in protest of political divisions, ineptitude, corruption, and more pertinently, resettlement failures. This was the surest writing on the wall that a failure to implement political reform prior to the 2012 elections will be history repeating itself. It was therefore a significant victory for Kenyan politics that the constitution was passed in the August 2010 referendum by a “yes” vote of 67 percent.

### *Kenya and the ICC*

At the end of March 2010, ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo received the go-ahead to launch the long-awaited investigation into the 2008 postelection violence that saw 1,200 people dead and 350,000 displaced. The prosecutor had to wait four months for the clearance to investigate, and this delay impacted against the relevant time frame for delivering the prosecution that was to be completed within 2010, in order to pave the way for the next elections in 2011. We should note that the Kenyan government was given one year to set up a tribunal to execute justice, but refused, hence the



authorization by the Hague to prosecute. Dragging the refusal became the principal reason for the delay in empowering the ICC investigation.

The ICC took over from The Commission of Inquiry on Post Election Violence (CIPEV) chaired by Justice Philip Waki, a Kenyan Appeal Court Judge in February 2008. The Waki report was handed over to the President and the Prime Minister on October 15, 2008, who both failed to act upon it, or disclose the culprits indicted in the report. The Waki Commission therefore referred the report to Kofi Annan the broker of the existing power sharing agreement, who subsequently handed it to the ICC prosecutor on July 9, 2009. Up to 20 important personalities, including members of the existing cabinet, had been indicted.

At the April 1, 2010, press conference given by Moreno-Ocampo, he unveiled his plans to visit the crime scenes, and interact with victims, and announced that the ICC “have a duty to protect”<sup>118</sup> witnesses and “will do so independently,”<sup>119</sup> but that witnesses would be few, in order to reduce the potential for identifications, unlike the 30 lot who were interviewed in the case of Katanga in the DRC. Hence Moreno-Ocampo decided to concentrate on at least two cases, with two to three people indicted in each case, as it was not binding to prosecute all 20 persons listed by the Waki Report.

Consequently on December 15, 2010, Moreno-Ocampo announced six names to be prosecuted, three on each side of the current government and opposition: (1) William Ruto, who was in opposition (ODM), for his role in orchestrating and preparing the violence in the Rift Valley against supporters of the then ruling PNU; (2) Henry Kosgey, the current Minister of Industrialization, for planning and organizing the attack against PNU supporters; (3) Joshua Arap Sang, a journalist, for organizing and commandeering the communications strategy that positioned and moved around perpetrators of the Rift Valley violence; (4) Francis Kirimi Muthaura, the current Secretary to the Grand Coalition Cabinet (and by default the Head of the Civil Service), for authorizing the use of excessive force as revenge against the opposition to the PNU; (5) Mohamed Hussein Ali, police chief at the time of the December 2007 elections, for authorizing killings and the use of excessive force in Kisumu and Kibera, and; (6) Uhuru Kenyatta, the current Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, among other things, for his part in organizing the Mungiki criminal organization to perpetrate violence against the opposition to the PNU. The ICC prosecutor announced that from 2006, Ruto and Kosgey principally planned the violence against PNU and government supporters, in anticipation of rigging and defeat at the polls. The ICC judges had up to March 11, 2011 to progress with the prosecution by issuing summons or arrest warrants. The initial hearings began on April 7, 2011.

*International Political Economy*

Kenya's IIAG ratings used to be moderate, but has deteriorated in the last three years—a direct reflection of the trend in political turbulence and violent clashes over the same period. Kenya ranked 20th in 2000/01, 2001/02, and 2002/03; 19th in 2003/04, 2004/05, and 2005/06; 23rd in 2006/07; 24th in 2007/08; and 26th in 2008/09.<sup>120</sup> As already implied, the GPI rankings also began to fall sharply from 2008—the year of the flawed electoral results and post election violence, and have become the trend since then: Kenya was 91st out of 121 in 2007; 119th out of 140 in 2008; 113th out of 144 in 2009; 120th out of 149 in 2010; and 111th out of 153 in 2011. The 2010 GPI noted Kenya to be among “African countries that have become significantly less peaceful since 2007.”<sup>121</sup> Also, the 2011 GPI noted the underreporting of violence.

The country's CPI rankings of 146th out of 180 in 2009, and 154th out of 178 in 2010 are indicative of the state of corruption that had built up with the Kibaki government over a period of time, and especially in 2005 and 2006 when a number of high profile scandals were revealed. Corruption has continued unabated. For example, two major corruption scandals resulted in an impasse between both sides of the coalition in February 2010 when the President and the Prime Minister each suspended a selection of government appointees over the scandal, without consulting each other. Also on March 9, 2010, President Kibaki suspended 13 government officials over fraudulent land purchases. On October 27, 2010 the Foreign Minister resigned over allegations of corruption in the acquisition of embassies abroad, particularly the loss of \$14 million through the purchase of the embassy in Japan. And the examples could go on.

The steadily rising GDP growth rate of 5.8 percent in 2005, 6.1 percent in 2006, and 7.2 percent in 2007, suddenly slumped to 1.7 percent in 2008,<sup>122</sup> and struggled back to 4 percent in 2010.<sup>123</sup> This trend is attributable mainly to the global economic slump resulting from the financial crises, and partly to the local and international loss of confidence resulting from the 2008 political showdown, plus the unrepentant attitudes of the existing coalition government that affected trade and investment. Foreign exchange earnings are chiefly from the exports of horticultural and petroleum products, tea, coffee, fish, and cement, which are then spent on importing capital equipment, crude and refined petroleum, vehicles, iron and steel components, medicines, fertilizers, resin, plastic and paper products. Although Kenya exports mainly to the West (UK, U.S., Netherlands), Uganda, and Tanzania, the country imports mainly from the Middle East and the East (India, China, and Japan).

In 2009, about 19.7 percent of the GDP was composed from the agricultural sector<sup>124</sup> with produce from horticulture, tea, coffee, sugarcane corn, wheat, rice, sisal, pineapples, pyrethrum, dairy products, meat and meat products, hides and skins from both domestic and wildlife. Exports of cut flowers now contribute more to GDP than tea, and 82 percent of Kenya's fresh produce are destined for Europe, particularly the UK that suffered the most in disruptions to aviation from the ash cloud of May 2010. Hence Kenya's 1 billion dollar a year flower industry that also employs some 60,000 people reportedly lost 3 million dollars a day<sup>125</sup> during the May 2010 volcanic ash eruption from Iceland. In 2009, about 16 percent of the GDP was composed from industry<sup>126</sup> involving tourism, petroleum products, grain and sugar milling, cement, beer and soft drinks, textiles, vehicle assembly, paper, and light manufacturing. It must be noted that the services industry, which is strongly linked to tourism contributed 62 percent to GDP in 2009.<sup>127</sup>

With government spending regularly outstripping earnings, plus a large services economy and high levels of corruption, there is not much targeted and strategic investment toward human development, which is left to drift. Kenya's HDI ranking was 147th out of 182 in 2009, and 128th out of 169 in 2010. The 2009 HDR also stated that at the end of 2008, some 300,000 to 600,000 people had been internally displaced as a result of the post election violence and other conflicts.<sup>128</sup> The refugee population (mainly from Somalia) also reached 220,000 within the same period. Furthermore, the 2010 GPI report placed Kenya as 24th among "countries ranked according to their combined number of refugees and IDPs per 100,000 people."<sup>129</sup> Life expectancy was 53.6 years on the HDI not long before the 2008 disastrous elections,<sup>130</sup> and improved slightly to 58.82 years in 2010.<sup>131</sup>

In early 2010, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) claimed to have discovered natural gas reserves in the northeastern part of Kenya. Prospecting continues, to determine if the reserves are commercially viable, along with the search for oil by the CNOOC.

### ***New Security Challenges***

#### *Post-constitutional Issues, and the ICC Investigation*

Civil unrests during the countdown to the new constitution of August 2010, especially allegations against government for the explosions targeted at groups with valid views on the draft constitution, are indications that Kenyan politicians have not turned a new leaf from the same attitudes that got them to a coalition government in 2008—the flawed elections and Kibaki's refusal to accept defeat. As soon as Moreno-Ocampo announced the ICC prosecution list on December 15, some 85 Kenyan MPs moved for Kenya to set

up a Kenyan trial that was previously denounced by the government. Subsequently, the government tried to intervene again, but the ICC progressed with the case, and the trials at the Hague commenced on April 7, 2011.

Hence the new security challenges ahead include how the country handles the ICC investigation, as well as the selective application of the newly passed constitution to suit or protect the interests of the governing and political elite, and particularly if there will be political space for the “no” campaign (of the new constitution) to pursue the streamlining of the contentious issues raised during the constitutional referendum of 2010. These issues were bound to divide ethnic, political, and other sectarian alliances, with potential to generate violence if not handled openly and honestly. There were disaffected constituencies among the population, including those displaced by the postelection violence who on February 17, 2010 staged a protest march from the Rift Valley to Nairobi, against political divisions, ineptitude, corruption, and resettlement failures.

### *Refugees*

The increasing number of refugees, particularly from the failed state of Somalia also posed internal security challenges for the struggling Kenyan state, which had just passed a new constitution that was yet to be tested by the variety of internal rancor already in existence within Kenya itself. As of May 2011, half of the 600,000 refugees that had left Somalia were domiciled in Kenya. The Kenyan state had to donate more land to the UN Human Rights Commission (UNHCR) for a new refugee complex to be built to complement the Dadaab refugee camp in North Eastern Kenya. We should note that, although the resources for the refugees do not come from the Kenyan purse, some of the refugees have links with Al-Shabaab and other globally known terrorist groups, therefore harboring the refugees on Kenyan soil constituted a threat to security. The refugee numbers increased, as Al-Shabaab wanted a regime change in Somalia, and had increased their onslaught on Somalia's fledgling Transitional Federal Government. In December 2010, the Kenyan authorities detained 346 refugees after two policemen were killed at the end of November; 52 of the detainees were Ethiopian and the remainder were Somalian.<sup>132</sup> More substantially, the famine experienced by Somalia from July 2011, generated a daily influx of at least 1,300 Somali refugees to the UNHCR camp in Dadaab, and to other refugee facilities in Kenya. The Horn of Africa itself received its fair share of refugees.

### *HIV/AIDS*

The HIV/AIDS pandemic is not as threatening in Kenya as it is in neighboring southern Africa. Nevertheless, in Kenya, about 1.25 million children

have lost one or both parents to AIDS (UNAIDS 2009).<sup>133</sup> In 2006, the HIV/AIDS adult prevalence rate was 6.1 percent within a total population of about 34.3 million, among which life expectancy was about 50 years for both sexes, in a country that was rated 154th on the HDI.<sup>134</sup> In 2007, “prevalence ranged between 7.1 percent and 8.5 percent,”<sup>135</sup> or precisely 7.8 percent. In spite of the comparatively low prevalence rate, experts had clearly identified that “prevalence among injecting drug users was 42.9 percent.”<sup>136</sup> Hence the UN Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) “supported the development of the National AIDS Strategic Plan and the Kenya Joint UN Programme of Support on AIDS (2007–2012).”<sup>137</sup> The UNAIDS Secretariat also assisted Kenya “to build local epidemiological capacity through a series of training workshops.”<sup>138</sup>

As part of the international effort, “In March 2009 the World Food Programme (WFP), with support from the UNAIDS Secretariat, teamed up with the Ministry of Health, National AIDS Control Council and North Star Alliance to open a drop-in wellness centre offering HIV prevention services, treatment for sexually transmitted infections and other basic health care for truckers and community members living near the [Mombasa] port.”<sup>139</sup> UNAIDS also partnered with the Millennium Villages project to help Kenya create mother-to-child transmission-free zones.<sup>140</sup> It appears that the female vulnerabilities of the pandemic are heightened in Kenya where the National AIDS/STI Programme have noted that “young women between 15 and 19 years are three times more likely to be infected than their male counterparts, while 20–24-year-old women are 5.5 times more likely to be living with HIV than men in their age cohort.”<sup>141</sup> As it is a recognized fact that “one third of people living with HIV are co-infected with tuberculosis,”<sup>142</sup> Kenya became one of the countries in which “over 60 percent of all tuberculosis patients know their HIV status.”<sup>143</sup> Apart from the HIV/AIDS pandemic, the general influx of fake medicines and drugs on the Kenyan free market has raised both local and international concerns. There are as many as 20,000 heroine addicts in the coastal areas due to the \$125 million a year heroine industry.<sup>144</sup>

### *Wildlife Poaching*

Dealing with the poaching of wildlife in Kenya has been a restive issue for many years, and it appears that both the government, and the Kenya Wildlife Service that is responsible for the long list of national parks dotted across the country, have still not garnered the resources and sophistication to apprehend the phenomenon, which occurs over a wide and rather unwieldy geographical patch. To complicate matters, poachers come from as far afield as Cameroon. Until the authorities pose a sufficient deterrent or get a grip on the phenomenon, the gains from poaching will continually outweigh the risks. For

example, the lucrative ivory trade from elephant tusks that has benefited chiefly the two top destination countries (Japan and Malaysia), has been difficult to control, not least because of systemic corruption at both high and low corridors. There are signs that the noose is tightening on the fluidity of smuggling. Some 2,160 kilograms of elephant tusks and five pieces of rhino horn ivory concealed under a shipment of avocado in 12 wooden boxes destined for Malaysia were seized at Jomo Kenyatta Airport on August 22, 2010.<sup>145</sup>

### *Managing Disasters*

General system inefficiencies also pose a security challenge in a country that is prone to both artificial and natural disasters. Hence Raila Odinga the Prime Minister called for an investigation into the October 2010 stadium stampede in Nairobi that killed nine people. The same stadium was banned by the International Federation of Association Football (FIFA) in 2005 when one person was killed during an international match between Kenya and Morocco. Until the culture of efficiency is embedded in safety and security, it is unpredictable what kind of response to expect during man-made or natural disasters, such as the March 4, 2010 floods that washed away three bridges.

### *Food Security and the Agrofuel Challenge*

Although Kenya has been designated by the FAO as food-insecure and having “exceptional shortfall in food production or supplies,”<sup>146</sup> there is the danger of land grabbing by foreign companies for agrofuel purposes.<sup>147</sup> FAO data show that 11 million people are malnourished even though 70 percent of the population depend on agriculture for their livelihoods. Some 20 percent of children are malnourished and underweight, while 30 percent of children are malnourished with stunted growth.<sup>148</sup>

## CHAPTER 7

---

# Guinea, Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, Cameroon, and Egypt

### Introduction

This chapter discusses five states: Republic of Guinea, Gabonese Republic, Republic of the Congo (also known as Congo-Brazzaville), Republic of Cameroon, and the Arab Republic of Egypt, selected either because of serial political difficulties or strong indicators of a ticking time bomb. Since identifying these countries for this publication, three have experienced political change that either caused the ticking bomb to explode, or reset it over a longer period: (1) there was a coup in Guinea in December 2008; (2) the Gabonese President Omar Bongo died and was replaced by his son in August 2009, and; (3) Egypt experienced a political uproar in January 2011. This chapter is the third of four consecutive chapters, each of which discusses a cluster of countries with similar issues or long-running problems, in case study format. Each case study has four sections: an initial concise summary that is a snapshot of the pertinent issues; a section that examines the background leading to the state of relevant domestic and international affairs; a section that discusses international political economy using key governance, economic, peace, and human development indicators, and; a section on new security challenges in areas including conventional security, health, food, energy, climate change or natural and artificial disasters. An attempt is made to point out factors of nationalism and supranationalism vis-à-vis the state of affairs, plus how each country fits into globalization and international politics, as an assessment of their international profile and potential.

### Guinea

Until November 2010, Guinea was a one-party state for most of its postindependence history, with a consistently poor governance record.

Dictatorships and “firm grip” politics have not helped with the country’s political grooming, hence the post-dictatorship era led to a military junta and a brief period of political chaos, until the 2010 multiparty elections ushered in a new government. Clearly, the political context has not been congenial to a coherent Guinean nationalism, something that can change in the years ahead. The country is highly endowed naturally, but the economy has been weak because of corruption and mismanagement, despite possessing half of the world’s reserves in bauxite. Fortunately, Guinea has very few external security challenges, and is not struggling with the HIV/AIDS pandemic.

### ***Historical and Political Context***

Guinea is not landlocked even though it shares boundaries with six countries: a northern border with Mali and Senegal; a northwestern border with Guinea-Bissau; a southern border with Sierra Leone and Liberia; a southeastern border with Cote d’Ivoire; and a western border is the Gulf of Guinea solely.

There are some 24 ethnic groups within the country, of which the Fulani (40 percent), Mandinka (30 percent), and Soussou (20 percent) are dominant. The remaining 10 percent consist of the Kpelle, Kissi, and others non-African, mostly French and Lebanese, and some other Europeans; non-Africans amount to just about 10,000.<sup>1</sup> But the colonial and official French language does not reflect the indigenous ethnonational distribution that allows for at least six nationally recognized languages: Malinke (by the Mandinkas), Susu (the Soussous), Pular (or Peuhl), Kissi, Kpelle, Loma (the Manden), and Arabic. Pular and Arabic stem from the Fulani and Islam (the dominant religion—85 percent), whereas Loma is of the Manden minority tribe in southern Guinea who could also be Liberians. Some 10 percent of the current 10.8 million population<sup>2</sup> or more are said to be Christian, and the remaining 5 percent are animist. We should note that a fair percentage of the total population are syncretistic—a proportion that is difficult to determine; and both Islam and Christianity would be casualties of syncretism.

### ***Sekou Touré and Independence***

The above listed ethnic distribution of Guinea has survived together, and remained more or less the same, from the mid-nineteenth century when they began to experience French military activity, until the Malinke warlord Almamy Samory Touré was defeated in 1898 prior to French control being established. Guinea became independent on October 2, 1958, not long after Ghana’s independence in the previous year. Sekou Touré, the great grandson of Samory who led the nationalism toward independence, had been



restive ever since the Malinke defeat that colonized the rest of Guinea. His close relationship with Ghana's independence nationalist Kwame Nkrumah, gained him inspiration and valuable lessons about pursuing and securing the Guinean independence soon after Ghana's. Being both Malinke and Muslim garnered him a large constituency of support across the Guinean territory. Buoyed by the 50 out of 60 seats won by his Democratic Party of Guinea (PDG) in the 1957 elections, Guineans supported his direction, and massively voted against the 1958 plebiscite to be part of French West Africa. With this result, the French took a strong hint of the renaissance of the age-old Malinke military prowess, and evacuated their armies.

Subsequently, Sekou Touré had the now easy choice of simply declaring Guinea independent. However, his domineering traits surfaced in how he maintained a one-party dictatorship that was in keeping with his other socialist comrades across the African continent such as Nkrumah and Mugabe, all of whom had been caught up in the wave of anticolonial nationalism that led their respective countries to independence. But unlike Nkrumah who was overthrown by the CIA in 1966, Sekou Touré took lessons from this too,<sup>3</sup> and managed to hang on to power until he died of natural causes on March 26, 1984. We should note that the huge political chasm created by Sekou Touré's demise immediately generated a military takeover within one week of his passing, and a Lieutenant Colonel Lansana Conté ushered in the Military Committee of National Recovery (CMRN).

### *Lansana Conté*

Even if the CMRN regime abolished Sekou Touré's one-party state constitution as part of establishing the Second Republic, Conté was also dictatorial until his passing on December 22, 2008. Without a constitution, the CMRN junta made up governance as they went along, through makeshift ordinances, decrees, and decisions from the leadership, until events following the referendum of December 23, 1990 replaced the CMRN with the Transitional Council for National Recovery (CTRN) that created the new *La Loi Fondamentale* constitution and a Supreme Court, and later legalized multiparty politics in 1992, to pave way for elections in 1993. Within the political wave of winding down military juntas across the West African subregion during the 1990s, Ghana's Rawlings conducted multiparty elections in 1992 and ushered Ghana into its Fourth Republic. Conté took inspiration from this development and conducted his first multiparty but flawed presidential elections soon afterward in 1993.

Subsequently, Conté's ruling Party for Unity and Progress (PUP) dominated the political landscape from the period they won 76 out of the 114 seats in the National Assembly in 1995. Another flawed election in 1998

saw Conté's reelection for another five-year term. But before this second term would end in 2003, Conté conducted the flawed referendum of November 2001 that amended the constitution to grant him unlimited terms of office, and extended the presidential term to seven years. Hence the protractedly ill Conté won the December 2003 elections hands down. By this stage, the scanty Opposition within the country had resolved to almost boycotting political participation rather than legitimizing the flawed proceedings. Local and municipal (or parliamentary) elections usually occurred two years after the presidential elections, hence the December 2005 parliamentary elections saw the ruling PUP win 31 of 38 municipalities, and 241 of 303 local councils; these elections were flawed nevertheless, even if the ballot boxes were transparent this time. The unlimited terms of presidential office (for Conté) is what manufactured the political time bomb that began to tick in Guinea, and it did not require rocket science to deduce that politics was heading for disaster, even if Conté would manage to hang on to power until he also passed away in December 22, 2008.

### *The Chaos after Conté*

The Guinean trait of being terror-struck by their dictatorial rulers manifested again, because a successful coup was staged only six hours after Conté was dead, by a National Council for Democracy and Development (NCDD) junta on December 23, 2008, led by Captain Moussa Dadis Camara who promised political change initially, but soon began to demonstrate similar spots of the Guinean despotic leopard. He announced in August 2009 that he was to be a candidate in future presidential elections. From that month, a disturbing turn of events began to unfold, including an assault on the deputy leader of the CNDD junta General Toto Camara, and an unprovoked attack on the Ghanaian Ambassador to Guinea by the Guinean security forces. Clearly, Camara was not that in control of affairs, and had not surmised the lessons of how detestable political dictatorship had become to ordinary Guineans. To stoke the fires further, the public protests in September 2009 encountered stiff military resistance, and resulted in the mutilation of 1,000 protestors, the raping of 109 women, and the murder of 157 protestors. A UN report on these crimes against humanity referred the junta to the International Criminal Court (ICC) of which Guinea is signatory.

Somehow, the elements of discontent and frustration that had been brewing in the ticking Guinean political bomb dictated that a third wave of dictatorship after independence would not be nurtured. Camara's own aide shot him in the head, and incapacitated him from leadership. As his medical treatment in Morocco failed to bring him back into mental shape, the NCDD's Minister of Defense Brigadier General Sekouba Konate became the

interim President of the Republic, while ECOWAS sought for a solution during December 2009. In January 2010, Camara was sent to recuperate in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, where the Burkinabe president and ECOWAS appointee mediating the Guinean crisis, managed to convince him, during the January 15 Ouagadougou Accords, to stay out of Guinean politics for his own good, and that of Guinea. General Konate remained as interim president, but paid heed to lessons, and conducted the June 27, 2010 elections of which he did not stand.

### *The 2010 Guinean Elections*

This election happened to be the first democratic vote for the country in 52 years. Over 3 million Guineans registered to vote, and as many as 24 candidates were approved to contest the presidential ballot. However, right from the onset, the top contestants were: Cellou Dalein Diallo of the Fulbe-dominated Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea (UFDG); Alpha Condé of the Mandinka-dominated Rally of the Guinean People (RPG); and Sidya Touré of the Union of Republican Forces (UFR). Diallo who was former Prime Minister to President Conté from 2004 to 2006, won 43.69 percent, followed by Condé with 18.25 percent, and Touré with 13.02 percent.<sup>4</sup> A run-off was therefore scheduled for September 19, 2010 to determine the president. This was at loggerheads with the trend among the African francophone countries (such as Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, and Togo) where presidential elections are always a straight challenge within a single round.

While the country was still plagued with the September 2009 massacre, amidst heightened local and international calls for justice, General Nouhou Thiam the head of the army announced on June 16, 2010, that the army would have no immunity for its involvement in the massacre. Furthermore, on June 21 (six days to the first round elections), a National Transitional Council launched a national reconciliation project. Also, as part of efforts to reduce some of the toxicity that had fermented within the army, and to ease tension, President Konate made some gestures of amnesty in July 2010: on July 1, he rehabilitated 16 soldiers that were accused of a coup plot in 1985; on July 3, he promoted all soldiers between corporal and major by one rank; and on July 14, he promoted all regional governors.

On July 28, 2010, Diallo signed an agreement with Sidya Touré to join political forces for the presidential run-off. Details of the agreement were not made public. Ben Sekou Sylla the head of the National Independent Election Commission (CENI), and El Haj Boubacar Diallo the Planning Director of CENI were jailed on September 9, 2010 over fraud allegations in connection with the first round of the elections. The allegations came from Alpha

Condé who appeared to be the disadvantaged candidate for the run-off, and not least because both the jailed CENI official Diallo and the other electoral candidate Diallo were of similar ethnic heritage, if not relatives. It remains unclear what direct contribution these jail sentences made to the subsequent clashes that ensued between ethnic camps of the two presidential candidates for the run-off (Diallo and Condé), and for which reason CENI announced on September 12 the suspension of the run-off scheduled for September 19, 2010.

In a show of deep concern, both the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN) immediately threw in their weight of advice and caution to the Guinean authorities to make sure the run-off took place as soon as feasible. Among other things, the justification for this deep concern was borne, not just by the fact that the rival camps could not agree initially on the new date for the run-off (Diallo preferring the earlier scheduled date, and Condé a later unscheduled date plus a reform of electoral structures before the run-off), but also because violent clashes erupted between the two camps during the week following the announcement of the electoral suspension. These clashes continued and lasted throughout the week, culminating in an arson attack on a warehouse that stored election materials, one fatality, and 50 casualties. Some 300 others were arrested and detained as a result. On September 21, 2010 the interim government called on CENI to set a date for the run-off amidst the crisis, prompting CENI to set October 24, 2010.

But the possibility of the run-off taking place in October was cast in doubt a few days to the event. Among other things, there were disputes about the neutrality of CENI even after the Malian national General Siaka Toumane Sangare had been appointed as the new head, to neutralize partiality. Eventually, the run-off occurred on November 7. After considering a variety of complaints, including from Diallo, that his supporters were unable to vote in areas such as Siguiri, CENI on November 15 announced Alpha Condé as the winner with 52.52 percent of the ballot, and Diallo with the remaining 47.58 percent. It became counterintuitive to accept that Condé who polled just 18 percent in the first round should shoot up to 52.52 percent whereas Diallo who already had 44 percent could only muster meagre percentage points to reach 47.58 percent. The jailing of two strategic CENI officials (Sylla and Diallo), plus Condé's post-first-round rainbow coalition with other political forces opposed to Sydia Touré and Diallo, might have worked in Condé's favour. But the popular view on the streets was that even if the voting was free and fair, the counting might not have been. Hence the results sparked clashes in the streets from supporters of both candidates, resulting in ten reportedly dead and dozens injured. On November 17, General Konate imposed a curfew, and an eight-day state of emergency.

On December 3, the Supreme Court confirmed Condé as the winner, at which point the AU responded to the successful completion of the Guinean vote by restoring the country from suspension due to the Dadis Camara coup d'état of December 2008. Alpha Condé was sworn in as president on December 21, 2010, and Guinea began a new political life. On December 30, Condé ordered the replacement of all civil servants in the offices of the prime minister and president. Legislative elections were scheduled to take place in 2011.

### *International Political Economy*

Guinea's ratings on the Ibrahim Index on African Governance (IIAG) have been poor, and worsened in recent years: 39th in 2000/01, 2001/02, 2002/03, and 2005/06; 38th in 2003/04 and 2004/05; 43rd in 2006/07; and 45th in 2007/08 and 2008/09.<sup>5</sup> Guinea was rated in the 2010 IIAG, as being among the bottom half of African countries in relation to accountability and corruption, even though the situation had improved by 12.4 percentage points from the 2009 assessment.<sup>6</sup> Corruption was rampant during the long reign of Conté, and in 2009, Guinea was ranked 168th out of 180 on the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), a position it had occupied since 2006. The CPI ranking further deteriorated in 2010 to 164th out of 178 (Transparency International)—a reflection of the political turmoil already discussed. Guinea also rated poorly (among the bottom third) of the 2010 IIAG's indicators on freedom of association;<sup>7</sup> this suggests that political competition was stunted. Furthermore, Guinea became ranked among the bottom African countries in connection with the "effective power to govern" and "electoral self determination" indicators of the 2010 IIAG.<sup>8</sup> Guinea was not listed on the Global Peace Index (GPI) from 2007 to 2010, but included in the 2011 compilation of the index, which ranked it 92nd out of 153.

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate for 2007 was estimated at 1.5 percent. This grew to 4.7 percent in 2008, but plunged to minus 3.5 percent in 2009, before appreciating to 3 percent at the close of 2010.<sup>9</sup> The economic downturn from the global financial crisis, and inarguably, other factors reeling from the political instability of the passing of President Conté in December 2008 that ushered in a military junta led by Camara all played their part. Noticeably, the successful completion of the presidential elections in December 2010 also reflected in the positive figure at the close of 2010. The international community, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and the Group of Eight Nations (G8) had earlier revised their development funding, and other plans for Guinea, because of the Camara military government.

Guinea has natural potential in bauxite (of which it possesses up to half of the world's reserves), gold, diamond, iron ore, uranium, hydroelectric power, and agricultural products such as fish, coffee, fruit, and meat. Exports comprise of products from the developed areas of potential such as bauxite and alumina (which contribute 80 percent of Guinea's foreign exchange),<sup>10</sup> gold, diamond, fish, and beverages. The economy therefore relies heavily on mining. Agriculture engages up to 80 percent of the labor force but the lack of sophistication means that it contributed only 24.2 percent of 2009's GDP. The services sector contributed 37.3 percent to GDP, and industry (most of which is mining) contributed the remaining 38.5 percent in that same year.<sup>11</sup> With a purchasing power parity of just \$10.48 billion in 2009,<sup>12</sup> Guinea's meagre earnings are usually spent on the bare necessities of fuel and other petroleum products, industrial, transport, and other mechanical equipment, clothing, and food.

Although 14.6 percent of the small GDP was spent on investment in 2009,<sup>13</sup> this is never sufficient for infrastructural and other strategic areas of development, especially if governance over the national pot suffered from the corruption of the Conté years. Consequently, the UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI) rated Guinea 170th out of 182 in 2009, and 156th out of 169 in 2010.<sup>14</sup> According to the 2010 HDR, more than half of the population of Guinea is poor,<sup>15</sup> and the rate of multidimensional poverty is as high as 81 percent.<sup>16</sup> The 2010 IIAG also rated Guinea among the bottom ten African countries (45th out of 53) in terms of human development.<sup>17</sup>

### *New Security Challenges*

#### *HIV/AIDS*

Fortunately, the prevalence of killer diseases (including the HIV/AIDS pandemic) is minimal in Guinea, hence despite the low HDI, life expectancy was estimated in 2009 as 57.6 years on the average.<sup>18</sup> In 2006, the adult (15–49) prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS was 1.5 percent among a population of 9.4 million, of which life expectancy was 55 years for women and 52 years for men, and of which 7,200 died from the pandemic in a country that was rated 156th during that year on the HDI.<sup>19</sup> The HIV/AIDS prevalence rate has more or less stabilized in Guinea: 1.5 percent in 2005 and 1.6 percent in 2008,<sup>20</sup> and 1.3 percent in 2009.<sup>21</sup>

#### *Food Security*

Most people in Guinea are farmers, who are altogether accountable for the production of the rice, coffee, pineapples, palm kernels, cassava, bananas,

sweet potatoes and meat from cattle, sheep, goats, and poultry, but the country has to import grain and other foodstuffs annually. FAO data show that 16 percent of the population are undernourished, 26 percent of children are malnourished and underweight, while 30 percent of children have stunted growth.<sup>22</sup>

## **Gabon**

Gabon has been more or less a one-party state until 2009, and the modern history of Gabon is synonymous with the name Bongo. Omar Bongo was president in 1967 for 42 years, and has been replaced by his son Ali Bongo. After Omar's passing on June 8, 2009, Ali won the multiparty elections of August 30, 2009 with the overt support of France, and to the chagrin of any existing opposition to the Bongo status quo. French influence in Gabon is blatant, as are also corruption, bad governance, and a weak economy, despite the country's oil, uranium, gold, and productive agriculture. A new but fragile chapter of multiparty democracy began in 2009.

### ***Historical and Political Context***

French explorer Pierre Savorgnan de Brazza visited the area in 1875 and became governor by the time France had occupied it in 1885, the same year that the Partition of Africa was finalized.<sup>23</sup> Gabon assumed a distinctive territory among French Equatorial Guinea in 1910 and became an independent republic on August 17, 1960 with Leon M'ba as the elected president of the 1961 election. French funding and interference in M'ba's election campaign ensured his victory as well as the preservation of French timber and mining interests. The extent of French interference was demonstrated when paratroopers flew from France in January 1964 to upset a military coup plotted against M'ba for trying to impose a one-party dictatorship. Subsequently, a French military base was established in Gabon on a permanent basis.

On M'ba's passing in 1967, he was replaced by his diminutive Vice President Omar Bongo, who with French partnership, perpetuated the one-party rule even further, with micro-managed dictatorship. In addition to being President, he was at the same time the Minister of Defense from 1967 to 1981, Minister of Information from 1967–1980, Minister of Planning from 1967–1977, Minister of Interior 1967–1970, and Prime Minister 1967–1975, during which period he and his ruling Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG) had become fully entrenched in Gabon. It was not until the December 1979 elections that he gave up some of his ministerial positions including being Prime Minister. However, as president, he manipulated the politics from a

strategically close distance, with the help of the permanent French military base that consistently quelled opposition attempts to oust him, particularly from 1990.

Notwithstanding the circumstances, something about the rigour of whatever opposition existed, ensured the enactment of a new constitution from March 1991 that ushered in multiparty elections in 1993. In this election, Omar only managed to scrape through with a 51.4 percent win, which was immediately followed by opposition strikes, and subsequently a government of national unity brokered by the Paris Accords of November 1994 that also failed to work. The subsequent 1996 and 1997 legislative and municipal elections re-sparked multiparty politics, and regained some lost momentum for the PDG, although the mayors elected in the key and major cities such as Libreville, were all opposition mayors. But by some amount of co-optations and buying-offs, Omar Bongo managed to consolidate enough power to get him reelected as president in 1998.

Judging from the lessons he had learnt from these democratic ordeals, and the paranoia from a potential future loss, he reentered the dictatorial-perpetuation mode of the 1960–1980 period. Hence in 2003, Omar successfully fiddled with the Gabonese constitution and imposed unlimited number of presidential terms, so that he got reelected to a third consecutive seven-year term from November 27, 2005. The opposition parties therefore saw Omar's passing in 2009 as a chance to change the status quo, but against such a heavily tilted playing field, and of course French overt support for his son Ali Bongo, the opposition parties were unable to turn the tide in the August 2009 election that was declared by both local and international observers, and particularly ECOWAS, as "meeting international standards." Ali who was Foreign Minister in his father's government from 1989 to 1991, Minister of Defence from 1999 to 2009, and a PDG vice president, won 42 percent of the national vote that got him sworn in as president on October 16, 2009. In most francophone African countries such as in Togo, Congo Brazzaville, and Guinea under Conté, there is just one round of elections.

Dating from the days of M'ba, French complicity in the successful perpetuation of Gabonese presidents is not only demonstrated in military support but also by the wealth of the Bongos stored in France. In May 2009, the BBC reported that Transparency International in France had alleged that Omar Bongo and two other African leaders had used African public funds to acquire properties in Paris.<sup>24</sup> But a French appeals court ruled that the activists could not act against foreign heads of state, including Dennis Sassou-Nguesso of Congo-Brazzaville and Teodoro Obiang Nguema of Equatorial Guinea. Earlier in February 2009, the French authorities had frozen Omar Bongo's bank accounts in France, in connection with the case of jailed French businessman Rene Cardona, who was later freed after Ali Bongo paid



\$580,000 into Omar Bongo's account. This payment was subsequently ruled as illegal in September 2009. An estimated 4 million dollars in French bank accounts reportedly belong to Omar Bongo. It is interesting to note that the late Omar Bongo was married to the late Edith Lucie Sassou-Nguesso, the daughter of current Congolese president Nguesso. French natural resource interest in Gabon is concentrated on oil, manganese, iron, and timber.

Gabonese are largely Bantus, even if they comprise of some 40 Bantu tribes. The Fang are the largest and make up about 30 percent of the population of 1.5 million people,<sup>25</sup> of which some 12,000 are French, including the 2,000 dual nationals. The Bongos are from an insignificant Bateke tribe. Fortunately, ethnicity does not play a significant role in Gabonese politics, hence it is safe to say that the Bongo followership is purely political patronage built up over the years, but which seem to be eroding for a variety of reasons including feelings of anti-hegemony.

Gabon's political history does not include a consistent or coherent opposition party. However, Ali Bongo polling just 42 percent of the August 2009 presidential election is a strong indication that a significant proportion of the country is opposed to the Bongo hegemony, and that the political space and opportunity that was created within just two months of Omar Bongo's demise had made room for serious challenge to the status quo. Coupled with a more tolerant political landscape in Ali Bongo's presidency, there was potential for a coherent opposition to emerge, and the next election would definitely be competitive. Some sections of the opposition denounced Ali Bongo's legal victory. On January 27, 2011, Andre Mba Obame who obtained 25.9 percent of the 2009 presidential vote as an independent candidate, and subsequently formed an opposition National Union party, declared himself as president and announced a parallel cabinet of 19 ministers, along the lines of the December 2010 postelectoral impasse in Cote d'Ivoire. Obame and his chosen cabinet then sought refuge at the UN compound in Libreville. The Gabonese interior ministry immediately dissolved his National Union party for high treason.

### *International Political Economy*

Gabon has not been doing too well on the IIAG, with worsening rankings in recent years: 23rd in 2000/01 and 2003/04; 25th in 2001/02, 2002/03, 2004/05, 2006/07, and 2007/08; 30th in 2005/06; and 27th in 2008/09.<sup>26</sup> Gabon was ranked among the very bottom countries in connection with accountability of public officials, and 42nd out of 53 in terms of overall accountability and corruption.<sup>27</sup> The extensive patronage to the late Omar Bongo ensured that Gabon rated among the very bottom countries in terms of freedom of speech and press;<sup>28</sup> clearly, the local reportage was not minded

to castigate the largesse of the former president. The country's previous fairly impressive GPI record took a plunge in 2010 to 74th out of 149, and worsened to 81st out of 153 in 2011, in comparison with 51st out of 144 in 2009, 55th out of 140 in 2008, or 56th out of 121 in 2007. This results from a combination of existing tensions that surfaced after the demise of Omar Bongo in June 2009, plus the opposition's frustration for their inability to replace the status quo during the opportunity afforded by the August 2009 presidential election, which instead brought Ali Bongo into office.

The country is naturally endowed with petroleum, timber, manganese, uranium, gold, and agricultural products such as cocoa, coffee, sugar, palm oil, rubber, cattle, and fish. Consequently, the exports consist of the items that fetch much income, such as crude oil—70 percent of all export earnings,<sup>29</sup> timber, manganese, and uranium. Imports include construction, industrial, transport and other capital equipment, foodstuffs, medicines, and other chemical needs. Real GDP growth rate, which was estimated at 5.6 percent in 2007, plummeted to 1.1 percent in 2008, and further to minus 1 percent in 2009<sup>30</sup> because of the effects of the global economic downturn, but recovered to 5.4 percent in 2010<sup>31</sup> even while a large part of the globe remained in recession. Again, this may be explained as a post-Omar Bongo influence—a rejuvenation of business and other prospects in the hope that corruption had subsided after the passing of Omar Bongo. Gabon's CPI rating was 106th out of 180 in 2009, and 110th out of 178 in 2010. As reflects the state of corruption, wealth and stealth have consistently been in the hands of patronage, and human development has suffered as a consequence. Gabon received an HDI rating of 103rd out of 182 in 2009; and 93rd out of 169 in 2010.

### ***New Security Challenges***

#### *HIV/AIDS*

In 2006, the adult prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS was 7.9 percent among a population of 1.4 million, from which 4,700 died of the pandemic, amidst a life expectancy of average 57 years, in a country that received a HDI rating of 123rd for that year.<sup>32</sup> The prevalence rate reduced to 5.9 percent in 2007. Life expectancy in 2010 was 53 years average.<sup>33</sup>

### **Congo-Brazzaville**

The Congo-Brazzaville is the country with a one-party state virus as the essential ingredient of the time bomb ticking. It has been a one-party state since independence, with a political history dominated by the current president.

Levels of corruption and mismanagement are very high, leading to a weak economy despite the country's oil wealth. The main security challenge is from within, along with food insecurity. The administration is struggling with handling the recent reoccurrence of poliomyelitis since October 2010 that appears to be part of the remaining and usually difficult 1 percent of the disease to eradicate from the planet. HIV/AIDS is also difficult to handle even if it is not as prevalent as in Southern Africa.

### ***Historical and Political Context***

Like Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville was part of the area that was visited in 1875 by the French explorer Pierre Savorgnan de Brazza, and in whose honour the capital was named, as Brazzaville. The area was a French colony by the time the Partition was finalized in 1885, and formed one of four territories that made up French Equatorial Africa in 1910 with modern Gabon, Central African Republic, and Chad, until the wave of anticolonial nationalism swept the colony into independence on August 15, 1960 under the leadership of Fulbert Youlou as the first president. Characteristic of his fellow nationalist leaders across the continent during this period, he tried to impose his political group, The Democratic Union for the Defense of African Interests (UDDIA), as the sole party. But he failed to maintain governance under his grip, and was eventually toppled on August 15, 1963 by an intense three day uprising that was cooked by civilians such as trade unionists, rival politicians, and youth group(s), and finalized by the army. Unlike his Gabonese counterpart, he was denied the French military support he requested. This was rather unfortunate for Youlou because his regime was obsequious to France.

In an interesting arrangement, the army propped up a new leader in the person of Alphonse Massamba-Débat who was Chair of the National Council of the Revolution (NCR), as Prime Minister. In the four month period that followed, both army and puppet supervised the drafting of a new constitution, and organized elections for Massamba-Débat to win, thereby making him president on December 19, 1963 for a five-year term. But Massamba-Débat was no different from Youlou, in that, he re-ushered the country into a one-party state with his NCR until he was overthrown on September 4, 1968, shortly before his term of office would expire. Being bankrupt of an ideology to drive the nation forward, Massamba-Débat adopted scientific socialism and sought to match this ideological drive with whichever alliances were both ideologically and geographically opposite to the West, leading to the establishment of relationships with far eastern entities such as China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and of course the Soviet Union, even if these entities were not practising scientific socialism themselves.

*First Coming of Nguesso*

Having successfully placed the country on the path of a single-party state, Massamba-Débat suffered the same fate he meted out to his predecessor, and was overthrown in August 1968 through a coup d'état that eventually installed Marien Ngouabi the head of the National Revolutionary Movement (NRM) as President on December 31, 1968. Ngouabi turned the NRM into the current Congolese Labour Party (PCT), but a palace coup from a military committee within the party, led by the current president Dennis Sassou Nguesso assassinated him on March 18, 1977 and temporarily replaced him with another puppet, Colonel Joachim Yhomby-Opango as president of the republic, who headed an 11-member interim government known as the Military Committee of the Party (CMP), with Sassou Nguesso as vice president and defense minister. As the Sassou-Nguesso scheming continued, the PCT's Central Committee accused President Yhomby-Opango of deviating from party lines, and removed him from office on February 5, 1979, replacing him with the real person behind the schemes—Sassou Nguesso. The PCT's Third Extraordinary Congress that elected Nguesso as president of the PCT's Central Committee, also elected Nguesso as President of the Republic. Nguesso was therefore no one's puppet but his own, and maintained his position until 1992.

Just like Omar Bongo of Gabon, who introduced multiparty politics in Gabon under heavy pressure from 1990 to 1993, Nguesso followed suit but encountered hard luck, as his attempt to get rid of the one-party state virus became his undoing. Nguesso introduced multiparty politics in 1990 but lost in the ensuing 1992 presidential elections conducted under his own watch, which then ostracized him firmly into the political wilderness of Opposition Leader for the next five years, while Pascal Lissouba, head of the Pan-African Union for Social Democracy (UPADS) became president.

*Second Coming of Nguesso: Perpetuating One Party Rule*

True to the tradition of his predecessors, Nguesso therefore had no choice but to resort to what he knows best, a pedigree that dates back to what ousted Fulbert Youlou the first president, the military solution, to overthrow Pascal Lissouba who was president during Nguesso's Opposition days. As it unfolded, the multiparty elections scheduled for July 1997 never occurred because tensions between the two competing parties (of Lissouba and Nguesso) spiralled into six months of civil war, during which Nguesso gained the upper hand with the help of Angolan military forces in October 1997. Nguesso resumed power, as president on October 15, 1997, but subsequently had to live by the sword, and deal with several rebel groups in 1998 and 1999. Eventually, his father-in-law and fellow ideologue, President Omar Bongo, came to his rescue to negotiate a ceasefire known as the December

1999 Accords with some of the rebel groups loyal to Pascal Lissouba, to allow for a transitional period of three years, during which Nguesso and the opposing forces should dialogue and agree a peace deal.

But owing to the hard lessons learnt from the past, Nguesso assumed more sophisticated one-party instincts, and managed to stifle his opponents to the point that despite an agreed new constitution of 2001, and a successful referendum of January 2002, the March 10, 2002 presidential elections had no competitors. In December 2001, Nguesso tried Pascal the former president in absentia for treason and corruption, which disenfranchized him from competing in March 2002. The other candidate, André Ntsatouabantou Milongo who was Prime Minister from June 1991 to August 1992, and headed the National Transitional Council that drafted the 2001, also withdrew his candidacy three days to election day. Nguesso, effectively the sole candidate, won 90 percent of the votes cast and was sworn in as president on August 14, 2002 for a seven year term. Nguesso also won the July 2009 presidential ballot with a 78.61 percent win, in an election that was boycotted by whatever form of Opposition existed, in that, Lissouba was out of the country, former Prime Minister Kolelas was dead, and Yhombi-Opango did not matter.

### *Amnesties*

When Nguesso became an “elected” president in 2009, after which period he perhaps felt more secure (in his single-party element), he initiated a parliamentary amnesty bill to pardon Pascal who had been exiled since his 2001 conviction in absentia. This move was similar to another window dressing gesture that granted former Prime Minister Kolelas an amnesty on November 23, 2005 to return to the country from exile, after being sentenced to death on May 4, 2000. In May 2007, former Prime Minister Joachim Yhombi-Opango was also granted amnesty (by the Council of Ministers) for a conviction in absentia during May 2001 for an alleged improper sale of oil while in office.

### *The Perpetual Reign of Nguesso*

According to the January 2002 constitution, which still remains in force, Nguesso is scheduled to remain president until August 13, 2016. It remains to be seen how he would expire: whether by the sword of a coup d'état, or by the one-party state.

### *International Political Economy*

Characterized by repressive governance and economic mismanagement, Congo-Brazzaville's IIAG rankings have been consistently low: 45th in 2000/01 and 2001/02; 40th in 2002/03 and 2007/08; 41st in 2003/04,

2004/05, 2005/06 and 2008/09; and 39th in 2006/07.<sup>34</sup> The 2010 IIAG ranked Congo among the bottom countries with serious issues about the safety of the person, 42nd out of 53 in terms of personal safety, and 43rd out of 53 in the safety and rule of law category,<sup>35</sup> which suggests that it is not in one's interest to pursue political opposition against the all powerful and perpetuating Nguesso. Congo also rated among the bottom six in terms of accountability and corruption.<sup>36</sup> For obvious reasons already discussed, Nguesso's Congo-Brazzaville did not rate highly in connection with national security problems.

The country's natural potential lies mainly in petroleum, timber, agriculture and some minerals. Consequently, exports are in the form of petroleum—which contributed 89 percent of export earnings in 2008,<sup>37</sup> lumber, plywood, sugar, cocoa, coffee, and diamonds. From March 2006 when the country became designated by the IMF and World Bank as a Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC), the GDP plummeted to minus 1.6 percent in 2007, before recovering significantly to 5.6 percent in 2008<sup>38</sup> mainly because of oil revenues that accounted for 85 percent of government revenue.<sup>39</sup> The GDP appreciated again to 7.6 percent in 2009, and 10.5 percent in 2010<sup>40</sup> despite the global economic downturn that caused the GDP of almost every country in the world to plummet. The country consumes approximately 10,000 barrels of oil per day and exports approximately 250,000 barrels per day, out of total reserves of 1.6 billion barrels; and produces natural gas locally. Imports consist mainly of construction, transport and other capital equipment, and food.

The level of corruption under President Nguesso has been extremely high. Hence Congo-Brazzaville's CPI ratings were 162nd out of 180 in 2009, and 154th out of 178 in 2010. Insufficient levels of strategic development at the relevant sectors of the economy has contributed to Congo's 2009 HDI rating of 136th out of 182, and 2010 rating of 126th out of 169. In 2010, life expectancy was estimated at 54.5 years on average. Unimpressive human development, high levels of corruption, and political repression, have reflected in the very low GPI performances: 117th out of 140 in 2008; 106th out of 144 in 2009; and 102nd out of 149 in 2010, and a slight improvement of 98th out of 153 in 2011.

### *New Security Challenges*

#### *HIV-AIDS*

In 2006, the adult prevalence rate was 5.3 percent among a population of close to 4 million, of which 11,000 died from the pandemic during that year, and life expectancy was an average of 54 years in a country that was

rated 142nd on the HDI of that year.<sup>41</sup> The adult prevalence rate shrunk to 3.9 percent in 2008.<sup>42</sup> Life expectancy however remained at 54 years since 2006. As part of international efforts to fighting the disease, Congo-Brazzaville became one of the destination countries where “the UNAIDS Secretariat undertook several high-level advocacy missions . . . to elicit stronger political, financial and programmatic commitment to the AIDS response by engaging with people living with HIV groups and civil society as well as soliciting both bi- and multilateral support, including with the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.”<sup>43</sup> The UNAIDS Secretariat also built “local epidemiological capacity through a series of training workshops.”<sup>44</sup>

An outbreak of poliomyelitis reoccurred in which 220 died and 268 became paralyzed from October 2010 to January 2011. Three quarters of victims are reportedly between ages 15 and 30, unlike the usual infantile target. Besides the general lack of preparedness and resources for this second outbreak, the administration appeared not to have sufficient properly trained nurses to handle polio patients, or enough vaccination for the general population.<sup>45</sup>

### *Food Insecurity*

As already mentioned, agriculture is rather rudimentary and does not produce enough of the food requirements that the country needs. In 2006, agriculture contributed just 4.7 percent of GDP,<sup>46</sup> and to date, the crops produced on a sufficiently export scale (sugar/cane, cocoa, and coffee) are not food crops. Furthermore, the basic foodstuffs such as cassava, rice, corn, peanuts, and vegetables cannot sustain the local population. In short, food has to be imported, and supplies could easily be sabotaged by external manipulation. Despite bordering on food insecurity, “President Sassou-Nguesso has ceded 10 million hectares of fertile land to South-African farmers to grow staple food crops for export without any percentage to remain in Congo, alongside 70,000 hectares granted to the Italian oil company ENI to plant oil palm monoculture plantations for agrofuel production, threatening Africa’s last precious tropical primary forest.”<sup>47</sup>

## **Cameroon**

Cameroon is a time bomb ticking. Despite the serial and serious problems with neighbors, the essential ingredients that keep the Cameroonian bomb ticking are internal, and constitute four elements embedded in the country’s modern history. First, the country has had a single President since 1982, who after 22 years in the presidency, managed to get rid of the constitutional limits to the presidential terms in April 2008. Second, the Anglophone community

in Cameroon feels alienated. Third, there is a religious divide of a Muslim north and an allegedly Christian south. Fourth, corruption is endemic and systemic.

Cameroon has serious border issues with neighbors because of the oil-rich Bakassi peninsula. The country is bordered by Nigeria to the west; the Central African Republic (CAR) to the east; Chad to the northeast; and Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and the Congo-Brazzaville to the south. The first four countries listed—Nigeria, CAR, Chad and Equatorial Guinea—constitute in order of magnitude the most notable and plaguing sources of security challenges to Cameroon. Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea also host secessionist movements that are claiming territory from Cameroon. It is a difficult country to govern, with lots of conventional security issues to grapple with, plus a weak economy, even if it is not struggling with the HIV/AIDS pandemic.

### *Historical and Political Context*

Cameroon was firmly established as a German colony in 1884 before the Berlin Conference of the following year<sup>48</sup> even if it was partitioned many times after the Partition of Africa. It was wrestled out of German hands through the Treaty of Versailles signed on June 28, 1919<sup>49</sup> to establish the League of Nations Mandates resulting from the outcome of WWI, and transferred to France and Britain to administer unequal portions of it between them. The arrangement stayed that way even after the League of Nations was dissolved at the end of WWII in 1946, particularly as Germany lost this war, and the 1945 Yalta Conference<sup>50</sup> transferred all the Mandates into UN Trust Territories. In the process, the Yalta Conference discussed what to do with postwar Germany and its possessions, and decided that Cameroon should remain in the hands of the French and British.

The smaller British portion suffered a subsequent partition into Northern and Southern Cameroon until the results of the 1961 plebiscite shifted the north of the two mini British territories to Nigeria in May of the same year, and the south to the larger French portion of Cameroon in October. As Nigeria was already independent in 1960, it was a Republic of Nigeria that Northern Cameroon joined in 1961. Likewise, the larger French portion of Cameroon was already independent in 1960, but when Southern Cameroon joined in 1961, they became a Federal Republic of Cameroun, and then a United Republic of Cameroun in 1972, until finally a Republic of Cameroun in 1984. Although both French and English are official languages, the country is very much a Francophonie state. Consequently, the Commonwealth tends to defer any potential disciplinary responsibilities to La Francophonie.





On November 6, 1982, Biya succeeded Ahmadou Ahidjo the nationalist leader who led the country to its independence in 1960 with the Cameroun National Union (CNU). The CNU was the dominant party at independence, and has more or less remained so because it was renamed in 1985 as the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM) and has been the ruling party since then; it was also the only legal political party until 1990. While Ahidjo was President, Biya became Prime Minister from June 30, 1975, and automatically assumed the role of President on November 6, 1982 when Ahidjo took brief medical leave that led to his abdication or resignation on November 4. Although Ahidjo remained the CNU's leader after his resignation, irreconcilable differences developed between him and Biya that forced him into exile in France, from where he resigned his CNU leadership, thereby handing Biya the full reins of the party. Biya has since remained leader of this party, which he renamed as CPDM.

Unlike Guinea and Congo-Brazzaville—two Francophonie countries that have been characterized by political instability, Cameroun has been very stable under the leadership of Paul Biya, who has been President for 29 consecutive years. Also, unlike Egypt, where clear frustrations have erupted against President Mubarak's *longue durée* or the scheming to be replaced with his son Gamal Mubarak, it is not clear in the case of Cameroun what about the familiarity of Biya's long tenure breeds the contempt, apart from the fact that a certain unease dwells within the political undercurrent. The obvious candidates such as: (a) the religious north-south divide; (b) the Anglophone-Francophone restiveness, and; (c) the systemic bad governance, all seem to constitute fringe factors to Biya's security, in that, none of these factors have impinged on his tenure of office or even his personal security. Hence, for a man who is currently 78 years old, he could remain President for as long as he is fit. Ethnicity is not an issue in Cameroon. The three faultlines listed above are discussed below.

### *The North-South Divide*

Ahmadou Ahidjo, the first President, was a Muslim from the north, and of the Fulani tribe. Even though it was thought that Maigari Bello Bouba, his fellow Muslim from the north, would replace him, the nod rather went to Biya, who has subsequently co-opted Bouba into his "unitary" government, even if Bouba remains the head of the National Union for Democracy and Progress (NUDP/UNDP) and has already announced his candidacy for the October 2011 presidential election. There are large numbers of Muslims in all the regions of Cameroun, however they dominate the north of the country. Of the 20 million Cameroonian population,<sup>51</sup> some 14 percent are Fulani and Muslims who occupy the northern sahelian and central highlands.

There are also said to be significant Islamic conversions taking place among the largely animistic Kirdi who make up 18 percent of the total population and also occupy the desert and central highlands. When Ahidjo abdicated in November 1982, Muslim elements among the Republican Guard who expected a Bouba succession failed to hide their consternation, and began plotting a coup. Biya got wind of it and disbanded the Republican Guard on April 5, 1984. The Muslim elements who had been wrong-footed, implemented their ill-hatched plot a day after the disbandment, which proved abortive. Hence there remains discontented Muslim elements within the national army.

### *The Anglophone-Francophone Restiveness*

This predicament stems from the following developments. John Fru Ndi heads what seems to be the mainstream opposition or the Social Democratic Front (SDF), based largely in what can be termed as the Anglophone region of the country. From when Southern Cameroon joined the Republic in October 1961, this Anglophone community has been restive over what it sees as “over-centralization” or relative discrimination from central government, hence the constant agitation for greater decentralization. However, the more antagonistic tussle emanates from outside of mainstream politics, and literally from hard line secessionist movements. As soon as the republic’s one-party status was lifted and multiparty politics began in 1990, the Anglophone pressure groups began to agitate for the secession of the former Southern Cameroon that joined the larger French territory in October 1960, and for their secessionist territory to be called The Republic of Ambazonia.

Although the Ambazonia Restoration Council (ARC) that was formed in 1984 evolved into the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC) and declared the territory as an independent state on December 31, 1999, this is not recognized by the UN, and therefore the territory officially remains under the Republic of Cameroon’s jurisdiction. A movement in exile generated the Ambazonia Liberation Party (ALIP) in July 2004, and subsequently in 2005 joined the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) that was formed in the Hague on February 11, 1991. Notable UNPO members that have successfully achieved independence are East Timor, Georgia, Latvia, Estonia, and Armenia; all are recognized by the UN. In characteristic fashion with secessionist movements, a Southern Cameroons Peoples Organization (SCAPO) formally proclaimed the Republic of Ambazonia as independent on August 31, 2006, to include the disputed territory of Bakassi. The secessionist pressure groups SCAPO, ALIP, SCNC operate from neighboring Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, as well as the Republic of Cameroon itself, all

of which would share sea boundaries if the secessions became successful. Fon Gorji-Dinka who appears to be a front man for the Ambazonia secessionist movements, filed a suit with a Bamenda High Court<sup>52</sup> and won a UN Human Rights Tribunal ruling in 2005 that said he should be compensated for suffering human rights abuses.<sup>53</sup>

### *The Systemic Bad Governance*

From when Biya became President in 1982, he conducted elections in 1984 and 1988, both of which he was the single candidate. In order to avoid further ridicule, he introduced multiparty elections in 1990 and conducted elections in 1992, 1997, and 2004, all of which were classed as flawed by international observers. The 1996 constitutional amendment to the country's 1972 constitution instituted a seven year presidential term. The subsequent 1997 elections disallowed an independent electoral commission, and the opposition parties boycotted it. A National Elections Observatory (NEO) was formed by Parliament in December 2000 that conducted the parliamentary and municipal (local) elections of 2002 and 2007, respectively, as well as the 2004 presidential elections, all of which were noted with several irregularities. Despite the heavily tilted uneven playing field, Biya could only muster 70.2 percent of the national vote. A subsequent independent body—Elections Cameroon (ELECAM) was created in December 2006, of which ten out of the 12 members are appointees from Biya's CDPM.

The 180-member National Assembly has a five year term but meets just three times in a year, and does nothing more than endorse whatever form of legislation ventures from the executive. Due to the relative decrease of Biya's 2004 electoral performance (compared with 1992 and 1997), the National Assembly endorsed in April 2008 Biya's constitutional propositions to eliminate limits to the presidential terms of office, even though the next presidential election was scheduled for October 2011. Note that the 1996 constitutional amendments only allowed for the presidential term to be renewed just once. The 1996 constitutional amendments also established a second tier of Parliament (the Senate) to comprise 100 members, which has never met. The judicial system is controlled by government at all levels. The Supreme Court is packed with the President's appointees. Membership to the High Court of Justice is elected by the existing and useless Parliament. Traditional chiefs including Fons and Fulani rulers are allowed to govern but within the law. Biya was the OAU Chair from July 8, 1996 to July 2, 1997: perhaps his landslide victories in 1992 and 1997 may have accrued some political capital toward his continental image at that time, which has now dimmed.

### *International Political Economy*

Judging from the above political background, Cameroon's IIAG performance is not a surprise: 35th in 2000/01, 2005/06 and 2006/07; 36th in 2001/02, 2003/04, and 2004/05; and 34th in 2002/03, 2007/08, and 2008/09.<sup>54</sup> Cameroon rated among the very bottom African countries in terms of electoral self-determination, and 43rd out of 53 in the participation and human rights category.<sup>55</sup> Also, Cameroon's CPI rating in 2009 was 146th out of 180 (along with Zimbabwe, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Russia and Ukraine); and 146th out of 178 in 2010. Cameroon is richly endowed with natural resources, from which agricultural and mineral related activity contribute to half of GDP; the remaining half comes from the services sector. In 2009, agriculture made up 20.3 percent, industry 30.5 percent and services 49.2 percent. The main export crops are cocoa, coffee, and cotton, whereas aboriculture produces timber and rubber. Mineral related activity has to do with crude oil, petroleum products, aluminum production, and ship repair, while the other agro-based industry has to do with food processing from the crops already mentioned (mainly cocoa and coffee) and textiles from the cotton. The economy grew by 3.5 percent in 2007, 3.9 percent in 2008, and plummeted to 0.9 percent in 2009 before appreciating to 2.8 percent in 2010<sup>56</sup>—probably because of the global economic downturn.

However, something about the dynamics of bad governance, corruption, misplaced priorities, economic mismanagement, conflict, and other contentious issues within the country ensure that development is lacking in priority areas. According to the U.S. State Department, “despite boasting a higher GDP per capita than either Senegal or Ghana, Cameroon lags behind these two countries in important socioeconomic indicators, including health and education.”<sup>57</sup> Cameroon's HDI rating was 153rd out of 182 in 2009, and 131st out of 169 in 2010. The 2009 HDR also stated that at the end of 2008, up to 7,800 people had been internally displaced as a result of conflict;<sup>58</sup> and the 2010 GPI report rated Cameroon 54th among “countries ranked according to their combined number of refugees and IGPs per 100,000 people.”<sup>59</sup> The lack of human development also registered on the GPI where there was a consistent decline: 76th out of 121 in 2007; 92nd out of 140 in 2008; 95th out of 144 in 2009; and 106th out of 149 in 2010; until a respite improvement of 86th out of 153 was registered on the 2011 peace index. Cameroon was noted by the 2010 GPI report as one of the “African countries that have become significantly less peaceful since 2007.”<sup>60</sup> Cameroon also rated among the bottom half of the 2010 IIAG in terms of human rights and participation issues.

### *New Security Challenges*

Cameroon's security challenges are chiefly: (a) the recurrent or ongoing insecurity issues with neighbors such as Nigeria (regarding the Bakassi Peninsula), CAR, Chad, and Equatorial Guinea; (b) the brewing and recurrent internal conflicts amidst bad governance; and (c) handling HIV/AIDS. Let us first deal with the neighborly issues.

#### *Nigeria*

The Bakassi Peninsula region has massive oil potential and became a source of conflicts, and eventually a border dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon that lasted some 15 years, until an arbitration by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in 2002 that the region should be handed over to Cameroon. Despite the ruling, armed and insurgent groups have taken advantage of the inadequate security in the area, to conduct abductions and acts of piracy. In the ongoing saga, the Cameroonian government on April 6, 2009 announced plans to address and take forward the border issues of Bakassi, a move which culminated in a June 17, 2009 meeting brokered between Nigeria and Cameroon by the UN Secretary General (UNSG) Ban Ki Moon over the demarcation of the common border and the final steps to handing over the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon. This also paved the way for a subsequent meeting of the joint border commission between the two countries, to proceed along the lines of what was mandated by the ICJ in 2002. The following chronology of selected episodes and events provide a snapshot of the insecurity and instability.

- Previous clashes with the Nigerian government forces over oil-rich Bakassi resulted in the killing of 21 Cameroonian troops on November 13, 2007. Suspicion fell on the Nigerian authorities who quickly denied their involvement, until a group calling themselves Liberators of Southern Cameroon People (LSCP) claimed responsibility. The LSCP's quest was self determination for the peninsula region. Earlier, the Nigerian Senate had ruled that the handover of oil-rich Bakassi to Cameroon was illegal, stating that "no part of Nigeria could be ceded without changing the constitution"<sup>61</sup> although the ICJ arbitration in 2002 ruled that Bakassi should go to Cameroon in order to resolve the 15-year border dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon.
- From January 18 to 19, 2008, armed clashes continued in the Akwaya border province of the Bakassi Peninsula between the Oliti community tribesmen in Cameroon and Yive community tribesmen from Nigeria,

during which ten people were killed.<sup>62</sup> SCAPO had earlier written to the Nigerian President on January 11, 2008 that “they would embark on armed conflict if Nigeria hands over the Bakassi Peninsula to the French Cameroon . . . the Nigerian government should allow them to determine their fate on the issue of cession of the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon.”<sup>63</sup>

- The Bakassi Freedom Fighters (BFF) attacked a French oil vessel on October 31, 2008 and took ten hostages who were subsequently released on November 11, 2008 in exchange for 13 Niger Delta rebels previously detained by the Cameroonian forces; this at least suggests Nigerian complicity in the peninsula’s affairs. Hence on November 21, 2008, President Biya discussed military assistance concerning the Bakassi peninsula with France that led to the signing of a new defence agreement with French Foreign Minister when the latter visited Cameroon during May 20–22, 2009.<sup>64</sup> In the absence of a grip on the Bakassi peninsula by the Cameroonian authorities, Ebi Dari the BFF Commander threatened on December 12, 2008 with a 15-day ultimatum to renew attacks on oil vessels if audience was not given to the BFF regarding negotiations for self-determination over the peninsula.<sup>65</sup>
- On January 24, 2009, the ICG reported that “pirates” attacked Greek vessels in Cameroonian territorial waters, and one person was killed in the process.<sup>66</sup>
- On March 14, 2009, the ICG reported that “unidentified men” kidnapped six foreign oil workers off the Bakassi peninsula. A government announcement of their release two days later was greeted with skepticism, mainly because previous captives were still in captivity. On July 19, 2009, four foreign oil workers were freed after three months in captivity; it was reported that some seven others were still held captive, and that the captors were the BFF.<sup>67</sup>
- Three Fillipinos and one Ukrainian who were workers of the Tidewater service company were freed on July 19, 2009 after three months in captivity.<sup>68</sup>
- On August 3, 2009 Cameroonian forces shot dead four armed men thought to be linked to the Niger Delta militants off the Cameroonian coast.<sup>69</sup>
- On August 11, 2009, BFF Commander Ebi Dari resigned over what was reported as infighting.<sup>70</sup>
- On October 10, 2009, the Cameroonian forces killed four pirates, took three as prisoners, seized a stash of weapons, and destroyed their speedboat when the pirates attacked a fishing vessel off the Bakassi Peninsula.<sup>71</sup>

- On December 19, 2009 the BFF claimed responsibility for a waterborne attack on a police convoy which killed one officer, as reported by the ICG.<sup>72</sup>
- On February 24, 2010, clashes ensued in the Bakassi Peninsula, as reported by the ICG. The Cameroonian government's elite Rapid Battalion Force for Delta attended to intervene but 24 civilians were injured in the process. The government therefore effected the conviction of 19 soldiers of the elite force on March 19, 2010 for their "acts of brutality against civilians."<sup>73</sup>
- On March 15, 2010, the African Marine Commando captured seven Chinese sailors and released them three days later. The ICG reported that the same commando gang are suspected to have captured a Nigerian boat with two crew on board on March 27, 2010.<sup>74</sup>
- On May 24, 2010, the Russian Ambassador began talks with the owner of the Russian North Spirit vessel, and pirates connected to the Nigerian based Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), in connection with the capture of the vessel's Russian captain Boris Tersintsev and Chief Engineer Officer Igor Shumik on May 16, 2010 while the ship was anchored in the Cameroon port of Douala.<sup>75</sup>

### *CAR*

On June 24, 2007, suspected rebels from CAR killed one person and seized 22 others in Landou and Ouro Kessoum in north-eastern Cameroon. Reports indicate that "A week earlier gunmen had taken 15 people hostage in a similar attack in the same area, but the victims managed to escape when their captors got drunk and fell asleep."<sup>76</sup> The Cameroonian forces designated a Rapid Intervention Brigade for eastern Cameroon, to combat incidents of insecurity, at a period when the UNHCR had noted that security problems in CAR was interfering with the refugee aid effort and contributing to refugees fleeing into Cameroon.<sup>77</sup> On August 8, 2007, UN agencies began to distribute aid to some 26,000 refugees—mostly northern Mbororo cattle herders who have fled from CAR into northern and eastern Cameroon.<sup>78</sup>

Insecurity issues with CAR keep surfacing from time to time, as it was reported in November 2009 that 12 people had died during a spate of 19 criminal attacks staged by gangs "composed of Cameroonian rebels and disgruntled soldiers from Chad and the CAR."<sup>79</sup> As a result, cross-border insecurity and transnational crime featured topmost during talks held between Biya and CAR President François Bozizé from December 7 to 8, 2009. On March 18, 2009 UNHCR High Commissioner António Guterres reported an increase in the influx of refugees from CAR into



eastern Cameroon, and made a plea for more international assistance; 80,000 refugees had arrived in Cameroon since 2003.<sup>80</sup>

### *Chad*

On November 19, 2009 a Joint Security Commission convened in Maroua between Cameroon and Chad, because it was alleged that Chadian forces had earlier attacked a Cameroonian village along the Lake Chad, which had somewhat re-opened bilateral tensions between the two countries. Chad on the other hand accused Cameroon of violating the 1970 border accords. Hence the joint convention sought to allay these tensions.<sup>81</sup>

### *Equatorial Guinea*

The fragile relations with neighboring Equatorial Guinea became frayed when the Guinean army killed a Cameroonian fisherman in December 2008 for allegedly straying into their territorial waters. Cameroon responded by arresting three Equatorial Guinean soldiers in the southern Cameroonian town of Kribi, and facilitated an exchange of prisoners on January 12, 2009.<sup>82</sup>

### *The Cameroonian Political Situation*

The Cameroonian state is unsustainable for too long unless there is a drastic turn around, which is nearly impossible with the resolve of Biya to hang on to power. In addition to the historical and political context already discussed, other experts have aptly summarized that “the co-option of elites through the distribution of state largesse, and the emigration of many educated young people, provide a certain safety valve for tensions, but the failure of reform and continued poor governance mean people no longer believe in the rule of law or peaceful political change.”<sup>83</sup>

The remainder of this chapter comprises a build up of politics from a crucial point in 2007, and captures the analysis that the explosion of the Cameroonian time bomb is inevitable. Results from the July 22, 2007 local (municipal and legislative) elections showed that the ruling CDPM won over 140 seats while the Opposition CDF got just 14 out of the total 180 seats. The Opposition claimed the elections were fraudulent. Biya subsequently announced in January 2008 the constitutional amendment to extend his presidency. This announcement caused unease within the country, and generated a spate of violent protests in Yaounde, Douala, and Bamenda that lasted four days from February 24, 2008; at least 17 people were reportedly killed.<sup>84</sup> A few weeks later, human rights campaigners from the Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture (ACAT) blew the whistle that at least 100 people died from these protests.<sup>85</sup> The Opposition SDF [had] boycotted the parliamentary debate about removing the constitutional limits to Biya’s

presidency. The Supreme Court also threw out the case brought against Biya by AMEC.<sup>86</sup>

On April 17, 2008, the majority CDPM Cameroonian Parliament voted to remove the constitutional limits to Biya's rule, in order to enable him to stand as a candidate for the presidential elections in 2011. On December 30, 2008, President Biya appointed the previously nominated 11 CDPM affiliates to the 12-member ELECAM. It became clear that electoral authority had more or less been transferred from the Cameroonian Ministry of Territorial Administration (MINAT) to the ruling CDPM. Repeated calls by the Opposition SDF to suspend the nominations were rejected by the Supreme Court on January 27, 2009. Other calls from the international community, particularly the EU, to moderate the partiality of ELECAM's composition met with stiff rebuttals from the Cameroonian Foreign Minister. The EU later issued an official condemnation of the composition of ELECAM.<sup>87</sup> The Opposition SDF decided to boycott the May 20 official holiday and celebrations of national unity.<sup>88</sup>

Biya engaged in a damage limitation exercise to save the reputation of his corrupt administration, through an anti-corruption campaign dubbed Operation Sparrowhawk: (a) Paul Ngamo Hamani the former head of the national airliner was charged with embezzling over \$250m on March 17, 2009; (b) the former Ambassador to the United States and Communications Minister was also arrested and detained for embezzlement; (c) Alphonse Siyam Siwe, the Minister for Energy, was sentenced to life on June 11, 2009 for embezzling \$75m when he was the administrator of Douala port. On June 30, 2009, President Biya rounded up the exercise with a cabinet reshuffle in which he replaced Prime Minister Inoni with Philemon Yang; the portfolios of nine other ministers were also affected. After Operation Sparrowhawk, President Biya jetted off to France on July 21, 2009 for a four-day official visit; and subsequently made several other visits abroad. Over time, the international community, including the Cameroonian diaspora, became fed up with the cosmetic anti-corruption campaign amidst the impunity of bad governance. On October 13, 2009 the U.S. Ambassador to Cameroon announced in Washington DC that the U.S. government would not recognize any election organized by the government-controlled ELECAM.

In another anti-corruption campaign dubbed Operation Epervier, a number of previous and serving government officials, including Haman Adama Halimatou and Roger Ntongo Onguene, who were former ministers of the ruling CPDM, were arrested on January 6 and 8, 2010 over charges of embezzlement. Subsequently, Mboua Massock, the leader of the opposition NODYNA party was arrested in a Bamenda hotel on January 27, 2009 while he prepared to stage a protest march to highlight 12 electoral demands ahead

of the 2011 elections.<sup>89</sup> Meanwhile Bibi Ngota, a journalist who was arrested on March 10, 2010 died in custody on April 22, 2010. Human Rights groups claim “he was denied medical attention”;<sup>90</sup> and rioters who took to the streets on May 3, 2010 clashed with riot police.

### *Stifling the Press*

As internal affairs continued, the leader of the northern Cameroonian MLPC rebel group was arrested on April 22, 2009 in Nigeria for allegedly plotting to overthrow President Biya.<sup>91</sup> On August 12, 2009 the Cameroonian human rights commission issued a report condemning the arbitrary arrests made by security forces, and highlighted that prison conditions were below the expectations of human rights. But bad governance and political abuses continued across the board, especially against press freedom, in an attempt to stifle the reportage of bad governance. On October 7, 2009 the government shut down a private radio station. On December 10, 2009 a leftist editor of the *Germinal* private weekly newspaper, Jean-Bosco Talla, was arrested and taken to the State Secretariat for Defense that was also the headquarters of the military police, for questioning.<sup>92</sup> He was later charged with “tarnishing President Biya’s honour”<sup>93</sup> over an alleged deal between Biya and former President Ahidjo that featured in a 2001 report.

To summarize the state of affairs, the International Crisis Group concluded in June 2010, that:

Constitutional and legal uncertainty; rivalries between the regime’s leading figures; the government’s attempts to control the electoral process; the rupture of the political contract between leaders and the population; widespread poverty and frustration; extensive corruption; and the frustration of a large part of the army all point to the possibility of a major crisis . . . The long Biya era, his manipulation of ethnic identities and the corruption and criminality among elites have generated numerous frustrations. The serious unrest of 2008, when economic grievances, political protest and elite manipulation resulted in dozens of deaths, gives an indication of the risks of violent conflict<sup>94</sup>

### *HIV/AIDS*

Compared with other Sub-Saharan African countries, especially those in southern and east Africa, such as South Africa, Botswana, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Kenya, and Tanzania, Cameroon is much better off but not off the hook. In 2006, the adult prevalence rate was 5.4 percent within a total population of then 17.3 million people, among which life expectancy was average 50.5 years, and some 46,000 people died during that year from the HIV/AIDS pandemic in a country that rated 148th on the HDI<sup>95</sup> In 2007, the adult prevalence rate improved to 5.1 percent and some 39,000 people

died. Cameroon was noted as one of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa where it was reported that more than 30 percent of sex workers were living with HIV.<sup>96</sup> Life expectancy improved to average 54 years in 2010.<sup>97</sup>

Given that the Cameroonian administration lacks a coherent focus on the HIV/AIDS pandemic, not least because of the ensuing internal political crisis, it is fortunate that the pandemic is not as pervasive compared to Southern Africa. However, the Cameroonian government has taken due advantage of other unconventional and relatively insignificant forms of help. For example, Cameroon participated in the partnership operation by the UNAIDS Secretariat, the Universal Postal Union, the International Labour Organization and the UNI Global Union to launch an HIV prevention campaign in 660,000 post offices across the world including those in Cameroon; these post office branches displayed and distributed information material on the pandemic.<sup>98</sup> Also, during the 2010 Football World Cup, the “UNDP partnered with the Sony Corporation and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to bring health information, with a special focus on HIV, to vulnerable communities in Cameroon.”<sup>99</sup>

### *Cholera*

Aside from HIV/AIDS, there was an outbreak of cholera in June 2010 that killed 300 people. At least 2,500 had been diagnosed of the disease since it broke out. A government official had reported that 70 percent of people who live in the northernmost parts of the country and shared borders with Nigeria and Chad had no access to portable water. Incidentally, some 600 people had died of the disease in next door Nigeria.

## **Egypt**

Egypt is the non-francophone of the five countries discussed in this chapter. Egypt's time bomb was ticking with President Hosni Mubarak, who had served 30 consecutive years in the head of state capacity—the longest for any ruler of Egypt since Muhammad Ali. This terminal ingredient was the main component of the time bomb. Furthermore, as he served a fifth consecutive term in office, he preferred his son Gamal Mubarak to be his successor, even if the country achieved surprisingly consistent generous ratings on the IIAG, and HIV/AIDS is almost eradicated. The military, it seemed, were reluctant about the President's son.

Although Egypt is in both Africa and the Middle East, the country is more Middle Eastern than African in the dominant psychology of international politics. Even if it is described as the third most populous country in Africa (after Nigeria and Ethiopia),<sup>100</sup> it is incomparably the most populous

in the Middle East.<sup>101</sup> Furthermore, Egypt's geographical location is more strategic than the other Maghreb countries, and Cairo hosts the permanent Headquarters of the League of Arab States.

Egypt lives on the Nile, but owing to what is now described as water shortage, the country is grappling with socioeconomic difficulties and food insecurity. Egypt has been under pressure to renegotiate the historical agreements negotiated in Egypt's favour, in relation to the uses and sharing of the Nile river system that runs through many other countries stretching from east to north Africa.

### ***Historical and Political Context***

Egypt became a republic in June 18, 1953 during the time of Gamal Abdel Nasser, and has a somewhat different foreign policy image from the other Middle East countries; for example, Egypt was merited to attend the 2009 Group of Eight Nations (G8) Summit in Italy, and has consistently been used by G8 member states to assist with brokerage over the Middle Eastern crisis, particularly negotiations with Israel. Being a close neighbor to Israel and sharing borders with western Israel and the Gaza Strip, Egypt's current foreign policy strategy has a historical antecedent dating from when President Anwar Sadat shifted from the existing Abdel Nasser policy of confrontation with Israel, to that of peaceful accommodation through negotiations, or what led to the signing of the Camp David accords between Egypt and Israel on September 17, 1978. Egypt's further pro-western credentials can be seen in the key role played during the 1990–1991 Gulf crisis, and the war that liberated Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. Not only did Egypt deploy 35,000 troops to join the international coalition against the forces of a fellow Arab country (Iraq), but Egypt's contribution amounted to the third-largest among the coalition forces, after the United States and the UK.

### ***The Constitution and Opposition***

However, the international benefits of Egypt's foreign policy image to the West, or Mubarak's foreign policy record for that matter, have done to nothing to alleviate internal political turmoil. Apart from the unpromising state of the economy (which is discussed later), the evolution of domestic politics predicates the turmoil, and the history of Opposition to government had not been promising. Constitutional arrangements under Egypt's current semi-presidential multiparty system, is one that made for a strong executive. Even though executive power is theoretically divided between President and Prime Minister, in practical terms, the President appoints the Prime Minister, and could also appoint one or more Vice Presidents, as well as the cabinet. But

Mubarak never appointed a Vice President throughout his 30-year presidency until Omar Suleiman was handed that role on January 29, 2011, as part of a cabinet shake up in response to violent protests for Mubarak to exit the presidency. The Parliament (or People's Assembly), which runs every five years, has 454 members, ten of whom are appointed by the President, and the remainder elected by popular vote. In the November 2000 parliamentary elections, 388 seats were won by Mubarak's ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), and the remaining 34 went to opposition representatives.

A reform of the country's presidential election law was announced by Mubarak in February 2005, which for the first time in the history of Egypt since it became a Republic in 1953, paved the way for more than a single candidate to participate in the September 2005 election. But the new election law had restrictions in the criteria for filing presidential candidates. Two candidates, Ayman Nour and Numan Gumaa, successfully entered the race, even if it appears that the restrictions were designed for the likes of Nour the leader of the El Ghad Party who had campaigned for political reform to limit presidential terms to two years maximum.<sup>102</sup> The electoral restrictions worked to the disadvantage of Mubarak's competitors, and ensured his landslide victory: Mubarak won 88 percent of votes cast; Nour won 7 percent; and Gumaa 3 percent. Nour's imprisonment following the election damaged Mubarak (or Egypt's) democratic credentials even further, especially as the 2005 election had already tarnished the country's image, in that, only 25 percent of registered voters participated from 50 percent of the total 72 million population who could vote.

The Muslim Brotherhood, which has existed since 1928, is so far the largest opposition group, winning 88 seats in the 2005 parliamentary elections, and having other members as independents and local councilors. This group was legally proscribed, and relatively disenfranchised, because among the long list of 34 constitutional amendments put forward by the Parliament on March 19, 2007, religion was forbidden as a basis for political activity. The group fielded 130 candidates for the November 2010 parliamentary elections, but lost across the board, including all 88 previous seats. The December 2010 run-off produced no better results for them either. Egypt consists of 10 percent Coptic Christians, but this group is apolitical, even if they are also not immune from government intimidations. In November 2010, a partially developed church building project was demolished by the authorities on the basis that the project broke official guidelines.

A gender-sensitive legislation was passed in 2009 to expand the Parliament from 454 to 518, and increase women seats to 64 (ten to be appointed by the President), from the November 2010 parliamentary elections, even if there was no obvious indication that this should change anything in Egyptian

politics. Nor could the existing and entrenched constitutional stipulation that 50 percent of the Parliament must represent workers and peasants, be a game changer unless these proletarian and plebeian representations were from an opposition party. The Parliament itself could be dissolved by the President prior to the end of its five-year term.

The existing the second tier and consultative Shura Council has 264 members, of which a third (88) are appointed, and the remaining two thirds elected, although in practical terms, half of these elected Shura councillors run a three-year shift out of the six year maximum term for Shura members. Furthermore, governors and city mayors are appointed by central government. In the grand scheme of Egyptian politics, local council politics do not matter much.

Even before the 2010 parliamentary and 2011 presidential elections, the March 2007 amendment to cease the judicial monitoring of elections was in force, and became an obstacle to challenging electoral outcomes. The 207 constitutional amendments of March 2007 were popularly opposed, and only 27 percent of voters reportedly participated, even if the official announcement on March 27, 2007 said 75.9 percent approved of the referendum to amend the constitution. Subsequently, the opposition to the constitutional status quo built up gradually to a crescendo during the first half of 2010, especially when the news broke out that Mohamed ElBaradei, a Nobel laureate and retired head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), had presidential ambitions but was barred by the existing constitution.

To tighten the screws further, on May 11, 2010 the Egyptian government announced the extension of the Emergency Law that has dogged the country for some 29 years. This law took effect in 1981 following the assassination of President Anwar Sadat, and consists of injunctions that allow government and Egyptian security forces to arrest, detain, and imprison anyone (including political opponents) without charges or trial, for as long as they wished. Several excuses, including terrorism, have been offered for the maintenance of this law, but many citizens and critics hold the firm view that extending the law was a tool to dealing with any form of opposition to government, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood that became proscribed by the March 2007 constitutional amendments.

The widespread and firm view that the Emergency Law was intended to deal with competition to the presidential race, had created paranoia, if not paralysis, among political opponents. Hence some citizens took it upon themselves to undertake civil action and advocacy against it, and collated half a million signatures within a matter of three weeks leading up to mid-August 2010.<sup>103</sup> This exercise formed part of the build-up toward the November 2010 parliamentary elections. In September 2010, the opposition Baa'th

Party that heavily supported Mohamed ElBaradei declared its intention to boycott the elections. However, the National Coalition for Change (the coalition of young activists led by ElBaradei) progressed with their campaign toward constitutional change to allow him to stand for the elections, and had subsequently collected 120,000 paper signatures and 700,000 internet signatures by September 18, 2010.


### *Some Middle East Issues*

Alongside the democratic evolution features Egypt's handling of its role as a moderate Arab nation in the Middle East, and support to the West without appearing to be delivering support for Israel to the angst of Iran, Syria, and other anti-semitic bodies such as Hamas and Hezbollah. Egypt was accused of assisting Israel in the siege against Hezbollah in September 2010. On April 28, 2010, Egypt handed down life sentences to three men for allegedly masterminding attacks on mainland Egyptian targets; and various lighter sentences against 26 others accused of alleged involvement, even if Hezbollah was not apologetic for its role in this Egyptian resistance. It appears that Egypt avoided the usual death sentence in order to lessen animosity from neighboring Arab states. We should also note that it was only as recently as October 2010 that flights resumed between Egypt and Iran, after 30 years.

### *Media Adeptness*

Due to Egypt's long running experience at handling difficult international issues, not least in relation to the Middle East, the government has become adept at strategic media management. For example, they took sharp lessons from the media frenzy and reportage surrounding the midnight touchdown on February 24, 2010 of the former Nigerian President Yar'Adua, when he was secretly flown in from Saudi Arabia where he had been receiving treatment for pericarditis over many weeks; his Vice President was sworn in as Acting President when Yar'Adua's long absence without leave created a constitutional conundrum as to who should run the government. Hence when Mubarak flew to Germany for a gall bladder operation, and the speculation about his health caused the Egyptian stock market to fall sharply, Mubarak appeared on both national and international television on March 26, 2010 and was seen speaking with doctors. The stock market recovered just as sharply soon after the televised announcement of the President's recovery. Mubarak returned to Egypt the next day, and his return generated full media attention, to counterbalance the simultaneous and extensive media coverage of Mohammed ElBaradei's rousing welcome to Egypt following his retirement from the IAEA, and his postretirement political plans. ElBaradei's trip home received a rousing welcome because of his willingness to "run for





Map of Egypt

President”<sup>104</sup> in the 2011 elections, and not least because the opposition saw him as a formidable and credible alternative to Mubarak.

Amidst the saga of the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico and the associated rumpus that gripped global attention, the Egyptian government covered up an oil spill in Egyptian waters from the middle of June 2010, until Amr Aly the Director-General of the Hurgada Environmental Protection and Conservation Association (HEPCA) made this public on July 1, 2010.<sup>105</sup> We should also note that the government’s media strategy includes stifling press freedom and dissenting voices. In the absence of a constitutional or judicial framework governing media operations, the government decreed that from October 15, 2010, private media companies could no longer perform satellite operations such as live broadcasting, without applying for new permits. This granted government television the monopoly to upload and broadcast via satellite, and also became a strategic weapon against the opposition media in the run-up to the 2010 and 2011 elections.

As Egypt did not allow international observers during the November 2010 parliamentary elections, and independent observers were barred from polling stations, it became impossible to pass an alternative judgement on the Opposition’s allegations of fraud. However, Human Rights Watch described some activities as “controlled violence” orchestrated by the authorities who “seemed to be in charge of what happened and when”<sup>106</sup> during the elections. The overall landslide victory for the government was not a surprise to anyone: as was reported, two-thirds of citizens had been born while Mubarak had been President, and knew of no serious alternative.<sup>107</sup> The new Parliament held its first session on December 13, 2010, and the 2011 presidential election that was originally scheduled for January was postponed to September. But the government was unable to muffle the media outbreak that erupted alongside the political uproar of January 2011, and which received unprecedented international media coverage, so that the termination of Egyptian cyberspace services failed as an antidote. Even so, the Egyptian authorities detained six journalists of Aljazeera English television and their camera equipment on January 31, 2011.

### *The Nile River Co-operative Agreement*

The uses and sharing of the Nile river have assumed a thorny area of dispute. The Nile has two tributaries: the White Nile that is the longest and sourced all the way from Lake Victoria in Kenya; and the Blue Nile that is sourced from Ethiopia. What contributes to the real substance of the Nile (the water volume, alluvial, and fertile content) are traced to the Blue Nile that originates from Ethiopia and supplies 90 percent of the Nile’s water

volume and 96 percent of its alluviality, even if the longest stretch of the Nile river system is in Sudan. However, the biased and discriminatory Nile Waters Agreement signed between Britain and Egypt on May 7, 1929, when Egypt was still a British colony, gave Egypt the right of veto against projects upstream that have potential to affect Egypt's share of the water that was designated as 48 billion cubic meters annually, and 4 billion cubic meters for Sudan<sup>108</sup> that has the Blue and White Nile joining in its capital Khartoum. This share of water usage was based on the report of a commission appointed by Cairo in 1925 that provided some technical basis for the shares of usage. The 1929 accord represented or spoke for the East African countries of Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania that were also British colonies at the time, and Sudan. A subsequent agreement signed in 1959 between Britain and Egypt, which is supplementary to the 1929 agreement, and is currently in vogue, revised the share of usage to accord Egypt 55.5 billion cubic meters annually (or 87 percent of the total water flow of the Nile), and accord Sudan 18.5 billion cubic meters annually, leaving the remainder for the other countries to scuffle.

Among the many issues, Ethiopia has claimed that the source of poverty within the country is due to its inability to use the Nile, hence the Cairo Cooperation Framework was agreed between Egypt and Ethiopia in July 1993.<sup>109</sup> Furthermore, the most distant stream—and the ultimate source of the Nile—is traced to Rwanda's Nyungwe Forest. Therefore issues about who should benefit from the Nile, and by how much, have become more interesting over time. Among the full spectrum of Nile-relevant countries, the monopoly of Egypt and Sudan has been deemed as illegal, and raised acute resentment over the years, resulting in several agreements about the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) over which the Extraordinary Nile Council of Ministers (NILE-COM) of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) met on April 13, 2010 in Sharm-el-Sheikh, and where Egypt and Sudan both failed to offer their stamp of approval, even though the CFA was finalized by the NBI in Kinshasa in 2009.<sup>110</sup>

Meanwhile within the context of the impending split of Sudan into Arabic North Sudan and African South Sudan (see Chapter 5), Egypt offered to bribe South Sudan with 300 million dollars for water and electricity projects, in a supposed move to build goodwill among NBI member states<sup>111</sup> prior to the NILE-COM meeting of July 2010. The sub-regional politics made it apparent that South Sudan may not necessarily agree with Arabic Egypt and North Sudan on Nile basin issues. It is also not clear if Egypt offered any money to the remainder of the NBI countries for goodwill purposes. When NILE-COM met in Alexandria in Egypt from July 27 to 28, 2010 to discuss co-operation and the conclusive agreement,<sup>112</sup> five East African NBI countries

(Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Uganda) rejected the Egypt and Sudan stance to go back on the 2009 deal signed in Kinshasa, and gave the remaining countries a one year ultimatum to join the pact.<sup>113</sup> The NBI is a partnership of the riparian states of the Nile River<sup>1</sup> and presided over by the Council of Ministers of Water Affairs of the Nile Basin states, that seeks to develop the river in a cooperative manner, share substantial socioeconomic benefits, and promote regional peace and security. The NBI members are Egypt, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Burundi, and Ethiopia.

It will be interesting to see how the pressure on the Nile's potential pans out when each NBI country eventually assumes the license to exploit its legitimate usage and territory within the Nile basin. Even Egypt that has the largest share of Nile usage to date, deems that as insufficient for its needs, and would have to introduce severe austerity measures that would hurt vital areas of the country's economy, in particular food security. Agriculture alone accounted for 83.3 percent of Egypt's water consumption in the fiscal year 2007/08, and Egypt had already been reducing the production of water-consuming crops such as rice, just to save water. Water allocation for Egypt's strong 80 million population calculates to around 800 cubic meters of water per capita per year, which is below the water poverty line of 1,000 cubic meters per capita per year.<sup>114</sup> As a predominantly arid country, most of Egypt's geographical territory would normally receive less than 3.15 inches (or 80 mm) of moisture elements annually, apart from the coastal areas where extreme downpours could measure up to 16.1 inches (or 410 mm).

### ***International Political Economy***

It is paradoxical to see that Egypt's IIAG rankings had been improving steadily despite the quiet unrest and simmering frustration that brewed underneath the political complex. Egypt was ranked 14th in 2000/01; 16th in 2001/02 and 2004/05; 17th in 2002/03; 13th in 2003/04; 10th in 2005/06, 2007/07, and 2007/08; and 9th in 2008/09.<sup>115</sup> This paradoxical improvement in overall governance was also consistent with the GPI ratings: 73rd out of 121 in 2007; 69th out of 140 in 2008; 54th out of 144 in 2009; and 49th out of 149 in 2010. To reflect the true state of affairs with regard to political participation and the constitutional and electoral issues discussed above, Egypt was ranked among the bottom countries in terms of the "electoral self-determination" and "free and fair elections" indicators on the 2010 IIAG. This also coincided with being rated among the very bottom African countries in terms of freedom of speech and press, as well as the press freedom index.<sup>116</sup>

Egypt has natural potential in crude oil, natural gas, coal, tantalite, gold, iron ore, phosphate, salt, hydroelectricity, and agricultural products such as cotton, rice, corn, wheat, beans, fruits, vegetables, cattle, water buffalo, sheep, and goats. Consequently, industry has flourished in areas of high natural potential that have been developed, which are: petroleum products including hydrocarbons and other chemicals, metals, pharmaceuticals, cement and construction, textiles, food processing, and last but not least tourism, which boosted the services sector that contributed 48.6 percent of GDP in 2009, thanks to revenues from the Suez Canal. In this same year, agriculture (mainly on the fertile and alluvial lands along the Nile) also contributed 13.5 percent of GDP even though this involved a third of the labor force. Industry contributed the remaining 37.9 percent of GDP.<sup>117</sup> Imports are mainly industrial and capital equipment, and foodstuffs. The economy used to grow an average 7 percent each year from 2005 to 2008, and subsided in 2009 to 4.7 percent due to the global economic downturn. Egypt's 2009 HDI rating was 123rd out of 182, and 2010 rating was 101st out of 169. The heavy hand of government in the affairs of the country, coupled with insider private sector business links, contributed to the state of corruption whereby Egypt rated 111th out of 180 in the 2009 CPI; and 98th out of 178 in the 2010 CPI.

### *New Security Challenges*

Egypt's food security challenges in relation to water shortage within a new Nile usage agreement among NBI member states have already been discussed above. There are security concerns about external operatives that are not easily identifiable as either Al Qaeda or Hezbollah, as was the source of the January 1, 2011 bomb attack against Coptic Christians in Alexandria that killed at least 23 people. Coptic Christians lodged strong complaints against inadequate government security prior to the celebration of Christmas on January 7. A Muslim man was convicted for the bomb attack that killed six Christians and one Muslim on January 6—the eve of Coptic Christmas in Egypt. On January 11, one Christian was shot dead and three others were wounded in an attack on a train. As a domino effect from the December 2010 uprising in Tunisia, mass anti-government protests erupted in Cairo, Suez, Alexandria and the Nile Delta on January 25, 2011, calling for Mubarak to step down as President. Opposition figure Mohamed ElBaradei re-entered the country in the midst of these demonstrations, offered himself for leadership, and called for political reform. The headquarters of the ruling NDP was burnt down. President Mubarak's speech on January 28, and subsequent cabinet reshuffle on January 31, did not appease the popular uproar. The population, who had been deprived of internet and SMS messaging, defied

the nationwide curfew imposed by Mubarak, and publicly demanded his resignation, among other things. Mubarak's subsequent speech on February 10, which met some demands minus his resignation, stirred up a deeper mood of reprisals for the future. He resigned the next day February 11, 2011.

Following Mubarak's resignation, his assets and those of his family were frozen. He and his sons were detained and tried, with some cabinet members, and aides. The trial of the Mubaraks commenced on August 3, 2011: the former President was tried for corruption and ordering the killings of civilian protestors; his sons were tried for financial corruption. The trial of the Defense Minister also began on August 3. On May 5, 2011, the Interior Minister was jailed 12 years for profiteering and money laundering. Despite regime change, a formidable opposition party or clear alternative to the ruling political structures did not immediately emerge. A non-Mubarak ruling apparatus or The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces military junta subsumed in the ensuing political change, while the popular flame kept fanning itself with calls for more justice, and further change.

The junta aimed to amend the constitution and conduct elections. The new regime also ushered in an era of renegotiating deals with some foreign partners. Egypt supplied 45 percent of Israel's gas, which was halted on February 5, 2011. The El-Arish gas pipeline suffered an attack from Bedouin gunmen, and on April 8 and 23, 2011, crowds gathered outside the Israeli embassy in Egypt and protested against a new exports deal, even if the new regime made noises that popular protests and attacks could not jeopardize Egyptian gas supplies to Israel. Meanwhile sectarian clashes between Christians and Moslems continued, with Coptic churches often ending up in flames. Consequently, Egypt dropped 24 places to 73rd position on the 2011 Global Peace Index. On July 8, 2011, the masses resumed protests at Tahrir Square and other venues, as they were not happy with the pace and extent of reforms. This summed up the state of flux in the foreseeable aftermath of Mubarak's political departure.

### *HIV/AIDS*

The HIV/AIDS pandemic is much less problematic (almost non-existent) in Egypt. The adult prevalence rate for the disease was less than 0.1 percent in 2001.<sup>118</sup> In 2006, this rate was still 0.1 percent among a population of some 74 million people who enjoyed an impressive life expectancy of average 68 years, and of which only 500 died of the disease during that year.<sup>119</sup> However, there has been no let up on the government's part. In 2008, Egypt was one of the countries where "the UNAIDS Secretariat undertook several high-level advocacy missions . . . to elicit stronger political, financial and programmatic commitment to the AIDS response by engaging with people living with HIV

groups and civil society as well as soliciting both bilateral and multilateral support, including with the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.”<sup>120</sup> Furthermore, it became government policy to deport any foreign “individuals once their HIV-positive status is discovered.”<sup>121</sup> Life expectancy has since improved to average 72 years in 2010.<sup>122</sup>

## CHAPTER 8

---

# Tanzania, Botswana, and Ghana

### Introduction

This chapter discusses three states: United Republic of Tanzania, Republic of Botswana, and Republic of Ghana. Unlike the penultimate chapters, these three countries were selected either because they are a success story, or have strong indicators of good governance that have equally reflected in good economic and other indicators. This chapter is the last of four consecutive chapters in case study format. Each case study has four sections: an initial concise summary that is a snapshot of the pertinent issues; a section that examines the background leading to the state of relevant domestic and international affairs; a section that discusses international political economy using key governance, economic, peace, and human development indicators, and; a section on new security challenges in areas including conventional security, health, food, energy, climate change or natural and artificial disasters. An attempt is made to point out factors of nationalism and supranationalism vis-à-vis the state of affairs, plus how each country fits into globalization and international politics, as an assessment of their international profile and potential.

### Tanzania

The United (Tanganyika and Zanzibar) Republic of Tanzania has more or less been a one-party state since independence. The country's postindependence politics began with the party of the independence nationalist leader Julius Nyerere, and has remained a one-party dominant state ever since, even if the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) dominated the Tanzanian central government, and the Civic United Front (CUF) dominated Zanzibar (the smaller partner of the union) until 2010. The 2010 referendum legalized an evolution of politics that has neutralized the clout of the CUF in Zanzibar. The country has a fair and improving economy even if the services sector is too



large. Nevertheless, Tanzania is grappling with HIV/AIDS, and a threat to food security by other factors such as the agro-fuel industry.

### *Historical and Political Context*

Tanzania (like next door Kenya) was on the India route of Portuguese explorer Vasco da Gama in 1498, and came under habitable Portuguese influence by 1506 as they began to build a few trading posts that later became forts. Sharing the same coastal strip along the Indian Ocean with Kenya that was once controlled in the seventeenth century by the Omani Arabs who conducted their trade in slaves, spice, and ivory between the East African coast and India, Tanzania also came under the onslaught of the Omanis, resulting in the Omani Sultan Seyyid Said setting up capital in Zanzibar City in 1840.

In the subsequent interregnum of nineteenth-century German activity in East Africa, Tanganyika (Tanzania minus Zanzibar) became part of German East Africa. Tanganyika is not territory that was handed over to the British East India Company in 1885 (such as Kenya). The German General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck successfully resisted the British invasion during WWI until the League of Nations Mandates afterward accorded the territory to Britain, simply because Germany had lost the war and was stripped of all imperial territory, which was then shared among the allies. This also means that, in the post – WWII arrangement that turned the League of Nations Mandated Territories into United Nations (UN) Trust Territories, Tanganyika remained under British control. The specific Zanzibar territory however remained clutched under Omani Arab rule from the seventeenth century, and succeeded in being recognized by Britain as independent in 1963. But a January 1964 revolution led by the local African population overthrew the Omani Arab Sultanate and temporarily installed Abeid Karume of the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) as President. Karume subsequently negotiated with Julius Nyerere a union of Zanzibar and Tanganyika to form Tanzania on April 26, 1964.

During the postwar period of British rule, Julius Nyerere, leader of the nationalist movement that led Tanganyika to independence, formed a political party known as the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) in 1954, and led Tanganyika to independence on December 9, 1961. Nyerere, like most of his African compatriots of the time, such as Nkrumah of Ghana, Kenyatta of Kenya, and Sekou-Toure of Guinea, followed the uncharted route of the concept of African socialism, as it was termed. But Nyerere went further, and succeeded in bringing the philosophical sophistication of the concept down to earth, by developing and pursuing an agenda that culminated in his February 5, 1967 Arusha Declaration, and set out the principles



of Ujamaa, which sought to transform the entire Tanzanian economic system, including the nationalization of industries and systems of commerce such as banking. This program carried on into the 1970s to transform Tanzanian society, and even touched villages, in what became known as the controversial villagization program of 1973–1976 that aimed to turn the scattered village systems into more nucleated and organized self-sufficient units of production. Nyerere later merged TANU with the Zanzibarian ASP to found the revolutionary CCM in 1977.

### *Constitutional Arrangements*

Current politics in Tanzania comprise the following interesting but obfuscating arrangements:

- A National Assembly or Parliament with a five year term of concurrent membership, over which the President appoints the Prime Minister or leader of government business.
- But the constitution also allows the appointment of Vice President, whose remit is not practically clear.
- By default, cabinet appointees should come from the National Assembly which is strictly an elected body, but the President could also make up to ten cabinet appointments.
- There is also a Parliament for Women Special Seats that constitutes 30 percent of the total number of elected constituency members. By a system of proportional representation, these special seats are apportioned according to seats each political party has won in the council. Hence, the number of seats can be equal to or more than a third of elected Councilors and Members of Parliament in each Council.
- Five members of the National Assembly reserved from Zanzibar, have had legislative rights over Tanzania even if the remainder of the union's parliament did not have legislative rights over Zanzibar.
- There was a referendum in July 31, 2010 whereby 66.37 percent of Zanzibarians voted to amend Zanzibarian laws to allow the winner of the two main rival parties in Zanzibar (CUF and CCM) to form a government of national unity. Under this arrangement each presidential candidate entered the elections with a running mate or vice presidential candidate from Zanzibar (the partner of the union), so that the latter automatically became the Vice President of the winning candidate in the united republic, and the President of Zanzibar.<sup>1</sup>

Although Nyerere followed the heels of his African compatriots and kept the country as a one-party (CCM) state, Abeid Karume remained President of

Zanzibar even after the union, and was grafted into the CCM *grande politique* as a “high ranking” member of the Tanzanian government hierarchy. Nyerere was followed by President Ali Hassan Mwinyi in 1985, who was also succeeded by the current President Jakaya Kikwete in December 2005. Also, Amani Abeid Karume, the son of former President Abeid Karume, became President of Zanzibar from 2000 and was reelected in 2005, even if the reputation of both elections was tarnished with irregularities and violence.

Irrespective of the union, Zanzibar also had its own government and parliament or House of Representatives. For example, the 2005 parliament that expired in 2010 was made up of 81 members serving five year terms, 50 of which were popularly elected, and ten appointed by the President of Zanzibar. The rest were 15 seats for women, five for regional commissioners, and one for the attorney-general. The CCM and CUF (also known as Chama Cha Wananchi) were the main competing parties in Zanzibar.

Even though the constitutional amendment of 1992 introduced multi-party politics, in practical terms, this was token and insignificant, because the *grande politique* has projected a dominant party outlook, with the ruling CCM looming large over the opposition parties for what they are worth. The CUF had just 19 seats in the Tanzanian National Assembly in the previous 2005 parliament that expired in 2010. Professor Ibrahim Lupumba, the CUF presidential candidate for the December 14, 2005 presidential elections, won 11.68 percent of the vote although the population of Zanzibar within the union is just 3 percent. But in Zanzibar proper, Ibrahim won 46.07 percent of the vote, losing marginally to CCM’s Amani Karume. The other relevant opposition parties were the CHADEMA—Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo, the Tanzania Labour Party, and the United Democratic Party. These parties gained parliamentary representation. A host of other parties did not.

The Tanzanian judicial system has a big plug into the legislature, in that, the attorney general is an ex-officio Member of Parliament. The President appoints the Chief Justice, and judges for the High and Appeals Courts, whereas the Chief Justice appoints all other judges in a legal system that has an elaborate appeals chain beginning from the primary courts and ascending to the district courts, then to the resident magistrate courts, then to the high courts, and finally to the Court of Appeals as necessary, except cases of constitutional and Islamic law. The judiciary at large functions with a combination of traditional (tribal), Islamic, and British common law.

Following the October 31, 2010 presidential and parliamentary that followed the July 31 referendum, Jakaya Kikwete won a second term with 61.17 percent of the vote. The main opposition contender of this election, Dr Willibrod Slaa of CHADEMA, won 26.34 percent of the vote; and the

CUF candidate Professor Ibrahim Lupumba won 8.06 percent. But as Dr Ali Mohamed Shein was the CCM's running mate (from Zanzibar) to Jakaya Kikwete, he became Vice President when Kikwete was sworn in as President November 6, 2010; he also automatically became the President of Zanzibar within the same tenure as the President of the union.

We should note, that the electoral performance of the 2005 incumbent CCM candidate Jakaya Kikwete's (Foreign Minister for ten years in the CCM government of former President Benjamin Nkapa) at 80 percent of the presidential vote in the 2005 general elections, became indicative of an increasing discontent with the one-party dominant system. Consequently in the October 2010 general elections, the incumbent President Kikwete gained less votes—61.17 percent.

### ***International Political Economy***

Despite being a one-party state, Tanzania has not been doing too badly on the Ibrahim Index on African Governance (IIAG): 16th in 2000/01, 2006/07, 2007/08, and 2008/09; 19th in 2001/02 and 2002/03; 20th in 2003/04 and 2004/05; and 18th in 2005/06.<sup>2</sup> Further data from the 2010 IIAG show Tanzania as a country slightly above the average: 21st out of 53 in Safety and Rule of Law; 15th in Participation and Human Rights; 15th in Sustainable Economic Opportunity; and 24th in Human Development.<sup>3</sup> Consequently, the Global Peace Index (GPI) published by the Institute of Economics and Peace (IEP) reflects a steadily peaceful country: 57th out of 121 in 2007; 58th out of 140 in 2008; 59th out of 144 in 2009;<sup>4</sup> and 55th in 2010.<sup>5</sup> The 2011 GPI also ranked it 56th out of 153. But the country's ratings on the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) have not been so glorious: 126th out of 180 in 2009; and 116th out of 178 in 2010. Tanzania scored 151st out of 182 on the 2009 Human Development Index (HDI), and 148th out of 169 on the 2010 HDI.

Owing to the global financial crisis and economic recession, Tanzania's economy, which expanded by 7.5 percent in 2008, grew at a slower rate of 5 percent in 2009, the first such reduction in eight years, and by far a very impressive record among many sub-Saharan countries within the same economic downturn period. In 2009, agriculture accounted for 26.4 percent of GDP, industry 22.6 percent, and services a whopping 50.9 percent.<sup>6</sup> This confirms what has been noted elsewhere by other experts that "mineral exports (especially gold) account for 37% of commodity exports, followed by manufactured goods and agricultural products (coffee, cotton, tea, tobacco, cashew nuts, and sisal). In terms of overall export earnings, services (tourism, telecommunication, and financial services) have gained immense

importance in recent years, with tourism contributing the bulk of service earnings.”<sup>7</sup>

Tanzania’s flower export industry is estimated to have lost around \$250,000 per day during the 2010 volcanic ash eruption from Iceland.<sup>8</sup> During the three days of May 5–7, 2010, Tanzania hosted the Twentieth World Economic Forum on Africa that was reportedly “the best ever in terms of attendance and also the quality and diversity of participants.”<sup>9</sup> In December 2010, electricity tariffs rose by 18.5 percent with effect from January 2011.

### *New Security Challenges*

Tanzania’s security challenges include emerging public dissent to the *modus operandi* of a new constitutional arrangement that facilitates the ruling CCM’s control over both the mainland and Zanzibar, and the increasing sidelining of opposition. On December 29, 2010, there were riots on the streets of Dar es Salaam against the new bullish constitution, which rioters said accorded too much power to the President. Subsequently on January 6, 2011, there were protests in Arusha against the detention of CHADEMA’s Chair Freeman Mbowe for turning up at a rally that was banned by the government; two people died, and ten were arrested by the security forces. Mbowe was released on bail the following day January 7.

### *HIV/AIDS*

In 2006, the adult (15–49) HIV/AIDS prevalence rate was 6.5 percent. Life expectancy was average 48 years, and about 140,000 died from the pandemic during that year among the total population of 38.3 million in a country that was rated 164th on the HDI of that year.<sup>10</sup> The prevalence rate reduced to 5.7 percent in 2007<sup>11</sup> but increased to 6.2 percent in 2008.<sup>12</sup> The UNAIDS 2010 Outlook Report put the current adult prevalence at 1.4 million people, which is a significant improvement, judging that this is just under 3 percent of the total population of 45 million.<sup>13</sup> Correspondingly, life expectancy has also improved to an average of 52.5 years.<sup>14</sup>

In 2008, Tanzania’s expenditure on health was 5.5 percent of GDP,<sup>15</sup> but in 2009, the government “announced a possible 25 percent cut in its AIDS budget.”<sup>16</sup> The country already relied on international support to combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Tanzania was one of the countries where “the UNAIDS Secretariat undertook several high-level advocacy missions . . . to elicit stronger political, financial and programmatic commitment to the AIDS response by engaging with people living with HIV groups and civil society.”<sup>17</sup> The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) also supported the national authorities and civil society organizations by providing

technical assistance. Furthermore “In 2008, UNESCO commissioned a review of best practices in tandem with an exploratory study undertaken in two countries—Namibia and the United Republic of Tanzania—to better understand how the education sector should support HIV-positive children attending school.”<sup>18</sup> From this review, UNESCO developed technical materials to address the education needs of HIV-positive students in the two countries.<sup>19</sup> Also, UNAIDS in partnership with the Millennium Villages project helped the Tanzanian government to create mother-to-child transmission-free zones in the country.

Despite the significant gains, there is still more to do in combating the pandemic. According to UNAIDS:

by May 2009, the number of AIDS patients undergoing antiretroviral therapy (ART) had reached 248,280 compared to 146,872 in 2007. Despite the huge increase in the number of people receiving ART, this constitutes only 55 percent of people enrolled in the programme. This is partly because some of the people enrolled are not yet eligible to receive ARVs, but also because some eligible people are not reached by the current service networks.<sup>20</sup>

#### *Threat to Farmland by the Agrofuel Industry*

Although Tanzania does not have acute food problems, there have been growing concerns about land grabbing by foreigners for agro-fuel purposes. According to a 2010 report issued by Friends of the Earth, Tanzania is one of three African countries (including Madagascar and Ghana) where there have been

protests following land grabs by foreign companies that have been accused of providing misleading information to local farmers, of obtaining land from fraudulent community land owners and of bypassing environmental protection laws. Agrofuels are competing with food crops for farmland, and agrofuel development companies are competing with farmers for access to that land. And this appears to be as much the case for jatropha, as for other crops, despite the claim that it grows on non-agricultural land.<sup>21</sup>

Apart from taking away land from locals or displacing it from agricultural purposes, local concerns include the fact that there will be minimal benefit for local economies and Tanzania's Exchequer. These protests caused some companies to discontinue their investments, such as the Swedish company Skebab, but others continued unchecked, under the cover of aid initiatives and “international development agencies such as EU Energy Initiative (EUEI), the World Bank, USAID and DFID.”<sup>22</sup> In 2009, some “1,000 rice farmers [were] forced off their land [on the Usangu plains] to make way

for sugarcane,”<sup>23</sup> A UK company Sun Biofuels acquired 8,000 hectares of land to grow *Jatropha*, while the UK-based CAMS Group acquired 45,000 hectares of land to produce ethanol from sweet sorghum.<sup>24</sup> FAO data show that 35 percent of the total population are malnourished. 44 percent of children are malnourished and underweight, while 50 percent are malnourished with stunted growth.<sup>25</sup>

## Botswana

Botswana is a shining example in Africa, but is also more or less a one-party state. Nationalism is very strong, with an identifiable Tswana national identity from a majority Tswana ethnics. The smooth political history of Botswana, combined with good governance and effective constitutional rule, have produced peace, along with sound economic development, even if the country is facing a challenge with the HIV/AIDS pandemic and the rate of homicide is high.

### *Historical and Political Context*

The name Botswana is derived from the Tswana ethnonational identity group who make up 79 percent of the 1.84 million people who populate the country. Botswana is landlocked by Namibia to its west and north; by Zimbabwe to its northeast; and by South Africa to its south and southeast. Botswana is economically liberated. A Botswana's life expectancy at 2010 is 61 years. The majority of Botswana speak Setswana, even if the majority of Setswana-speaking people living in the Southern African region reside in South Africa simply because the southern part of Bechuanaland (British Bechuanaland) joined Republic of South Africa; the northern part of Bechuanaland became modern Botswana.

The regional evolution of what pertains in modern Botswana is directly relevant from the nineteenth century when the Tswana faced threats and incursions from two neighboring ethnonational identity groups—the Ndebele, and Boers (Afrikaans), and for which sole reason the Tswana had recourse to become the British Protectorate of Bechuanaland in 1885 to start with. In the following three decades, the Tswana ethnonational identity group retained its identity and distinctive ethnonational rule amidst British central or political authority, so that even after two separate advisory councils had to be established in 1920 (each for the Tswana and Europeans), further Tswana assertiveness and proclamations merited regularizing Tswana ethnonational rule in 1934. The subsequent compromise of a Tswana-European advisory council in 1951, led to a joint political solution of a kind—a consultative



council as stipulated by the constitution of 1961, the same year in which the Bechuanaland Democratic Party (BDP) was founded by Seretse Khama, leader of the Tswana independence nationalist movement.

Tswana nationalism furthered its aims and claims to self rule, sending a clear signal to the British, who tactfully acquiesced to Tswana's bid for national self-determination in June 1964. The momentum of the independence movement generated nationalistic proposals, including the constitution of 1965, and the decision to establish the capital for Tswana self government in Gaborone in 1965, instead of the existing capital Mafikeng, simply because the latter sat within the territory of modern South Africa from when "southern Bechuanaland" joined what became the Republic of South Africa. Under the 1965 constitution, democratic elections were conducted, of which the BDP won 28 of the 31 seats contested. Under this constitution, the elections are directly parliamentary, but indirectly benefits the presidential candidate of the winning party, who simply became appointed as President. Hence, Seretse Khama the head of the BDP, who was also the leader of the independence movement, automatically became the winner and first President of a Botswana that gained full independence on September 30, 1966. This was poignant for the distinctive Tswana rule and identity because Khama was at the same time the legitimate chief of the Ngwato subtribe of the Setswana. In tandem with the Tswana identity, the BDP also became known as the Botswana Democratic Party at independence.

In the modern politics of postindependent Botswana, during which the BDP has never lost an election, Khama was reelected twice and died in office in 1980. His Vice President, Ketumile Masire, became the appointed President. When Masire became an elected President in 1984, he was also reelected twice (in 1989 and 1994), but in his old age of 73, probably became too weary for the demanding presidential schedule, and constitutionally appointed his Vice President Festus Mogae as President in 1998.

The year 1994 saw many forms of political opposition including calls for a deepening of democracy, in the form of electoral reform, gender equality, and more equality among tribes and linguistic groups. This may be partly due to the end of apartheid in next door South Africa that gave impetus for advocacy on all progressive fronts. The ruling BDP responded with a series of reforms: (a) the Citizenship Act of 1995; (b) electoral reforms in 1997 including the establishment of an Independent Electoral Commission, voting rights extended to citizens abroad, and the voting age lowered from 21 to 18; (c) the reform of the presidential executive in 1998 to entrench the existing constitutional and automatic succession of the Vice President to President, and the imposition of a maximum ten year or two-term limit on the presidency.

When Mogae became an elected President in 1999, he was reelected once more on October 30, 2004. In the evolution of politics in Botswana, it became stipulated that a President could only serve a maximum of two terms; hence, Mogae stepped down on March 31, 2008 (instead of October 2008) and appointed a former Vice President Ian Khama, who assumed President the next day. The second President Khama (son of the former President) was commander of the Batswana army. He also became an elected President by the October 16, 2009 election. As part of the grooming for the president-in-waiting, General Khama resigned from being the commander of the Batswana army in 2007 and handed over to Lieutenant General Tebogo Masire the son of former President Ketumile Masire. Of course as President, Khama was commander-in chief of the armed forces. Clearly, the *kokofu*<sup>26</sup> football of postindependent Batswana politics ensures that the ball is passed on to the appropriate candidate among the establishment (the majority BDP), against which the three identifiable opposition groups for what they are worth (the Botswana National Front—BNF, the Botswana Congress Party—BCP, and the Botswana Alliance Movement—BAM) are no serious match. However, multiparty politics in Botswana is very free and fair. If the opposition parties are unable to kick any fuss, provided there is no fuss that could be kicked, that is why there is peace.

### *Constitutional Arrangements*

The parliamentary history of modern Botswana dates from the 1965 elections that gave the BDP the majority. The National Assembly, which is reelectable every five-year election period, has expanded systematically from 31 in 1965 to 57 currently, of which the BDP has 45 seats as per the October 16, 2009 elections. The BNF won six seats, and a strategic electoral pact between the BCP and BAM got the pair of them five seats. One seat is held by an independent candidate—for the first time in the country's modern politics. The four additional seats to the National Assembly are specially elected, but these are currently held solely by the ruling and majority BDP.

As it is the party parliamentary candidates (and not the presidential candidate) who are directly elected, legislative power is automatically vested in the government. Executive (presidential) power is also held by the party, since the President chooses his cabinet, including his Vice President, from among the parliamentarians. The judiciary is also government-controlled, in that, even if it is not founded on traditional law but instead based on a judicial code enshrined by the constitution to synchronize with international human rights, the judges are appointed by the President. Subsequently, because the Tswana identity became synonymous with the independence nationalist movement, and of course Botswana's modern politics, there is no mainstream

judicial role for traditional (non-government) rulers or chiefs, except within customary law, which is more or less practiced at the village level. In other words, the High Court is supreme. Commissioners with executive authority over the nine district councils and five town councils are also appointed by the President, even if their local councilors and policy committee members are chosen entirely by local processes. But the ruling BDP has the strong hand over Gaborone City Council: four of the five seats representing the five constituencies of this council were won by GDP candidates.

To compensate chieftdom for their worth in the *grande politique*, they feature prominently in the 35 member House of Chiefs, to which any draft legislation must be referred just for their opinions. Eight members of this body represents the eight Tswana subtribes, and are members for life. The 27 other members, of which 22 are from designated regions across Botswana, and five others specially elected (effectively appointed) by the President, can only serve maximum five year terms. In stark terms, the GDP dominates, and has been the sole party in government since independence in 1966. We should therefore call Botswana a one-party state, and a very peaceful one at that. As already mentioned, the pattern so far concludes that one has to be within an exclusive clique of the establishment (must be a Khama or a Masire), in order to ascend to the presidency.

### ***International Political Economy***

As a beacon of good governance, Botswana has attained the most consistently impressive IIAG ratings among the mainland countries on the African continent, despite being a one-party state, and even if the lack of oil and the toll of the HIV/AIDS pandemic against the Exchequer have contributed to relegating it to fifth position in terms of Human Development. Otherwise, Botswana's overall IIAG ratings are as follows: 2nd in 2000/01, 2001/02, and 2002/03; 3rd in 2003/04, 2004/05, 2005/06, 2006/07, and 2008/09; and 4th in 2007/08.<sup>27</sup> Botswana topped the IIAG's 2010 chart in handling accountability and corruption, and came third in the "accountability, transparency and corruption in rural areas" indicator.<sup>28</sup> The IEP's 2010 GPI discussion paper confirms that "Botswana provides financial assistance for investments in rural areas or regions that have development potential."<sup>29</sup> The low level of corruption has reflected well in the global CPI ratings: 37th out of 180 in 2009; and 33rd out of 178 in 2010. Consequently, the GPI ratings are equally impressive: 42nd out of 121 in 2007; 46th out of 140 in 2008; 34th out of 144 in 2009; 33rd out of 149 in 2010; and 35th out of 153 in 2011. Both the 2010 and 2011 GPI reports recognized Botswana as the most peaceful country

in Sub-Saharan Africa, and “a relatively harmonious society, although the homicide rate is high.”<sup>30</sup>

The economy that experienced an average 9 percent growth annually in the 30-year post independence period of 1967–2006<sup>31</sup> has also tasted its fair share of the recent global economic downturn: economic growth reduced to 4.4 percent in 2007;<sup>32</sup> then reduced further to 3 percent in 2008, and plummeted to minus 5 percent in 2009.<sup>33</sup> However, something about the knack of good governance, limited corruption, and the appetite for peaceful existence (confirmed by the indicators discussed above) combine to ensure that even the one-party state of Botswana since independence “maintained a sound fiscal policy and a negligible level of foreign debt. Foreign exchange reserves were estimated to be \$9.2 billion in November 2009, representing approximately 20 months’ cover of imports of goods and services.”<sup>34</sup> However, coupled with other challenges such as battling the HIV-AIDS pandemic, it can be understood why Botswana had a low HDI rating of 125th out of 182 in 2009, and 98th out of 169 in 2010, even if “enhanced . . . infrastructure, education system, health facilities and housing facilities.”<sup>35</sup> are also a factor of the country’s level of peacefulness.

The economy relies mainly on industry and services, which accounted for the respective 45.8 percent and 51.9 percent of GDP in 2008. Mining is the industrial mainstay, with diamonds, copper, nickel, and soda ash on the list of minerals. With such a short list, it makes sense to note that being the world’s top producer in gem-quality diamonds is of key importance. Botswana’s annual revenue from diamonds is a whopping 3 billion dollars, which constitutes one third of its GDP and two thirds of export revenues.<sup>36</sup> The main contributory factor to the recent contractions in this non-diversified economy is the fact that the global credit crunch impacted unfavourably against the global jewellery market, hence Botswana’s diamond exports in the first quarter of 2008 worth \$924 million reduced drastically by 75 percent to just \$237 million.<sup>37</sup>

As at June 2010, the diamond mines, which are now operating at 80 percent capacity, offer an indication that confidence is returning to the industry.<sup>38</sup> The diamond industry (Debswana) is owned jointly by the DeBeers of South Africa and the Botswana government, and this might be the explanation as to why over 685,000 of the Botswana labor force, out of a total population of just 1.8 million,<sup>39</sup> are in the formal sector.

### *New Security Challenge (HIV-AIDS)*

The most serious security challenge is the HIV/AIDS pandemic. According to the UNAIDS 2006 report, there were “no clear signs of declining HIV

prevalence elsewhere in southern Africa—including in Botswana, Namibia and Swaziland, where exceptionally high infection levels continue.”<sup>40</sup> A UNAIDS 2006 report on the global AIDS epidemic stated that the prevalence of HIV/AIDS among adults was as high as 24.1 percent; life expectancy was as low as 40 years for both sexes, and some 18,000 people died of the pandemic, while the government spent a whopping \$165,000,000 of much needed funds combating the disease in a developing country that was rated 131st on the HDI.<sup>41</sup> Botswana has since hovered around the unenviable position of the second most HIV/AIDS prevalent country in the world (after Swaziland); the adult prevalence rate in 2007 was estimated to have dropped by just a small fraction to 23.9 percent,<sup>42</sup> only to increase to 25 percent in 2008<sup>43</sup> and depreciate slightly again to 23.8 percent in 2009.<sup>44</sup> Combating the pandemic has taken its toll on a country where “domestic resources cover the majority of the AIDS budget”<sup>45</sup> and where “government revenues fell by more than 40 percent between the second and third quarters of 2008.”<sup>46</sup>

The pandemic is being tackled from all angles, with both local and international effort. Even the U.S. Peace Corps that had left in 1997 at the end of their 30 year mission, as well as USAID that also disappeared in 1996, reappeared in 2002 because of HIV/AIDS.<sup>47</sup> The government began a comprehensive program involving both literary campaigns and administering anti-retroviral drugs to victims. Former President Festus Mogae whose term of office expired in 2008, also led a new initiative that “brought together African leaders to unite around HIV prevention effort.”<sup>48</sup> Additionally, and as part of the international effort, Botswana became a top destination country where “the UNAIDS Secretariat undertook several high-level advocacy missions . . . to elicit stronger political, financial and programmatic commitment to the AIDS response by engaging with people living with HIV groups and civil society.”<sup>49</sup> The UNAIDS Secretariat also built “local epidemiological capacity through a series of training workshops,”<sup>50</sup> and the UNODC provided technical assistance to national institutions including civil society organizations.<sup>51</sup> Combating the pandemic has encountered complications, such as, HIV prevalence among females between the ages of 15 and 19 . . . is double . . . and the cause of these startling differences is intergenerational sex.”<sup>52</sup>

However, there are signs that efforts have paid good dividends. The 2008 Aids Epidemic Update stated that “an estimated 79 percent of adults enrolled in the early stages of Botswana’s antiretroviral therapy scale-up were alive five years later.”<sup>53</sup> The 2010 World AIDS Outlook also stated that “Botswana leads the world in domestic spending on HIV as a proportion of its government revenue—over four percent. This is so because the government’s

share of the economy is about 35 percent and its relatively strong economy is less vulnerable to shocks.”<sup>54</sup> Life expectancy in 2010 had appreciated to 61 years.<sup>55</sup> However, there is still some way to go, particularly for the female gender. According to the UNAIDS World Outlook 2010 Report, “a modelling study conducted by the Centre for the AIDS Programme of Research in South Africa (CAPRISA) shows that HIV is now the leading cause of mortality among women of reproductive age, with HIV—related maternal mortality rates in sub-Saharan Africa increasing and surpassing other causes. The study showed that about half of all maternal deaths in Botswana and Lesotho were associated with HIV.”

## Ghana

Ghana has achieved the status of a trail blazer and trend-setter nation. Nationalism is very strong. Peace and good governance have combined to forge a strong Ghanaian national identity in the postindependence period, building on the naming of the country as Ghana at independence on the basis that majority of the citizens could be traced to the Old Ghana Empire of the Western Sudan. Ghana assumed a one-party state under Nkrumah the independence nationalist, but has evolved into a presidential state of two main parties, along the lines of U.S. politics, even if it was previously modeled after the UK that experienced political change in 2010 with the formation of a coalition government and a political landscape of three main political parties. Ghana is an example of good governance paying good dividends, with accompanying sound indicators in governance, peace, human development, and the economy, even if the country is facing the challenge of managing floods and disasters from both natural and artificial sources, and coping with a threat to food insecurity from the agrofuel industry.

### *Historical and Political Context*

Ghana was the first sub-Saharan African country to gain independence from colonial rule, on March 6, 1957. Nkrumah, then took the country along the path of a one-party state, adopted and pursued socialism, and allied with The Soviet Union and China. It was Nkrumah who set this trend that was followed by other anticolonial nationalist leaders across Africa, including those of Uganda, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Cameroon, and Tanzania, and to the annoyance of the United States. Hence the CIA engineered a military coup that overthrew Nkrumah on February 24, 1966 by the National Liberation Council (NLC) led by Brigadier Akwasi Amankwaa Afrifa. The NLC governed for three years and



Map of Ghana

supervised multiparty elections in 1969 that ushered in the Progress Party (PP) led by Dr Kofi Abrefa Busia as Prime Minister.

Ghana has experienced a spate of military leaderships, coups, counter-coups, and democratic elections, and set the following trends that were emulated across Africa: (a) became the first sub-Saharan state to gain independence from colonial rule; (b) initiated the characteristic one-party state government spearheaded by Nkrumah; (c) subsequently experienced military coups and military governance; (d) took on the ill-fated structural adjustment programs (SAP) introduced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the 1980s and 1990s; (e) reconverted to democratic politics from 1992. Ghana has subsequently become the best example of democratic governance and the shining light of democratization in Africa including the Maghreb. Consequently, the country has blazed the trail for the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The following chronology highlights the chain of governments:

- March 6, 1957—became independent; Dr Kwame Nkrumah is Prime Minister with his Convention People's Party (CPP) in the lead of government; the National Liberation Movement (NLM) was the main Opposition party.
- July 1, 1960—became a republic with a presidential system; Nkrumah became first President, and led a one-party system with a CPP government.
- February 24, 1966—the republic was overthrown by a military coup that ushered in the NLC.
- October 1, 1969—the second republic was installed, with Dr Busia as Prime Minister and leader of the winning PP that won the 1969 elections; the National Alliance of Liberals (NAL) was the Opposition Party.
- January 13, 1972—military coup led by Colonel Acheampong overthrew the second republic, and ushered in the National Redemption Council (NRC).
- July 5, 1978—a palace coup within the NRC led by Lieutenant General FWK Akuffo ousted Acheampong, and restructured the military government into the short-lived Supreme Military Council (SMC).
- May 15, 1979—Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings led an unsuccessful military uprising, was arrested, court-martialed, and sentenced to death.
- June 4, 1979—a military uprising led by Captain Kwadwo Boakye-Djan released Jerry Rawlings from prison and teamed up to oust the SMC; Rawlings governed as head-of-state for three months, and conducted elections on June 18, 1979.



- September 24, 1979—the third republic was installed with Dr Hilla Limann as President and leader of the People's National Party (PNP) that won the June 1979 elections; the main opposition party was the Popular Front Party (PFP).
- December 31, 1981—the third republic was overthrown by Rawlings who led and ushered in a military-cum-civilian People's National Defence Council (PNDC).
- December 1992—the fourth republic was installed; Jerry Rawlings was democratically elected as President with his National Democratic Congress (NDC) as leading party that won the 1992 elections; the main opposition National Patriotic Party (NPP) boycotted the election, in which Rawlings gained 58.3 percent of the popular vote.
- December 1996—Rawlings of NDC is democratically reelected; the main opposition party was the NPP.
- December 2000—John Agyekum Kufuor and the NPP surpassed the incumbent NDC to win the December 2000 elections; John Atta Mills was the NDC candidate and successor to Rawlings whose maximum two terms of office had expired.
- December 2004—Kufuor and the NPP retained power in democratic elections; NDC remained as the main opposition.
- December 2008—John Atta Mills and the NDC resurfaced by surpassing the incumbent NPP in a close election, with a margin of just 0.46 percent of the presidential vote.

Democratization in Ghana has not come cheap: some heavy prices have had to be paid along the way, such as the incumbent NPP handing over to the Opposition NDC during the most recent (December 2008) election, with a vote difference of just 0.46 percent. Such a feat would have been impossible in Kenya in December 2007, or Zimbabwe in March 2008, where wide margins of electoral losses by the incumbents in both instances became inadmissible, and led to chaos, and subsequently power-sharing governments.

As mentioned, Ghana has had military regimes and interruptions to democratic governance. It was not until the country converted to democratic governance, stuck with it, and practiced it with some seriousness, that order and prosperity began to shape up. The Ghanaian characteristic of managing to sort out the political chaff without tribal hostilities unlike Kenya, Zimbabwe, Nigeria,<sup>56</sup> and lately Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire, has been key to the thriving democratic governance. It has been argued that having the majority of Ghanaians—some 79 percent<sup>57</sup> whose historical and anthropological origins are traceable to the Old Ghana Empire, and for which reason the independence nationalists Dr J.B. Danquah and Dr Kwame Nkrumah

renamed the colonial Gold Coast as Ghana at independence, has contributed to forging the common Ghanaian identity.<sup>58</sup> There also seems to be a unique Ghanaian temperament that prefers to set aside hostilities and forge ahead with priorities.

### *International Political Economy*

On December 15, 2010, Ghana officially began oil production at the Golden Jubilee Fields amidst a controversy that a clause within the Petroleum Revenue Management Bill to prevent government from using the country's petroleum prospects as collateral to obtain loans, had been robustly ignored by the government.

Ghana's ranking on the IIAG is impressive and consistent: seventh in 2000/01, 2001/02, 2007/08, and 2008/09; and 8th in 2002/03, 2003/04, 2004/05, 2005/06, and 2006/07.<sup>59</sup> Data from the 2010 IIAG show that Ghana topped the Press Freedom Index, of which Ghana had improved by 1.3 percentage points from the 2009 assessment. Ghana was 6th in Safety and Rule of Law, 6th in Participation and Human Rights, 12th in Sustainable Economic Opportunity, and 12th in Human Development.<sup>60</sup> Being a beacon of good governance has also reflected in the country's GPI ratings: 40th out of 121 in 2007; 40th out of 140 in 2008; 52nd out of 144 in 2009; 48th out of 149 in 2010; and 42nd out of 153 in 2011. The CPI rankings are also above average: 69th out of 180 in 2009; and 62nd out of 178 in 2010. However, Ghana's 2009 HDI rating (152nd out of 182) was two steps behind Sudan,<sup>61</sup> and a downturn from the 2005 HDI that ranked Ghana 135 out of 175 and Sudan 147 out of 175.<sup>62</sup> The reasons may be located in the fact that the Ghanaian government that recorded GDP purchasing power parities of \$35.09 billion, \$36.53 billion, and \$38.24 billion in 2008, 2009, and 2010 respectively, had been cash strapped in comparison with the oil-rich Sudanese counterpart that recorded GDP purchasing power parities \$90.12 billion, \$93.91 billion, and \$98.79 billion in those same years.<sup>63</sup> However, the Sudanese high purchasing power indicators could not buy peace—a commodity that the oil-rich but war-torn Sudan could not afford, in sharp contrast with Ghana's impressive peace ratings listed above. Ghana's 2010 HDI rating was 130th out of 169, and lost as much as 25 percent in HDI due to multidimensional inequality.<sup>64</sup>

Ghana is the world's second largest producer of cocoa (after Cote d'Ivoire). With the rising level of cocoa prices to as high as £2,368 per tonne in May 2010, the crop contributed its respectable quota to the Ghanaian economy that was expected to grow by 5.7 percent in 2010.<sup>65</sup> The sheanut industry, which comes under the auspices of the Cocoa Board (COCOBOD), also

rakes in \$30 million in foreign exchange to the Ghanaian economy annually, and “engages more than 900,000 women in the three northern regions, who collect over 130,000 tonnes of dry nuts annually.”<sup>66</sup>

According to the Ghana Investment Promotion Council’s third quarter report for 2009, tourism created direct and indirect employment of 260,000 jobs. The much touted flow of remittances from abroad forms an important component of the Poverty Reduction Strategy. There has been a steady rise of the remittance culture. Although the 2009 HDR stated that Ghana’s total remittance inflow in 2007 amounted to \$117 million or 10.2 percent of net overseas development assistance (ODA) receipts, 0.8 percent of GDP, and 0.1 percent of foreign direct investments (FDI),<sup>67</sup> a Bank of Ghana press conference on the import bill revealed that remittances totaled \$4.23 billion in the first half of 2009 alone<sup>68</sup> even if this was 1.3 percent less than what was recorded at the same period in the previous year. Remittances contributed to the buffer for the 2009 financial year when the newly elected government inherited a budget deficit of 14.9 percent, and GDP grew by just 4.7 percent. In September 2010, the Bank of Ghana announced that remittances between January and May 2010 had already amounted to 4.2 billion dollars, representing a 22.2 percent increase over the same period in 2009.<sup>69</sup>

### *New Security Challenges*

Ghana is not at war, and the potential sensitivities with Cote d’Ivoire about ocean and sea boundaries for crude oil prospecting, or with Burkina Faso about the rise of water levels at the Bagre Dam that leads to flooding in northern Ghana,<sup>70</sup> do not have war potential. The most urgent, non-military, security challenges are: (a) floods and disasters due to both climate change and artificial factors; (b) inter-tribal conflicts in the north of the country; and (c) food security. These security challenges have escalated both the budget and responsibilities of the National Disaster Management Organization (NADMO), especially as 2010 alone featured a record number of high profile disaster and conflict cases, and now, refugees from Cote d’Ivoire, even if addressing this latest challenge will most likely be funded by the UN High Commission for Refugees.

### *Managing Disasters*

At the beginning of May 2010, NADMO despatched “30 packets of roofing sheets, 230 pieces of mattresses, 250 pieces of blankets, four bales of used cloths, 200 pieces of Wellington boots, 50 bags of rice, 20 bags of beans and 20 bags of maize”<sup>71</sup> to flood victims of the Paawudu, Nseesadwona, Chia and Kotokuom communities near the Birem and Pra Rivers in the Akyemmansa

District of the Eastern Region. Another consignment of relief items followed at a latter date to the other affected communities of Nyamebekyere, Asabedie, Adjobue, and Asuboa.

On June 20, 2010, a ten-hour spate of torrential rains caused fatalities and devastations in Southern Ghana, stretching across the Volta, Central, and Greater-Accra regions: (a) in the Volta Region, a bridge that linked Ghana and Togo collapsed, cutting off travelers between the two countries, and submerging large areas of land and communities; (b) in the Central Region, the sports stadium at Agona Swedru was damaged, together with some school buildings, and (c) in the Greater Accra Region, the Ghana Navy and other military personnel evacuated at least 5,000 people from low lying areas of the harbor city of Tema.<sup>72</sup> The Accra-Tema motorway was also flooded and became unmotorable.

On July 16, 2010, torrential rains flooded and cut off the cocoa growing areas of Subonpam, Asamoah Shell, Agyapongkrom, Agya Yanti, Alhaji Akuraa, Asuogya, Besiese, Adidease, Atronic, Kotokrom, Baakoniaba, and Yawsen in the Sunyani area of the Brong-Ahafo Region. The rains caused River Amoma to overflow its banks, and roads, footpaths, and other communication routes became unusable. Cocoa beans and food stuffs became stuck, and life was grounded to a halt, as both human and motor transport were severely restricted, and school attendance suffered. A 16 year old pupil who attempted to across River Amoma to attend school at Atuahenekrom on July 20 got drowned. NADMO Municipal Co-ordinator at Sunyani conducted an initial assessment on July 17<sup>73</sup> in order to plan a relief operation in response to the disaster.

NADMO had been troubleshooting earlier during the year. In May 2010, the Western Regional Office of NADMO announced it had identified as many as 270 flood-prone areas in the Western Region alone, with 17 in the Sekondi-Takoradi and Shama areas of the region.<sup>74</sup> There is now a Presidential Task Force Committee on Floods, and the cost of disaster management may continue its upward trend, particularly as NADMO's responsibilities have graduated from just providing relief, to resettling whole communities in some cases. On July 14, 2010, NADMO recommended the resettlement of about 5,000 flood victims from the low lying areas of Enchi and Dadieso in the Awowin-Suaman District of the disaster prone Western Region.<sup>75</sup> In July 2010, the Ghanaian cabinet approved funds for the emergency reconstruction of roads destroyed by the heavy rains in the Western Region.<sup>76</sup> Some 5 million dollars from the government and UN sources were made available, while the World Bank pledged 4 million dollars towards the relief effort, and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN/OCHA) estimated approximately 170,000 disaster victims in the form of loss of lives,

homes and property.<sup>77</sup> The World Health Organization (WHO) also donated medical supplies to the flood-stricken Central Gonja district.

In addition to natural factors from climate change, the rise of water levels at the Bagre Dam in neighboring Burkina Faso causes flooding in Northern Ghana. When the Bagre Dam was opened on September 4, 2009, the White Volta and its tributaries in Ghana were flooded within two days, prompting NADMO and a team of military engineers to attend to the situation on September 8, 2009. There have been some discussions between the Ghanaian and Burkinabe governments over this issue<sup>78</sup> especially as recurrence of this disaster will persist for the foreseeable future. On September 1, 2010 the Ghana Embassy in Burkina Faso warned that a spill-over from Bagre was imminent. Subsequently, 17 fatalities were reported on September 10, 2010 as a result of the flooding that occurred a few days after the warning.<sup>79</sup> Subsequently, some 3,234 houses from 55 communities collapsed, 23,588 farmlands were destroyed, 1,109 ruminants were washed away, altogether displacing some 25,112 persons in the Central Gonja district of northern Ghana.<sup>80</sup> Consequently, the Ghanaian government has obtained a \$500 million Brazilian facility to construct a dam in Pwalugu in the Upper East Region to accommodate the excess water spillage from the Bagre Dam. The Brazilian funding will also cater for another flood related dam in the Western Region.<sup>81</sup> Handling Ivorian refugees will be done as necessary.

### *Handling Internal Conflicts*

Among the many instances of intertribal conflicts scattered across Northern Ghana, the two notable ones that have plagued the state, and have been politicized by governments over the years are: (a) the longstanding conflict between Kusasis and Mamprusis in the Bawku area, and; (b) the famous conflict between the rival Abudu and Andani Gates of Dagbon over the murder of Ya-Na Yakubu Andani the former regent of Dagbon in 2002.<sup>82</sup> As reported by Ghanaweb, this conflict was restaged in courtroom clashes between the two camps at the Accra Fast Track High Court where the murder suspects were being tried on September 7, 2010.

A new wave of clashes began on May 2010, among the Kumbatiac and Gbankoni communities, as well as the Bimoba clans of Dikporu, Nakuuks, and Naadaungs, in the Bunkpurugu-Yunyoo districts, over land, chieftaincy, and other communal issues. The list of disaster incidents caused by these clashes include at least four fatalities, the burning of 368 houses, and the displacement of hundreds of Ghanaians who fled to Northern Togo. This exodus generated high level meetings between the President of Ghana, the Togolese National Security Minister Colonel Titi Kpima, and the Togolese Ambassador in Ghana Jean Pierre Gbikpi-Benissan. Officials from both countries

could not agree on whether the figures parading in the media circus about the number of Ghanaian refugees that had fled to Togo, was either 1,000 or 3,500;<sup>83</sup> the UN High Commission for Refugees that was attending to the humanitarian situation on the ground had put the figure at 3,200.<sup>84</sup> On May 27, 2010, NADMO despatched the following relief items to the Bunkpurugu/Yunyoo district:

200 packets of roofing sheets, 30 packets of roofing nails, 3,000 pieces of poly mats, 200 pieces of plastic bowls, 200 plastic buckets, 100 cartons of soap and ten bales of men jeans trousers and shirts. Others are; ten bales of ladies dresses, ten bales of boy's 'T' shirts and trousers, ten bales of girl's skirts and men T shirts, five bales of ladies blouses, 400 pieces of student's mattresses and 15 large size tents.<sup>85</sup> The above consignment was followed by another on June 1, 2010 including: "300 bags of maize, 300 bags of rice, 300 bags of beans, 100 cartons of soap, 100 cartons of cooking oil, 200 packets of roofing sheets, 5,000 mats and 1,000 pieces of mattresses"<sup>86</sup>

#### *Food Security*

FAO data show that 8 percent of the population are undernourished. Some 18 percent of children are underweight, while 22 percent of children are malnourished with stunted growth.<sup>87</sup> Among those who faced food insecurity for a variety of reasons, those in the relatively underdeveloped regions north of the country were the most affected:

A Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA), launched by the UN's World Food Programme in Accra on 6 May, outlined that 1.2 million people were insecure, with limited access to sufficient and nutritious food. Some 0.5 million in the rural areas of the three northern regions were determined to be at risk, while up to 1.5 million in the remaining seven regions faced comparable problems. The CFSVA cited the Upper West Region as the most affected area, where 34% of the population were food insecure, followed by the Upper East Region with 15%, and the Northern Region with 10%. The main causes of food insecurity included reliance on traditional and often inefficient agricultural practices, limited markets for farm produce, high food prices, lack of education and hazards such as weather conditions<sup>88</sup>

#### *Threat to Farmland by the Agrofuel Industry*

It appears that the political stability and suitable weather in Ghana have made it more attractive to some other forms of investments not necessarily beneficial to the country. Although Ghana does not have acute food problems, there have been growing concerns about land grabbing by foreigners for agrofuel purposes. According to a 2010 report issued by Friends of the Earth, Ghana

is one of three African countries (including Tanzania and Madagascar) where there have been:

protests following land grabs by foreign companies that have been accused of providing misleading information to local farmers, of obtaining land from fraudulent community land owners and of bypassing environmental protection laws. Agrofuels are competing with food crops for farmland, and agrofuel development companies are competing with farmers for access to that land. And this appears to be as much the case for jatropha, as for other crops, despite the claim that it grows on non-agricultural land<sup>89</sup>

Apart from taking away land from locals or displacing it from agricultural purposes, local concerns include minimal benefit for local economies, and Ghana's Exchequer. The local protests caused some companies to discontinue their investments, such as the Swedish company Skebab, but others continued unchecked, such as: (1) the Italian based Agroils that acquired 105,000 hectares of land; (2) the UK-based Jatropa Africa that acquired 120,000 hectares; (3) the Norwegian company Scanfuel that has already cultivated 10,000 hectares and has contracts for almost 400,000 hectares; (4) the Israeli company Galten that acquired 100,000 hectares; and (5) the Norwegian company BioFuel Africa.<sup>90</sup> Ghanaian farmers that are growing jatropha under profit-sharing lease agreements with Jatropa Africa have already covered 100,000 hectares of land.<sup>91</sup>

Although the government of Ghana signed a Treaty in July 2006 that established the Pan African Non-Petroleum Producers Association (PANPP), also known as the "green OPEC," to promote biofuels production, an FAO study found that "none of the land destined for agrofuels in . . . Ghana . . . was intended to produce agrofuels for domestic consumption. All the crops grown would be sold for export,"<sup>92</sup> not to mention the fact that these land developers or investors had paid very little for the land through disguised alibi, in a country where some 50 percent of citizens live off the land by growing foodstuffs for local consumption. BioFuel Africa is reported to have illegally acquired 38,000 hectares of land that was already rented to local villagers, through a thumbprint signatory procedure with the illiterate local chief, to the horror of his subjects who knew nothing about the deal.<sup>93</sup>

### *Health Security*

Despite being a Third World country, the Department of Health in Ghana has robustly tackled health problems to minimize the risk or prevalence of disease. Also, "UNAIDS mobilized an additional US\$ three million from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, in order to scale up

the prevention of mother-to-child HIV transmission services in Ghana.”<sup>94</sup> This funding doubled the coverage of such services.<sup>95</sup> The HIV/AIDS adult prevalence rate has remained very low and stable.<sup>96</sup> It was 2.3 percent in 2006 when life expectancy was average 57 years and the population was 22 million, with a HDI rating of 138th in that year (UNAIDS 2006).<sup>97</sup> In 2007, the adult prevalence rate depreciated to 1.9 percent.<sup>98</sup> Life expectancy has also improved dramatically, and was estimated in 2010 at 60.55 years average<sup>99</sup> for the 24 million population.<sup>100</sup>

Data from the 2010 second quarter review on HIV/AIDS control showed that the affected population was 240,802 nationwide, of which 219,600 are adults. Hence 21,202 children have tested positive to the HIV/AIDS disease nationwide. The death rate of HIV/AIDS victims was quoted as 17,058 annually.<sup>101</sup> The Ghana AIDS Commission have stated that the prevalence rate of the pandemic among young people from 15 to 24 years old was 1.9 percent in 2008 and 2.1 percent in 2009.<sup>102</sup> As the prevalence rate of the pandemic is very low (compared with other countries in Southern Africa), prevention programs have focused mainly on sex workers.<sup>103</sup> But the government’s approach to tackling the pandemic is comprehensive and not limited to urban areas, for example, 1,020 people were screened in 2008 at the Agona Government Hospital in the Central Region, of which 103 were diagnosed as HIV positive. In 2008, the UNAIDS Technical Support Facility partnered with the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration “to build capacity among consultants in support facility priority areas and to widen their consultant database.”<sup>104</sup> Subsequently, the UNAIDS West African Regional Support Team partnered with the Millennium Villages project and “provided technical support to integrate mother-to-child HIV transmission services in the Millennium Villages in Ghana.”<sup>105</sup>

As a result of 142 confirmed cases of H1N1 (Swine Flu) pandemic recorded in the harbor city of Tema during May 2010, the Tema Metropolitan Health Directorate vaccinated about 29,520 residents in the Tema Metropolis against the pandemic by the end of June 2010.<sup>106</sup> However, Malaria remains a problem and the National Malaria Control Programme is working aggressively to deal with the disease.

In 2010, it was also reported on the Government of Ghana’s website that the prevalence of guinea worm had dwindled to almost eradication point: starting from 3,239 cases reported between January and June 2001; followed by 3,076 reported for the same period in 2002; plus further systematic reductions to just over 200 for the same period in 2008; and finally to as few as eight in 2009.<sup>107</sup> The history of the relative shortage of doctors and other medical personnel in the underdeveloped northern regions of the country is being tackled by a program of incentives.



## CHAPTER 9

---

# Union Government of Africa

### Introduction

This chapter captures the road map to date of the AU's drive toward political and economic integration of the eight constitutive Regional Economic Communities (RECs) of the African continent into a Union Government of Africa. Following the Grand Debate on the Union Government that took place at the Ninth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of AU Heads of State and Government (or Summit) held in July 2007 in Accra, the AU Chairperson and President of Ghana, John Kufuor, appointed a High Level Panel of experts chaired by Adebayo Adedeji to review the state of the union. The prime purpose was to assess and chart the way toward this union government, with terms of reference chiefly to "evaluate the African economic and political integration agenda and existing ongoing reviews on political integration by the AU Commission as well as other AU Organs and the RECs."<sup>1</sup> A June 2006 study<sup>2</sup> published on the subject by the AU had already laid sufficient groundwork for this High Level Panel to build on.

With the establishment of the AU in July 2002, some mechanisms began to take shape rapidly, such as the APRM that was established in 2003 with a mandate to ensure that member states conformed to mutually agreed values in democratic, economic, and corporate governance, including socioeconomic development. But accession to the APRM is voluntary. Hence, the periodic peer reviews on governance have been conducted only in participating countries, which numbered 29 as of June 2008, of which 14 had been reviewed by September 2010. The APRM'S highest decision-making body consists of Heads of State and Government, who usually meet twice a year. However, a separate Panel of Eminent Persons has independent oversight of the peer review process, supported by a secretariat.



Political Map of Africa 2010

### The Road Map to Union Government

Three months of the Adedeji review and analysis concluded the obvious: that the idea of a United States of Africa was 50 years old since Dr Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana mooted it in the year of Ghana's independence—1957; that both the OAU and AU leaderships of generations past have been toying with the agenda; and that now is the time to seriously get on with it. The way forward, was therefore not when, but how to implement what was assumed as agreed. Although the report was concluded in December 2007, the grand debate held at the Ninth Summit in Accra reflected the politics of the consensus building process. Interestingly, the report concluded that the union must be of peoples and not just governments, more or less establishing the social underpinnings of the Union Government or the commencement of civil society advocacy into the process. Hence, for example, the strong advocacy from civil society organizations (CSOs) and human rights groups on the continent, pushing for the AU not to defer the ICC's decision to arrest President al-Bashir of Sudan for genocide and crimes against humanity, arguing that "any deferral would negate the fight against impunity in Africa."<sup>3</sup>

As a follow-up on the Accra Summit, the Report of the Committee of Twelve Heads of State and Government that met from May 22 to May 23, 2008 in Arusha, reaffirmed the Accra Declaration and took further steps. As a result, the Eleventh Summit held at Sharm-el-Sheikh from June 30 to July 1, 2008 requested that the AU Commission "work out, the modalities and details for the implementation of the recommendations on the Union Government of the Committee of Twelve"<sup>4</sup> and submit proposals for the next AU Summit where a whole day's session was to be devoted on the matter. This Special Session on The Union Government was held in Addis Ababa on February 1, 2009 as part of the Twelfth Summit, and the leaders of the continent resolved to do everything within capability to complete the road map toward the Union Government, and to give this resolution some impetus. A product of this impetus was Decision 233 of the Twelfth Summit that resolved to transform the AU Commission (AUC) into the AU Authority (AUA). As this would be a fundamental change to the AU itself, in that, Article 20 of the Constitutive Act established the Commission that is none other than the very Secretariat of the African Union, the Executive Council recommended in Decision 233 that the necessary unraveling of the Constitutive Act itself be made in order for the transformation from AUC to AUA to take place.

This meant substantial work for the AUC's Legal Department, as well as figuring out what the future running costs of the refurbished AUC or the new AUA would be. As the AUC was to take charge of transforming itself

into the AUA, Decision 263 of the Thirteenth Summit in July 2009 held at Sirte in Libya requested the AUC to prepare and submit the necessary legal instruments including the structure of the new AUA and the financial implications, and report on the implementation of these at the Seventeenth Ordinary Session of the Executive Council of July 22–23, 2010 at Kampala, Uganda, which immediately preceded the Fifteenth Summit of July 25–27 at which the AUA was to be ratified. The proposed timing of this ratification also had to do with Article 32(3) of the Constitutive Act, which stipulates a 12-month period for the Executive Council to deliberate on a proposal from the time of notification.

As is typical of most ambitious projects, some member states (South Africa and Ethiopia) took opposition at a rather late stage (September 2010) to the Union Government of Africa, on the basis that this would infringe on sovereignty. Ethiopia's excuse probably had to do with apprehensions over the fact that as host of the AU headquarters, its local and internal governance arrangements would come under scrutiny, amidst other fears that it might in the future lose hosting the AU headquarters altogether. South Africa's stance was rather more cynical and had to do with a "better than thou" attitude toward the remainder of the continent. However, the continent acted the part with increasing tenacity ever since replacing the OAU with the AU, and inched closer to this goal by replacing the AUC with the AUA in 2010. The AU also kept its eye on the ball of establishing certain key accelerators such as continental financial institutions (African Central Bank, Monetary Fund, Investment Bank) and an African Standby Force. Subsequently, the AU is on course to fulfilling the 2008 road map agreed in Sharm-el-Sheikh that comprised: Phase I—Operationalization of the AUA (Feb. 2009–Jan. 2010); Phase II—Consolidation of the Authority (Feb. 2010–Jan. 2012); and Phase III—Constitutional Conference to set the basic framework for a United States of Africa.

Following the August 2007 launch of the AU Framework and Guidelines for Land Policy in Africa, and as part of the fight against food insecurity, the progress of activity led to the March 2010 Resolution L7 "Towards Realizing A Food Secure Africa within Five Years." The Conference of African Ministers of Agriculture (CAMA) 2010 was held from October 26 to 29 in Malawi, where an annual Africa Day for Food and Nutrition Security was commemorated on October 30. The 2007 land policy initiative was jointly birthed by the joint consultative workshop comprising of the AU, the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), and the African Development Bank (AfDB).

Subsequently, the Eighth Meeting of the AU-RECs-ECA-AfDB Committee of Secretariat Officials took place in Zanzibar on November 4, 2010 "to

speed up actions leading to the effective implementation of its programmes in a bid to concretize the integration of the continent”<sup>5</sup> toward the formation of the African Economic Community (AEC). A Minimum Integration Programme (MIP) involving agriculture, infrastructure, and education was reported. The participating Regional Economic Communities (RECs) were: the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS); Southern African Development Community (SADC); Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); Community of Sahel Saharan States (CEN-SAD); East African Community (EAC); the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU); plus of course the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the African Development Bank (AfDB), the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), and the European Commission (EC).

As regards security, the Fourteenth Summit held in Addis Ababa from January 31 to February 2, 2010, designated 2010 as the Year of Peace and Security in Africa. Under this rubric, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) sent a delegation to Cote d’Ivoire in September 2010 to meet with the Cote d’Ivoire government, civil society, and the international community in connection with the much postponed election that was scheduled for October 31, 2010. In the same vein, the AUC/AUA issued a warning to the Guinean authorities to ensure that an election took place as soon as possible when the run-off ballot scheduled for September 19 was postponed by the authorities on September 12 due to inter-party clashes. The PSC subsequently held its 248th meeting on November 13, 2010 over Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire, Sudan, Niger, and Comoros. The PSC also established a High Level Ad Hoc Committee on Libya at its 265th meeting held on March 10, 2011 in Addis Ababa, to engage with all parties involved in the Libyan conflict of 2011, and against the background of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 of 2011. At the meeting of the International Contact Group on Libya, held in Rome on May 5, 2011, the Chairperson of the AUC reiterated the AU’s position and commitment to facilitate the resolution of the Libyan crisis and a democratic transition. This was followed by President Zuma’s visit to Libya at the end of May 2011, and his subsequent engagement with NATO representative David Cameron when the latter visited South Africa on a UK trade mission in July 2011. The AU and NATO were at loggerheads over Libya: the AU was negotiating for a Libyan future that featured Gaddafi, whereas NATO wanted a Libyan future without Gaddafi.

The AU Post-Conflict Reconstruction Committee on the Sudan was established to facilitate all forms of activity toward consolidating peace in the Sudan regardless of the outcome of the January 2011 referendum for the self determination of South Sudan. The PSC therefore urged AU member states

to consider forms of assistance such as lifting unilateral sanctions against the Khartoum government, and debt cancellations, in order to ease the implementation of the outstanding provisions of the CPA and the resolution of post-referendum arrangements. An African Standby Force was also operationalized in October 2010, with a ten-day simulated exercise involving “more than 120 African military components and police forces from North, East, West, South, and Central African regions, along with and 75 civilians and various European Union partners.”<sup>6</sup>

On November 4, 2010, the AU held its first Conference of States Parties to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty in accordance with Articles 12 and 14 of the Treaty of Pelindaba that was signed in Cairo in 1996 and took effect in July 2009. Among other things, this conference elected the following AU member states as members of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (ACNE): Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Mauritius, Senegal, South Africa, Togo, and Tunisia. Subsequently, the First Ordinary Session of ACNE took place on May 4, 2011 in Addis Ababa.

Following the December 2009 Copenhagen Accord that resulted from the fiercely participated and inconclusive Fifteenth Session of the Conference of Parties (COP 15) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Committee of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC) met at Addis Ababa on November 15, 2010 to prepare and guide the African negotiating system for the COP16 on UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol that was scheduled to take place in Cancun, Mexico. The AU prepared to head for Cancun “with a sharpened African common position on climate change” and look out for “the review and facilitation of the pledges made by developed countries in order to constitute the Green Fund of the Copenhagen Accord.”<sup>7</sup>

At Cancun from November 19 to December 10, both the old worst polluters of the developed West, and the emerging nations such as China and India, could not commit to curbing carbon emissions to the required levels, and instead advocated strongly toward other means, such as reducing deforestation, which passes the buck to Africa and other parts of the green Third World. Hence, what Cancun achieved was to protect forests and share technologies. The Cancun Accord established the \$100 billion Green Fund to provide emerging nations with green technologies to cut down on emissions, without any assurance on the fund. Participating nations therefore departed in anticipation of what the next annual conference scheduled for Durban, South Africa, in 2011 would bring.

Meanwhile, the road map to Union Government followed on course with the Sixteenth AU Summit in January 2011, which was themed “Towards

Greater Unity and Integration Through Shared Values.” In January 2011, South Sudan became the newest sovereign state in Africa, and the newest on earth, after a successful UN-sponsored referendum to secede from Sudan, in which 99 percent of citizens from South Sudan voted to affirm this choice. July 9, 2011 became the official date for the independence of South Sudan.

## CHAPTER 10

---

# International Politics of Africa

### Introduction

Adequate discussions have already ensued in this book about the UN vis-à-vis the international politics of Africa, and about Africa's recent significant global partner (China). Hence, this final chapter concentrates on Africa's relations with two historical global partners: the EU and the WTO.

### The Lisbon Treaty and the EPAs

The relationship between Africa and the EU has to do with a combination of what has borne out of the colonial relationship, the vexed issue of the unlevel playing field that continues to persist between the two partners, and the reality that the advantaged partner does not wish to see the playing field leveled. Hence, the Second Africa-EU Summit held in Lisbon<sup>1</sup> during December 8–9, 2007, was poised to be a boxing match. There were a number of vexed issues simmering in the background, the most contentious of which was the fact that preferential trade agreements between the ACP countries and the EU were grossly incompatible with WTO rules. A fierce battle was already raging between the G8 and the G90 Alliance at the WTO, and within this battle, the BRIC countries were also carving out their niche as strong and emerging economies that posed a serious threat to western economic hegemony.

Africa appeared to be the usual soft target that could be bullied into submission, and the AU was adamant not to be such a target. The 2007 Lisbon summit also became a crunch decision-making and watershed encounter, because December 31 of that year was the deadline for the existing EPAs: reciprocal free trade agreements between the EU and the ACP bloc of 79 less developed countries, through which the EU sought to liberalize investment within the ACP, and at the same time guarantee protection for EU operations, through the imposition of unfair and unjustified rules and deals.<sup>2</sup>



New or interim deals were meant to be signed or initiated prior to the December 2007 deadline, the absence of which the EU intended to raise tariffs for countries that had no drafts on the negotiation table. The EU proposals were obviously inimical to the African interest, and tensions were already high in the wake of the summit. Even the tangential political context indicated that the gloves were off prior to the summit; for example, the ensuing and starkly turbulent relationship between Zimbabwe and the UK that had in the past manifested in colorful verbal exchanges, generated some objections from the UK and other western allies to President Mugabe's attendance at Lisbon. The AU became adamant to use this tangential episode to make a point, in advance, about their attitude toward the impending substantive issue of Lisbon (EPAs), and subsequently took the view that Mugabe should attend Lisbon or the AU will not attend. We know that the summit took place, so Mugabe must have attended, and Gordon Brown, the UK Prime Minister, absconded.

Among other things, the interim deals aimed to commit African countries to "liberalising up to 97% of their trade with the EU over ten to fifteen years, removing policy tools they need for development, and to negotiating on other issues including services, investment and intellectual property."<sup>3</sup> The disadvantages proposed by the EU were amply clear to both governments and NGOs, as well as experts. Oxfam was of the view that "these deals will undermine development in ACP countries by obliging them to open their markets too quickly, thereby exposing subsistence farmers and fledgling industries to premature—and in many cases unfairly subsidized—competition from Europe."<sup>4</sup> No wonder as at the middle of December 2007, countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, Gabon, Congo Brazzaville, Angola, and all Caribbean countries except Haiti<sup>5</sup> had not signed any deals, and were not in a hurry to do so. Professor Joseph Stiglitz (Nobel Laureate in Economics) also advised Ghana's Minister of Finance in July 2008 that "EPA does not give sufficient opportunities for businesses in LDCs to develop to levels where they can compete favourably with their counterparts in the EU and that is critical to the development of a country like Ghana."<sup>6</sup> The one-page Lisbon Declaration that resulted from the two-day Lisbon summit was bland and not very binding<sup>7</sup>—an indication that the detailed action plans and steps outlined in the so-called joint strategy document<sup>8</sup> could be reluctantly pursued. The EU contributed its own quota to undermining the relationship by "playing certain African regions off against each other"<sup>9</sup> to the annoyance of AU partners.

The EU subsequently took forward bloc negotiations with Africa's RECs, out of which subsequent bilateral agreements could be signed with their individual member states, but these bloc negotiations would be anything but smooth. The RECs are: the Common Market for Eastern and

Southern Africa (COMESA); Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS); Southern African Development Community (SADC); Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); Community of Sahel Saharan States (CEN-SAD); East African Community (EAC); the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU); and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

Although the EU was seeking to allow ACP countries 100 percent access to the EU market in return for a reciprocal 80 percent access to their domestic markets, the ECOWAS Commissioner for Trade and Industry maintained that ECOWAS would only allow 65 percent EU access or 70 percent at the most, subject to a firm commitment by the EU to support EPA-related projects such as processing locally and adding value to primary products. Hence, an initial June 30, 2009 deadline agreed with ECOWAS was extended to October 31, but by October 20, negotiations between ECOWAS and the EU were far from conclusive.<sup>10</sup> Meanwhile, at the country level, Ghana was certainly not ready to sign what was still referred to as an Interim Economic Partnership Agreement (IEPA), prompting neighboring Cote d'Ivoire to go ahead and sign off its stepping stone agreements to an EPA. The wranglings of the ECOWAS EPA continued, yet was not ready for signing by the time of the next Africa-EU Summit of November 29–30, 2010.

In the SADC, the regional policy incoherences of signing up to post-2007 EPAs took their toll, as relations strained between South Africa on the one hand, and Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS) on the other, all of which are members of the five-nation South Africa Customs Union (SACU) founded in 1910. A 1999 Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) between the EU and South Africa impacted negatively on the BLNS countries, which became adamant that trade policies ought to be streamlined to enable them to engage the process of negotiating their EPAs.<sup>11</sup> Subsequently, in October 2010, SACU “instructed a team of technical experts to draft terms of reference acceptable to all five member states, in order to resolve the contentious issue of an economic partnership agreement with the European Union.”<sup>12</sup>

Meanwhile, as of August 2010, some SADC countries, including Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Mozambique, had agreed to EPAs, while others, such as Namibia, South Africa, and Angola, were back-pedaling on the agreement as it stood. Experts and activists continually made it clear that “(EPA) has the potential to split Africa and poses a great threat to Southern African Development Community’s planned economic and financial integration.”<sup>13</sup>

As of the end of October 2010, the East African Community (EAC), comprising Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi, was resolute that it

would miss the November 2010 deadline to sign the EPA with the EU,<sup>14</sup> for reasons including the lack of mutual benefit between the EAC and EU partners. It was widely acknowledged that some RECs, such as the SADC, ECOWAS, and COMESA, were already advanced in laying proper trade platforms for both intra-regional and inter-regional trade in Africa.<sup>15</sup>

Agreeing EPAs assumed lengthy processes simply because it became increasingly clear to AU counterparts that the EU-Africa relationship bore the signs of a partnership that was strategic to the EU's interests to the neglect of Africa's. This had been the trend at other trade platforms, particularly the WTO. It is widely noted that "The language contained in agreements being negotiated by the EU through the WTO with their southern counterparts often deliberately disguises real political goals, obscuring the negative economic implications for those countries of the neoliberal agenda."<sup>16</sup>

With the politicization of EPAs, the swords were already drawn even before the Third Africa-EU Summit in November 2010. At the pre-summit Joint Task Force meeting in Addis Ababa of October 20–21, 2010, Henrike Klavet, a representative of the Maastricht-based European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) was already talking about "a more political approach to Africa–EU relations in the perspective of the next summit and beyond."<sup>17</sup> It became notable, that at the Third EU-Africa Summit, EPAs that were negotiated as far back as the second summit in 2007 were still not ready for signing.

But against the above context, the tedious EPAs, and EU-Africa palaver for that matter, had become less palatable, as was evident in the number of EU leaders who exhibited their lack of appetite by failing to attend the third summit in Tripoli from November 29 to 30, 2010, at which nothing major occurred apart from adopting the 2011–2013 Joint Action Plan. The Tripoli Declaration determined to carry on with business as usual and "reconvene in Brussels in 2013."<sup>18</sup>

### Africa and the WTO

Chapter 2 of this book broached the WTO as a subject. The following section focuses on the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) of 2001, plus the progress on the new Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) cartel.

The economic and financial crisis that shook the world economy in the closing months of 2008 produced a global recession in 2009 that also resulted in the largest decline in world trade in more than 70 years. The rate of trade growth had already slowed from 6.4 percent in 2007 to 2.1 percent in 2008, but the 12.2 percent contraction in 2009 was without precedent in world

history. The WTO projected a modest recovery in 2010 that should reverse some of the impact of the trade collapse.<sup>19</sup>

The 2010 World Trade Report was themed on natural resources, defined as “stocks of materials that exist in the natural environment that are both scarce and economically useful in production or consumption, either in their raw state or after a minimal amount of processing.”<sup>20</sup> In the inescapable world of economics underpinned by an equally inescapable rule of supply and demand, almost all natural resources are characterized by a number of factors including the fact that: (1) they are unevenly distributed across the globe; (2) they are exhaustible, and so can run out of supply; (3) they have a certain influence on the market depending on their demand and dominance in world output and trade; and (4) they have potential to suffer from market failures, and most certainly price volatility. We also know that inevitable factors such as population growth, increasing industrialization, and the rise of developing economies (some of which are rising at a faster rate than could be accurately determined) have driven the globalization of trade in natural resources, particularly when transport is much easier with modern technology, and the increasingly globalized world has equally inevitably opened up the global commodity markets,<sup>21</sup> so that the dynamics of world trade was now beyond the world’s control, so to speak.

In the above context, it becomes amply clear for the African continent that has so far relied more on extracting its rich natural resources for export, that securing some measure of control over the politics of world trade was absolutely necessary, and this had been Africa’s main concern within the WTO. There are many reasons for this concern, but the topmost was because “the share of natural resources in world trade has risen sharply in recent years, partly reversing the trend since World War II towards increasing trade in manufactured goods”<sup>22</sup> without necessarily increasing the value of commodities from Africa, nor the negotiating powers of the Group of 77 Developing Countries (G77), most of which are African. Africa has so far specialized in exporting raw materials to the industrialized world whilst the latter has specialized in manufacturing—with the majority of their products circulating among themselves, and the remainder to the less developed regions. The 2010 World Trade Report would have it that

Less industrialized regions have very little intra-regional trade in natural resources, whereas more industrialized regions tended to trade resources within their own regions. Shares of intra-regional trade in natural resource exports of the more industrialized WTO regions in 2008 were as follows: 82 percent for Europe, 78 percent for Asia and 62 percent for North America. Meanwhile,

resource-dominant regions of the CIS, Africa and Middle East had very low intra-regional trade shares of 12, five and two per cent respectively.<sup>23</sup>

The idea that Africa could strategically conduct more intra-regional and inter-regional trade for its own benefit has not yet materialized because the continent is comparatively less industrialized and not yet a significant benefactor of its own industrial and manufactured goods. Africa would have to take on an industrialization drive to achieve this.

In another related sphere of argument (exports of natural resources), the value of Africa's exports is in inverse proportion to the volume of exports, in comparison to the rest of the world. The 2010 World Trade Report stated that "the total value of Africa's exports of natural resources was just under US\$ 406 billion, representing 73 per cent of the continent's exports . . . Europe had the smallest share of resources in total exports at 14 per cent, although the value of this trade was greater than any other region at nearly US\$ 892 billion."<sup>24</sup>

Africa's frustrations about global trade relationships, particularly the collapse of the DDA in 2008, was further clarified in President Mugabe's September 24, 2010 speech at the 65th UN General Assembly, that the DDA was "stalled because of the intransigence of some countries." Subsequently from 2008, the strategic role of Brazil, as a member of both the Group of 20 (industrialized and industrializing) Nations and the Group of 77 Developing Countries, to see to the rightful conclusion of the DDA, became a simultaneous move to champion the cause of developing countries, as well as the new BRICS group. Among other things, the stalling of the DDA in 2008 caused the proliferation of bilateral trade agreements across the globe, especially in Asia. At the January 2011 annual meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, world leaders called for the conclusion of the DDA by the end of 2011.

The BRICS is a new trade cartel of strategic interests, for its constituent emerging economies that also happen to be developing countries. Russia sought to capitalize on the BRICS relationship in order to make further inroads into world trade, at least prior to WTO accession from 2011. A strong relationship already existed between Russia and China: Russia is the world's biggest energy producer and China is the world's biggest energy consumer; trade between the two countries amounted to some \$38.8 billion in 2009–2010; a crude oil pipeline of 1,000 kilometers was under way between Russia and China; these two veto holding members of the UNSC hold the key to reigning in Iran's nuclear programme that has ignited global security concerns because of the power imbalance in the Middle East. The IMF predicted a 9.6 percent growth for China in 2011.

Apart from assuming leading roles in trade and negotiations such as the DDA, other indicators that point to Brazil's credentials as an emerging economy included the fact that national petroleum organization Petrobras became the fourth largest company in the world when it was valued at \$200 billion in September 2010. India also made its case as a fast emerging economy, as well as the second most populous nation in the world, even if the inability to prepare sufficiently to host the 2010 Commonwealth Games raised eyebrows. The IMF forecasted an 8.4 percent growth for India in 2011. The Russian president's state visit to India on December 21, 2010 generated a lot of deals including the supply of fighter jets to India. South Africa is obviously the strongest economy in Africa, as well as an irrevocable candidate for an African permanent seat<sup>25</sup> on an expanded UN Security Council (UNSC). South Africa was formally asked to join BRICS on December 24, 2010. South Africa's biggest trading partner is China, with trade between the two countries amounting to at least 17 percent of South Africa's import bill in 2009, and exports to China amounting to 10.34 percent in the same year.<sup>26</sup> China-South Africa trade increased tenfold since 2001, and stood at over \$16 billion at August 2010 when President Zuma visited China with a 300 entourage.<sup>27</sup>

Within the context of developing the BRICS cartel, emerged the spate of competitive devaluations or currency wars that gripped the world's top performing nations, and which has direct implications for the economies of BRICS, as well as economic relations among BRICS. As a result of the global financial meltdown in 2008, many currencies devalued against the dollar, but China did not devalue the Yuan. China, Japan, and Brazil have been among the top large economies that accumulated huge current account surpluses, and whose currencies had risen substantially against the dollar. The Japanese Yen had risen 14 percent against the dollar from June to September 2010 alone.<sup>28</sup> In September 2010, the Bank of Japan intervened by devaluing its currency, and subsequently introduced a stimulus package of 61.3 billion dollars for the Japanese economy in October 2010 while cutting down the interest rate to almost 0 percent.

China resolved not to budge, prompting the U.S. House of Representatives to approve tariffs against Chinese imports in September 2010, and sparking fears from economists, that retaliation could generate an era of protectionism as occurred in the 1920s and 1930s. The Brazilian Finance Minister subsequently stated that "we are in the midst of an international currency war . . . This threatens us because the advanced nations are threatening to devalue their currencies."<sup>29</sup> The Chinese currency had long been viewed as overvalued, hence a few days prior to the 2010 IMF-World Bank annual meeting scheduled for October 8–10, the United States intensified calls for an appreciation of the Chinese currency by 15–20 percent to reflect

its true value. China was reluctant to devalue the Yuan for a variety of reasons including the fear of losing global competitiveness. Alongside this, China thought the dollar's dominance was "a product of the past," a view made public by the President of China as he visited the United States in January 2011. In the fast developing multipolar era of globalization, economic wars among the strongest nations created ripples of impact across the globe. As already mentioned, the impact is not just at the BRICS but within the BRICS, for example: China has a huge trade surplus with the United States and a deficit with Brazil; South Africa's biggest trading partner is China.

The currency wars continued at the November 2010 Group of Twenty States (G20) summit in Seoul, South Korea, where G20 members became very critical of the United States for printing \$600 billion as a means of quantitative easing to stimulate the U.S. economy just before this summit. The U.S. ploy weakened the dollar and strengthened exporting from the country, at the expense of other external economies across the globe, for the simple reason that the dollar became cheaper. Nevertheless, the United States could not live within its means, and continued to accrue debt to the point of breaching its debt ceiling of \$14.3 trillion, but the government intervened with an emergency bill to raise the ceiling 12 hours before the deadline on August 2, 2011. This allowed the United States government to burrow more to meet its financial commitments including the provision of social security benefits, medicines, and medicare. The bill allowed the United States government to initiate a plan of \$2.4 trillion deficit reduction, of which \$900 billion constituted cuts over a period of ten years, complemented by \$1.5 trillion of savings from taxing the rich—to be negotiated by a Presidential committee. These decisions by the United States Treasury had direct implications for the global economy, particularly those of China and Japan, which are the top and second largest holders of United States treasury bonds respectively; and of course Brazil, which had accumulated a huge current account surplus, and whose currency had risen substantially against the dollar.

The ripple effect of the United States debt arrangement to other parts of the globe was unavoidable, and Prime Minister Putin of Russia made a televised comment on August 2, 2011, that "the United States was living off the global economy like a parasite." In the couple of days following the United States decision, there was a global market slump as the meltdown on stock markets around the world resulted in some of the deepest plunges in two years, and continued in the negatives for a while. On August 4, 2011, the Dow Jones closed losing 512.68 points and falling by 4.31 percent; the London FTSE and Frankfurt Stock Exchange both fell by 3.4 percent; Paris fell by 3.9 percent; and Milan fell by over 5 percent. The eurozone was in turmoil as the debt contagion could not be stopped. Greece, Ireland and

Portugal had already received financial bail outs, but Italy and Spain were unavoidably next in line, and there were fears that the world's third largest economy now in a sovereign debt crisis would not be able to help its members. The eurozone however hemmed in its interest rates by keeping it at 1.5 percent. In Asia, the Taiwan Stock Exchange fell by 5.5 percent, the Japanese Nikkei Index fell by 3.72 percent, Hong Kong by 4.2 percent, South Korea by 3.7 percent, Indonesia by 4.86 percent, Singapore by 3 percent, and Thailand by 2.73 percent. The Australian stock exchange also fell by 4 percent.

As part of the ensuing international politics of trade, the visit by the U.S. President to India a few days before the November 2010 G20 meetings, generated the U.S. announcement of the end of trade restrictions between the two countries that would foster trade in hi-tech and dual use military equipment including hardware and Boeing aircraft. The United States also endorsed India's bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC, even though Indian positions and advocacy at the WTO (e.g., about the DDA's Special Safeguard Mechanism) were grossly anti-American. Also, India's position on global climate change negotiations was for the monitoring of greenhouse gas emissions in developed countries, plus the sourcing of a Green Fund to provide emerging nations with green technologies to cut down on emissions, as pledged by developed countries in the December 2009 Copenhagen Accord, agreed in the December 2010 Cancun Accord, and was to be reviewed with the December 2011 Durban Accord.



# Notes

## Chapter 1

1. The Levin Institute, "Globalization 101," The State University of New York, [http://www.globalization101.org/What\\_is\\_Globalization.html](http://www.globalization101.org/What_is_Globalization.html) (accessed November 19, 2010).
2. Anthony Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 31–32.
3. Michael Amoah, *Reconstructing the Nation in Africa: The Politics of Nationalism in Ghana* (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2007), 10–17.
4. Amoah, *Reconstructing the Nation in Africa*, 15.
5. Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), 1.
6. Ken Wolf, "Hans Kohn's Liberal Nationalism: The Historian as a Prophet," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 37, no. 4 (1976): 651.
7. Han Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background* (New York: Macmillan, 1944).
8. Jonathan Sperber, review of "What is a Nation? Europe 1789–1914," *The American Historical Review* 112, no. 3 (2007): 921.
9. Sperber, 921.
10. Andre Liebich, "Searching for the Perfect Nation: The Itinerary of Hans Kohn (1891–1971)," *Nations and Nationalism* 12, no. 4 (2006): 579.
11. Liebich, 590.
12. Liebich, 590.
13. Liebich, 579.
14. Hans Kohn, *Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East* (London: George Routledge and Sons Ltd, 1932).
15. Hans Kohn, *A History of Nationalism in the East* (London: Routledge, 1929), 9.
16. Kohn, *Nationalism and Imperialism*, 4.
17. Kohn, *Nationalism and Imperialism*, 49.
18. Kohn, *Nationalism and Imperialism*, 49.
19. Kohn, *Nationalism and Imperialism*, 49.
20. Kohn, *Nationalism and Imperialism*, 50.
21. Hans Kohn, *Prophets and Peoples: Studies in Nineteenth Century Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1946), 3–4.

22. Kohn, *Nationalism and Imperialism*, 50.
23. Wolf, 666.
24. Wolf, 666.
25. Kohn, *Prophets and Peoples*, 3.
26. The UK Government commissioned The National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education (NCIHE), chaired by Sir Ron Dearing, which published its report, *Higher Education in the Learning Society* in 1997—popularly known as The Dearing Report. Recommendation 88 of this report was to assess the state of higher education ten years later. Hence, in 2007, experts conducted the due review known as *The Dearing Report: Ten Years On*, and published a Volume of Essays on progress to date since The Dearing Report of 1997. Among other things, the 2007 review comprised a comparative study of national inquiries into higher education conducted in the United States, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and the UK, as well as a special survey conducted in Autumn 2006 among 100 individuals with different roles and responsibilities across the British higher education sector, in order to update the original consultation with the sector included in *Report 1* of The Dearing Report.
27. Jonathan Adams and David Smith, “Higher Education, Research and the Knowledge Economy: From Robbins to ‘the Gathering Storm’,” in *The Dearing Report: Ten Years On*, ed. David Watson and Michael Amoah (London: Institute of Education, 2007), 82.
28. Adams and Smith, 108.
29. Taken from Amoah, *Reconstructing the Nation in Africa*, 15.
30. For the full debate on the theorizing on nationalism, see chapter 2 of Amoah, *Reconstructing the Nation in Africa*.
31. Amoah, *Reconstructing the Nation in Africa*, 35–42.
32. Joseph Casely-Hayford, *Ethiopia Unbound: Studies in Race and Emancipation* (London: CM Phillips, 1911), xxv.
33. For a full explanation of this polarity, see Amoah, *Reconstructing the Nation in Africa*, 117.
34. Michael Amoah, “Nationalism in Africa: Ghana’s Presidential Election,” *Review of African Political Economy* 30, no. 95 (2003):150. Also see Amoah, *Reconstructing the Nation in Africa*, 117.
35. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 1.
36. This phenomenon was first highlighted in Amoah, *Nationalism in Africa*, 150, and fully developed in chapter 6 of Amoah, *Reconstructing the Nation in Africa*.
37. Amoah, *Reconstructing the Nation in Africa*.
38. Amoah, *Reconstructing the Nation in Africa*, 114.
39. John Hutchinson, *Modern Nationalism* (London: Fontana, 1994), 42–43; James Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity* (London: Macmillan, 1991), 51–52.
40. Figuration is also known as politics-of-the belly, and can be defined simply as: a status quo of unequal distribution and accumulation of public opportunity and wealth, in which a system of social inequality operates through the political

- interdependence of allies (or opponents) within the political arena, along tribal or clientelistic contours, and supervised by the State. For a fuller explanation of figuration and how it develops, see Amoah, *Reconstructing the Nation in Africa*, 114–116.
41. For the full detail on the traditions of origin, see chapters 3 and 4 of Amoah, *Reconstructing the Nation in Africa*.
  42. The wider Guan ancestry comprises 79 percent of the population and consists of Akan (45.3 percent), Guan (4 percent), Ga-Adangbe (7.3), Mole Dagbani (15.2), Gurma (3.6), Grusi (2.6), Mande-Busanga (1 percent). The remainder of the population comprises Ewes (11.7), other Ghanaian tribes or CTMs (1.4), and other residents including nonGhanaians (7.8). The total is 99.9 percent.
  43. This phrase was a famous mantra within the Charter of Redemption introduced by General I K Acheampong, Chairman of the National Redemption Council (NRC) that overthrew the Busia elected government by the January 13, 1972 coup.
  44. The lyrics of the National Pledge are as follows: I promise on my honour to be faithful and loyal to Ghana my motherland. I pledge myself to the service of Ghana with all my strength and with all my heart. I promise to hold in high esteem our heritage won for us through the blood and toil of our fathers. And I pledge myself in all things to uphold and defend the good name of Ghana. So help me God.
  45. Anthony Smith, *National Identity* (London: Penguin), 59.
  46. Amoah, *Reconstructing the Nation in Africa*, 5.
  47. Liebich, 579.
  48. The full title of Hans Kohn's 1932 book says *Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East*.
  49. Kohn places the emergence of nationalism with that of the modern state from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. For more on this, see Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, 4.
  50. Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, 7.
  51. Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, 6.
  52. Hans Kohn, "The Genesis and Character of English Nationalism," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 1, no. 1 (1940): 69.
  53. Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, 4.
  54. Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, 4.
  55. Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, viii.
  56. Kohn, *A History*, 9–10.
  57. Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, 3–4.
  58. Kohn, "The Genesis and Character," 79–94.
  59. Amoah, *Reconstructing the Nation in Africa*, 34.
  60. For a fuller discussion of this argument in relation to the Fanti, see Amoah, *Reconstructing the Nation in Africa*, 33–39.
  61. Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, 4.
  62. Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, 4.

63. Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, 15.
64. Please note that these figures kept evolving, until the international dispute over the independence of Kosovo was brought to a close when the UN-sponsored International Court of Justice ruled on July 22, 2010 that Kosovo's UDI did not violate international law. The figures are only meant to give readers some idea of the global split that occurred on the Kosovo issue. Outside of the UNSC, each state has varied reasons for the steadfastness or shiftiness of their positions, which could be compared to shifting sands.
65. Of the five members of the UNSC with veto powers, the U.S., UK and France recognized Kosovo's UDI. China expressed concern, and Russia rejected it outright as illegal.
66. Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, 6, 10–11.
67. Kohn, *A History*, 2–3.
68. Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), 92–103.
69. Wolf, 670.
70. Wolf, 672.
71. Kohn, *Prophets and Peoples*, 2.
72. Amoah, *Reconstructing the Nation in Africa*, vii.

## Chapter 2

1. These were the members of the European Steel and Coal Community.
2. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), "NATO-Russia set on path towards strategic partnership," [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-1438A233-84BB8B91/natolive/news\\_68876.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-1438A233-84BB8B91/natolive/news_68876.htm) (accessed November 22, 2010).
3. NATO, "NATO-Russia set on path."
4. President Obama's Democratic Party had just lost the majority in the Senate, and furthermore, the new Senate speaker would be a Republican.
5. Aljazeera English news broadcast televised on March 10, 2010.
6. World Trade Report 2010, 59.
7. The OPEC countries in alphabetical order are Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela.
8. Condoleezza Rice, "Rethinking the National Interest: American Realism for a New World," *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 4 (2008): 4 and 6.
9. Rice, 4.

## Chapter 3

1. From the text of President Mugabe's speech on September 24, 2010 at the 65th UN General Assembly.
2. United Nations, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the UN Secretary-General S/2005/60 (New York: UN Secretariat), 4.

3. UN Report S/2005/60, 4.
4. Resolution 1679 of the UNSC.
5. Harry Broadman, *Africa's Silk Road: China and India's New Economic Frontier* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2007), 82.
6. Broadman, *Africa's Silk Road*, 100.
7. Transparency International, "Corruption Perceptions Index 2010," Transparency International, [http://www.transparency.org/policy\\_research/surveys\\_indices/cpi/2010](http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010) (accessed October 28, 2010).
8. Colum Lynch, "African Union Force Low on Money, Supplies and Morale," *The Washington Post*, May 13, 2007, Africa Section.
9. Lynch, "African Union Force."
10. UN Security Council Resolution 1769 of 2007.
11. According to UN General Assembly document A/C.5/64/15 dated January 22, 2010 that sets out the funding figures for approved resources peacekeeping operations of the various UN missions across the globe from July 1, 2009 to June 30, 2010.
12. UNAMID, "Facts and Figures," UNAMID, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/facts.shtml> (accessed May 22, 2010).
13. UN Security Council Resolution 1593 of 2005.
14. Press Release SC/8351.
15. Desmond Davies, "Africa versus the ICC," *African Prospects*, December 2009, 10.
16. See African Union decision document Assembly/AU/Dec.263 (XIII).
17. Agenda item EX.CL/607(XVII) for this meeting.
18. Taken from live interview granted by Moses Wetangula to Aljazeera English on August 27, 2010.
19. Africa Confidential, "The Snubbing of Sudan," *Africa Confidential* 48 no. 3 (2007): 9.
20. Davies, "Africa versus the ICC," 11.
21. Davies, "Africa versus the ICC," 11.
22. Aljazeera English news broadcast televised on July 31, 2010.
23. Jean Mucyo, Report of National Independent Commission in charge of gathering proofs showing the involvement of the French government in the genocide perpetrated in Rwanda in 1994 (Kigali: Government of Rwanda, 2007).
24. See AU document: Assembly/AU/Dec.221(XII).
25. From AU document: Assembly/AU/Dec.221(XII).
26. Human Rights Watch (HRW) press conference televised by France24 and Aljazeera English on May 26–27, 2010.
27. Al-Bashir's live campaign speech televised by Aljazeera English April 1, 2010.
28. See <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kosovo>; accessed May 21, 2010.
29. See [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European\\_Union\\_Rule\\_of\\_Law\\_Mission\\_in\\_Kosovo](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union_Rule_of_Law_Mission_in_Kosovo); accessed May 21, 2010.
30. See [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International\\_recognition\\_of\\_Abkhazia\\_and\\_South\\_Ossetia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_recognition_of_Abkhazia_and_South_Ossetia); accessed May 21, 2010.
31. See [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South\\_ossetia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_ossetia); accessed May 21, 2010.

32. See [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South\\_ossetia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_ossetia); accessed May 21, 2010.
33. Michael Amoah, *Reconstructing the Nation in Africa: The Politics of Nationalism in Ghana* (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2007), 44. Also see James Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 62.

## Chapter 4

1. Henning Melber and others, *China in Africa* (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2007), 6.
2. Melber and others, 6.
3. Melber and others, 6.
4. Transparency International, "Corruption Perceptions Index 2010," Transparency International, [http://www.transparency.org/policy\\_research/surveys\\_indices/cpi/2010](http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010) (accessed October 28, 2010).
5. Melber and others, 41.
6. Kerry Brown and Zhang Chun, *China in Africa: Preparing for the Next Forum for China Africa Cooperation* (London: Chatham House, 2009), 4.
7. Page 3 of the transcript.
8. Liu Guijin, *Darfur and Sino-African Relations* (London: Chatham House, 2008), 3.
9. Condoleezza Rice, "Rethinking the National Interest: American Realism for a New World," *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 4 (2008): 4.
10. Rice, 4.
11. Harry Broadman, *Africa's Silk Road: China and India's New Economic Frontier* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2007), 132.
12. Broadman, 6.
13. Broadman, 83.
14. Broadman, 65.
15. Broadman, 81.
16. Broadman, 82.
17. Broadman, 82.
18. Broadman, 100.
19. Broadman, 82.
20. Broadman, 100.
21. Camillus Eboh, "Nigeria, China agree to fund 3 refineries," *Reuters Africa*, May 13, 2010, <http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE64C0T320100513> (accessed May 14, 2010).
22. Joy Online, "Ghana signs railway contract with Chinese firm," Joy Online, <http://news.myjoyonline.com/business/201011/56755.asp> (accessed November 30, 2010).

## Chapter 5

1. The views of the JEM representative interviewed on the Aljazeera "Frost Over the World" program of September 19, 2009.

2. BBC, "Clash on south Sudan boundary with Darfur 'kills 55'," BBC, April 25, 2010, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8642711.stm> (accessed April 27, 2010).
3. Aljazeera English Television broadcast of July 17, 2010.
4. In an interview televised by Aljazeera English on March 31, 2010.
5. Live interview televised on Aljazeera English on April 1, 2010.
6. Live campaign speech televised by Aljazeera English on April 1, 2010.
7. Live televised reporting from Sudan by Mohammed Adow, reporter for Aljazeera English on October 7, 2010.
8. Live interview by Ghazi Salahuddin televised by Aljazeera English on October 7, 2010.
9. Live televised reporting from Sudan by Mohammed Adow, reporter for Aljazeera English on October 8, 2010.
10. Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, *The Comprehensive Peace Agreement* (Kenya: Republic of Sudan/SPLM, 2005), 65.
11. Sudan, *Comprehensive Peace Agreement*, 66.
12. Sudan, *Comprehensive Peace Agreement*, 68.
13. Sudan, *Comprehensive Peace Agreement*, 69.
14. Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, and Tunisia.
15. As reported by France24 television on October 12, 2010.
16. Institute for Economics and Peace, "2010 Global Peace Index," Institute for Economics and Peace, <http://www.economicsandpeace.org/> (accessed October 25, 2010).
17. Institute for Economics and Peace, "2010 Discussion Paper: Peace, Wealth and Human Potential," Institute for Economics and Peace, <http://www.economicsandpeace.org/> (accessed October 25, 2010).
18. Data for Sudan was based on information collected from North Sudan only, according to the 2010 HDR.
19. UNDP, *Human Development Report* (New York: UNDP, 2009), 63.
20. UNDP, *2009 HDR*, 63.
21. CIA, "World Factbook on Sudan," CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/su.html> (accessed January 26, 2011).
22. Mo Ibrahim Foundation, "2010 Ibrahim Index of African Governance," Mo Ibrahim Foundation, <http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/section/the-ibrahim-index> (accessed October 13, 2010).
23. Mo Ibrahim Foundation, "The Ibrahim Index of African Governance 2009," Mo Ibrahim Foundation, <http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/section/the-ibrahim-index> (accessed May 26, 2010).
24. Ibrahim Foundation, *2010 Ibrahim Index*.
25. UNDP, *2009 HDR*, 26.
26. UNDP, *Human Development Report* (New York: UNDP, 2010), 26.
27. International Crisis Group, "CrisisWatch Bulletin No. 70," International Crisis Group, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/> (accessed July 21, 2010).
28. ICG, *Bulleting No. 76*.

29. International Crisis Group, "Africa Report No. 157," International Crisis Group, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/> (accessed July 21, 2010).
30. Reported by Mohammed Adow on Aljazeera Television news broadcast during August 20, 2010.
31. CIA, *Sudan*.
32. UNAIDS, "2008 UNAIDS Annual Report," UNAIDS, <http://www.unaids.org/en/resources/unaidspublications/2011/> (accessed July 15, 2010).
33. UNAIDS, *2008 Annual Report*.
34. UNAIDS, "Outlook Report 2010," UNAIDS, <http://www.unaids.org/en/resources/unaidspublications/2011/> (accessed July 15, 2010).
35. FAO, "Country Profiles," FAO, <http://www.fao.org/countryprofiles/default.asp?lang=en> (accessed November 4, 2010).
36. IEP, *2010 Discussion Paper*, 30.
37. International Crisis Group, "CrisisWatch Briefing No. 80," International Crisis Group, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/> (accessed July 21, 2010).
38. ICG, *Briefing No. 81*.
39. ICG, *Briefing No. 81*.
40. ICG, *Briefing No. 82*.
41. ICG, *Briefing No. 83*.
42. According to the Aljazeera English televised news broadcast of July 5, 2010.
43. According to the Aljazeera English televised news broadcast of August 27, 2010.
44. Xan Rice, "Somali Radio Stations Bow to Islamist Ban on Music," April 13, 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/apr/13/somalia-radio-music-ban> (accessed June 14, 2010).
45. BBC, *Somali Islamist Insurgents Seize Pirate Haven*.
46. According to the Aljazeera English television broadcasts of June 13–14, 2010.
47. Ibrahim Foundation, *2009 Ibrahim Index*.
48. Ibrahim Foundation, *2010 Ibrahim Index*.
49. UNDP, *2009 HDR*, 63.
50. IEP, *2010 Discussion Paper*, 94.
51. CIA, *Somalia*.
52. UNDP, *2010 HDR*, 99.
53. Maplecroft, "Terrorism Risk Index," Maplecroft, <http://www.maplecroft.com/about/news/terrorism.html> (accessed November 16, 2010).
54. Episode 194 of the Inside Story series, televised by Aljazeera English on September 29, 2010.
55. UNAIDS, "2006 Report on the global AIDS epidemic," UNAIDS, <http://www.unaids.org/en/resources/unaidspublications/2011/> (accessed July 25, 2010).
56. CIA, "World Factbook on Somalia," CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html> (accessed January 26, 2011).
57. UNAIDS, *2010 Outlook Report*.
58. Wikipedia, "Idi Amin," Wikipedia, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idi\\_Amin](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idi_Amin) (accessed 22 April 2010).



59. Patrick Keatley, "Idi Amin," *The Guardian*, August 18, 2003, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2003/aug/18/guardianobituaries> (accessed April 22, 2010).
60. The CIA World Factbook has the figure as 100,000 whereas Amnesty International has estimated 300,000 [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yoweri\\_Museveni](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yoweri_Museveni) (accessed April 23, 2010).
61. Ibrahim Foundation, *2009 and 2010 Ibrahim Indexes*.
62. Ibrahim Foundation, *2010 Ibrahim Index*.
63. IEP, *2010 Discussion Paper*, 13.
64. Ibrahim Foundation, *2010 Ibrahim Index*.
65. CIA, "World Factbook on Uganda," CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ug.html> (accessed January 26, 2011).
66. CIA, *Uganda*.
67. CIA, *Uganda*.
68. CIA, *Uganda*.
69. FAO, *Uganda*.
70. UNDP, *2009 HDR*, 63.
71. UNDP, *2009 HDR*, 63.
72. UNDP, *2009 HDR*, 72.
73. UNDP, *2009 HDR*, 173.
74. IEP, *2010 Discussion Paper*, 93.
75. CIA, *Uganda*.
76. CIA, *Uganda*.
77. According to the Aljazeera English televised news broadcast of July 5, 2010.
78. According to Aljazeera English televised analysis of July 11, 2010.
79. According to Aljazeera English news broadcast televised on July 28, 2010.
80. ICG, *Africa Report No. 157*.
81. Operation Thunder Lightning's code name for Joseph Kony's base in the Garamba forest
82. ICG, *Africa Report No. 157*.
83. As reported by Aljazeera English television on March 17–18, 2010.
84. UNAIDS *2006 Report*.
85. CIA *Uganda*.
86. UNAIDS, *2008 Annual Report*.
87. UNAIDS, *2008 Annual Report*.
88. UNAIDS, *2008 Annual Report*.
89. UNAIDS, *2008 Annual Report*.
90. UNAIDS, *2009 Annual Report*.
91. UNAIDS, "2009 AIDS Epidemic Update," UNAIDS, <http://www.unaids.org/en/resources/unaidspublications/2011/> (accessed October 16, 2010).
92. UNDP, *2010 HDR*, 71.
93. Xan Rice, "Ugandan paper ordered to stop printing list of gay people," November 1, 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/01/uganda-paper-gay-list> (accessed November 5, 2010).
94. Xan Rice, *Ugandan paper ordered to stop*.

95. UNAIDS, *2010 Outlook Report*.
96. UNAIDS, *2010 Outlook Report*.
97. UNAIDS, *2010 Outlook Report*.
98. UNAIDS, *2010 Outlook Report*.
99. Population Reference Bureau, "2010 World population Data Sheet," Population Reference Bureau, <http://www.prb.org/Publications/Datasheets/2010/2010wpds.aspx> (accessed November 1, 2010).
100. This announcement was also televised by France 24 on November 30, 2010.
101. Statement from Young-Jin Choi, Envoy of the UN Mission, on December 3, 2010.
102. From the text of press statement issued by Young-Jin Choi, Head of the UN Mission in Cote d'Ivoire.
103. Government of Cote d'Ivoire, "The Constitution of Cote d'Ivoire," Government of Cote d'Ivoire, [http://abidjan.usembassy.gov/ivoirian\\_constitution2.html](http://abidjan.usembassy.gov/ivoirian_constitution2.html) (accessed January 27, 2011).
104. Cote d'Ivoire, *Constitution*.
105. By radio interview on France 24.
106. Interviews with Moreno-Ocampo televised on France 24 and Aljazeera English.
107. Ibrahim Foundation, *2009 and 2010 Ibrahim Indexes*.
108. Ibrahim Foundation, *2010 Ibrahim Index*.
109. IEP, *2010 Discussion Paper*, 13.
110. UNDP, *2009 HDR*, 63.
111. M. J. Morgan, "Cocoa prices continue to soar," *African Business*, no. 365 (2010): 48.
112. Wikipedia, "Cote d'Ivoire," Wikipedia, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cote\\_d%27ivoire](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cote_d%27ivoire) (accessed June 19, 2010).
113. Morgan, 48.
114. Morgan, 48.
115. UNDP, *2009 HDR*, 40.
116. IEP, *2010 Discussion Paper*, 12–13.
117. UNDP, *2009 HDR*, 50.
118. UNAIDS, *2009 Aids Epidemic Update*, 24.
119. UNAIDS, *2009 Aids Epidemic Update*, 21.
120. CIA, "World Factbook on Cote d'Ivoire," CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iv.html> (accessed January 27, 2011).

## Chapter 6

1. Statistics South Africa, "Mid-year population estimates 2010," Statistics South Africa, <http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/statsdownload.asp?PPN=P0302&SCH=4696> (accessed July 25, 2010).
2. Tom Nevin, "South Africa: Anger mounting over land handover pace," *African Business*, no. 365 (2010): 66–67.
3. Nevin, 66.

4. CIA, "World Factbook on South Africa," CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sf.html> (accessed January 27, 2011).
5. CIA, *South Africa*.
6. As reported by Aljazeera English Television broadcast of August 24, 2010.
7. Mo Ibrahim Foundation, "The Ibrahim Index of African Governance 2009," Mo Ibrahim Foundation, <http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/section/the-ibrahim-index> (accessed May 26, 2010).
8. Institute for Economics and Peace, "2010 Global Peace Index," Institute for Economics and Peace, <http://www.economicsandpeace.org/> (accessed October 25, 2010).
9. Institute for Economics and Peace, "2010 Discussion Paper: Peace, Wealth and Human Potential," Institute for Economics and Peace, <http://www.economicsandpeace.org/> (accessed October 25, 2010).
10. CIA, *South Africa*.
11. Neil Ford, "South Africa the 2010 legacy: tangible and intangible effects," *African Business*, no. 365: 34–38.
12. CIA, *South Africa*.
13. UNDP, *Human Development Report* (New York: UNDP, 2010), 8.
14. IEP, *2010 Discussion Paper*, 49.
15. A consulting firm in assurance and tax.
16. Moin Siddiqi, "Should South Africa now bid for the Olympics?" *African Business*, no. 365 (2010): 22.
17. According to the Aljazeera "Inside Story" program themed on South Africa and the 2010 World Cup televised on June 13 and 14, 2010. This is a confirmation of 25.2 percent also reported on page 34 of the June 2010 edition of *African Business*.
18. Ford, 34.
19. Special coverage on the Football World Cup televised by Aljazeera English on July 11, 2010.
20. Ford, 36.
21. Ford, 34.
22. UNAIDS, "Outlook Report 2010," UNAIDS, <http://www.unaids.org/en/resources/unaidspublications/2011/> (accessed July 15, 2010).
23. Statistics South Africa, "Mid-year population estimates 2010."
24. UNAIDS, *2010 Outlook Report*.
25. UNAIDS, "2006 Report on the global AIDS epidemic," UNAIDS, <http://www.unaids.org/en/resources/unaidspublications/2011/> (accessed July 25, 2010).
26. UNAIDS, "2009 AIDS Epidemic Update," UNAIDS, <http://www.unaids.org/en/resources/unaidspublications/2011/> (accessed October 16, 2010).
27. Statistics South Africa, "Mid-year population estimates 2010."
28. CIA, *South Africa*.
29. Statistics South Africa, "Mid-year population estimates 2010."
30. UNAIDS, *2010 Outlook Report*.

31. UNAIDS, *2010 Outlook Report*.
32. UNAIDS, *2010 Outlook Report*.
33. UNAIDS, *2010 Outlook Report*.
34. UNAIDS, *2010 Outlook Report*.
35. UNAIDS, *2010 Outlook Report*.
36. UNAIDS, *2010 Outlook Report*.
37. UNAIDS, *2010 Outlook Report*.
38. UNAIDS, *2010 Outlook Report*.
39. UNAIDS, *2010 Outlook Report*.
40. UNAIDS, *2010 Outlook Report*.
41. UNAIDS, *2010 Outlook Report*.
42. UNAIDS, *2010 Outlook Report*.
43. This was the same year that the European powers finalized their mutual agreements about the partition of colonies; see page 48 of Amoah (2007a).
44. Ibrahim Foundation, *2009 and 2010 Ibrahim Indexes*.
45. IEP, *2010 Global Peace Index*, 17.
46. IEP, *2010 Discussion Paper*, 12–13.
47. IEP, *2010 Discussion Paper*, 93.
48. CIA, “World Factbook on Angola,” CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ao.html> (accessed January 27, 2011).
49. Harry Broadman, *Africa’s Silk Road: China and India’s New Economic Frontier* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2007), 82.
50. Sarah Rundell, “Angola is Latest Investment Magnet,” *African Business*, no. 365: 25.
51. Rundell, 25.
52. UK All Party Parliamentary Group on Angola, *Observations and Recommendations on a Visit to Angola* (London: Parliament of Westminster, 2006), 3.
53. Rundell, 24–25.
54. Rundell, 24–25.
55. Wikipedia, “Angola,” Wikipedia, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angola> (accessed June 19, 2010).
56. CIA *Angola*.
57. U.S. State Department, “Background Note: Angola,” U.S. State Department, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6619.htm> (accessed June 19, 2010).
58. State Department, *Angola*. Also, CIA data has a 0.6 percent reduction, which confirms U.S. State Department analysis that growth “was flat.”
59. Rundell, 24.
60. Rundell, 24.
61. CIA, *Angola*.
62. Rundell, 26.
63. Rundell, 24.
64. State Department, *Angola*.
65. UNHCR, “World Refugee Survey 2008—Angola,” UNHCR, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,USCRI,,COD,456d621e2,485f50c0c,0.html> (accessed March 15, 2010).

66. State Department, *Angola*.
67. IRIN PlusNews, "ANGOLA: Prevention made in China," IRIN PlusNews, November 12, 2008, <http://www.plusnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=81432> (accessed March 15, 2010).
68. All Party Parliamentary Group, 21.
69. All Party Parliamentary Group, 22.
70. U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, "Towards Angola Strategy: Prioritizing US-Angola Relations" (Washington, D.C.: US Council on Foreign Relations, 2007), xi.
71. Council on Foreign Relations, 3.
72. Council on Foreign Relations, 5.
73. Council on Foreign Relations, 45.
74. All Party Parliamentary Group, 3.
75. CIA, *Angola*.
76. IEP, *2010 Global Peace Index*, 30.
77. IEP, *2010 Discussion Paper*, 13.
78. UNAIDS, *2006 Report*.
79. CIA, *Angola*.
80. UNAIDS, *2009 Aids Epidemic Update*.
81. UNAIDS, *2008 Annual Report*.
82. FAO, "Country Profiles," FAO, <http://www.fao.org/countryprofiles/default.asp?lang=en> (accessed November 4, 2010).
83. The Axis Alliance comprised of German, Italian, Japanese, Hungarian, Romanian and Bulgarian military forces. Together, these Axis Forces fought in WWII against the Allies which included the United States, UK, USSR, France, and China (the veto-holding members of the UN Security Council) and a host of other countries including South Africa.
84. Mainly the United States, UK, Canada, Australia.
85. According to the U.S. these sanctions target only seven specific businesses owned or controlled by government officials, and not ordinary citizens.
86. BBC, "China may recall Zimbabwe weapons," BBC, April 22, 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7360438.stm> (accessed March 18, 2009).
87. See Annex Table 1—Basic indicators for all Member States of this report.
88. Ibrahim Foundation, *2009 and 2010 Ibrahim Indexes*.
89. Broadman, 62.
90. CIA, "World Factbook on Zimbabwe," CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/zi.html> (accessed January 27, 2011).
91. Broadman, 275.
92. CIA, *Zimbabwe*.
93. CIA, *Zimbabwe*.
94. UNDP, *2010 HDR*, 42.
95. UNDP, *2009 HDR*, 174.
96. UNDP, *2009 HDR*, 63.
97. UNDP, *2009 HDR*, 63.
98. IEP, *2010 Discussion Paper*, 94.

99. UNDP, *2009 HDR*, 174.
100. CIA, *Zimbabwe*.
101. IEP, *2010 Global Peace Index*.
102. IEP, *2010 Discussion Paper*, 47.
103. IEP, *2010 Discussion Paper*, 47.
104. O.B. Yedder, "Tanzania hosts 'best ever' World Economic Forum on Africa," *African Business*, no. 365 (2010): 28–32.
105. These African countries are listed in Wikipedia as hosting the production of blood diamond.
106. Voice of America, "World Diamond Council Urges Release of Zimbabwe Activist on Marange Field," VOA, June 18, 2010, <http://www1.voanews.com/zimbabwe/news/Diamond-Council-Demands-Release-of-Zimbabwe-Researcher-96670229.html> (accessed June 25, 2010).
107. VOA.
108. VOA.
109. UNAIDS, *2006 Report*.
110. CIA, *Zimbabwe*.
111. UNAIDS, *2009 Annual Report*.
112. UNAIDS, *2008 Annual Report*: See WHO's Global Tuberculosis Control chart on page 8 of this report.
113. Friends of the Earth Europe International, "Africa: up for grabs," FOEI, <http://www.foei.org/en/resources/publications/pdfs/2010/africa-up-for-grabs/view> (accessed January 11, 2011).
114. FAO, *Zimbabwe*.
115. CIA, "World Factbook on Kenya" CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ke.html> (accessed January 27, 2011).
116. Kofi Annan's live interview with Teymoor Nabili on Aljazeera English that was televised on March 10, 2010.
117. The reporting on this incident was televised by both France 24 and Aljazeera English during June 13–14, 2010.
118. Content of Luis Moreno-Ocampo speech delivered at April 1, 2010 Press Conference.
119. Luis Moreno-Ocampo speech.
120. Ibrahim Foundation, *2009 and 2010 Ibrahim Indexes*.
121. IEP, *2010 Discussion Paper*, 13.
122. Wikipedia, "Kenya," Wikipedia, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kenya> (accessed July 19, 2010).
123. CIA, *Kenya*.
124. CIA, *Kenya*.
125. Seymour, Richard, "Kenya: Exports buried in volcanic ash," *African Business*, no. 365 (2010): 68–69.
126. CIA, *Kenya*.
127. CIA, *Kenya*.
128. Broadman, 63.

129. IEP, *2010 Discussion Paper*, 94.
130. UNDP, *2009 HDR*, 173.
131. CIA, *Kenya*.
132. As reported by Aljazeera English television news bulletin on December 6, 2010.
133. UNAIDS, *2009 Annual Report*.
134. UNAIDS, *2006 Report*.
135. UNAIDS, "2006 Report on the global AIDS epidemic," UNAIDS, <http://www.unaids.org/en/resources/unaidspublications/2011/> (accessed July 25, 2010).
136. UNAIDS, *2008 Annual Report*.
137. UNAIDS, *2008 Annual Report*.
138. UNAIDS, *2008 Annual Report*.
139. UNAIDS, *2009 Annual Report*.
140. UNAIDS, *2009 Annual Report*.
141. UNDP, *2009 Aids Epidemic Update*.
142. UNAIDS, *2009 Annual Report*.
143. UNAIDS, *2009 Annual Report*.
144. According to Catherine Soi reporting, East African analyst for Aljazeera English television, November 17, 2010.
145. According to the August 28, 2010 edition of "The Week in Africa" program televised by France24.
146. Friends of the Earth.
147. Friends of the Earth.
148. FAO, *Kenya*.

## Chapter 7

1. U.S. State Department, "Background Note: Guinea," U.S. State Department, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2824.htm> (accessed November 9, 2010).
2. Population Reference Bureau, "2010 World population Data Sheet," Population Reference Bureau, <http://www.prb.org/Publications/Datasheets/2010/2010wpds.aspx> (accessed November 1, 2010).
3. Even if Sekou Toure was not of the same international stature as Kwame Nkrumah who had crossed carpet from the West to make friends with the East (particularly The Soviet Union and China), and was being emulated by other nationalist leaders across the African continent, and for which reason the CIA decided to destabilize him.
4. Wikipedia, "Guinean Presidential Election, 2010," Wikipedia, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guinean\\_presidential\\_election,\\_2010](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guinean_presidential_election,_2010) (accessed August 14, 2010).
5. Mo Ibrahim Foundation, "The Ibrahim Index of African Governance 2009," Mo Ibrahim Foundation, <http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/section/the-ibrahim-index> (accessed May 26, 2010).
6. Mo Ibrahim Foundation, "2010 Ibrahim Index of African Governance," Mo Ibrahim Foundation, <http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/section/the-ibrahim-index> (accessed October 13, 2010).

7. Ibrahim Foundation, *2010 Ibrahim Index*.
8. Ibrahim Foundation, *2010 Ibrahim Index*.
9. CIA, "World Factbook on Guinea," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gv.html> (accessed January 27, 2011).
10. Wikipedia, *Guinea*.
11. CIA, *Guinea*.
12. This was estimated by the CIA Factbook at \$10.29 billion in 2007 and \$10.75 billion in 2008.
13. CIA, *Guinea*.
14. UNDP, *Human Development Report 2010* (New York: Palgrave, 2010).
15. UNDP, *HDR 2010*, 98.
16. UNDP, *HDR 2010*, 99.
17. Ibrahim Foundation, *2010 Ibrahim Index*.
18. CIA, *Guinea*.
19. UNAIDS, "2006 Report on the global AIDS epidemic," UNAIDS, <http://www.unaids.org/en/resources/unaidspublications/2011/> (accessed July 25, 2010).
20. UNAIDS, "2009 AIDS Epidemic Update," UNAIDS, <http://www.unaids.org/en/resources/unaidspublications/2011/> (accessed October 16, 2010).
21. CIA, *Guinea*.
22. FAO, "Country Profiles," FAO, <http://www.fao.org/countryprofiles/default.asp?lang=en> (accessed November 4, 2010).
23. Michael Amoah, *Reconstructing the Nation in Africa: The Politics of Nationalism in Ghana* (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2009), 48.
24. BBC, "Gabon: Silence is Golden," BBC, May 29, 2009, [http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/africa/features/focus\\_magazine/news/story/2009/05/090529\\_bongo\\_gabon.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/africa/features/focus_magazine/news/story/2009/05/090529_bongo_gabon.shtml) (accessed 26 March 2010).
25. PRB, *Gabon*.
26. Ibrahim Foundation, *2009 and 2010 Ibrahim Indexes*.
27. Ibrahim Foundation, *2010 Ibrahim Index*.
28. Ibrahim Foundation, *2010 Ibrahim Index*.
29. CIA, *Gabon*.
30. CIA, *Gabon*.
31. State Department, *Gabon*.
32. UNAIDS, *2006 Report*.
33. CIA, *Gabon*.
34. Ibrahim Foundation, *2009 and 2010 Ibrahim Indexes*.
35. Ibrahim Foundation, *2010 Ibrahim Index*.
36. Ibrahim Foundation, *2010 Ibrahim Index*.
37. State Department, *Congo-Brazzaville*.
38. CIA, *Congo-Brazzaville*.
39. Wikipedia, *Republic of the Congo*.
40. CIA, *Congo-Brazzaville*.
41. UNAIDS, *2006 Report*.



42. UNAIDS, *2009 Aids Epidemic Update*.
43. UNAIDS, *2008 Annual Report*.
44. UNAIDS, *2008 Annual Report*.
45. According to the "People and Power" programme televised by Aljazeera English at 22.30 GMT on January 26, 2011.
46. CIA, *Congo-Brazzaville*.
47. Friends of the Earth Europe International, "Africa: up for grabs," FOEI, <http://www.foei.org/en/resources/publications/pdfs/2010/africa-up-for-grabs/view> (accessed January 11, 2011).
48. Amoah, *Reconstructing the Nation in Africa*, 48.
49. The mandate from Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations took effect on this date.
50. This occurred from February 4–11, 1945.
51. PRB, *Cameroon*.
52. Case number HCB28.92.
53. Wikipedia, "Ambazonia," Wikipedia, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ambazonia> (accessed March 29, 2010).
54. Ibrahim Foundation, *2009 and 2010 Ibrahim Indexes*.
55. Ibrahim Foundation, *2010 Ibrahim Index*.
56. CIA, *Cameroon*.
57. State Department, *Cameroon*.
58. UNDP, *2009 HDR*, 63.
59. IEP, *2010 Discussion Paper*, 94.
60. IEP, *2010 Discussion Paper*, 13.
61. BBC, *Bakassi handover ruled "illegal."*
62. Sunday Isuwa, "Bakassi 10 Die in Country, Cameroon Clash," *AllAfrica.com*, January 19, 2008, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200801190024.html> (accessed August 1, 2010).
63. Sufuyan Ojeifo, "Bakassi—Group Writes Yar'Adua, Threatens Armed Struggle," *AllAfrica.com*, January 14, 2008, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200801141198.html> (accessed August 1, 2010).
64. AFP News, "French PM builds 'renewed' ties with west Africa," AFP News, May 21, 2009, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iHjswTLAmF-mFabknN4NaKMt5bUw> (accessed August 1, 2010).
65. Solomon Tembang Mforgham, "Cameroon: Bakassi rebels give ultimatum," *AfricaNews*, December 12, 2008, [http://www.africanews.com/site/list\\_messages/22083](http://www.africanews.com/site/list_messages/22083) (accessed August 1, 2010).
66. International Crisis Group, "CrisisWatch Database," International Crisis Group, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/crisiswatch.aspx> (accessed November 16, 2010).
67. ICG, *CrisisWatch Database*.
68. AFP News, "Four oil hostages freed in Cameroon," AFP News, July 21, 2009, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5inHMnZjukG5UaO09S2f3J-4nkmnA> (accessed August 1, 2010).

69. ICG, *Crisis Watch Database*.
70. ICG, *Crisis Watch Database*.
71. Tansa Musa, "Cameroon military repels pirate attack, kills 4," *Reuters*, October 15, 2009, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLF20942> (accessed August 1, 2010).
72. ICG, *Crisis Watch Database*.
73. ICG, *Crisis Watch Database*.
74. ICG, *Crisis Watch Database*.
75. RIA Novosti, "Talks on release of Russian sailors abducted in Cameroon underway," RIA Novosti, May 24, 2010, <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20100524/159133679.html> (accessed August 1, 2010).
76. ICG, *Crisis Watch Database*.
77. ICG, *Crisis Watch Database*.
78. ICG, *Crisis Watch Database*.
79. ICG, *Crisis Watch Database*.
80. Voice of America, "UNHCR Says More CAR Refugees Entering Cameroon," VOA, March 18, 2010, <http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/africa/west/UNHCR-Says-More-CAR-Refugees-Entering-Cameroon-88429837.html> (accessed August 1, 2010).
81. ICG, *Crisis Watch Database*.
82. ICG, *Crisis Watch Database*.
83. International Crisis Group, "Africa Report No 160," International Crisis Group, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/> (accessed July 21, 2010).
84. BBC, *Deadly violence rages in Cameroon*.
85. Tansa Musa, "Cameroon activists say riots kill more than 100," *Reuters*, March 5, 2008, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL0521512320080305?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=0> (accessed August 1, 2010).
86. ICG, *Crisis Watch Database*.
87. Tansa Musa, "EU Condemns Election Management Transfer in Cameroon," *Newstime Africa*, November 15, 2009, <http://www.newstimeafrica.com/archives/6216> (accessed August 1, 2010).
88. ICG, *Crisis Watch Database*.
89. ICG, *Crisis Watch Database*.
90. AFP News, "Cameroon launches inquiry into journalist's death," AFP News, April 23, 2010, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hvJ3UMIWaWuCLqDNpOMWyXkWvq5A> (accessed August 1, 2010).
91. ICG, *Crisis Watch Database*.
92. Committee to Protect Journalists, "Cameroonian editor under arrest," Committee to Protect Journalists, December 15, 2009, <http://cpj.org/2009/12/cameroonian-editor-under-arrest.php> (accessed August 1, 2010).
93. ICG, *Crisis Watch Database*.
94. International Crisis Group, *Africa Report No. 161*.
95. UNAIDS, *2006 Report*.
96. UNAIDS, *2009 Aids Epidemic Update*.

97. CIA, *Cameroon*.
98. UNAIDS, *2009 Annual Report*.
99. UNAIDS, *2010 Outlook Report*.
100. Nigeria's population was estimated in 2009 as 149,229,090 and Ethiopia as 85,237,338 (CIA Factbook).
101. Egypt's population was estimated at September 2010 to be 79,089,650.
102. The Weekly Standard, "Democracy on the Nile," The Weekly Standard, March 27, 2006, <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/012/034kkgwf.asp> (accessed 26 March 2010).
103. As was reported by Aljazeera English television on August 16, 2010.
104. M. Azzam, "Monarchs of the Nile," *The World Today* 66, no. 5 (2010): 17.
105. Televised interview of Amr Aly on July 1, 2010 on Aljazeera English.
106. From press statement issued by Joe Stork, Deputy of the Middle East Division of Human Rights Watch, and televised live by Aljazeera English on November 29, 2010.
107. By Jackie Rowland, and televised on Aljazeera English on November 27, 2010.
108. Faustine Rwambali, "Tanzania Ignores Nile Treaty, Starts Victoria Water Project," *All Africa.com*, February 9, 2004, <http://www.ntz.info/gen/b00412.html#id04693> (accessed May 14, 2010).
109. Maha El Dahan, "FACTBOX: Nile river agreements and issues," *Reuters*, July 27, 2009, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE56Q3MD20090727> (accessed November 4, 2010).
110. Desalegn Sisay and Djamel Belayachi, "Widening rift over Nile River," Ethiopian Progressive Forum, April 19, 2010, <http://www.ethiopianreview.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=18863#p103694> (accessed May 14, 2010).
111. Ashraf Badr, "Egypt to grant South Sudan \$300 mln for projects," *Reuters*, July 11, 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE66A04120100711> (accessed November 4, 2010).
112. El Dahan, *FACTBOX: Nile*.
113. Barry Malone, "Nile agreement countries reject Egyptian pressure," *Reuters*, July 27, 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE65Q0E1> (accessed November 4, 2010).
114. Maha El Dahan, "Egypt says historic Nile River rights not negotiable," *Reuters*, July 27, 2009, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/07/27/us-egypt-nile-framework-idUSTRE56Q3LZ20090727> (accessed November 4, 2009).
115. Ibrahim Foundation, *2009 and 2010 Ibrahim Indexes*.
116. Ibrahim Foundation, *2010 Ibrahim Index*.
117. CIA, *Egypt*.
118. CIA, *Egypt*.
119. UNAIDS, *2006 Report*.
120. UNAIDS, *2008 Annual Report*.
121. UNAIDS, *2010 Outlook Report*.
122. CIA, *Egypt*.

## Chapter 8

1. National Electoral Commission of Tanzania, "Conditions for the nomination of a candidate for a Presidential and Vice-Presidential seat," National Electoral Commission of Tanzania, <http://www.nec.go.tz/?modules=eprocess&sub&top=candidate> (accessed May 7, 2011).
2. Mo Ibrahim Foundation, "The Ibrahim Index of African Governance 2009," Mo Ibrahim Foundation, <http://www.moiibrahimfoundation.org/en/section/the-ibrahim-index> (accessed May 26, 2010).
3. Mo Ibrahim Foundation, "2010 Ibrahim Index of African Governance," Mo Ibrahim Foundation, <http://www.moiibrahimfoundation.org/en/section/the-ibrahim-index> (accessed October 13, 2010).
4. Institute for Economics and Peace, "2009 Global Peace Index," Institute for Economics and Peace, <http://www.economicsandpeace.org/> (accessed October 25, 2010).
5. Institute for Economics and Peace, "2010 Global Peace Index," Institute for Economics and Peace, <http://www.economicsandpeace.org/> (accessed October 25, 2010).
6. CIA, "World Factbook on Tanzania," CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tz.html> (accessed November 9, 2010).
7. UNAIDS, "The Global Economic Crisis and HIV Prevention and Treatment Programmes: Vulnerabilities and Impact," UNAIDS, October 2009, <http://www.unaids.org/en/resources/unaidspublications/2011/> (accessed January 2, 2011).
8. Richard Seymour, "Kenya: Exports buried in volcanic ash," *African Business*, no. 365 (2010): 69.
9. Ben Yedder, "Tanzania hosts 'best ever' World Economic Forum on Africa," *African Business*, no. 365 (2010): 28.
10. UNAIDS, "2006 Report on the global AIDS epidemic," UNAIDS, <http://www.unaids.org/en/resources/unaidspublications/2011/> (accessed July 25, 2010).
11. UNAIDS, "2009 AIDS Epidemic Update," UNAIDS, <http://www.unaids.org/en/resources/unaidspublications/2011/> (accessed October 16, 2010).
12. UNAIDS, *The Global Economic Crisis and HIV Prevention*, 7.
13. Population Reference Bureau, "2010 World population Data Sheet," Population Reference Bureau, <http://www.prb.org/Publications/Datasheets/2010/2010wpds.aspx> (accessed November 1, 2010).
14. CIA, *Tanzania*.
15. UNAIDS, *The Global Economic Crisis and HIV Prevention*, 7.
16. UNAIDS, *The Global Economic Crisis and HIV Prevention*, 30.
17. UNAIDS, *2008 Annual Report*.
18. UNAIDS, *2008 Annual Report*.
19. UNAIDS, *2008 Annual Report*.
20. UNAIDS, *The Global Economic Crisis and HIV Prevention*, 29–30.

21. Friends of the Earth Europe International, "Africa: up for grabs," FOEI, <http://www.foei.org/en/resources/publications/pdfs/2010/africa-up-for-grabs/view> (accessed January 11, 2011).
22. Friends of the Earth.
23. Friends of the Earth.
24. Friends of the Earth.
25. FAO, "Country Profiles," FAO, <http://www.fao.org/countryprofiles/default.asp?lang=en> (accessed November 4, 2010).
26. A type of game with the rule that whoever has the ball passed it strictly and always to their friends, relatives or members of a clique. This was characteristic of the people of Kokofu town in Ashanti, Ghana, hence the term "kokofu" became incorporated into political language.
27. Ibrahim Foundation, *2009 and 2010 Ibrahim Indexes*.
28. Ibrahim Foundation, *2010 Ibrahim Index*.
29. Institute for Economics and Peace, "2010 Discussion Paper: Peace, Wealth and Human Potential," Institute for Economics and Peace, <http://www.economicsandpeace.org/> (accessed October 25, 2010).
30. IEP, *2010 Global Peace Index*, 17.
31. US State Department, "Background Note: Botswana," US State Department, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1830.htm> (accessed July 29, 2010).
32. CIA, *Botswana*.
33. State Department, *Botswana*.
34. State Department, *Botswana*.
35. IEP, *2010 Discussion Paper*, 70.
36. M. J. Morgan, "Diamonds regain sparkle," *African Business*, no. 365 (2010): 50.
37. Morgan, *Diamonds*, 50.
38. Morgan, *Diamonds*, 50.
39. PRB, *Botswana*.
40. UNAIDS, *2006 Report*.
41. UNAIDS, *2006 Report*.
42. CIA, *Botswana*.
43. UNAIDS, *2009 Aids Epidemic Update*, 19.
44. UNAIDS, *2010 Outlook Report*.
45. UNAIDS, *The Global Economic Crisis and HIV Prevention*, 5.
46. UNAIDS, *The Global Economic Crisis and HIV Prevention* 4.
47. State Department, *Botswana*.
48. UNAIDS, *The Global Economic Crisis and HIV Prevention*, 14.
49. UNAIDS, *2008 Annual Report*.
50. UNAIDS, *2008 Annual Report*.
51. UNAIDS, *2008 Annual Report*.
52. UNAIDS, *2010 Outlook Report*.
53. UNAIDS, *2009 Aids Epidemic Update*, 16.
54. UNAIDS, *2010 Outlook Report*.

55. CIA, *Botswana*.
56. Michael Amoah, "The most difficult decision yet: Ghana's 2008 presidential elections," *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations* 3, no. 4 (2009): 178.
57. The wider Guan ancestry comprises 79 percent of the population and consists of Akan (45.3%), Guan (4%), Ga-Adangbe (7.3%), Mole Dagbani (15.2%), Gurma (3.6%), Grusi (2.6%), Mande-Busanga (1%). The remainder of the population comprises Ewes (11.7%), other Ghanaian tribes or CTMs (1.4%), and other residents including nonGhanaians (7.8%). The grand total is 99.9 percent.
58. Michael Amoah, *Reconstructing the Nation in Africa: The Politics of Nationalism in Ghana* (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2007): 1–107, 187.
59. Ibrahim Foundation, *2009 and 2010 Ibrahim Indexes*.
60. Ibrahim Foundation, *2010 Ibrahim Index*.
61. UNDP, *2009 HDR*, 169.
62. UNDP, *2007 HDR*, 236.
63. CIA, *Sudan and Ghana*.
64. UNDP, *2010 HDR*, 88.
65. M. J. Morgan, "Cocoa prices continue to soar," *African Business*, no. 365 (2010): 48–49.
66. GhanaWeb, "Shea earns Ghana 30 million dollars annually—Veep," GhanaWeb, August 21, 2010, <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=188777> (accessed August 24, 2010).
67. UNDP, *2009 HDR*, 161.
68. GhanaWeb, *Oil Import Bill Slumps*.
69. GhanaWeb, *Remittances to Ghana*.
70. Michael Amoah, "Ghana," In *Africa Year Book Volume 6: Politics, Economy and Society South of the Sahara 2009*, ed. Andreas Mehler, Henning Melber and Klaas van Walraven (Leiden: BRILL, 2010), 101.
71. GhanaWeb, *NADMO donates relief items*.
72. GhanaWeb, *Floods Wreak Havoc in Southern Ghana*.
73. GhanaWeb, *Widespread floods hit Sunyani*.
74. GhanaWeb, *NADMO identifies*.
75. GhanaWeb, *Resettle flood victims*.
76. GhanaWeb, *Cabinet approves funds*.
77. GhanaWeb, *\$5m Help For Flood Victims*.
78. Amoah, *Ghana*, 101.
79. GhanaWeb, *Dam spill floods kill 17*.
80. GhanaWeb, *Central Gonja floods displace 25,000*.
81. GhanaWeb, *A Dam For Pwalugu*.
82. Amoah, *Ghana*, 99–100.
83. GhanaWeb, *Government has no official list*.
84. GhanaWeb, *3,200 flee ethnic strife*.

85. GhanaWeb, *NADMO despatches relief items*.
86. GhanaWeb, *Government has no official list*.
87. FAO, *Ghana*.
88. Amoah, *Ghana*, 102.
89. Friends of the Earth.
90. Friends of the Earth.
91. Friends of the Earth.
92. Friends of the Earth.
93. Friends of the Earth.
94. UNAIDS, *2009 Annual Report*.
95. UNAIDS, *2009 Annual Report*.
96. UNAIDS, *2009 Annual Report*.
97. UNAIDS, *2006 Report*.
98. UNAIDS, *2008 Annual Report*.
99. CIA, *Ghana*.
100. PRB, *Ghana*.
101. GhanaWeb, *Over 21,000 children in Ghana are HIV positive*.
102. GhanaWeb, *HIV/AIDS disease still prevalent*.
103. UNAIDS, *2009 Aids Epidemic Update*, 26.
104. UNAIDS, *2008 Annual Report*.
105. UNAIDS, *2009 Annual Report*.
106. GhanaWeb, *Tema vaccinates*.
107. Joy Online, "Ghana to be declared free of Guinea worms," Joy Online, July 15, 2010, <http://news.myjoyonline.com/health/201007/49173.asp> (accessed July 15, 2010).

## Chapter 9

1. Adebayo Adedeji, *Audit of the African Union* (Addis Ababa: African Union, 2007), xvi. Page xvi of the 2007 Adedeji report of the audit or review conducted by the High Level Panel of experts chaired by Adebayo Adedeji.
2. African Union, "A Study on an African Union Government: Towards the United States of Africa," African Union, [http://www.africa-union.org/Doc/study\\_on\\_AUGovernment\\_june2006.pdf](http://www.africa-union.org/Doc/study_on_AUGovernment_june2006.pdf) (accessed June 15, 2010).
3. Desmond Davies, "Africa versus the ICC," *African Prospects*, December 2009, 10.
4. African Union, "Decisions, Declarations, Tribute and Resolution of the 11th Ordinary Session," African Union, [http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ASSEMBLY\\_EN\\_30\\_JUNE\\_1\\_JULY\\_2008\\_AUC\\_ELEVENTH\\_ORDINARY\\_SESSION\\_DECISIONS\\_DECLARATIONS\\_%20TRIBUTE\\_RESOLUTION.pdf](http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ASSEMBLY_EN_30_JUNE_1_JULY_2008_AUC_ELEVENTH_ORDINARY_SESSION_DECISIONS_DECLARATIONS_%20TRIBUTE_RESOLUTION.pdf) (accessed October 21, 2010).
5. African Union Press Release No. 156/2010.
6. African Union Press Release No. 150/2010.
7. African Union Press Release No. 160/2010.

## Chapter 10

1. Portugal held the rotating EU presidency at the time.
2. Dot Keet, *Economic Partnership Agreements: Responses to the EU Offensive Against ACP Developmental Regions* (Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2007), 10.
3. Barbara Stocking, "Seismic Rupture: Africa-European Union Trade," *The World Today* 64, no. 1 (2008): 22.
4. Stocking, 21.
5. Stocking, 21.
6. GhanaWeb, "Nobel Economist Stiglitz Criticizes EPA," GhanaWeb, July 8, 2008, <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=146532> (accessed July 8, 2008).
7. Africa and Europe in Partnership, "Lisbon Declaration—EU Africa Summit," Africa and Europe in Partnership, December 19, 2007, [http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/eas2007\\_lisbon\\_declaration\\_en.pdf](http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/eas2007_lisbon_declaration_en.pdf) (accessed December 1, 2010).
8. Africa and Europe in Partnership, "The Africa—EU Strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy," Africa and Europe in Partnership, December 7, 2007, [http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/eas2007\\_joint\\_strategy\\_en.pdf](http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/eas2007_joint_strategy_en.pdf) (accessed December 1, 2010).
9. The precise view of President Alpha Oumar Konare, Head of the African Union at the time of the 2007 Lisbon Summit.
10. GhanaWeb, "ECOWAS Gets Tough on EU," GhanaWeb, October 20, 2009, <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=170537> (accessed October 20, 2009).
11. Transnational Institute, "EPA Threatens to Tear Apart Oldest Customs Union," Transnational Institute, May 2008, <http://tni.org/inthemedial/epa-threatens-tear-apart-oldest-customs-union> (accessed April 13, 2010).
12. Bilaterals.Org, "Experts Called in to Fix Customs Union Split," Bilaterals.Org, October 7, 2010, <http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?article18253> (accessed November 17, 2010).
13. Bilaterals.Org, "EPA the Biggest Threat to African Integration, Keet," Bilaterals.Org, August 19, 2010, <http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?article17928> (accessed November 17, 2010).
14. Bilaterals.Org, "EAC Likely to Miss November EU Trade Deadline," Bilaterals.Org, October 28, 2010, <http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?article18384> (accessed November 17, 2010).
15. Bilaterals.Org, "EPA the Biggest Threat to African Integration, Keet."
16. Transnational Institute, "The WTO Doha round and EPAs in an Era of Crisis: Salvation or Suicide for ACP Countries," Transnational Institute, September 2010, <http://www.tni.org/article/wto-doha-round-and-epas-era-crisis-0> (accessed April 13, 2010).
17. According to AU Press Release No. 149/2010.
18. Africa and Europe in Partnership, "Tripoli Declaration: 3rd Africa-EU Summit," Africa and Europe in Partnership, November 30, 2010, <http://www>.



- africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/doc\_tripoli\_declaration\_en.pdf (accessed December 1, 2010).
19. World Trade Organization, *World Trade Report 2010* (Geneva: WTO Publications, 2010), 18.
  20. World Trade Organization, *World Trade Report 2010*, 5.
  21. World Trade Organization, *World Trade Report 2010*, 5–6.
  22. World Trade Organization, *World Trade Report 2010*, 6.
  23. World Trade Organization, *World Trade Report 2010*, 6.
  24. World Trade Organization, *World Trade Report 2010*, 57—see table 5.
  25. The African Union sought to have two seats on the UN Security Council—Nigeria had become a second obvious candidate because of its population.
  26. CIA, “World Factbook on South Africa,” CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sf.html> (accessed January 27, 2011).
  27. As reported by Aljazeera English Television broadcast of August 24, 2010.
  28. According to Richard Quest, during “Quest Means Business,” CNN on October 8, 2010.
  29. Statement occurred in Episode 39 of the “Counting the Cost” program televised on Aljazeera English on October 8, 2010.

# Bibliography

- Adams, Jonathan and David Smith. "Higher education, research and the knowledge economy: from Robbins to 'the Gathering Storm'." In *The Dearing Report: Ten Years On*, edited by Michael Amoah and David Watson, 81–108. London: Institute of Education, 2007.
- Adedeji, Adebayo. *Audit of the African Union*. Addis Ababa: African Union, 2007.
- AFP News. "French PM Builds 'renewed' Ties with West Africa." AFP News, May 21, 2009, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iHjswTLAmF-mFabknN4NaKMt5bUw> (accessed August 1, 2010).
- AFP News. "Four Oil Hostages Freed in Cameroon." AFP News, July 21, 2009, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5inHMnZjukG5UaOO9S2f3J-4nkmnA> (accessed August 1, 2010).
- AFP News. "Cameroon Launches Inquiry into Journalist's Death." AFP News, April 23, 2010, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hvJ3UMIWaWuCLqDNpOMWyXkWvq5A> (accessed August 1, 2010).
- Africa and Europe in Partnership. "Lisbon Declaration—EU Africa Summit." Africa and Europe in Partnership, December 19, 2007, [http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/eas2007\\_lisbon\\_declaration\\_en.pdf](http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/eas2007_lisbon_declaration_en.pdf) (accessed December 1, 2010).
- Africa and Europe in Partnership. "The Africa—EU Strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy." Africa and Europe in Partnership, December 7, 2007, [http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/eas2007\\_joint\\_strategy\\_en.pdf](http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/eas2007_joint_strategy_en.pdf) (accessed December 1, 2010).
- Africa and Europe in Partnership. "Tripoli Declaration: 3rd Africa-EU Summit." Africa and Europe in Partnership, November 30, 2010, [http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/doc\\_tripoli\\_declaration\\_en.pdf](http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/doc_tripoli_declaration_en.pdf) (accessed December 1, 2010).
- AfricaNews. "Cameroon: Bakassi Rebels Give Ultimatum." AfricaNews, December 12, 2008, [http://www.africanews.com/site/list\\_messages/22083](http://www.africanews.com/site/list_messages/22083) (accessed August 1, 2010).
- Africa Confidential. "The Snubbing of Sudan," *Africa Confidential* 48, No. 3 (2007): 9.

- African Union. "A Study on an African Union Government: Towards the United States of Africa." African Union, [http://www.africa-union.org/Doc/study\\_on\\_AUGovernment\\_june2006.pdf](http://www.africa-union.org/Doc/study_on_AUGovernment_june2006.pdf) (accessed June 15, 2010).
- African Union. "Decisions, Declarations, Tribute and Resolution of the 11th Ordinary Session." African Union, [http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ASSEMBLY\\_EN\\_30\\_JUNE\\_1\\_JULY\\_2008\\_AUC\\_ELEVENTH\\_ORDINARY\\_SESSION\\_DECISIONS\\_DECLARATIONS\\_%20TRIBUTE\\_RESOLUTION.pdf](http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ASSEMBLY_EN_30_JUNE_1_JULY_2008_AUC_ELEVENTH_ORDINARY_SESSION_DECISIONS_DECLARATIONS_%20TRIBUTE_RESOLUTION.pdf) (accessed October 21, 2010).
- African Union. "Decisions, Declarations, Message of Congratulations and Motion of the 12th Ordinary Session." African Union, [http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ASSEMBLY\\_EN\\_1\\_3\\_FEBRUARY\\_2009\\_AUC\\_TWELFTH\\_ORDINARY\\_SESSION\\_DECISIONS\\_DECLARATIONS\\_%20MESSAGE\\_CONGRATULATIONS\\_MOTION.pdf](http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ASSEMBLY_EN_1_3_FEBRUARY_2009_AUC_TWELFTH_ORDINARY_SESSION_DECISIONS_DECLARATIONS_%20MESSAGE_CONGRATULATIONS_MOTION.pdf) (accessed October 21, 2010).
- African Union. "Decisions and Declarations of the 13th Ordinary Session." African Union, [http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ASSEMBLY\\_EN\\_1\\_3\\_JULY\\_2009\\_AUC\\_THIRTEENTH\\_ORDINARY\\_SESSION\\_DECISIONS\\_DECLARATIONS\\_%20MESSAGE\\_CONGRATULATIONS\\_MOTION\\_0.pdf](http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ASSEMBLY_EN_1_3_JULY_2009_AUC_THIRTEENTH_ORDINARY_SESSION_DECISIONS_DECLARATIONS_%20MESSAGE_CONGRATULATIONS_MOTION_0.pdf) (accessed October 21, 2010).
- Amoah, Michael. "Nationalism in Africa: Ghana's Presidential Election." *Review of African Political Economy* 30, No. 95 (2003): 149–156.
- Amoah, Michael. *Reconstructing the Nation in Africa: The Politics of Nationalism in Ghana*. London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2007.
- Amoah, Michael. "The most difficult decision yet: Ghana's 2008 presidential elections." *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations* 3, No. 4 (2009): 174–181.
- Amoah, Michael. "Ghana." In *Africa Year Book Volume 6: Politics, Economy and Society South of the Sahara 2009*, edited by Andreas Mehler, Henning Melber and Klaas van Walraven, 97–106. Leiden: BRILL, 2010.
- Azzam, M. "Monarchs of the Nile." *The World Today* 66, No. 5 (2010): 16–19.
- Badr, Ashraf. "Egypt to grant South Sudan \$300 mln for projects." *Reuters*, July 11, 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE66A04120100711> (accessed November 4, 2010).
- BBC. "China May Recall Zimbabwe Weapons." BBC, April 22, 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7360438.stm> (accessed March 18, 2009).
- BBC. "Bakassi Handover Ruled 'illegal'." BBC, November 23, 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7108887.stm> (accessed August 1, 2010).
- BBC. "Deadly Violence Rages in Cameroon." BBC, February 29, 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7268861.stm> (accessed August 1, 2010).
- BBC. "Gabon: Silence is Golden." BBC, May 29, 2009, [http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/africa/features/focus\\_magazine/news/story/2009/05/090529\\_bongo\\_gabon.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/africa/features/focus_magazine/news/story/2009/05/090529_bongo_gabon.shtml) (accessed March 26, 2010).
- BBC. "Clash on south Sudan boundary with Darfur 'kills 55.'" BBC, April 25, 2010, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8642711.stm> (accessed April 27, 2010).
- BBC. "Somali Islamist Insurgents Seize Pirate Haven," BBC, May 2, 2010, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8657060.stm> (accessed June 14, 2010).

- Bilaterals.Org. "Experts called in to fix customs union split." Bilaterals.Org, October 7, 2010, <http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?article18253> (accessed November 17, 2010).
- Bilaterals.Org. "EPA the biggest threat to African integration, Keet." Bilaterals.Org, August 19, 2010, <http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?article17928> (accessed November 17, 2010).
- Bilaterals.Org. "EAC likely to miss November EU trade deadline." Bilaterals.Org, October 28, 2010, <http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?article18384> (accessed November 17, 2010).
- Broadman, Harry G. *Africa's Silk Road: China and India's New Economic Frontier*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2007.
- Casely-Hayford, Joseph Ephraim. *Ethiopia Unbound: Studies in Race and Emancipation*. London: C M Phillips, 1911.
- Brown, Kerry and Zhan Chun. *China in Africa—Preparing for the Next Forum for China Africa Cooperation*. London: Chatham House, 2009.
- CIA. "World Factbook on Angola." CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ao.html> (accessed January 27, 2011).
- CIA. "World Factbook on Botswana." CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bc.html> (accessed January 27, 2011).
- CIA. "World Factbook on Cameroon." CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cm.html> (accessed January 27, 2011).
- CIA. "World Factbook on Cote d'Ivoire." CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iv.html> (accessed January 27, 2011).
- CIA. "World Factbook on Egypt." CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html> (accessed January 27, 2011).
- CIA. "World Factbook on Gabon." CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gb.html> (accessed January 27, 2011).
- CIA. "World Factbook on Ghana." CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gh.html> (accessed January 26, 2011).
- CIA. "World Factbook on Guinea." CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gv.html> (accessed January 27, 2011).
- CIA. "World Factbook on Kenya." CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ke.html> (accessed January 27, 2011).
- CIA. "World Factbook on Somalia." CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html> (accessed January 26, 2011).
- CIA. "World Factbook on South Africa." CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sf.html> (accessed January 27, 2011).
- CIA. "World Factbook on Sudan." CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/su.html> (accessed January 26, 2011).
- CIA. "World Factbook on Tanzania." CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tz.html> (accessed November 9, 2010).
- CIA. "World Factbook on The Republic of Congo." CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cf.html> (accessed January 27, 2011).
- CIA. "World Factbook on Uganda." CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ug.html> (accessed January 26, 2011).

- CIA. "World Factbook on Zimbabwe." CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/zi.html> (accessed January 27, 2011).
- Committee to Protect Journalists. "Cameroonian editor under arrest." Committee to Protect Journalists, December 15, 2009, <http://cpj.org/2009/12/cameroonian-editor-under-arrest.php> (accessed August 1, 2010).
- Davies, Desmond. "Africa versus the ICC." *African Prospects*. December 2009.
- Eboh, Camillus. "Nigeria, China agree to fund 3 refineries." *Reuters Africa*, May 13, 2010, <http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE64C0T320100513> (accessed May 14, 2010).
- El Dahan, Maha. "FACTBOX: Nile river agreements and issues." *Reuters*, July 27, 2009, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE56Q3MD20090727> (accessed November 4, 2010).
- El Dahan, Maha. "Egypt says historic Nile River rights not negotiable." *Reuters*, July 27, 2009, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/07/27/us-egypt-nile-framework-idUSTRE56Q3LZ20090727> (accessed November 4, 2009).
- FAO. "Country Profiles." FAO. <http://www.fao.org/countryprofiles/default.asp?lang=en> (accessed November 4, 2010).
- Ford, Neil. "South Africa the 2010 legacy: tangible and intangible effects." *African Business* No. 365 (2010): 34–38.
- Friends of the Earth Europe International. "Africa: up for grabs." FOEI, August 2010, <http://www.foei.org/en/resources/publications/pdfs/2010/africa-up-for-grabs/view> (accessed January 11, 2011).
- Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983.
- GhanaWeb. "Nobel Economist Stiglitz Criticizes EPA." GhanaWeb, July 8, 2008, <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=146532> (accessed July 8, 2008).
- GhanaWeb. "Oil Import Bill Slumps." GhanaWeb, July 22, 2009, <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=165733> (accessed June 14, 2010).
- GhanaWeb. "ECOWAS Gets Tough on EU." GhanaWeb, October 20, 2009, <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=170537> (accessed October 20, 2009).
- GhanaWeb. "NADMO donates relief items to Akyemmansa flood victims." GhanaWeb, May 8, 2010, <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=181659> (accessed July 5, 2010).
- GhanaWeb. "3,200 flee ethnic strife in Ghana, cross to Togo." GhanaWeb, May 26, 2010, <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=182844> (accessed July 5, 2010).
- GhanaWeb. "NADMO despatches relief items to Bunkpurugu displaced persons." GhanaWeb, May 28, 2010, <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=182968> (accessed July 5, 2010).
- GhanaWeb. "NADMO Identifies 279 flood prone areas in WR." GhanaWeb, May 30, 2010, <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=183104> (accessed July 4, 2010).

- GhanaWeb. "Government has no official list of refugees in Togo—Interior Minister." GhanaWeb, June 2, 2010, <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=183259> (accessed July 5, 2010).
- GhanaWeb. "Floods Wreak Havoc in Southern Ghana." GhanaWeb, June 21, 2010, <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=184587> (accessed July 4, 2010).
- GhanaWeb. "Death Toll in Ghana's Floods rises to 24." GhanaWeb, June 21, 2010, <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=184640> (accessed July 4, 2010).
- GhanaWeb. "Tema Vaccinates 29,520 people against H1N1." GhanaWeb, July 3, 2010, <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=185429> (accessed July 4, 2010).
- GhanaWeb. "HIV/AIDS disease still prevalent in the country." GhanaWeb, July 13, 2010, <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=186031> (accessed July 15, 2010).
- GhanaWeb. "Resettle flood victims in Awowin-Suaman District—NADMO." GhanaWeb, July 14, 2010, <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=186102> (accessed July 14, 2010).
- GhanaWeb. "Over 21,000 children in Ghana are HIV positive—Koomson." GhanaWeb, July 21, 2010, <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=186557> (accessed July 22, 2010).
- GhanaWeb. "Widespread floods hit Sunyani and its environs." GhanaWeb, July 22, 2010, <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=186605> (accessed July 23, 2010).
- GhanaWeb. "Cabinet approves funds for emergency road construction." GhanaWeb, July 31, 2010, <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=187232> (accessed August 2, 2010).
- GhanaWeb. "Shea earns Ghana 30 million dollars annually—Veep." GhanaWeb, August 21, 2010, <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=188777> (accessed August 24, 2010).
- GhanaWeb. "Six injured in Abudu-Andani clashes." GhanaWeb, September 8, 2010, <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=189979> (accessed September 8, 2010).
- GhanaWeb. "Bagre dam spillage kills 9." GhanaWeb, September 8, 2010, <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=190026> (accessed September 9, 2010).
- GhanaWeb. "Dam spill floods kill 17 in Ghana." GhanaWeb, September 10, 2010, <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=190164> (accessed September 10, 2010).
- GhanaWeb. "A Dam For Pwalugu To Check Bagre Dam Spillways." GhanaWeb, September 14, 2010, <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=190356> (accessed September 14, 2010).
- GhanaWeb. "Remittances to Ghana hits \$4.2 billion Mid-Year." GhanaWeb, September 30, 2010, <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=194310> (accessed October 1, 2010).

- GhanaWeb. "Central Gonja floods displace 25,000." GhanaWeb, October 16, 2010, <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=195318> (accessed October 16, 2010).
- GhanaWeb. "\$5m Help For Flood Victims." GhanaWeb, November 5, 2010, <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=196794> (accessed November 9, 2010).
- Government of Cote d'Ivoire. "The Constitution of Cote d'Ivoire." Government of Cote d'Ivoire, [http://abidjan.usembassy.gov/ivoirian\\_constitution2.html](http://abidjan.usembassy.gov/ivoirian_constitution2.html) (accessed January 27, 2011).
- Government of Ghana. "Ministry of Health." Government of Ghana, [http://www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=332:ministry-of-health&catid=74:ministries&Itemid=224](http://www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=332:ministry-of-health&catid=74:ministries&Itemid=224) (accessed July 15, 2010).
- Government of Kenya. *The Proposed Constitution of Kenya*. Nairobi: Attorney General of Kenya, 2010.
- Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement. *The Comprehensive Peace Agreement*. Kenya: Republic of Sudan/SPLM, 2005.
- Guijin, Liu. *Darfur and Sino-African Relations*. London: Chatham House, 2009.
- Hutchinson, John. *Modern Nationalism*. London: Fontana, 1994.
- Institute for Economics and Peace. "2009 Global Peace Index." Institute for Economics and Peace, <http://www.economicsandpeace.org/> (accessed October 25, 2010).
- Institute for Economics and Peace. "2010 Global Peace Index." Institute for Economics and Peace, <http://www.economicsandpeace.org/> (accessed October 25, 2010).
- Institute for Economics and Peace. "2010 Discussion Paper: Peace, Wealth and Human Potential." Institute for Economics and Peace, <http://www.economicsandpeace.org/> (accessed October 25, 2010).
- Institute for Economics and Peace. "2011 Global Peace Index." Institute for Economics and Peace, <http://www.visionofhumanity.org/info-center/global-peace-index-2011/> (accessed August 3, 2011).
- Institute for Economics and Peace. "2011 Discussion Paper: New Dimensions of Peace—Society, Economy and the Media." Institute for Economics and Peace, <http://www.visionofhumanity.org/info-center/global-peace-index-2011/> (accessed August 3, 2011).
- International Crisis Group. "Africa Report No 74." International Crisis Group, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/> (accessed July 21, 2010).
- International Crisis Group. "Africa Report No 75." International Crisis Group, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/> (accessed July 21, 2010).
- International Crisis Group. "Africa Report No. 157." International Crisis Group, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/> (accessed July 21, 2010).
- International Crisis Group. "Africa Report No 158." International Crisis Group, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/> (accessed July 21, 2010).
- International Crisis Group. "Africa Report No 160." International Crisis Group, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/> (accessed July 21, 2010).

- International Crisis Group. "Africa Report No 161." International Crisis Group, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/> (accessed July 21, 2010).
- International Crisis Group. "CrisisWatch Briefing No. 80." International Crisis Group, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/> (accessed July 21, 2010).
- International Crisis Group. "CrisisWatch Briefing No. 81." International Crisis Group, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/> (accessed July 21, 2010).
- International Crisis Group. "CrisisWatch Briefing No. 82." International Crisis Group, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/> (accessed July 21, 2010).
- International Crisis Group. "CrisisWatch Briefing No. 83." International Crisis Group, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/> (accessed July 21, 2010).
- International Crisis Group "CrisisWatch Bulletin No. 70" International Crisis Group, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/> (accessed July 21, 2010).
- International Crisis Group "CrisisWatch Bulletin No. 76" International Crisis Group, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/> (accessed July 21, 2010).
- International Crisis Group. "CrisisWatch Database." International Crisis Group, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/crisiswatch.aspx> (accessed July 21, 2010).
- IRIN PlusNews. "ANGOLA: Prevention made in China." IRIN PlusNews, November 12, 2008, <http://www.plusnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=81432> (accessed March 15, 2010).
- Isuwa, Sunday, "Bakassi 10 Die in Country, Cameroon Clash." *AllAfrica.com*, January 19, 2008, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200801190024.html> (accessed August 1, 2010).
- Joy Online. "1,000 Ghanaian refugees to return home." Joy Online, May 27, 2010, <http://news.myjoyonline.com/news/201005/46793.asp> (accessed July 5, 2010).
- Joy Online. "Ghana to be declared free of Guinea worms." Joy Online, July 15, 2010, <http://news.myjoyonline.com/health/201007/49173.asp> (accessed July 15, 2010).
- Joy Online. "Ghana signs railway contract with Chinese firm" Joy Online. <http://news.myjoyonline.com/business/201011/56755.asp> (accessed November 30, 2010).
- Keatley, Patrick. "Idi Amin." *The Guardian*, August 18, 2003. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2003/aug/18/guardianobituaries> (accessed April 22, 2010).
- Keet, Dot. *Economic Partnership Agreements: Responses to the EU Offensive against ACP Developmental Regions*. Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2007.
- Kellas, James G. *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity*. London: Macmillan, 1991.
- Kohn, Hans. *A History of Nationalism in the East*. London: Routledge, 1929.
- Kohn, Hans. *Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East*. London: George Routledge and Sons Ltd, 1932.
- Kohn, Hans. "The Genesis and Character of English Nationalism." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 1, No. 1 (1940): 69–94.
- Kohn, Hans. *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background*. New York: Macmillan, 1944.
- Kohn, Hans. *Prophets and Peoples: Studies in Nineteenth Century Nationalism*. New York: Macmillan, 1946.



- Liebich, Andre. "Searching for the Perfect Nation: The Itinerary of Hans Kohn (1891–1971)." *Nations and Nationalism* 12, No. 4 (2006): 579–596.
- Lynch, Colum. "African Union Force Low on Money, Supplies and Morale," *The Washington Post*, May 13, 2007, Africa Section.
- Malone, Barry. "Nile agreement countries reject Egyptian pressure." *Reuters*, July 27, 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE65Q0E1> (accessed November 4, 2010).
- Maplecroft. "Terrorism Risk Index." Maplecroft, <http://www.maplecroft.com/about/news/terrorism.html> (accessed November 16, 2010).
- Mayall, James. *Nationalism and International Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Melber, Henning and others. *China in Africa*. Uppsala, Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2007.
- Mo Ibrahim Foundation. "The Ibrahim Index of African Governance 2009." Mo Ibrahim Foundation, <http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/section/the-ibrahim-index> (accessed May 26, 2010).
- Mo Ibrahim Foundation. "2010 Ibrahim Index of African Governance." Mo Ibrahim Foundation, <http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/section/the-ibrahim-index> (accessed October 13, 2010).
- Morgan, M J. "Cocoa prices continue to soar." *African Business* No. 365 (2010): 48–49.
- Morgan, M. J. "Diamonds regain sparkle." *African Business* No. 365 (2010): 50.
- Mucyo, Jean. *Report of National Independent Commission in charge of gathering proof showing the involvement of the French government in the genocide perpetrated in Rwanda in 1994*. Kigali: Government of Rwanda, 2007.
- National Electoral Commission of Tanzania. "Conditions for the nomination of a candidate for a Presidential and Vice-Presidential seat." National Electoral Commission of Tanzania, <http://www.nec.go.tz/?modules=eprocess&sub&op=candidate> (accessed May 7, 2011).
- Nevin, Tom. "South Africa: Anger mounting over land handover pace." *African Business* No. 365 (2010): 66–67.
- Newstime Africa. "EU Condemns Election Management Transfer in Cameroon." Newstime Africa, November 15, 2009, <http://www.newstimeafrica.com/archives/6216> (accessed August 1, 2010).
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "NATO-Russia set on path towards strategic partnership." NATO, November 2010, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-1438A233-84BB8B91/natolive/news\\_68876.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-1438A233-84BB8B91/natolive/news_68876.htm) (accessed November 22, 2010).
- Ojeifo, Sufuyan. "Bakassi—Group Writes Yar'Adua, Threatens Armed Struggle." *AllAfrica.com*, January 14, 2008, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200801141198.html> (accessed August 1, 2010).
- Population Reference Bureau. "2010 World Population Data Sheet." Population Reference Bureau, <http://www.prb.org/Publications/Datasheets/2010/2010wpds.aspx> (accessed November 1, 2010).

- Reuters. "Cameroon activists say riots kill more than 100." Reuters, March 5, 2008, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL0521512320080305?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=0> (accessed August 1, 2010).
- Reuters. "Cameroon military repels pirate attack, kills 4." Reuters, October 15, 2009, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLF20942> (accessed August 1, 2010).
- RIA Novosti. "Talks on release of Russian sailors abducted in Cameroon underway." RIA Novosti. May 24, 2010, <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20100524/159133679.html> (accessed August 1, 2010).
- Rice, Condoleezza. 2008. Rethinking the National Interest: American Realism for a New World, *Foreign Affairs* 87, No. 4 (2008): 1–26.
- Rice, Xan. "Somali Radio Stations Bow to Islamist Ban on Music." *The Guardian*, April 13, 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/apr/13/somalia-radio-music-ban> (accessed June 14, 2010).
- Rice, Xan. "Ugandan paper ordered to stop printing list of gay people." *The Guardian*, November 1, 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/01/uganda-paper-gay-list> (accessed November 5, 2010).
- Rundell, Sarah. "Angola is Latest Investment Magnet." *African Business* No. 365 (2010): 24–26.
- Rwambali, Faustine. "Tanzania Ignores Nile Treaty, Starts Victoria Water Project." *All Africa.com*, February 9, 2004, <http://www.ntz.info/gen/b00412.html#id04693> (accessed August 1, 2010).
- Sisay Desalegn and Djamel Belayachi. "Widening rift over Nile River." *Ethiopian Progressive Forum*, April 19, 2010, <http://www.ethiopianreview.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=18863#p103694> (accessed May 14, 2010).
- Seymour, Richard. "Kenya: Exports buried in volcanic ash." *African Business* No. 365 (2010): 68–69.
- Siddiqi, Moin. "Should South Africa now bid for the Olympics?" *African Business* No. 365 (2010): 22–23.
- Smith, Anthony. *National Identity*. London: Penguin, 1991.
- Smith, Anthony. *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995.
- Sperber, Jonathan. Review of "What Is a Nation? Europe 1789–1914." *The American Historical Review* 112, No. 3 (2007): 921–922.
- Statistics South Africa. "Mid-year population estimates 2010." Statistics South Africa, <http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/statsdownload.asp?PPN=P0302&SCH=4696> (accessed July 25, 2010).
- Stocking, Barbara. "Seismic Rupture: Africa-European Union Trade." *The World Today* 64, No. 1 (2008): 21–22.
- The State University of New York. "Globalization 101" The Levin Institute, [http://www.globalization101.org/What\\_is\\_Globalization.html](http://www.globalization101.org/What_is_Globalization.html) (accessed November 19, 2010).
- The Weekly Standard. "Democracy on the Nile." *The Weekly Standard*, March 27, 2006, <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/012/034kkgwf.asp> (accessed March 26, 2010).

- Transparency International. "Corruption Perceptions Index 2009." Transparency International, [http://www.transparency.org/publications/annual\\_report](http://www.transparency.org/publications/annual_report) (accessed October 15, 2010).
- Transnational Institute. "EPA Threatens to Tear Apart Oldest Customs Union." Transnational Institute, May 2008, <http://tni.org/inthemedial/epa-threatens-tear-apart-oldest-customs-union> (accessed April 13, 2010).
- Transnational Institute. "The WTO Doha round and EPAs in an era of crisis: Salvation or suicide for ACP countries." Transnational Institute, September 2010, <http://www.tni.org/article/wto-doha-round-and-epas-era-crisis-0> (accessed April 13, 2010).
- Transparency International. "Corruption Perceptions Index 2010." Transparency International, [http://www.transparency.org/policy\\_research/surveys\\_indices/cpi/2010](http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010) (accessed January 4, 2011).
- UK All Party Parliamentary Group on Angola. *Observations and Recommendations on a Visit to Angola*. London: Parliament of Westminster, 2006.
- United Nations. *Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General S/2005/60*. New York: UN Headquarters, 2005.
- UNAIDS. "2006 Report on the global AIDS epidemic." UNAIDS <http://www.unaids.org/en/resources/unaidspublications/2011/> (accessed July 25, 2010).
- UNAIDS. "2008 UNAIDS Annual Report." UNAIDS, <http://www.unaids.org/en/resources/unaidspublications/2011/> (accessed July 25, 2010).
- UNAIDS. "2009 Annual Report." UNAIDS, <http://www.unaids.org/en/resources/unaidspublications/2011/> (accessed July 25, 2010).
- UNAIDS. "2009 AIDS Epidemic Update." UNAIDS, <http://www.unaids.org/en/resources/unaidspublications/2011/> (accessed July 25, 2010).
- UNAIDS. "Outlook Report 2010". UNAIDS, <http://www.unaids.org/en/resources/unaidspublications/2011/> (accessed July 25, 2010).
- UNAIDS. "The Global Economic Crisis and HIV Prevention and Treatment Programmes: Vulnerabilities and Impact." UNAIDS, October 2009, <http://www.unaids.org/en/resources/unaidspublications/2011/> (accessed July 25, 2010).
- UNAMID. "Facts and Figures" UNAMID, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/facts.shtml> (accessed July 25, 2010).
- UNDP. *Human Development Report 2007/8*. New York: UNDP, 2008.
- UNDP. *Human Development Report 2009*. New York: UNDP, 2009.
- UNDP. *Human Development Report 2010*. New York: Palgrave, 2010.
- UNHCR. "World Refugee Survey 2008—Angola." UNHCR, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,USCRI,,COD,456d621e2,485f50c0c,0.html> (accessed July 25, 2010).
- U.S. Council on Foreign Relations. *Towards Angola Strategy: Prioritizing US-Angola Relations*. Washington, D.C.: US Council on Foreign Relations, 2007.
- U.S. State Department. "Background Note: Uganda." U.S. State Department, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2963.htm> (accessed June 17, 2010).

- U.S. State Department. "Background Note: Botswana." US State Department, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1830.htm> (accessed June 17, 2010).
- U.S. State Department. "Background Note: Angola." U.S. State Department, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6619.htm> (accessed June 17, 2010).
- U.S. State Department. "Background Note: Cameroon." US State Department, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/26431.htm> (accessed June 17, 2010).
- U.S. State Department. "Background Note: Gabon." US State Department, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2826.htm> (accessed August 14, 2010).
- U.S. State Department. "Background Note: Guinea." U.S. State Department, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2824.htm> (accessed August 14, 2010).
- U.S. State Department. "Background Note: The Republic of Congo." US State Department, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2825.htm> (accessed August 14, 2010).
- Voice of America. "World Diamond Council Urges Release of Zimbabwe Activist on Marange Field." VOA, June 18, 2010, <http://www1.voanews.com/zimbabwe/news/Diamond-Council-Demands-Release-of-Zimbabwe-Researcher-96670229.html> (accessed August 14, 2010).
- Voice of America. "UNHCR Says More CAR Refugees Entering Cameroon." VOA, March 18, 2010, <http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/africa/west/UNHCR-Says-More-CAR-Refugees-Entering-Cameroon-88429837.html> (accessed August 14, 2010).
- Wikipedia. "Ambazonia." Wikipedia, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ambazonia> (accessed March 29, 2010).
- Wikipedia. "Idi Amin." Wikipedia, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idi\\_Amin](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idi_Amin) (accessed April 22, 2010).
- Wikipedia. "List of Countries by Human Development Index." Wikipedia, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_countries\\_by\\_Human\\_Development\\_Index](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_Human_Development_Index) (accessed June 7, 2010).
- Wikipedia. "Cote d'Ivoire." Wikipedia, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cote\\_d%27ivoire](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cote_d%27ivoire) (accessed June 19, 2010).
- Wikipedia. "Angola." Wikipedia, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angola> (accessed June 19, 2010).
- Wikipedia. "Blood Diamond." Wikipedia, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blood\\_diamond](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blood_diamond) (accessed June 25, 2010).
- Wikipedia. "Kenya." Wikipedia, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kenya> (accessed July 19, 2010).
- Wikipedia. "Guinea." Wikipedia, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guinea> (accessed August 14, 2010).
- Wikipedia. "Guinean Presidential Election, 2010." Wikipedia, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guinean\\_presidential\\_election,\\_2010](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guinean_presidential_election,_2010) (accessed August 14, 2010).
- Wikipedia. "Republic of the Congo." Wikipedia, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic\\_of\\_Congo](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Congo) (accessed November 10, 2010).
- Wolf, Ken. "Hans Kohn's Liberal Nationalism: the Historian as a Prophet." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 37, No. 4 (1976): 651–672.

World Health Organization. "The World Health Report 2006—working together for health." World Health Organization, <http://www.who.int/whr/2006/en/> (accessed October 15, 2010).

World Trade Organization. *World Trade Report 2010*. Geneva: WTO Publications, 2010.

Yedder, Ben O. "Tanzania hosts 'best ever' World Economic Forum on Africa." *African Business* No. 365 (2010): 28–32.

# Index

- Abdullah, Ahmed, 51  
Abdelmahmood, Fatia, 51  
Abkhazia, 39, 223  
aboriculture, 155  
Abyei, 37, 52–7, 60  
Accra, 33–4, 85, 195–7, 201, 203  
Accra III Agreement, 85  
Acheampong, I K, 11, 191, 221  
Acholi tribe, 73  
ACNE, 206  
ACP, 34, 209–11, 242, 251, 254  
Adada, Rodolphe, 32  
Adedeji, Adebayo, 201, 203, 241, 245  
Adow, Mohammed, 225–6  
AEC, 205  
AfDB, 204–5  
Afghanistan, 19, 33, 35, 75, 77, 85, 107  
affiliation, 11, 123  
Africa Confidential, 35, 223, 245  
African Business, 228–30, 232, 238–40, 248, 252–3, 256  
African Standby Force, 204, 206  
African Union (AU), 4, 20, 25, 30–3, 35–7, 42, 57, 61, 90, 92, 108, 138, 201–7, 209–11  
AFRICOM, 78  
Afrifa, Akwasi, A, 189  
Afrikaner, 113  
Afro-Arab, 57  
Afro-Shirazi Party, 176, 178  
AGOA, 42  
agriculture, 22, 28, 59, 61, 68, 75, 101, 110, 119, 132, 140–1, 148–9, 155, 170–1, 180, 204–5  
agrofuel, 132, 149, 182, 189, 197–8  
Ahidjo, Ahmadou, 152–3, 161  
Ahmadinejad, 21  
Ahmed, Sheikh Sharif, 64, 66–7  
Akan, 11, 81, 221, 240  
Akobo, 60  
Aksum, 9  
Akuffo, F W K, 191  
Akwaya, 156  
Al Karaouine University, 8  
al-Bashir, Omar Hassan, 4, 24–5, 33–7, 48, 50–4, 56–8, 60, 203, 223  
al-Gaddafi, Muammar, 29, 33–4, 36–7, 205  
Al-Shabaab, 62–4, 66–7, 70, 77, 130  
al-Turabi, Hassan, 53, 58  
Albania, 12, 38–9  
Albertine Rift, 76  
Alexandria, 9, 53, 169, 171  
Algeria, xi, 20, 32, 43, 75–6, 206, 222, 225  
ALIP, 53  
Aljazeera English TV, 50, 118, 168, 222–6  
alliances, v, ix, 17, 123, 130, 145  
aluminium, 59  
Aly, Amr, 168, 237  
Ambazonia, 153–4, 235, 255  
AMEC, 160  
Amin, Idi, 70–1, 73, 77, 226–7, 251, 255  
AMIS, 30–2, 42–3  
AMISOM, 61–4, 67, 77  
An Yue Jiang, 116  
ANC, 99–101  
ancestry, 2, 11, 221, 240

- Ancient Ghana, 11, 189, 192  
 Anglo-Egyptian, 29  
 Ankole Kingdom, 70  
 Annan, Kofi, 123–4, 126–7, 232  
 annexation, 18–19, 29, 70  
 Anyidoho, Henry, 32  
 APRM, 20, 191, 201  
 anthropological, 192  
 anticolonial (ism), 9, 70, 82, 106, 122, 135, 145, 189  
 anti-missile defence, 18–19  
 Arab League, 2, 4, 20–1, 23–5, 31–7, 56–7  
 Arab Maghreb Union, 205, 211  
 Arabic, 2, 4, 23–4, 29, 51, 53, 56, 134, 169  
 Arabized Tunjur, 29  
 ARC, 153  
 Argentina, 40  
 Arusha, 176, 181, 203  
 Arusha Declaration, 176  
 Ashanti, 9, 12, 239  
 Asia, 4, 20, 22, 99, 106, 122, 213–14, 217  
 association, 7, 80, 83, 102, 139  
 ASWJ, 62–3  
 Atabani, Salahuddin, 54  
 AUA, 20, 203–5  
 AUC, 20, 203–5, 241, 246  
 Australia, 21, 58, 217, 220, 231  
 Axis Alliance, 113, 231  
 Azzam, M, 237, 246
- Badr, Ashraf, 237, 246  
 Bagre Dam, 194, 196, 249  
 Bakassi, 153, 156, 235, 245–6, 251–2  
 Bakassi Freedom Fighters, 137  
 Bakassi Peninsula, 150, 156–8  
 Bakayoko, Youssouf, 88–9, 91  
 Balkans, 4  
 Bamenda, 154, 159–60  
 bananas, 68, 81, 140  
 Banny, Charles Konan, 85–7  
 Bantus, 70, 99, 113, 143  
 Basque, 38  
 Bateke tribe, 143
- Botswana, 183, 185, 187  
 bauxite, 134, 140  
 BDP, 184–6  
 Bechuanaland, 183–4  
 Bédié, Konan, 82–3, 87–9  
 Belgium, 18, 75  
 Benguela railway, 111  
 Benin, 32, 92  
 Berlin Conference, 150  
 Besigye, Kizza, 74, 76  
 bibliographical, 6  
 Binaisa, Godfrey, 73  
 biofuel(s), 183, 198  
 Biya, Paul, 152–4, 157–61  
 Blair, Tony, 115  
 BLNS countries, 211  
 Boakye-Djan, Kwadwo, 191  
 Boer, 99, 183  
 Bongo, Ali, 141–4  
 Bongo, Omar, 133, 141–4, 146, 234, 246  
 Bosnia, 12, 23  
 Botswana, v, x, 3, 35, 102, 104, 112, 116, 161, 175, 183–9, 211, 239–40, 247, 255  
 Botswana Congress Party, 185  
 Bouake, 84–5  
 Bouba, Maigari Bello, 152–3  
 Bozizé, François, 158  
 Brazil, xi, 22–3, 32, 102, 106, 196, 212, 214–16  
 BRICS, xi, 23, 102, 212, 214–16  
 Broadman, Harry G, 223–4, 230–2, 247  
 Brong-Ahafo Region, 195  
 Brown, Gordon, 210  
 Brylle, Torben, 52  
 Buganda, 70–1, 78–9  
 Bulgaria, 12, 18, 39, 231  
 Burkina Faso, 81, 83, 85–6, 88, 137, 194, 196, 206  
 Burundi, 170, 211  
 Bush, George (Jnr), 18  
 Bush, George (Snr), 19  
 Busia, Kofi Abrefa, 11, 191, 221

- Cabinda Province, 105, 108  
 CACE, 42  
 CAHOSCC, 206  
 Cairo, 21, 163, 169, 171, 206  
 Camara, Dadis Moussa, 136–7, 139  
 Camara, Toto, 136  
 Cameroon/Cameroun, v, vii, x, 60, 131,  
     133, 149–62, 189, 206, 235–7,  
     245–8, 251–3, 255  
 Cameroun National Union, 152  
 Cancun Accord, 206, 217  
 Cape Verde, 92, 102  
 cartel, xi, 22–3, 102, 212, 214–15  
 Carter, Jimmy, 50, 52  
 cashew nuts, 180  
 cassava, 140, 149  
 Catalan, 38  
 CDPM, 154, 159, 160  
 CEI, 86–91  
 CEN-SAD, 211  
 CENI, 137–8  
 census, 50–1  
 Center for Jewish History, 5  
 Central African Republic, 60–1, 78,  
     150, 156, 158, 236, 255  
 Central Region, 195, 199  
 centralized government, 2, 13–14, 71  
 CFA franc, 92  
 Chad, 29, 34, 50, 60, 75, 78, 93, 145,  
     150, 156, 158–9, 162  
 CHADEMA Party, 179, 181  
 Chama Cha Mapinduzi, 175  
 Chama Cha Wananchi, 179  
 Chatham House, 42, 224, 247, 250  
 chief (s), 55, 71, 154, 184, 186, 196,  
     198  
 Chikane, Abbey, 120  
 China/Chinese, v, ix, xi, 4, 21–5, 28,  
     31–2, 36–8, 41–6, 56, 82, 101–2,  
     106, 110–11, 116, 119, 128–9,  
     145, 158, 189, 206, 209, 212,  
     214–16, 222–4, 224, 230–1, 233,  
     247–52  
 China-Africa, 41–6  
 cholera, 112, 162  
 Christian, 9, 83, 125, 134, 150, 159,  
     164, 171–2  
 chronology/chronological, 10, 62, 64,  
     87, 156, 191  
 CIA, 135, 189, 225–35, 237–41, 243,  
     247–8  
 CIPEV, 127  
 citizenship, 3, 11, 15, 55, 84, 86, 184  
 civic nationalism, ix, 5–7, 10–12,  
     14–15  
 Civic United Front, 175  
 clientelism, 221  
 climate change, xi, 47, 82, 97, 133, 175,  
     194, 196, 206, 217  
 CNOOC, 44–5, 129  
 CNPC, 31, 44–5  
 cocoa, 81–2, 93, 144, 148–9, 155, 193,  
     195, 228, 240, 252  
 coffee, 75, 81, 122, 128–9, 140, 144,  
     148–9, 155, 180  
 coherence, 1, 20, 94, 211  
 cohesion, 3, 7, 13  
 COJEP, 83  
 Cold War, 16, 18  
 colonial (ism), ix, 5, 9, 12, 29, 81–3,  
     110, 113, 123, 134, 189, 191, 193,  
     209  
 Columbia, 69  
 COMESA, 205, 211–12  
 communism, 5  
 Comoros, 75, 93, 205  
 Compaore, Blaise, 85, 87  
 conceptualization, 6  
 Condé, Alpha, 137–9  
 conflict (s), v, ix, x, 4, 16–17, 24–5,  
     29–30, 36–7, 39, 48, 50–2, 59–60,  
     63, 68, 75–6, 78, 81, 93, 99, 109,  
     113, 119, 121–2, 125, 129, 155–7,  
     161, 194, 196, 205  
 Congo-Brazzaville, v, x, 120, 133, 142,  
     144–62, 234–5  
 Congo, Republic of, 32, 247, 255  
 congruent, 3, 10  
 Connor, Walker, 15, 222  
 consociation, 2–3



- constitution (al), x, xi, 4, 34, 39, 67–8,  
     70–1, 74–5, 81, 83, 86, 88–91, 95,  
     106, 117–18, 121–6, 129–30,  
     135–6, 142, 145, 147, 149, 154,  
     156, 159–61, 163–6, 168, 170,  
     172, 178–9, 181, 183–5, 204,  
     103, 250  
 Conté, Lansana, 135–7, 139–40, 142  
 contours, v, ix, 1–4, 16–17, 21, 23–4,  
     221  
 conventional security, 18–19, 24, 27,  
     29–32, 47–50, 54, 60–4, 69, 71–3,  
     76–9, 84–6, 93–5, 106–8, 112,  
     116, 123, 129–30, 136–7, 150,  
     156–9, 194  
 Copenhagen Accord, 206, 217  
 Coptic Christians, 164, 171–2  
 corn, 68, 129, 149, 171  
 corruption, xi, 41, 75, 93, 101–2, 105,  
     109, 119, 121, 125–6, 128–30,  
     132, 134, 139, 140–1, 143–5,  
     147–8, 150, 155, 160–1, 171–2,  
     186–7  
 Corruptions Perception Index (CPI), 22,  
     31, 41, 59, 68, 71, 93, 102, 109,  
     119, 128, 139, 144, 148, 155, 171,  
     180, 186, 193, 223–4, 254  
 COSATU, 100  
 Cote d'Ivoire, v, x, xi, 11, 47, 75, 80–96,  
     109, 120, 134, 143, 189, 192–4,  
     205, 211, 228, 247, 250, 255  
 coterminus, 3  
 cotton, 23, 75, 155, 171, 180  
 Coulibaly, Ibrahim, 94–5  
 Council of the EU, 17  
 coup d'état, x, 71, 83–4, 89, 108,  
     122–3, 133, 136–7, 139, 141, 143,  
     146–7, 153, 189, 191, 221  
 CPA, 24, 30, 32, 52, 55, 60, 206  
 CPP, 191  
 criteria, 9, 15, 55, 164  
 Cromwell, Oliver, 16, 18  
 CSCEC, 44–5  
 CTRN, 135  
 cultural nationalism, 3, 8, 13–14  
 culture/cultural, 1, 3, 8, 11, 13–14, 121,  
     132, 194  
 currency war (s), 215–16  
 Cyprus, 23, 38  
 Czech Republic, 12–13, 18, 39  
  
 Daju, 29  
 Danquah, J B, 192  
 Darfur/Darfurians, 24, 29–30, 32–7,  
     42–3, 46–8, 50–4, 56–8, 60, 78,  
     222, 224–5, 246, 250, 254  
 Dari, Ebi, 157  
 Davies, D, 223, 241, 248  
 DDA/DDR, xi, 20, 22–3, 212, 214–15,  
     217  
 debate on nationalism, ix, 1, 4, 5, 6,  
     9–10, 15–16, 220  
 DeBeers, 187  
 Debswana, 187  
 debt ceiling, xi, 216–17  
 Deby, Idriss, 34  
 deficit reduction, 216  
 definitions, of nationalism, 2, 3–7, 21  
 democracy, 114, 121–2, 136, 141, 146,  
     152, 184, 237, 253  
 democratization, 28, 191–2  
 Derg, 9  
 designation, 17, 20–1, 82  
 Diallo, Cellou Dalein, 137–8  
 Diallo, El Haj Boubacar, 137–8  
 diamond, 99, 101, 110–11, 120, 140,  
     148, 187, 232, 239, 252, 255  
 Diarra, Seydou, 85  
 dichotomy, 9, 5–12, 16  
 Dinka, 55–6, 134  
 DLK, 39  
 DPK, 39  
 diplomatic, 18, 42, 44, 78, 111  
 disaster management, 121, 194, 195  
 disasters, x, xi, 24, 47, 95, 121, 132,  
     136, 194–6  
 Djibouti, 64, 68, 77, 225  
 doctrine, 2, 14, 16, 29  
 Doha, 20, 22, 48, 50, 58, 212, 242, 254  
 dominion, 7, 29, 99  
 dos Santos, José Eduardo, 109

- Douala, 158–60  
 Douekoe, 94  
 Dow Jones, 216  
 DRC, 60–1, 75, 78, 106, 108, 111–12, 116, 120, 127  
 Durban Accord, 217
- EAC, 211–12, 242, 247  
 East Timor, 15, 153  
 Eastern Europe, 6–7, 18  
 Eastern Region, 195  
 ECA, 204–5  
 ECCAS, 205, 211  
 ECDPM, 212  
 economic communities, 205  
 economic downturn, 68, 97, 102, 139, 144, 148, 155, 171, 180, 187, 193  
 economics, ix, x, xi, 1, 2, 4, 7, 10, 13–14, 20, 22–3, 27–9, 31, 41, 44, 47, 59, 62, 68, 70, 78, 81–2, 92, 97, 102–3, 105, 111, 113, 115, 118–20, 122, 128, 133, 139, 144, 147–8, 155, 161, 163, 170–1, 178, 180–1, 183, 187, 193, 201, 204–16, 223, 225, 229, 250  
 ECOSOC, 28  
 ECOWAS, 84–5, 90–2, 137, 142, 205, 211–12, 242, 248  
 education, 3, 8, 28, 66, 69, 100, 103, 126, 155, 182, 187, 197, 205, 220, 245  
 Egypt, v, vii, x, xi, 3, 21, 29, 34–5, 53, 76, 133, 162–73, 225, 237, 246–8, 252  
 ElBaradei, Mohamed, 165–6, 171  
 El Ghad Party, 164  
 Eldoret, 126  
 ELECAM, 154, 160  
 elections, x, xi, 12, 37, 50–8, 68–70, 73–4, 76, 81–3, 85–92, 94–5, 106, 116–18, 122–6, 134, 137–9, 141–2, 146–7, 159–61, 163–6, 178–80, 184–6, 189–93, 205, 220, 233, 236, 240, 246, 252, 255  
 Electoral Commission, 51, 86, 124, 154, 184, 238, 252
- Emperor Menelik I/II, 9  
 enclave, 108  
 Encyclopaedia Britannica, 5  
 energy, xi, 20, 23, 28, 44–7, 97, 101, 111, 133, 182, 206, 214  
 England, 3, 9, 15  
 English, 5, 8, 13–16, 51, 150  
 Enlightenment, 8, 15  
 EPAs, 20, 42, 209–12, 242, 247, 254  
 Equatorial Guinea, 141–2, 150, 153, 156, 159  
 Eritrea, 43  
 Estonia, 13, 18, 39, 153  
 Ethiopia, 9–10, 34, 44, 75, 93, 130, 162, 168–70, 204, 206, 220, 237, 247, 253  
 ethnic (ity), ix, 2–3, 5–7, 10–12, 14, 33, 39, 58, 71, 80–4, 86, 89, 93, 122, 124–5, 130, 134, 138, 143, 152, 161, 220, 240, 248, 251  
 ethnîe, 11, 183  
 ethnogeographic, 4, 6, 10–13, 17, 20, 25, 28, 64, 68, 81, 86, 99, 163  
 ethnonational (ism), 2–3, 10–12, 70, 81, 86, 113, 121–2, 134, 183, 222  
 EU-Africa Summit, 57, 116, 212  
 EUEI, 182  
 EULEX, 38–9  
 EU-MEFTA, 23  
 Eurasia, 22  
 eurocentric (ity), 6–8, 13, 15–16, 230  
 European Central Bank, 17  
 European Council, 17–18, 39  
 European Court of Justice, 17  
 European Parliament, 17  
 European Union (EU), 4, 12–13, 17–20, 22–3, 31–2, 37–9, 42–3, 51–2, 57, 69, 92, 116, 160, 182, 209–12, 216–17, 223, 236, 242–3, 245, 247–8, 251–3  
 eurozone, 13, 17–18, 216–17  
 evolution (ary), 9, 11, 14, 22, 27, 28, 122, 123, 163, 166, 175, 183, 185  
 Ewe, 12, 221, 240

- exclave, 108  
 Exim Bank, 44–5, 110, 119  
 expression (s), ix, 2, 6
- failed state, 61–2, 64, 68–9, 130  
 Fanti, 9, 12, 14, 221  
 Falklands, 40  
 FAO, 28, 61, 68, 76, 113, 121, 132,  
     141, 183, 197–8, 226–7, 231–4,  
     239, 241, 248  
 Fascism, 5  
 FDI, 31, 45, 194  
 federal (ism), 3, 62, 66–7, 130, 150  
 Fez, 8  
 FIFA, 132  
 figuration, 11, 220–1  
 Filipinos, 157  
 FLEC-FAC, 108  
 FLEC-PM, 108  
 FLEC-Renovada, 108  
 flood (ing), 132, 189, 194–5, 240,  
     248–50  
 FNLA, 106, 110  
 FOCAC, 42  
 food/food security, xi, 28, 47, 61–2, 76,  
     91, 97, 113, 121, 131–3, 140–1,  
     144–5, 148–9, 155, 163, 170–1,  
     175–6, 182, 189, 194–5, 197–8,  
     204  
 Forces Nouvelles, 84–8, 94  
 FORD-Kenya, 122  
 FORD-People, 122  
 FPI, 83, 86  
 France 24 TV, 34, 228, 232  
 franchise, 15, 41, 164  
 Francophonie, 83, 150, 152  
 French, 5, 13–14, 20, 81–2, 84–5, 91,  
     94, 134–5, 141–3, 145, 150, 153,  
     157, 223, 235, 245, 252  
 French Revolution, 14  
 Friends of the Earth, 182, 197, 232–3,  
     235, 239, 241, 248  
 FRONASA, 73  
 FTSE, 216  
 Fulani, 135, 152, 154  
 Fur, 29
- G20, 36, 102, 216–17  
 G77, 213  
 G8, 21, 139, 163, 209  
 Ga-Adangbe, 221, 240  
 Gabon, v, x, 133, 141–6, 189, 210, 234,  
     246–7, 255  
 Gaborone, 184, 186  
 GAFTA, 21, 23  
 Gambari, Ibrahim, 32, 52  
 Gambia, 31  
 Gates, Robert, 21  
 GATT, 22  
 Gbagbo, Laurent, 83–95  
 Gellner, Ernest, 219–20, 248  
 genocide, 4, 24, 30, 33, 36, 50, 53, 203,  
     223, 252  
 geopolitique, 18, 37  
 Georgia, 13, 39–40, 153  
 Germany, 3, 18, 27–8, 75, 150, 166,  
     176  
 Ghana, ii, v, vii, x, 1, 9–12, 14, 31–4,  
     44–6, 52, 77, 81, 123, 134–6, 155,  
     175–6, 189–99, 201, 203, 210–11,  
     219–21, 224, 234, 239–42,  
     246–51  
 global governance, v, ix, x, 1, 4, 16–17,  
     27–40, 44, 50–7, 69, 78, 87–95,  
     126–7, 129–30, 209, 212–17  
 global politics, ix, 12–16, 17–25,  
     27–40, 41–6, 89–96, 162–3,  
     205–6, 209–17  
 global market slump, xi, 212–13,  
     216–17  
 Global Peace Index (GPI), x, xi, 22,  
     58–9, 68, 75, 93–4, 102–3, 109,  
     112, 119, 128–9, 139–40, 148,  
     155, 170, 180, 186, 193  
 globalization, v, ix, x, 1–2, 4, 17, 23–40,  
     58–60, 68–9, 74–6, 92–3, 101–3,  
     109–12, 118–20, 128–9, 139–40,  
     143–44, 147–8, 155, 180–1,  
     186–7, 193–4, 205–6, 212–17  
 GNPOC, 31, 45  
 gold, 59, 99, 101, 119, 140, 141, 144,  
     171, 180  
 Gold Coast, 193

- Gonja, 196, 240, 250  
 Gorji-Dinka, Fon, 154  
 governance, x, xi, 11, 27, 41, 47, 59, 62, 64, 68, 69, 74–5, 81, 97, 102, 105, 113, 117–18, 120, 121, 133, 135, 139, 140, 141, 145–7, 152, 154–6, 159–61, 170, 175, 180, 183, 186–7, 189, 191–3, 201, 204, 238, 252  
 Grant Thornton, 103  
 Greater-Accra Region, 195  
 Green Fund, 206, 217  
 Green Peace, 95  
 Greece, 39, 216  
 gross domestic product, 43, 59, 61, 68, 75, 76, 101, 102, 103, 110, 112, 118, 119, 128, 129, 139, 140, 144, 148, 149, 155, 171, 180, 181, 186, 187, 193, 194  
 Guan, 11, 221, 240  
 Guéi, Robert, 93  
 guerrilla warfare, 94, 108, 114  
 Guijin, Liu, 42, 224, 250  
 Guinea, v, x, 77, 91, 96, 133–41, 142, 152, 159, 176, 189, 205, 233, 234, 247, 255  
 guinea worm, 50, 199, 241, 251  
 Guinea-Bissau, 92, 134  
 Gulf of Aden, 68, 69  
 Gulf of Guinea, 111, 134  
 Gulf of Mexico, 168  
 Gumaa, Numan, 164  
 Guterres, António, 158  
  
 Hague, 55, 127, 130, 153  
 Hamas, 166  
 Hapsburg, 12–13  
 Harun, Ahmad, 33  
 health, xi, 28, 47, 50, 69, 79, 97, 100, 103, 105, 116, 131, 133, 155, 162, 166, 175, 181, 187, 196, 198–9, 241, 250, 251, 256  
 Hebrew, 5  
 HEPCA, 168  
 Herzegovina, 12, 23  
 heterogeneity, 12  
 Hezbollah, 37, 166, 171  
 High Court of Justice, 80, 90, 95, 154, 179, 186, 196  
 HIPC, 148  
 historical, 2, 5, 6, 8, 28, 47, 54, 55, 70–4, 81–2, 99, 106–8, 113–18, 121–6, 134–7, 141–2, 145–6, 150–4, 159, 163–70, 176–80, 183–6, 189–93, 209, 219, 253  
 HIV/AIDS, 61, 69–70, 79–80, 95–6, 97, 103–5, 106, 112, 113, 120–1, 130–1, 134, 140, 144, 145, 150, 156, 161–2, 172–3, 176, 181–2, 183, 186, 187–9, 199, 241, 249  
 Hizbul Islam, 62, 64  
 Horticulture, 129  
 Houphouët-Boigny, Felix, 81, 82, 84, 86  
 human development, x, xi, 47, 50, 59, 81, 97, 103, 109, 113, 121, 129, 133, 140, 144, 148, 155, 175, 180, 186, 189, 193, 225, 229, 254, 255  
 human rights, 30, 34, 36, 41, 56, 80, 109, 116, 120, 125, 130, 154, 155, 159, 161, 168, 180, 185, 193, 203, 22, 237  
 Humboldtian Revolution, 8  
 Hungary, 12, 13, 39  
  
 IAEA, 28, 165, 166  
 Ibrahim Index (IIAG), x, xi, 59, 68, 74–5, 92–3, 102, 109, 118, 119, 120, 128, 139–40, 143, 147–8, 155, 162, 170, 180, 186, 193  
 Ibrahim, Khalil, 50–1  
 Iceland, 129, 181  
 ICJ, 28, 38, 39, 156  
 identity, ix, 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11, 17, 27, 70, 78, 81, 84, 86, 87, 88, 113, 121, 183, 184, 185, 189, 193, 221, 253  
 ideology, 2, 14, 29, 66, 82, 145, 146  
 IDPs, 59, 68, 76, 109, 119, 129  
 IEP, 59, 102, 103, 109, 112, 180, 186, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 235, 239  
 IEPA, 211

- IGAD, 205, 211  
 IMF, 28, 44, 92, 111, 139, 148, 191, 214, 215  
 IMO, 28  
 imperialism, 6–7, 9, 12, 219, 220, 221, 251  
 independence, ix, 9, 11, 12, 15, 24, 25, 29, 37, 39, 40, 48, 51, 52, 53, 56, 57, 58, 60, 69, 70, 71, 81, 82, 106, 108, 110, 113, 121, 122, 124, 133, 134–5, 136, 144, 145, 152, 153, 175, 176, 184, 185, 186, 187, 189, 191, 192, 193, 203, 207, 222  
 India, xi, 19, 22, 23, 69, 91, 99, 102, 121, 122, 128, 176, 206, 212, 215, 217, 223, 224, 230, 247  
 Indonesia, 15, 217  
 inequality, 193, 220  
 integration, 1, 14, 20, 70, 86, 201, 205, 207, 211, 242, 247  
 intelligentsia, 13  
 International Criminal Court (ICC), ix, 4, 24, 25, 32–7, 48, 53, 54, 56, 92, 121, 126–7, 129–30, 136, 203, 223, 241, 248  
 International Crisis Group, 78, 157, 158, 161, 225, 226, 235, 236, 250–1  
 international political economy, ix, xi, 28, 47, 58–60, 68–9, 74–6, 92–3, 97, 101–3, 109–12, 118–20, 128–9, 133, 139–40, 143–4, 147–8, 155, 170–1, 175, 180–1, 186–7, 191, 193–4  
 international politics, ix, x, 1, 2, 4, 16–25, 31, 27–40, 106, 110–12, 162, 203–7, 209–18  
 Iran, 21, 56, 110, 166, 214, 222  
 Iraq, 21, 59, 163, 222  
 Ireland, 232  
 Iron Curtain, 3, 13  
 irrational (ity), 10, 11, 120  
 Islam (ic), 2, 4, 21, 23, 24, 29, 33, 36, 56, 57, 61, 62, 64, 66, 77, 81, 83, 125, 134, 153, 179, 226, 246, 253  
 Islamic Courts Union, 64, 67  
 Italy/Italian (s), 9, 18, 75, 84, 113, 149, 163, 198, 231  
 ivoirité, xi, 81, 82, 83, 84, 88, 93  
 Ivory Coast, x, 80–96  
 Janjaweed Militia, 33, 50  
 Japan, 22, 128, 132, 162, 215, 216, 217, 231  
 jatropha, 182, 183, 198  
 JEM, 34, 47–8, 50, 51, 54, 58, 224  
 Johannesburg, 100  
 Johansen, Raymond, 32  
 Joint Security Commission, 159  
 Jordan, 21, 36  
 Juba, 53, 54, 58, 78  
 Karume, Abeid, 176, 178–9  
 Karume, Amani, 179  
 Kampala, 33, 37, 63, 73, 77, 78, 79, 80, 204  
 KANU, 122, 124, 125  
 Karzai, Hamid, 21  
 Kenya, v, x, 11, 34, 52, 58, 68, 69, 73, 75, 77, 92, 97, 121–32, 155, 161, 168, 169, 170, 176, 192, 206, 211, 225, 232, 233, 238, 247, 250, 253, 255  
 Kenyatta, Jomo, 121, 122, 124, 142, 176  
 Khadis' Courts, 125  
 Khama, Seretse, 184  
 Khartoum, 29, 30, 31, 48, 50, 52, 53, 54, 56, 59, 169, 206  
 Khoikhoi, 99  
 Kibaki, Mwai, 122, 123, 124, 126, 128, 129  
 Kikosi Maalum, 73  
 Kikuyu, 122  
 Kikwete, Jakaya, 179, 180  
 Kirdi, 153  
 Kitara Empire, 70  
 Klavet, Henrike, 212  
 Kohn, Hans, ix, 1, 4–16, 219, 220, 221, 222, 251, 252, 255  
 Kokofu, 185, 239  
 Konare, Alpha Oumar, 242

- Kony, Joseph, 77, 78, 227  
 Kosovo, v, ix, 12, 14–15, 25, 27, 29, 37–40, 222, 223  
 Kouassi, Ferdinand, 89  
 Krasniqi, Jakup, 39  
 Kribi, 159  
 Kufuor, John Agyekum, 33, 52, 123, 192, 201  
 Kushayb, Ali, 33  
 Kuwait, 163, 222  
 Kyoto Protocol, 206  
 Kyrgyzstan, 21
- La Loi Constitution, 135  
 labour, 28, 79, 162  
 Lancaster House Agreement, 113, 114, 115  
 language, 2, 5, 13, 15, 51, 81, 134, 150, 212  
 Latvia, 13, 18, 39, 153  
 League of Nations, 27, 150, 176, 235  
 Lebanon, 21, 37, 134  
 Leo Baeck Institute, 5  
 Lesotho, 189, 211  
 Lettow-Vorbeck, Paul von, 176  
 Levin Institute, 219, 253  
 liberalism, 15  
 Liberia, 37, 43, 84, 91, 96, 120, 134  
 Libreville, 142–3  
 Libya, 20, 29, 33, 36, 43, 56, 57, 76, 110, 204, 205, 206, 222, 225  
 Liebich, Andre, 6, 12, 219, 221, 252  
 Limann, Hilla, 192  
 Linas-Marcoussis Accord, 84–5  
 Lisbon Treaty (EU), 18  
 Lisbon Treaty (AU), 20, 117, 209–12, 242, 245  
 Lissouba, Pascal, 146, 147  
 Lithuania, 13, 18, 39  
 London, 5, 14, 111, 114, 216, 219  
 LRA, 60–1, 70, 77, 78  
 LSCP, 156  
 Luanda, 106, 108  
 Lugbara fetich priestess, 87  
 Lule, Yusuf, 73
- Lupumba, Ibrahim, 179, 180  
 Luxembourg, 18
- M'ba, Leon, 141  
 Machage, Wilfred, 125  
 Madagala, 77  
 Madagascar, 182, 198  
 Mafikeng, 184  
 Maghreb Union, 20, 25, 33, 35, 36, 37, 163, 191, 205, 211  
 magnum opus, 6  
 Maguwu, Farai, 120  
 malaria, 79, 112, 149, 173, 198, 199  
 Malawi, 37, 113, 204  
 Mali/an, 138, 206  
 malnourishment, 61, 113, 121, 132, 141, 183, 197  
 Mande-Busanga, 221, 240  
 Mandela, Nelson, 99, 100, 102  
 Mandinka/Malinke, 134, 135, 137  
 Maplecroft Terror Risk, xi, 62, 69, 226, 252  
 Marange diamond field, 120, 232, 255  
 marginalization, 41, 57, 78  
 maritime, 28, 69  
 Maroua, 159  
 Masire, Ketumile, 184, 185  
 Masire, Tebogo, 185  
 Massamba-Débat, A, 145, 146  
 Massock, Mboua, 160  
 matrix, 14  
 Motswana, 183  
 Mauritania, x, 20, 34, 75, 93, 225  
 Mauritius, 102, 206  
 Mayardit, Salva Kiir, 52, 54  
 Mbeki, Thabo, 52, 90, 99, 102, 117  
 MDC-M, 117  
 MDC-T, 117, 118  
 Mediterranean, 20, 23  
 Medvedev, Dmitry, 19, 22  
 MEFTA, 21, 23  
 MEND, 158  
 Messeriya Arabs, 55–6, 60  
 Metohija, 38  
 metropolis, 199  
 Mexico, 168, 206

- MFN, 43  
 Middle East, 4, 5, 20, 23, 128, 162, 163, 166, 214, 237  
 military, 9, 11, 12, 18, 21, 24, 29, 31, 32, 48, 60, 73, 76, 83, 84, 86, 105, 108, 135, 135, 136, 139, 141, 142, 145, 146, 157, 161, 162, 172, 189, 191, 192, 194, 195, 196, 206, 217, 231, 236, 253  
 Millennium Villages, 79, 131, 182, 199  
 Mills, John Atta, 46, 192  
 Milongo, André, 147  
 Milton, John, 14, 16  
 MINAT, 160  
 MJP, 84  
 MLPC, 161  
 modern, 3, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 18, 42, 141, 145, 149, 183, 184, 185, 213, 221  
 Modern Ghana, 11, 12, 14  
 modernism, 8, 9, 13, 14, 16, 221  
 modernist, 9  
 Mogadishu, 62–4, 77  
 Mogae, Festus, 184, 185, 188  
 Mohamed, Abdullahi, 67  
 Moi, Daniel Arap, 73, 122, 125  
 Mole Dagbani, 221, 240  
 Mombassa, 121  
 monotony, 6, 7, 9  
 MONUC, 78  
 Montenegro, 12, 15  
 Moreno-Ocampo, Luis, 33, 34, 92, 126, 127, 129, 228, 232  
 Morocco, 8, 20, 76, 132, 136, 225  
 Moslem (Muslim), 40, 64, 87, 125, 135, 150, 152, 153, 164, 165, 171, 172  
 Mozambique, 116, 119, 211  
 MPCI, 84  
 MPIGO, 84  
 MPLA, 106, 110, 111  
 Mubarak, Gamal, 152, 162  
 Mubarak, Hosni, xi, 34, 152, 162, 163, 164, 166, 168, 171, 172  
 Mucyo, Jean, 223, 252  
 Mugabe, Robert, 97, 99, 114, 116, 117, 118, 120, 135, 210, 214, 222  
 Mugisha, Frank, 80  
 multinational, 2, 3, 9, 10, 11, 12  
 Museveni, Yoweri, 70, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 227  
 Muslim Brotherhood, 99, 164–5  
 Musoke-Kibuuka, Vincent, 80  
 Musyoka, Kalonzo, 123  
 Mutambara, Arthur, 117  
 mutation, 2, 10  
 Muteesa, King Edward, 71  
 Mutharika, Bingu wa, 37  
 mutuality, 6, 17, 57, 201, 212, 230  
 Muzorewa, Abel, 114  
 Mwinyi, Ali Hassan, 179  
 myths of origin, 2  
 Nabili, Teymoor, 232  
 NADMO, 194–7, 240, 241, 248, 249  
 NAL, 191  
 Namibia, 106, 182, 183, 188, 211  
 NARC, 122, 123  
 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 163  
 nation (s), ii, ix, 1, 2, 3, 7, 9, 10, 11, 14, 21, 22, 23, 27, 28, 32, 36, 43, 139, 166, 176, 221, 222  
 nation-state (s), 3, 10  
 national identity, 3, 10, 12, 70, 81, 84, 86, 113, 121, 183, 189, 221, 253  
 national reconstruction, 110, 111, 115, 205  
 national self determination, 53, 156, 157, 184, 205  
 nationalism (s), v, ix, x, xi, 1–16, 17, 183, 189, 219, 220, 221, 224, 251  
 nationalism debate, 4–16  
 nationalist movement (s), 2, 13, 14, 16, 70, 81, 82, 113, 176, 184, 185  
 nationhood, 2–3, 12, 13, 15  
 NATO, 13, 17, 18, 19, 21, 37, 38, 39, 205, 222  
 natural resources, 21, 22, 44, 155, 213, 214  
 NBI, 169, 170, 171  
 NCDD, 136  
 NCP, 29, 52, 55, 56, 58  
 NCR, 145

- NDC, 192  
 NDP, 164, 171  
 N'dre, Paul Yao, 89  
 Ndi, John Fru, 153  
 NEO, 154  
 New Forces, 84, 85, 86, 88  
 new security challenges, xi, 28, 47,  
     60–1, 69–70, 76–80, 93–6, 97,  
     103–5, 112–13, 120–1, 129–32,  
     133, 140–1, 144, 148–9, 157–62,  
     171–3, 175, 181–3, 194–9  
 Ngouabi, Marien, 146  
 Ngota, Bibi, 161  
 Ngwato, 184  
 Niger, x, 205  
 Niger Delta, 45, 157, 158  
 Nigeria, 11, 31, 44, 45, 52, 75, 77, 93,  
     104, 110, 119, 150, 153, 156, 157,  
     158, 161, 162, 166, 192, 210, 222,  
     224, 237, 243  
 Nile, 29, 31, 45, 53, 163, 168–70, 171  
 Nile River Agreement, 53, 168–70, 171  
 NILE-COM, 169  
 Nkapa, Benjamin, 180  
 Nkomo, Joshua, 114  
 Nkrumah, Kwame, 135, 176, 189, 191,  
     192, 203, 233  
 NLC, 189, 191  
 NLM, 191  
 NODYNA, 160  
 North Africa, 4, 20, 76, 163  
 North America, 21, 213  
 North Star Alliance, 131  
 North Sudan, 24, 45, 48, 53, 55, 56,  
     57, 58, 169, 225  
 Northern Ghana, 12, 46, 194, 196, 197,  
     199  
 Northern Ireland, 17  
 Northern Rhodesia, 113  
 Norway, 32  
 Nour, Ayman, 164  
 NPP, 192, 198  
 NRC, 191, 221  
 NRM, 74, 146  
 nuclear energy, 19, 28, 206, 214  
 NUDP, 152  
 Nyerere, Julius, 175, 176, 178, 179  
 Nzara County, 61  
 OAU, 20, 154, 203–4  
 Obama, Barack, 18, 19, 91, 222  
 Obote, Milton, 70, 71, 73  
 Odinga, Jamoro Oginga, 123  
 Odinga, Raila, 92, 123, 124, 125, 132  
 ODM, 123, 124, 125, 127  
 ODM-Kenya, 123  
 OIC, 2, 4, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 31, 32,  
     33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 56  
 oil, 4, 23, 31, 36, 37, 43, 44, 45, 53, 54,  
     55, 57, 59, 60, 76, 80, 81, 82, 105,  
     106, 108, 110, 111, 112, 129, 130,  
     141, 143, 144, 145, 147, 148, 149,  
     150, 155, 156, 157, 168, 171, 186,  
     193, 194, 197, 198, 214, 216, 240  
 Ojok, David Oyite, 73  
 Okello, Tito, 73  
 Olara-Okello, 73  
 Old Ghana Empire, 11, 189, 192  
 Oliti community, 156  
 Omani Arabs, 122, 176  
 one-party state, x, 74, 82, 113, 121,  
     122, 133, 135, 141, 144, 145, 146,  
     147, 153, 175, 178, 180, 183, 186,  
     187, 189, 191  
 OPEC, 21, 23, 110, 198, 222  
 Operation Sparrowhawk, 160  
 Operation Thunder, Lightning, 78, 227  
 OSCE, 19, 39  
 Ottoman Empire, 13  
 Ouagadougou Accords, 137  
 Ouagadougou Political Agreement  
     (OUA), 85, 87  
 Ouattara, Alassane, 82–95  
 Ouattara Empire/tribe, 81, 82, 83, 84,  
     86  
 Oxford University, 8  
 Owada, Hisashi, 38  
 Pakistan, 19, 21, 69  
 Palestine, 5  
 PANPP, 198  
 Paris, 5, 94, 142, 216



- parliament (ary), 13, 17, 20, 63, 67, 68, 73, 74, 76, 80, 86, 101, 110, 111, 117, 124, 125, 136, 147, 154, 159, 160, 164, 165, 168, 178, 179, 184, 185
- partition, 141, 145, 150, 230
- patriot/ism, 10, 11, 83, 84, 176, 178
- patronage, 143, 144
- PCT, 146
- PDCI, 82, 83, 86, 88, 89
- PDG, 135, 141, 142
- PDOC, 31, 45
- peace indicators, x, xi, 22, 58–9, 68, 75, 93–4, 102–3, 109, 112, 119, 128–9, 139–40, 148, 155, 170, 180, 186, 193
- Pelindaba Treaty, 206
- pericarditis, 166
- periodization, 8–9
- Petrobras, 215
- petroleum, 23, 31, 44, 45, 59, 68, 75, 101, 128, 129, 140, 144, 148, 155, 171, 193, 198, 215
- PFP, 192
- philosophical, 10, 111, 176
- pineapple, 82, 129, 140
- Ping, Jean, 35
- piracy/pirates, 61, 64, 69, 122, 156, 157, 158, 226
- plebiscite, 53, 55, 56, 135, 150
- PNP, 192
- PNU, 124, 127
- Poland, 13, 18
- political context, x, 3, 10, 12, 27–9, 29–32, 47, 70–4, 81–2, 99–101, 106–8, 113–18, 121–7, 134–7, 141–3, 145–7, 150–4, 163–70, 176–80, 183–6, 189–93, 209–10
- political economy, ix, xi, 28, 47, 58–60, 68–9, 74–6, 92–3, 97, 101–3, 109–12, 118–20, 128–9, 133, 139–40, 143–4, 147–8, 155, 170–1, 175, 180–1, 186–7, 191, 193–4
- political faultlines, 57, 152
- Political Islam, 4, 21, 36
- political nationalism, 15
- political rationality, 11
- politics-of-the-belly, 220
- POPCRU, 100
- population, 11, 14, 39, 59, 61, 66, 70, 78, 79, 81, 82, 83, 95, 104, 112, 113, 115, 120, 121, 122, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 134, 140, 141, 143, 144, 148, 149, 152, 153, 161, 164, 170, 171, 176, 179, 181, 183, 187, 197, 199, 213, 221, 228, 229, 233, 237, 238, 240, 243, 252
- Portugal/Portuguese, 106, 108, 110, 111, 113, 121, 122, 176, 217, 242
- postcolonial, ix, 12
- poverty reduction, 194
- Powell, Colin, 30
- Prague, 5, 12
- press freedom, 161, 168, 170, 193
- propaganda, 48
- protectorate, 38, 81, 124, 183
- PSC, 20, 30, 31, 35, 88, 205
- PUP, 135–6
- Puritan Revolution, 14, 16
- Qatar, 31, 34, 36, 42, 48, 50, 58, 222
- quantitative easing, 216
- Quest Means Business, 243
- Quest, Richard, 243
- Radio Bar-Kulan, 64
- rapporteur, 5
- rational (ity), 10, 11, 15
- rationalization of ethnonationalism (ROE), 10
- Rawlings, Jerry, 135, 191, 192
- RDR, 83, 84, 87
- RECs, 201, 204, 210, 212
- recession, 144, 189, 212
- referendum, 37, 48, 51, 53–8, 60, 67, 68, 74, 117, 123, 124, 126, 130, 135, 136, 147, 165, 175, 178, 179, 205, 206, 207
- refugees, 59, 61, 68, 76, 79, 91, 95, 109, 119, 121, 129, 130, 155, 158, 159, 194, 196, 197, 230, 254

- religion/religious, xi, 2, 4, 14, 21, 29,  
     67, 125, 134, 150, 152, 164  
 Rhodesia, 113, 114, 115, 119  
 rice, 129, 140, 145, 170, 171, 182, 194,  
     197  
 Rice, Condoloeza, 24, 222, 240, 253  
 Robow, Sheikh Mukhtar, 66  
 Romania, 12, 13, 18, 38, 93  
 Rompuy, Herman Van, 18  
 Rowland, Jackie, 237  
 rubber, ix, 28, 100, 144, 155  
 Russia, xi, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24,  
     28, 31, 36, 37, 38, 39, 42, 56, 102,  
     116, 155, 158, 212, 214, 215, 216,  
     222, 236, 253  
 Ruto, William, 124, 126, 127  
 Rwanda, 11, 31, 35, 36, 37, 75, 169,  
     170, 211, 223, 252  
  
 SACU, 211  
 Sadat, Anwar, 163, 165  
 SADC, 97, 99, 105, 113, 115, 116,  
     117, 118, 205, 211, 212  
 Sahara (n), 20, 43, 44, 80, 109, 119,  
     161, 162, 180, 187, 189, 191, 205,  
     211, 240, 246  
 Said, Seyyid, 176  
 Salahuddin, Ghazi, 54, 225  
 San, 99  
 SAP, 191  
 Sarkozy, Nicolas, 20, 91  
 Saudi Arabia, 21, 68, 110, 166, 222  
 Savimbi, Jonas, 108  
 SCAPO, 153, 157  
 SCNC, 153  
 Scotland, 3  
 secessionism, 3, 15, 38, 40, 62, 105,  
     108, 150, 153, 154  
 security, ix, x, xi, 4, 18, 19, 20, 27, 28,  
     30, 32–7, 47–50, 53–9, 60–1,  
     61–70, 76–80, 91, 93–6, 103–5,  
     112–13, 116–21, 123, 126,  
     129–32, 136–9, 143, 147–9,  
     149–62, 171–2, 181–3, 187–9,  
     194–9, 204, 205–6, 214, 215, 223,  
     231  
 security sector reform, 67  
 Sejdiu, Fatmir, 39  
 Selebi, Jacob Jackie, 102  
 Senegal, 31, 77, 134, 155, 206  
 separatism, 40  
 Serbia/Serbs, 12, 14, 15, 18, 38, 39  
 SETC, 44  
 Setswana, 183, 184  
 Seychelles, 102  
 Sharm-El-Sheikh, 53, 169, 203, 204  
 Sharmake, Ali, 67  
 Shura Council, 165  
 Sierra Leone, 84, 134, 155  
 Sinopec Corp, 31, 44, 45  
 Sirte, 33, 56, 57, 204  
 sisal, 129, 180  
 SLA, 48, 50, 58  
 Slaa, Willibrod, 179  
 Slovakia, 12, 13, 18, 38, 39  
 Slovenia, 12, 13, 18, 39  
 SMC, 191  
 Smith, Anthony, 219, 221, 253  
 Smith, Ian, 113, 114, 115, 119  
 sociological, 6, 104  
 Somalia, v, vii, 47, 61–70, 75, 77, 129,  
     130, 225, 226  
 Somaliland, 62, 69  
 sorghum, 68, 183  
 Soussou, 134  
 South Africa, v, vii, x, xi, 22, 23, 35, 52,  
     90, 97–105, 106, 110, 111, 112,  
     113–14, 115, 116, 117, 149, 161,  
     183, 184, 187, 189, 204, 205, 206,  
     211, 212, 215, 216, 220, 228, 229,  
     231, 253  
 South Sudan, 15, 24, 30, 37, 47, 48, 50,  
     51, 52, 53–8, 60, 61, 78, 169, 205,  
     207, 225, 237  
 South Ossetia, v, ix, 25, 29, 38, 39–40,  
     223, 224  
 Southern Ghana, 46, 195, 240  
 Soviet Union, 5, 18, 82, 106, 145, 189,  
     233  
 Soweto, 100  
 Spain, 38, 40, 77, 217  
 SPCIB, 44

- Sperber, Jonathan, 219, 253  
 SPLM/A, 4, 24, 30, 48, 51, 52, 56, 57, 225, 250  
 SSM, 22, 23  
 state (s), x, 2, 3–4, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 27, 33, 34, 37, 38, 42, 44, 53, 61, 62, 64, 66, 68, 69, 70, 71, 74, 76, 78, 82, 88, 91, 92, 93, 97, 109, 113, 117, 121, 122, 130, 133, 135, 141, 142, 144, 146, 147, 150, 153, 159, 162, 166, 169, 170, 171, 175, 178, 180, 183, 186, 187, 189, 191, 196, 201, 204, 205, 206, 211, 215, 221, 222  
 statesmanship, 48  
 Stiglitz, Joseph, 210, 242, 248  
 stock exchange, 216, 217  
 Stocking, B, 242, 253  
 structural adjustment, 191  
 subcontours, v, ix, 16, 17, 23, 24  
 subnational, 2  
 Sudan, v, vii, ix, x, 4, 15, 23, 24–37, 47–61, 74, 75, 78, 119, 169, 170, 193, 203, 205, 207  
 Suez Canal, 171  
 supranational (ism), v, ix, x, 1, 3, 4, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 23, 34, 36, 37, 47, 97, 133, 175  
 Supreme Court, 74, 83, 124, 135, 139, 154, 160  
 Swaziland, 161, 188, 211  
 Sweden, 32, 252  
 Switzerland, 3, 75  
 synchronize, 10, 44, 185  
 synchrony, 11  
 Syria, 21, 166  
  
 Taha, Ali Osman, 52, 54  
 Taiwan, 38, 217  
 Tajikistan, 21  
 Tanganyika, 175, 176  
 TANU, 176, 178  
 Tanzania, v, vii, x, 58, 71, 73, 120, 128, 169, 170, 175–83, 189, 198, 211, 232  
 Taylor, Charles, 37  
 TDCA, 211  
 tea, 75, 122, 128, 129, 180  
 Tema, 195, 199, 241, 249  
 territoriality, 2, 14, 157, 159, 160  
 terrorism, xi, 62, 165, 226, 252  
 TFC/TFG/TFP/TNG, 62–68, 77  
 Thailand, 23, 217  
 theories of nationalism, ix, 1, 4, 5, 16  
 theorizing, v, ix, 1, 3, 4–16, 220  
 Thiam, Nouhou, 137  
 TNC, 22  
 tobacco, 75, 180  
 Touré, Mohamed, 91  
 Touré, Samore, 81  
 Touré, Sekou, 134–5, 176, 233  
 Touré, Sidya, 137–8  
 trade alliance/cartel, v, ix, 17–23  
 traditions of origin, 11, 70, 221  
 Trafigura, 95  
 transnational, 2, 4, 158  
 Transparency International, 59, 102, 109, 119, 139, 142, 223, 224, 254  
 Treaty of Pelindaba, 206  
 Treaty of Simulambuco, 108  
 Treaty of Versailles, 27, 150  
 tribe, 2, 29, 50, 73, 122, 134, 143, 152, 156, 184, 186, 221, 240  
 tripanosomiasis, 112  
 Tsvangirai, Morgan, 97, 116, 117, 118  
 Tswana, 161  
 tuberculosis, 79, 105, 121, 131, 149, 173, 298, 232  
 Tunisia, xi, 20, 76, 171, 206, 225  
 Turkmenistan, 21  
 Turkey, 33, 56  
 types of nationalism, 2, 3, 6, 10, 12  
 typhoid, 112  
  
 UAE, 48, 75  
 UANC, 114  
 UDDIA, 145  
 UDI, 12, 14, 15, 38, 39, 40, 113, 115  
 Uganda, v, vii, x, 33, 47, 60, 70–80, 170, 189, 204, 211  
 Ujamaa, 178

- Ukraine/Ukrainian, 13, 18, 155, 157  
 UNAIDS, 79, 80, 104, 112, 131, 149,  
   162, 172, 181, 182, 187, 188, 189,  
   198, 199, 226, 232, 233, 237, 239,  
   241, 254  
 UNAMID, 24, 32, 35, 43, 52, 64, 57,  
   60, 223, 254  
 UNDP, 59, 68, 140, 152, 162, 225,  
   226, 240, 254  
 UNECA, 205  
 UNESCO, 28, 69, 79, 182  
 UNFCCC, 206  
 UNHCR, 61, 79, 91, 130, 158, 230,  
   236, 255  
 UNI Global Union, 162  
 UNIDO, 28  
 UNITA, 106, 108, 152  
 Union Government, v, 20, 201–7, 241,  
   246  
 United Nations, ix, 2, 27–9, 30, 36, 39,  
   42, 139, 176, 205, 222, 254  
 United States, xi, 2, 5, 18, 19, 21, 22,  
   23, 25, 28, 30, 31, 32, 36, 37, 38,  
   42, 43, 52, 53, 58, 64, 78, 91, 111,  
   115–16, 160, 163, 188, 189, 203,  
   204, 215, 216, 217, 231, 241, 246  
 United States of Africa, 241  
 Universal Postal Union, 28, 162  
 UNLF/A, 71, 73  
 UNMIS, 39, 78  
 UNOCI, 84–95  
 UNODC, 61, 78, 131, 181, 188  
 UNPO, 153  
 UNSC, 4, 14, 19, 21, 24, 28, 30, 31,  
   32, 34, 36, 37, 38, 43, 46, 53, 54,  
   56, 58, 62, 75, 87, 91, 94, 95, 214,  
   215, 217, 222, 223  
 UN Trust Territories, 150, 176  
 UPADS, 146  
 UPC, 79, 71, 73  
 UPDF, 78  
 Upper-East Region, 196, 197  
 Upper-West Region, 197  
 uranium, 59, 140, 141, 144  
 Uruguay Round, 22  
 USAID, 182, 188  
 US-MEFTA, 23  
 Uzbekistan, 21  
 vegetables, 149, 171  
 villagization, 178  
 Volta Region, 195  
 Vuk, Jeremic, 38  
 Wahabbism, 62, 66  
 Waki Commission, 127  
 Wales, 3  
 war crimes, 30, 33, 53  
 Warsaw Pact, 18  
 Weber, Max, 6  
 Western Germany, 18  
 Western Europe, 6, 7, 8, 16, 18  
 Western Region, 195, 196  
 Western Sudan, 11, 189  
 Wetangula, Moses, 34, 223  
 wheat, 129, 171  
 wildlife, 121, 129, 131  
 WNPOC, 31, 45  
 Wolf, Ken, 16, 219, 220, 238, 255  
 World Bank, 28, 110, 111, 118, 139,  
   148, 182, 195, 215, 223, 224, 230,  
   247  
 World Economic Forum, 41, 120, 181,  
   214  
 World War I/II, 5, 9, 27, 113, 150, 176  
 WTO, 21–3, 43, 44, 102, 209, 212,  
   213, 214, 217, 242, 243, 254, 256  
 Xhosa, 99  
 Yalta Conference, 150  
 Yaounde, 159  
 Yar'Adua, Umaru Musa, 166  
 Yedder, Ben O, 232, 238, 256  
 Yemen, 68  
 Yhomby-Opango, J, 146  
 Yive community, 156  
 Youlou, Fulbert, 145, 146  
 Yugoslavia, 37  
 Zambia, 73, 77, 106, 116  
 ZANU-PF, 99, 114, 116, 117, 118

- Zanzibar, 175, 176, 178, 179, 180, 181, 204
- ZAPU, 114
- Zimbabwe, v, x, 11, 52, 97, 99, 101, 113–21, 155, 161, 183, 192, 210, 211, 231, 232
- ZIMCORD, 115
- Zionism, 5, 16
- Zogby International, 80
- Zone of Confidence, 84, 85, 86, 94
- Zulu, 99
- Zuma, Jacob, 99, 101, 118, 205, 215