Nicole Stokes–DuPass

Integration and New Limits on Citizenship Rights

Denmark and Beyond

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DENMARK AND BEYOND

Nicole Stokes-DuPass

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This work is dedicated in loving memory of my father, James Stokes, Jr., who loved and supported me unconditionally. I miss you and your encouragement daily.

For my son, Tyler, who is by far my greatest creation, I hope that reading this will inspire you to pursue your dreams and to know that anything is truly possible with good luck (luck defined as opportunity meeting intellect, training, and dedication to one's craft).

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Acknowledgments

My interest in this topic, at the most basic level, was a product of my insatiable curiosity about culture, politics, and human nature—particularly how and why we behave as we do (both collectively and individually). I am deeply indebted to a number of people who made my work possible and whose insights and critiques were invaluable. First, thank you to Joya Misra and Jennifer Lundquist. Both heavily influenced and guided the formation of this work. I am forever grateful for their time, support, and constructive criticism. Both helped to sharpen my writing and to develop my analytical thinking on this work. I also want to thank Eric Einhorn for encouraging me to think critically about politics and for nurturing my excitement for the role of the state in shaping political and social events. I also thank him for many great conversations about Denmark and how the Danes are changing—whether they (we) like it or not. I also thank David Cort for always pushing me methodologically and challenging me to really "prove" the theories that I enjoy thinking and writing about.

I also owe a large debt to the many folks at Det Nationale Forskningscenter for Velfærd (SFI-the Danish National Centre for Social Research), namely Hans Hansen, Neils Ploug, Garbi Schmidt, Vibeke Jakobsen, Tine Rostgaard, Lotte Rener, and, especially, Jon Kvist. Jon graciously gave valuable resources and time to support my work from the beginning and throughout this project—all of which have paid dividends over the

THE CONTEXT AND SETTING

I WAS INITIALLY DRAWN TOWARD CONDUCTING RESEARCH in Denmark because of its reputation as one of the most advanced and comprehensive social welfare states in the world. Denmark (like many of its Nordic neighbors) also has a reputation for being socially progressive in terms of social policies and human rights. I arrived in Denmark during the summer of 2000 unaware that I was about to witness a pivotal cultural and political turning point. There was a growing trend toward entitlement retrenchment and anti-immigration sentiment. Denmark was in the midst of a historic national election marked by the rise of two conservative political parties: the Liberal Party (Venstre in Danish) and the Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti in Danish). The rise in popularity of these once-marginalized political parties also marked significant ideological and political shifts in public and political discourse about ethnic populations living in Denmark and the impending arrival of new immigrants.

I lived in a college dormitory (called a kollegium in Danish) with Danish university students while these events unfolded. Within a few days of my arrival, I was pushed by my neighbors to immediately start Danish language classes and to acquire enough knowledge about Danish history and political systems to have something

intelligent to add to the many political discussions that occurred almost daily over morning coffee in our tiny fourth-floor kitchen.

One of my most vivid memories of these early days is attending the birthday party of Astrid, a neighbor. Our shared kitchen was decorated in the Danish national colors (red and white) and there were images of the Danish flag on the cake, on the banner, and on the cocktail napkins that we used. After everyone from our floor and some outside guests arrived, we sat at a large candlelit dinner table that was filled with wine, beer, and platters of home-cooked food made by residents of our floor. Before dinner was served, everyone stood up and sang the following song, "I dag er det Astrid's Fødselsdag, Hurra! Hurra! Hurra! Hun sikkert sig en gave får, som hun har ønsket sig i år med dejlig chokolade og kager til." This song is similar to the English "Happy Birthday" song.

After the singing, the platters of food were served family style, with each person passing the various courses of food around the large table. Everyone was speaking Danish and, at times, someone would tap a glass with their silverware to signal that the side conversations should stop and that someone was going to make a speech about the honoree. When the speech was over, everyone lifted their glasses toward the guest of honor, laughed, and cheered. Thereafter, the side conversations resumed.

At that time, I did not speak Danish and I remember that none of my neighbors translated the songs or speeches. Even my invitation to the party was presented more as a command than as a welcoming invitation to attend. Yet I felt warmth and a sense of coziness during the evening—a feeling that I later learned is called hygge in Danish.

As I reflect on the 18 months that I lived at the kollegium, I recall many parties that followed the same theme and ritual. Even my birthday was celebrated in this way despite the fact that I am African American and from the United States. In fact, at the floor planning meeting where mine and other birthdays in October were being discussed, I jokingly asked, "Where is the American flag for my birthday?" I was promptly told, "You are in Denmark now and this is how we do things!"

When I think of and describe Danish national identity, these birthday parties are among the first images that come to mind. In the early days, I had no understanding about the traditions associated with this way of celebrating a person's birthday. I do remember feeling conflicting emotions at these events. On one hand, I felt a warmth and sincerity that I had not felt in any other university event I had attended in the United States. This was evident by the level of care my neighbors exhibited in cooking the delicious food that we ate, the time and energy spent preparing and decorating the room, and the intensity of emotion contained in the speeches made during the dinner.

On the other hand, I also never felt more socially isolated than I did at these parties. Even though all of my neighbors spoke English, not one person attempted to translate what was being said or to explain why the Danish flag was used as decoration. I had to constantly interrupt conversations happening around me to solicit explanations of what was going on. The strong sense of tradition and national identity—as illustrated in this small but significant way (a birthday party)—represents a powerful theme expressed throughout this book: the contradiction of being welcomed and simultaneously being kept at a distance. This theme was echoed by many of my immigrant respondents when asked about their integration to life in Denmark.

Like many of my respondents, I also learned very quickly that the key to social acceptance among my Danish neighbors was to rapidly learn and express an appreciation for the traditions of our kollegium—a place that I later learned was one of the oldest student houses in Copenhagen. This kollegium was as heavily steeped in tradition as the people who lived there. These traditions play a significant part of what many of my respondents would later describe as typical "Danishness."

Anyone with a cursory knowledge of Danish history can understand why Danes hold on so fervently to their history and cultural traditions. Denmark is a nation that has fended off one adversary

after another. Its history is punctuated by several wars with its Nordic neighbors, where each defeat resulted in territory reductions. The losses of land resulted in a heavily centralized Danish state led by an agrarian class—a state-building pattern that was unusual as compared to that in other parts of Europe where states were typically formed out of either elite-driven social movements or peasant rebellions (Campbell et al., 2006).

In the 10 years that followed (2000–2010), I have traveled back to Denmark for both work and pleasure. I often feel conflicted about my experiences thus far in this proud and beautiful country. On one hand, I felt welcomed by my neighbors—several of them have remained close friends whom I visit each time I return to Denmark. On the other hand, I have also experienced Danes shouting at me in anger on the subway, telling me in Danish, "Foreigner, go back home."

INTRODUCTION

This book focuses on the increasing role of nation-states as critical actors in using social policy to make race (racial and ethnic hierarchies) and to redefine what it means to be a full citizen. Citizenship scholars have noted that this concept has traditionally been used as the means for uniting diverse groups under one national identity—especially true for nations with long and diverse histories of receiving immigrants (i.e., United States, Canada, etc.). Using Denmark as a case study, my research moves away from recent citizenship literature. I argue that states with recent and rising immigration have begun to constrain citizenship from performing its traditional role and have used it to divide populations rather than to unite them.

In particular, I examine the relationship between native-Danes' discourse and new-Danes' (or ethnic/immigrant Danes') perceptions of their identity and their families' identities in light of this discourse. The data demonstrate how the Danish case presents

challenges for prevailing theories about citizenship, intermarriage, and assimilation. Denmark, as a relatively homogeneous country and a relatively new immigrant-receiving country, gives us the opportunity to reexamine classic theories on citizenship, assimilation, and intermarriage from a unique point of view. The Danish case also best captures the invisible work of integration and the new limits being placed on citizenship rights. Recent changes to Danish laws intended to restrict sham marriages and decrease immigration from non-Western countries are also limiting the marital rights of Danish citizens and permanent residents.

The issue of intermarriage and immigration policies gained national attention in Denmark with the publication of journalist Ralf Christensen's op-ed piece on his personal and negative experiences with Danish Immigration Services in August 2012. This was not the first media story about a couple being denied a family reunification visa. What makes the story compelling is that this time the story was being told by a well-connected native-Danish citizen and a public figure. Christensen and his Turkish wife, Merih, have put a new face to this issue. Their experience highlights the unintentional consequences of these restrictive policies: a native Dane whose right to reside in Denmark with his immigrant wife is being challenged by Danish authorities. In the article, Christensen described the lengthy application process, frequent verbal miscommunications regarding immigration regulations, conflicting information on Danish government websites, and finally the nine-hour-long wait to meet with immigration officials—only to have his wife's application for a residence visa be denied. Christensen described the entire process as "degrading" and "inhumane" in the article and in the subsequent interviews. The couple eventually prevailed and was awarded the visa upon appeal. The appeal was won citing European Union (EU) laws associated with family reunification. The significance of Ralf and Merih's appeal is that their case exposed how recent changes to Danish laws regarding immigration

have been at odds with EU laws and recommended best practices. Their story went viral both domestically and internationally, thus exposing the invisible—and sometimes unjust—side effect of the recent restrictive laws and social policy. Their case shows how the state can deny people the right to marry whom they want and to remain in their country with their spouse.

In his seminal work, Milton Gordon (1964) argued that intermarriage contributes to the inevitable absorption of ethnic populations into the dominant society of the United States. By examining this form of assimilation through the lens of identity politics in contemporary Denmark, I argue that the concept of intermarriage, commonly viewed by many social scientists as the final step in the assimilation process leading to cultural fusion, has now become the first step for many third-country nationals. By examining intermarriage in this context, we observe that increasingly restrictive laws and social policy have complicated the respective social locations of native Danes, ethnic Danes, and some third-country nationals in terms of who can and cannot make legitimate claims to "Danishness." Despite claims that economic self-sufficiency, cultural assimilation and language acquisition are key to social inclusion and acceptance into Danish society, many of the third-country nationals, although achieving these objectives, still expressed significant feelings of exclusion from Danish society. In this book, I show how these recent changes to immigration law now restrict the marital rights of native Danes and also constrain citizenship from performing its traditional function in relatively new immigrant-receiving countries with once-homogeneous populations.

Denmark was racially and religiously homogeneous until the latter half of the twentieth century, when it began receiving more diverse immigrants. As the number and variety of non-Scandinavian and non-Western European people immigrating to Denmark rises, the society is experiencing many of the challenges associated with becoming a diverse and multicultural society.

The universality of access to the myriad benefits and programs offered within the Danish welfare state is typically assumed to be a function of a strong social contract between the citizen and the state. Yet there is substantial debate about whether some immigrants and non-EU foreign nationals living in Denmark should and do have the same rights of access as Danish citizens. These debates are frequently played out in the public policy forum, specifically within the context of recent political elections and subsequent revisions to immigration and citizenship laws.

At issue is the fact that many Danish citizens and political actors have mixed feelings about immigration and the increased diversity that has resulted. Some citizens and politicians with conservative leanings on issues of immigration have pushed for stricter legislation and administrative policies that serve to limit the number of people entering Denmark and support social policies that encourage rapid social integration for new immigrants into Danish culture. Opponents to these measures argue that these policies force assimilation upon new arrivals who are third-country nationals in the form of required language and culture courses and restrictive housing policies. They further argue that these policies are also discriminatory because the provisions of the Integration Act are not applied to foreign nationals from other Nordic or EU countries.

As more people like Ralf and Merih Christensen and some of my respondents become more visible and commonplace, these laws face greater scrutiny from political actors and citizens both within and outside of Denmark. Some have begun to question whether the Danish state vis-à-vis legislation and restrictive social policies has infringed on a citizen's basic human right—to marry the person that one chooses and continue to reside in one's country. This line of discourse is moving to the foreground of many conversations about immigration, citizenship, and national identity throughout Europe.

Like many of its European neighbors, immigration to Denmark has undergone significant changes over the last several decades. Migration between Denmark and other wealthy European countries has consistently been the most significant source of immigration. The number of immigrants to Denmark from these countries has more or less corresponded to the number of emigrants. What are new and most significant are the increasing numbers of immigrants from Turkey, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa. As Table 1.1 demonstrates, in 1984, foreign nationals represented only 2% of the total population, and by the year 2000, this grew to 4.9%. In 2012, foreign nationals were 10.4% of the population and descendants of non-Western countries represented 6.5% of the population (*Statistical Yearbook 2000, 2004, 2006, 2010*; Statistics Denmark, 2012). These figures may underestimate immigrants because those ethnics with Danish citizenship are not statistically considered "foreign."

According to the Danish Ministry of the Interior, immigrants are defined as "persons who were born outside of Denmark and whose parents are foreign citizens or were born outside Denmark." Descendants are defined as "persons born in Denmark to parents who are not Danish citizens born in Denmark" (*Statistical Yearbook 2000*: 8). This distinction is important for two reasons. First, official records and statistics about "foreigners" are divided into these categories. Second, when the issue of immigration is discussed in the media or in terms of social policy, these two populations are often combined. Tracking the Danish population by country of origin or citizenship status may not accurately capture racial or ethnic identity. For example, a Turkish immigrant would be statistically counted as "foreign" unless he/she acquires Danish citizenship, upon which he/she would be counted as "Danish." Although collecting data on parents' descent helps to address this concern to a point, a third-generation Turkish immigrant would still be statistically indistinguishable from other Danes.[1]

Table 1.1   Immigrant/Descendant Total Population (1980–2010)

	1980	1996	1998	2000	2004	2008	2010
Europe (Non-EU)							
of which,							
Turkey	14,086	35,739	37,519	36,569	30,273	28,662	28,776
Bosnia-Herzegovina	0	16,232	19,705	20,315	17,173	11,581	11,110
Former Yugoslavia	7,126	11,073	12,889	12,803	12,883	9,333	8,067
Africa							
of which,							
Morocco	1,943	3,268	3,557	3,573	3,087	2,787	2,752
Somalia	102	6,925	11,890	14,265	13,099	8,751	8,223
North America	2,830	3,923	8,047	4,086	3,949	6,785	7,240
South and Central America							
of which,							
Brazil	129	695	812	937	1,075	1,449	1,825
Asia and Pacific							
of which,							
China	212	1,657	2,074	2,513	5,156	6,341	7,168
Iraq	102	7,077	9,419	12,687	19,423	17,058	15,603
Iran	215	7,363	6,844	5,702	4,911	4,214	4,238
Lebanon	156	4,438	4,421	3,418	5,156	1,601	1,460
Pakistan	6,400	6,552	6,934	7,115	7,022	6,502	6,887
Philippines	784	1,808	2,096	2,145	2,457	4,414	6,364
Sri Lanka	181	5,736	5,409	4,851	3,671	2,622	2,572
Thailand	353	2,748	3,365	4,092	5,436	6,580	7,586
Vietnam	1,319	5,001	5,228	5,007	4,241	3,875	3,895
Afghanistan	5	217	378	513	306	9,298	8,892
Russia/Fr. Soviet Union	206	1,717	2,312	2,952	4,748	8,043	9,664
Stateless or Unknown	965	10,452	9,902	7,588	4,192	230	228

Note: These data reflect the way in which citizenship is defined. According to the Danish Citizenship Act, the mother determines citizenship.

Source: *Statistical Yearbook 2011*, Statistics Denmark, http://www.dst.dk/en.aspx.

Denmark's current ethnic populations fall into a variety of racial and ethnic categories, including Greenlanders, citizens of other Nordic countries, EU citizens, citizens of North and South America and Australia, and finally "new immigrant populations,"

including people from other European Countries (non-EU), Africa, the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and Asia (which are statistically combined under the category "Asia").[2] Presently, the largest ethnic groups from non-EU countries are immigrants and descendants from the following countries in order from largest to smallest: Turkey, Iraq, Norway,[3] Bosnia-Herzegovina, Afghanistan, Somalia, Thailand, former Yugoslavia, and China. Table 1.1 summarizes this information.

WHY DENMARK?

Studying citizenship and integration policies in Denmark yields significant contributions. First, the topic is timely. Danish society has changed significantly over the past 50 years to include people who are different racially, religiously, and ethnically. Similar to other European societies, Demark is in the midst of what Cem Özdemir (2006) aptly described as an "integration challenge," where these nations have a severe barrier preventing full integration of ethnic populations—an inability (or perhaps resistance) to view the immigrant or foreign national as a potential citizen with equal rights, protections, and duties. The default position of the Danish government and some of its native population has been to define the immigrant or foreign national by his or her country of origin, color, or religion and to construct Danish identity in opposition to the characteristics of "the other."

Second, Denmark, like the other nations in Scandinavia, has long been regarded as one of the most liberal and open societies in terms of public attitudes and social policy. Denmark is one of the most advanced and comprehensive social welfare states in the world (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Yet, Denmark's progressive reputation is increasingly at odds with recent events occurring in the country since 2004—such as the continual rise of right-wing political parties and the escalating xenophobic and anti-immigration

media discourse that has gained international attention with the Prophet Muhammad Cartoon controversy. Several cartoons were published (first in 2005 and again in 2008) in the *Jyllands-Posten*, a major Danish newspaper, that depicted Muhammad, the founder of Islam, with bombs and other weapons in his hands and devil horns attached to his head wrap. Responses from the Muslim community over these drawings varied from peaceful protests at Danish government buildings and Danish embassies to public Danish flag burnings and boycotts of Danish exports and domestic products. Responses from the Danish government and many native Danes were initially apathetic. Most native Danes did not see "the big deal" when the cartoons were meant to be funny and satirical. The *Jyllands-Posten* eventually issued an apology for the offensive nature of the cartoons and, in January 2006, the Danish Prime Minister released a statement denouncing the cartoons. The perceived lack of immediate action on the part of the Danish government, and the republication of the images in 2008 kept racial and ethnic tensions high between the native Danes and the Muslim community.

All of these events reflect growing social, racial, and religious unrest. This contradiction highlights what Jocelyne Cesari described as "the multicultural dilemma," where achieving true multiculturalism involves willingness (on the part of dominant groups) to move beyond symbolic expressions of tolerance to providing ethnic minorities "with public space in political and economic spheres" (Yurdakul and Bodemann, 2007: 7–9). As cited within Yurdakul and Bodemann (2007), Cesari expresses notable skepticism about the achievement of multiculturalism in Europe, arguing that the idea may promote democracy by integrating diverse cultures but that it also maintains inequality. The "dilemma," as she describes it, lies with Islam itself because Islam in Europe requires political representation and recognition of Shari'a law. In the end, Cesari seems to acknowledge that Islam is in the process of its "diasporization, an entirely new experience for

Muslims that must entail, what Will Kymlicka (1995) called the protection of individual freedom, including in particular women's rights and the promotion of social equality" (Yurdakul and Bodemann, 2007: 7–9).

These incidents also highlight growing tensions between native Danes, third-country nationals, and ethnic denizens and also expose the processes associated with integration—Denmark's transition from tribe-like community to modern multicultural society (as defined by Tönnies and, later, by Durkheim). Ferdinand Tönnies (2001) described two contrasting systems of social order. He defined the first, namely community (Gemeinschaft), as a social order based on the unity of kinship ties or familial relationships guided by "fundamental harmony of wills and is developed and cultivated by religion and custom" (Tönnies, 2001: 247). Within the community, customs and rituals are highly valued and viewed as critical to maintaining the common good. In the community, the reliance on kinship ties makes the demarcation between stranger and native pronounced and strictly enforced (247–248).

Tönnies argued that the second social order, society (Gesellschaft), is based on rationality as expressed within civil society. The social relations of the society are "guaranteed and protected by political legislation and where its policies and their ratification are derived from public opinion" (247–248). Unlike the community, the society has no predetermined unity and no emphasis on the common good. According to Tönnies, the rationality of the society also makes the distinction between natives and strangers less relevant because membership within the society is no longer based on kinship relations but rather based on contributions made to the society (as measured by various forms of human and social capital) (249–251). Tönnies' distinctions are critical to my analysis (that will be fully discussed in subsequent chapters) that Denmark is a nation caught in transition between these two social orders, as evidenced by the use of citizenship and integration legislation by the Danish state. On one hand, the

use of terms like "new Danes" and provisions of the laws that articulate one can achieve Danishness through integration and then naturalization seems to promote the multiculturalists' ideals of a Gesellschaft-like society. On the other hand, further provisions and social policies contained within the same laws contradict these ideals. The contradictory provisions and policies underscore and reinforce the differences between native and stranger in a similar manner as in the Gemeinschaft community. I argue that while Denmark undergoes this transformation (from community to society), how Danish culture is defined and experienced will be at the center of the transformation process.

Third, and perhaps most significant, relatively little scholarship has examined how recent social policies and legislation in Denmark are explicitly redefining what it means to be Danish and which groups can and cannot legitimately make claims to this identity. Indeed, these redefinitions are affecting not only immigrants and ethnics but also native Danes. Specifically, I examine the provisions of the Integration Act of 1998 and argue that this law and the resulting social policies articulate expectations for third-country nationals and ethnics to become Danish without clear operational definitions for what Danishness constitutes. As long as becoming Danish is expected but undefined, immigrants and ethnics will not have their claims to Danish identity recognized and legitimized by native Danes.

THE SCOPE OF THIS PROJECT

When I began my research, I wanted to understand how Danish identity is changing as a result of increased diversity and recent state requirements for immigration and integration. I also wanted to learn how immigrants and ethnics negotiate their own identity as they are confronted with traditional and shifting notions of what it means to be Danish. My research approach makes the following two basic assumptions.

Acquiring Citizenship Does Not Guarantee Social Acceptance

In Denmark, citizenship has recently become the most impor-
tant status in terms of securing the highest level of social rights,
benefits, and social identity. The recent emphasis on integrating
foreign and ethnic populations living in Denmark on the part
of political actors represents examples of state-created and state-
sanctioned constructions of what it means to be Danish. The
enactment of the Integration Act represents the roadmap for how
immigrants become new Danes and eventually jurisdictionally
Danish—but as discussed earlier, it is doubtful that many ethnic
people will ever be perceived by most Danes as Danish by nature.

My goal was to learn about the assimilation experiences of people
who have recently (from 2000 to 2008) immigrated to Denmark as
well as of their spouses—specifically, I am interested in the assimila-
tion experiences of third-country nationals (those emigrating from
outside Nordic and EU countries) to Danish society.

*People and Political Actors Define "Successful" Integration
Quite Differently*

Political actors define successful integration as acquiring an
"understanding of the fundamental values and norms of Danish
society" while simultaneously achieving socioeconomic assimila-
tion, especially in the labor market. My research explores how first-
generation immigrants and ethnic denizens position themselves in
relation to the integration discourse described above. I am most
interested in how notions of belonging are intrinsically linked to
the ways in which social inclusion and exclusion are subjectively
experienced.

In addition to how first-generation immigrants to Denmark
view themselves, I am also interested in how they position their
family within the context of the assimilation/integration discourse
described earlier. I answer how these first-generation immigrants

experience social boundaries in Denmark, as well as how these boundaries are influenced by legislation, public policies, and discourse. My research also explores constructions of Danish national identity and the development of legislation and public policies that manufacture and reinforce these constructions.

Research Questions

This book addresses the following research questions:

- How do changes to immigration and integration policies articulate the expectations for and place limitations on various categories of immigrants and ethnic populations in terms of making claims to Danish identity?
- How has Danish identity been constructed by actors in light of increased diversity and recent changes to immigration and integration policies?
- How have restrictive social policies and anti-immigrant discourse concerning intermarriage between native Danes and third-country nationals affected social boundaries between the two and contributed to the erosion of citizenship rights of these native Danes?
- How do natives, immigrants, and ethnics experience the integration requirements and restrictive social policies in Denmark?

Exploring Danishness

To understand Danish identity, I initially asked my neighbors at the kollegium to describe Danish identity. Later, I asked my respondents and their native-Dane spouses. Two concepts were described consistently by both native Danes and ethnics— Janteloven and hygge. Janteloven is a concept made famous in a 1933 novel by Aksel Sandemose, who portrayed life in a small

Danish town where no one is anonymous and whose inhabitants are guided by the Law of Jante or a sort of ten commandments. The Jante law asserts that everyone is equal, everyone should be treated the same, and everyone should conform and should not stand out. Today, the Law of Jante is used popularly as a term to disparage notions of individual achievement as paramount over collective welfare and the common good. Most of the Danes asked about Janteloven viewed the concept as old fashioned— almost quaint or stereotypical Danishness. Yet all of my Danish respondents named the concept as the main marker of Danishness and generally viewed it as something positive that connected them to other Danes and Nordic people. Many of my ethnic respondents viewed this concept quite differently. Abasi,[4] a 34-year-old man from Kenya who came to Denmark in 2000 to live with his native-Dane wife whom he met in Kenya, described Janteloven as "an invisible rope strangling the Danish—keeping them from really living and experiencing all that life has to offer."

Similar to Abasi, several of my ethnic respondents viewed the Janteloven as an ideology that places limits on individual potential and prevents Danes from celebrating how individual achievements can affect and enhance the experiences of the society. In later chapters, I show how some of my respondents encountered the Janteloven in their everyday interactions with native Danes and the ways in which perceived limitations associated with its use are manifested in the daily lives of my respondents.

Hygge, the second concept used to describe Danish culture, is difficult to translate into English but is often described as coziness, a comfortable and cheerful atmosphere. This is a term used by Danes to describe home and family life, and it is a term that is reserved for those who are allowed into one's personal realm. I experienced hygge during the birthday party at the kollegium. It was evident by the atmosphere created for and during the party— the home-cooked food, the candlelight, the family-style seating, and the speeches. This concept is also viewed quite differently by

many of the native Danes and ethnics interviewed. The native Danes describe hygge as something almost sacred and reserved for those who you are most intimate with—family and close friends. Some of the ethnics that I spoke with view it more as a spectacle, strange and even nationalistic. Robin, a 33-year-old woman from Trinidad, who came to Denmark to live with her native-Dane husband whom she met in Trinidad said, "The Danes are all about using candles and the flag for everything. The first time that Steen (her husband) brought me to meet his family, their house was covered with candles and the napkins had the flag on it. I thought it was weird because at home in Trinidad, no one would do that. My first thought was 'they are very patriotic people'."

Similar to Robin, many of my respondents described their respective experiences with hygge as conveying the opposite of the intended emotion of the event. The intention of hygge on the part of many native Danes is to convey coziness and warmth for the participants in the event. Several of my respondents described their experiences with hygge as awkward, artificial, and forced.

As noted earlier, Danishness has not been formally defined by political actors despite the fact that becoming Danish is expected of immigrants and ethnics. These groups are required to demonstrate high proficiency with Danish language, culture, and history as legislated by the Integration Act and revisions to the Danish Citizens Act. I argue that as a result of this lack of definition, Danish identity has become stereotyped with the practice of the Janteloven and hygge. I also assert that the teaching of these concepts to new and ethnic Danes through the mandated Danish History and Culture course reinforces these stereotypes. Several of my immigrant and ethnic respondents felt that Janteloven and hygge as cultural constructs demonstrate the inclusiveness of this narrowly constructed form of Danish identity and also demonstrate. what they perceive as. an unwillingness on the part of many native Danes to legitimize their claims to Danishness (which may or may not include the ethnic's or immigrant's use of these concepts).

FOCUSING ON NEW DANES

I focus on Danish culture from the perspective of new arrivals and ethnic people living in Denmark. As noted earlier, the public discourse from the late 1990s to the present focuses on integrating "new Danes," and I decided that I needed to talk to these individuals about why they chose to come to Denmark, whether they see themselves as "new Danes," and how they view themselves and their families within this discourse? I was also fascinated with the debates surrounding the passage and implementation of the Integration Act of 1998—the law that created the three-year Introduction Program for all new third-country national immigrants to Denmark who are 18 years or older. Nordic citizens and EU citizens were exempted from all provisions of the Integration Act of 1998 and subsequent amendments. The Introduction Program has three parts—a Danish culture and history course, Danish language courses, and an individualized work/activation plan.

Because I was an immigrant living in Denmark at the time the Integration Act became effective, I had firsthand experience going to the local Kommune (municipal office) to obtain my yellow CPR medical card (Det Centrale Personregister, similar to the social security card and driver's license in the United States). This is the primary form of identification in Denmark. It is used for everything from mundane tasks, such as renting a DVD and checking out a library book, to the most serious uses, such as providing proof of medical benefits when ill and proof of address if stopped by local authorities. I also experienced a meeting with an Integration Consultant who helped me to sign up for Danish language courses and the Danish History and Culture course. Based on all of these experiences, I knew where I could go to gain access to this population for this study—government offices and language schools.

Methods and Selection of Participants

In 2001, I contacted a social worker that I knew, who put me in contact with another social worker that she knew who worked at the Municipality Office of Social and Labor Training (Københavns Kommune-Famile og Arbejdsmarkedsforvaltningen) located in the Nørrebro section of Copenhagen and which has a large ethnic population. At the time, all new immigrants who resided in the Greater Copenhagen area had to register with this center for commencement of their Introduction Program within one month of their arrival in Denmark. This office was the main gatekeeper and made it the ideal site for this kind of study in terms of having access to the widest selection of possible participants. First, I interviewed the social worker about the integration law and her work with this population and then, I told her about the project. She gave my project proposal to her supervisor and they allowed me to have limited access to their pool of clients.

Methods and Data Collection

In order to address the research questions above, I utilized mixed methods for this project, including time series interview data, life-history questionnaire, historical case analysis, participant and direct observation, and content analysis. Since the original study (2000–2001), I conducted two additional ethnographic fieldwork visits to Denmark in 2004 and 2008. On these visits, I used the following methods: structured life-history interview, questionnaire, and observation. I conducted my field research from January 2004 until February 2004. Due to my familiarity with the location and my previous working relationships with the Danish National Institute for Social Research and the Copenhagen Municipality Office of Social Welfare, I was able to conduct follow-up interviews with five of my 2000–2001 participants within the time allocated. I next conducted my field research

from May 31, 2008 until August 25, 2008. I again made use of my previous working relationships with the Danish National Institute for Social Research, the Copenhagen Municipality Office of Social Welfare, and Center for Beskæftigelse, Sprog og Integration Sprogcentret Kigkurren (CBSI), to complete this project within the time allocated.

During the summer of 2008, I interviewed 20 participants who had migrated to Denmark after the passage of the Integration Act and after marriage with a Danish citizen (the majority were native Danes but three participants were married to ethnic Danish citizens or Danes by jurisdiction). In addition to the 20 people who self-selected to be interviewed, 40 additional respondents completed a life-history questionnaire. My main objective was to explore the interplay between the respondents' lives in Denmark and their perceptions about their social location within the integration discourse. Of the 20 people interviewed in 2008, my first contact with 11 of them goes back to 2001 and I was able to interview them (and in some cases) their native-Dane spouses multiple times (2001, 2004, and 2008).

In the 2008 study, I made use of Seidman's (1998) technique for phenomenological in-depth interviewing. I conducted two semistructured iterative interviews—each with a specific purpose. The first interview inquired into the interviewee's biography and life story. The second interview oriented both the research and the interviewee to the specific experience of interest—living in Danish society as a native Dane, ethnic Dane, or new Dane and how the interviewees constructed their respective identities within the context of the immigration debates and discourse described earlier. All of the interviews lasted between one and two hours and covered a variety of topics including, family history, descriptions about how they grew up and their previous experiences within their country of origin, reasons for coming to Denmark, their early impressions of and experiences with Danish culture as compared with their current impressions of and experiences

with Danish culture, and their respective social locations within Danish society.

The first interview was conducted at my office at the Danish National Institute for Social Research. In all cases, the second and all subsequent interviews were conducted at the respondent's home. After each interview, I wrote analytical memos recording the physical appearance of each respondent, any notable verbal and non-verbal communication, and description of their home and their neighborhood. All interviews were transcribed. After reviewing each transcript, I grouped interview segments by topics and themes that were common among the participants and were representative of the literature presented later.

I argue that this genre of qualitative methodology is most appropriate for capturing the meaning of identity as lived in the everyday. For the phenomenological approach, language is viewed as the "primary symbol system through which meaning is both constructed and conveyed" (Holstein and Gubrium, 1994). It is vital to our understanding of how identity is constructed that the participant's lived experience be articulated in his/her own words. The methodological decision to use life-history interviews in addition to a questionnaire was based on my previous research in Denmark and prevailing literature on ethnic identity. An individual's decision to claim one identity versus or coupled with another depends greatly on the following: social setting or context; political climate and racial or ethnic relations of the sending and receiving societies; and the educational attainment and social class of the individual prior to and after immigrating (Waters and Ueda, 2007; Waldinger, 2007). Gaining perspective on these respondents' respective life histories in terms of how they perceive, articulate, and experience identity is critical to understanding the rationales that shape the decision to claim one identity over another or multiple identities.

The interview data from 2008, which constitute the principal material for this book, were gathered against a background

of long-term translocal ethnographic experience with migration to Denmark. During my time in Denmark, I completed two of the three required parts of the Introduction Program as outlined in the Integration Act—I completed one year of Danish language instruction and the Danish History and Culture course (called Kurset I Samfundsforståelse in Danish) at the Sprogcentret Kigkurren in Copenhagen. At the time (2000–2001), this was the one of only two language schools for new immigrants to Denmark who resided in the Greater Copenhagen area. I chose this location because the majority of new immigrants and ethnic Danes attended this location, because it had the largest student capacity (more availability of classes), and it was the most centrally accessible by public transportation.

In addition to participant observations from 2001, I also conducted direct observations of three cohorts of ten native English-speaking, ten Russian-speaking immigrants and seven Asian immigrants being taught in English—all began the Danish History and Culture course in June 2008 and completed the course in August 2008. Of the ten students in the native English-speaking cohort, four agreed to be interviewed for the study. Of the ten students in the Russian-speaking cohort, two agreed to be interviewed for the study. Of the seven Asian students, one agreed to be interviewed for this project. In addition to the observational data, I also conducted interviews with the directors of each language school and two instructors for the Danish language courses.

I conducted a critical content analysis of the Danish History and Culture course as the means for socializing new and ethnic Danes to manufactured Danish identity. As mentioned earlier, when I lived in Denmark, I voluntarily (I was not required to do so) completed two of the three required parts of the Introduction Program as outlined in the Integration Act. The fees for the language and culture courses were paid by the Kommune (Copenhagen municipality)—this was also the case for all of my participants.

In addition to participant observations, I performed a content analysis of the course materials and I conducted direct observation of cohorts of students at two different time periods: in 2001 (when the course was newly implemented and the curriculum delivery was locally determined) and in 2008 (after the curriculum was locally modified based on previous research by Danish and non-Danish social scientists who evaluated the course and found inconsistencies in its effectiveness for integrating new and ethnic Danes to Danish culture).

I organized my data collection by using analytic memos of each phase of the process, from negotiating access to the site (kept within a journal of this process from October 2007 to September 2008) to my interviews with participants and institutional elites (including Kobenhavn Kommune personnel).

In summer 2007, I utilized the services of a transcriptionist to transcribe tapes with interviews conducted in 2001 and 2004. I also reviewed each transcript by listening to each interview tape to fix the transcript for Danish words and expressions used during the interview that the transcriptionist would not know or understand the context. From 2008 to 2011, I transcribed the interviews conducted during the summer of 2008 and coded the portions of the transcript based on the following themes that emerged from the interview data.

Data Analysis Procedures

I made the decision early in this project that I would rely heavily on qualitative methods in order to seek answers to the research questions posed earlier. My research questions are process-oriented and reflect that I wanted to gain better understanding of identity politics in Denmark. I approached data analysis using grounded theory (Emerson et al., 1995), in which priority is given to discovering theory within the field notes and interview data by making frequent and constant comparisons across the data (143–144).

Specifically, I used two primary techniques for data analysis—constant comparison analysis (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) and keywords-in-context (Fielding and Lee, 1998).

Constant comparison analysis originally was developed to analyze data that were collected over a series of rounds. These rounds of data analyses lead to theoretical sampling, which involves the sampling of additional people, groups, events, incidents, activities, and documents in order to develop emergent themes and to identify conceptual boundaries (Charmaz, 2000). Keywords-in-context is a data analysis technique that reveals how respondents use words in context by comparing words that appear before and after "key words." This type of analysis identifies how one uses and interprets the concepts (Leech and Onwuegbuzie, 2007: 563–564).

In terms of the first technique—constant comparison analysis, I reviewed the interview transcripts from the multiple data sets to identify underlying themes and connections to theories that are presented within the data. In the first round of data collection (2000–2001), this process was done inductively, where my coding (major themes) emerged from the life-history questionnaire and the interview data. In the second and third rounds of data collection (2004 and 2008), the process became more deductive when I used the initial themes and theoretical threads that emerged from the first round as the roadmap for seeking validity and reinforcement of these themes in the subsequent ethnographic fieldwork visits. Based on the first round of data collection, I learned that the data were drawing on themes and theories of citizenship, social identity, assimilation, acculturation, and nationalism. I also learned how Danish identity was defined, viewed, and experienced by natives, ethnics, and new immigrants and how the emerging integration discourse was critical to understanding the respective assimilation experiences of my respondents.

Following Rossman and Rallis' (2003) process for using constant comparison analysis technique, I printed multiple copies

of each interview transcripts.[5] Then, I performed an initial read of each transcript in its entirety. Then I performed a second read of each transcript and began to note commonalities in the responses across the transcripts. I noted comments on social identity, Danishness, national identity, integration, and citizenship using different-colored highlighters for each of the comments noted above to mark the first copy of the interview transcripts. I used one consistent color for each theme throughout the multiple data sets. After doing so, I chunked the data identified into smaller meaningful parts. Then, I labeled each chunk with a descriptive title or a "code." The codes were categorized based on the themes noted earlier (citizenship, social identity, etc.). Then, I compared each new chunk of data with previous codes, so similar chunks would be labeled with the same code. After all the data were coded, the codes were grouped by similarity, and the theme was identified and documented based on each grouping.

According to Rossman and Rallis (2003), one way of verifying the coding is to go back into the field and undertake "member checking" (Merriam, 1998) with the participants by asking if the themes, arguments, or assertions developed from the first round of coding are accurately describing their statements (Janesick, 2000; Merriam, 1998), leading to descriptive validity (Maxwell, 1992, 1995). In the third and final round of data collection (in 2008), I performed this with the 14 participants that I was able to interview multiple times and when we reviewed previous responses to my interview questions and when I shared my interpretations of their previous responses with them, I was able to achieve descriptive validity of my coding of previous data sets.

In terms of the second data analysis technique—keyword-in-context—I reviewed the interview transcripts from the multiple data sets to note the participants' usage of keywords identified based on the emerging themes. Here, I wanted to examine the terms used in the provisions of the Integration Act, and commonly used in the Danish media discourse about integration, to

ascertain how my respondents felt about these keywords or used them (or did not use them) in their descriptions of their identities and how they see themselves in relation to the media discourse. I focused on the following keywords: integration; new Danes; ethnic Danes or second-generation immigrants; native Danes; Danish culture; Janteloven; and hygge.

As noted above, I was able to verify my interpretations with the 14 respondents when I returned to the field in 2008. I reviewed with participants their previous use of (or non-use) of these keywords and my interpretations associated with the use (or non-use). and they were able to give me critical feedback on the accuracy of my definitions, explanation of the themes identified. and my subsequent and resulting interpretations. Here, I was able to identify underlying connections that the participant was imply- ing through her/his speech, particularly the uses of these concepts from the perspective of the person using the keyword. Some respondents were surprised by the use of these terms by political actors to describe them and in the review process, they were able to share with me their reflections on their (and political and/or media actors') use of these key concepts. Many of these reflections yielded rich and layered insights into their views of themselves in relation to their or their family's claims to Danishness and Danish identity, which I discuss in more detail in later chapters.

A Comparative Historical Approach

In addition to the methods and analysis described above, I also performed a comparative historical case analysis of Danish immigration and integration legislation. The historical within-case approach allows us to examine how identity politics in Denmark evolved and were shaped by past and recent historical and political events. The unit of analysis is the nation-state and the method for this study is the historical case study method as defined by Alexander George and Thomas McKeown (1985). They state that

a "case study focuses on within-case analysis to evaluate claims about causal process" (George and McKeown, 1985: 186–187). Specifically, I conducted within-case comparisons of immigration and integration legislation and social policies across historical time from 1924 to the present day. I focus the analysis on the examination of the provisions of the Integration Act of 1998, the Danish Citizens Act of 1950, and their respective revisions to demonstrate how the Danish state is using citizenship and nationality to create Danishness.

Anthony Marx (1998) states "the [goal] is to explain *why* states act. Specific state policy is historically embedded, reflects ideology, is constrained by dominant political and economic claims . . ." (2). Following Marx, I explain why the Danish state acts in the ways described in later chapters by grounding my analysis in the historical context for these actions.

My analysis of the Danish case relies on multiple sources of evidence, including content analysis of legislation and media publications and public documents about citizenship, national identity, and integration. Following the methods of George and McKeown (1985), and Yin (1994), I show that the Danish case is exceptional and presents challenges for prevailing theories about the conceptual relationship of citizenship and nationality. The methodological decision to use comparative historical case study in this study allows us to understand the phenomenon of identity construction in contemporary Danish society as demonstrated by examination of a series of specific changes in citizenship and integration legislation and the resulting social policy.

This study is interpretive, as defined by Arend Lijphart (1971)—where the use of theory is the mechanism for exploring the nuances of the Danish case. According to Lijphart, the interpretations gained from the theoretical foundation provide "prescriptive leverage" and are utilized to examine and interpret phenomenon within the case (Kaarbo and Beasley, 1999: 374). In this study, I reviewed prevailing theories about citizenship and

nationality in order to examine the decision-making processes and the evolution of Danish national identity. Specifically, I show how these historical changes to Danish citizenship legislation and integration social policy have constrained the ability for citizenship as a concept to perform its traditional role of binding multicultural populations within a single national identity. In other words, through the use of theory, I demonstrate how citizenship has become a tool used by some Danish political actors to make the boundaries between those who can make legitimate claims to Danish identity and those who cannot more rigid and fixed.

The presentation of data is narrative, where the case study tells a story based on the variables in their social context (Yin, 1994). The advantage to the narrative presentation is, as Pennington and Hastie's (1986) research demonstrates, that "people think in stories, not in terms of comparing the value of variables in isolation" (cited in Kaarbo and Beasley, 1999: 384–385). The complexities and evolution of citizenship and integration legislation in Denmark are best illuminated when situated in the political, historical, and social contexts in which they occur and develop.

I also used George and McKeown's (1985) method of "pattern tracing" or investigating the "decision process by which various initial conditions are translated into outcomes." In order to measure the outcomes of Danish identity construction, I performed content analysis of public documents about citizenship and integration from the Danish government in order to pattern trace. These documents provide a detailed account of the legislative and social policy directives within the Integration Act and Danish Citizens Act from enactment to the present. Examination of these documents provides insight into the policy decision-making process at the nation, state, and local levels of government, which results in present-day outcomes for how native Danes, ethnic populations, and immigrants can and cannot make claims to Danish identity.

Overview of the Book Chapters

I situate my data by reviewing prevailing literature on national-ism, citizenship, and intermarriage assimilation. In Chapter 1, I have outlined the scope of and the methods for the project. I have argued that Danish national identity is manufactured vis-à-vis the state with the use of legislation and social policies that use Danish citizenship as an instrument to formally construct Danish identity for the native[6] population while simultaneously and informally excluding ethnic and non-native populations from using citizen-ship to also make legitimate claims to Danish identity.

Chapter 2 is a comparative historical analysis of citizenship law and integration policies in Denmark over time. In this chapter, I answer the research question—how do changes to immigration and integration policies articulate the expectations for and place limitations on various categories of immigrants and ethnics in terms of making claims to Danish identity? My theoretical frame-work and analysis of how the Danish state is using citizenship to make race moves away from the recent trend of arguing for the greater salience of post-national citizenship, which often dimin-ishes or removes altogether the role of nation-states as critical actors in shaping the use of and outcomes for citizenship. In this chapter, I argue that despite the inclusion of social identity and the growing recognition of the integration challenges facing many nation-states, most citizenship scholars fall short in identifying the specific roles that states often play in manufacturing social identity or race making (Marx, 1998).

I also explore the convergence of nationality, citizenship, and social identity as demonstrated with recent revisions to Danish citizenship laws and the implementation of restrictive social poli-cies—specifically the Attachment Requirement. I argue that the Attachment Requirement places significant limitations on immi-grants and also erodes the citizenship rights of native Danes who partner with third-country nationals.

In Chapter 3, I explore how Danish identity is viewed by ethnic, native, and new Danes. I am most interested in how Danishness has transformed in the wake of growing multiculturalism. This chapter addresses the following research question—how has Danish identity been constructed by actors in light of increased diversity and recent changes to immigration and integration policies. To answer this question, I primarily use interview data with native Danes, ethnic Danes, and recent immigrants to argue that Danish identity is manufactured by actors and often constructed in opposition to a racialized other. I also show that the difficulty with constructing an operational definition for Danishness is similar to the processes associated with how other dominant identities (masculinities, whiteness) are more easily defined by the "other." These dominant identities are simultaneously invisible, often becoming most visible in relation to the other.

In Chapter 4, I examine how Danish identity is constructed by the state through the enactment of the Integration Act of 1998. In particular, I examine the use of the Danish History and Culture course as the manufactured representation of Danish identity that is mandated for immigrants and ethnics to learn and master as evidence of "successful" integration. I explore the contradictions contained within the Integration Act about what it means to be Danish and who can and cannot make claims to Danish identity. This chapter addresses the following research question: how do immigrants and ethnics experience the integration requirements and restrictive social policies in Denmark?

To address this question, I use content analysis of the curriculum and observational data from the Danish History and Culture course.

Chapter 5 is an analysis of the assimilation processes associated with intermarriage within an increasingly restrictive immigration system that makes it difficult for third-country nationals to obtain residency rights and naturalization. Denmark, as a relatively homogeneous country and a relatively new immigrant-receiving

country, gives us the opportunity to reexamine classic theories on assimilation and intermarriage from a unique point of view. This chapter addresses the following research question—how have restrictive social policies and anti-immigrant discourse concerning intermarriage between native Danes and third-country nationals affected social boundaries between the two and contributed to the erosion of citizenship rights of these native and ethnic Danes?

The interview data presented in this chapter complicate prevailing assumptions about the intermarriage and acculturation process. Some respondents indicated that they retained their original ethnic identity as a defense against what they perceive as a resistance on the part of native Danes to incorporate them into Danish society. By examining assimilation and intermarriage in Denmark, I argue that increasingly restrictive policies have created a fixed boundary between those who are Danes by "nature" and those who are Danes by "jurisdiction." In other words, one can be a Danish citizen, who theoretically has the same rights and protections as other citizens—unless you choose to partner with a third-country national immigrant and want to reside in Denmark. A prime example of this boundary is the Attachment Requirement used by state authorities in determining a couple's right to obtain family reunification.

I argue that the regulation of intermarriage in this context represents examples of state interventions shaping the assimilation outcomes and complicating the respective social locations of native Danes, ethnic Danes, and some third-country nationals. Within the context of a restrictive immigration system and a hostile climate of public discourse surrounding integration, social boundaries have become more fixed despite the occurrence of intermarriage between native Danes and third-country nationals.

Chapter 6 is the conclusion and summarizes my primary findings and arguments. I argue that Danish identity is "Gemeinschaft-like" in nature, where obtaining true acceptance among native Danes is difficult to achieve for many ethnic and immigrant

populations. Denmark is in the midst of a cultural transition from a tribe-like community to a modern multicultural society (as defined by Tönnies and Durkheim). In this sense, the community becomes an expression of culture, where, for many native Danes, the community is inwardly focused and exclusively experienced as demonstrated by the practice of hygge. My respondents and I noted that this practice contrasts with the cozy and inclusive feeling that hygge is supposed to convey. One of my respondents described this contradiction best. Milagros, 20, from Brazil, in describing an unscheduled visit to her new mother-in-law's house, said that she can only experience coziness when an appointment is made and that her experiences with Danish hygge often comes with high expectations, strict rules, and rituals.

While Denmark remains as a community or in Gemeinschaft, the representations of Danish culture are inwardly focused and exclusively experienced as demonstrated with the practice of hygge. As a result, the Janteloven functions as the cultural narrative that many native Danes use to defend and articulate this form of Danish identity. I argue that the Janteloven as a cultural narrative, while being viewed by many native Danes as quaint and old fashioned, maintains its contemporary relevance by outlining strict rules for conforming to this narrow construct of Danishness. As a result, these otherwise seemingly democratic and open concepts (hygge and Janteloven) actually become the cultural barriers that prevent access for ethnics and immigrants and that also prevent many native Danes from adopting a more inclusive view of what it means to be Danish.

My analysis of the development of Danish integration policy in this chapter also exposes a strong and growing emphasis on these issues of culture. As Hedetoft and Hjort (2002) observed, the emergence of a consensus among the Danish population on "the integration problem" associated with some third-country nationals has manifested into explicit demands for "cultural transformation" toward this notion of Danishness. As demonstrated throughout,

these demands are situated in a legislative mandate and a cultural discourse for these groups to assimilate to Danishness—an expectation not explicitly mandated for other EU or Nordic immigrants to Denmark (Schmidt, 2011: 258–260).

Interestingly, Janteloven is not an exclusively Danish concept. It is also associated with Nordic identity—specifically in Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. Despite this common identification, Danes and Norwegians more frequently evoke Janteloven into their respective cultural narratives than Swedes. I conclude this chapter by exploring the expressions of Janteloven among these three Nordic countries in the wake of their respective approaches to integration policies and immigration law. This concluding chapter also shows how this state-centered analysis of the Danish case has broader implications and applications to other nation-states. I provide an outline for further study on the increasing role of the nation-state in shaping identity politics.

THEORIZING CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

THIS CHAPTER ADDRESSES THE QUESTION: HOW DO CHANGES to immigration and integration policies articulate the expectations for and place limitations on various categories of immigrants and ethnic populations in terms of making claims to Danish identity? In order to answer this question, I explore the convergence of nationality, citizenship, and social identity as demonstrated by recent revisions to citizenship laws and the implementation of restrictive social policies in Denmark—specifically the Integration Act of 1998, revisions to the Danish Citizens Act of 1950, and the Attachment Requirement (from 2001 to 2012)—all of which have increasingly restricted the citizenship process. I argue that changes to the Danish Citizens Act and the recent implementation of the Attachment Requirement place significant limitations on and ultimately degrade the citizenship rights of native and ethnic Danes and their respective third-country immigrant partners.

It is futile to search for conceptual meaning by isolating the terms *citizenship*, *nationality*, and *social identity*. Rather it is more fruitful to explore the convergence of these concepts and how, together, they create social identity and conversely social

exclusion. Using Bryan Turner's theory of dynamic citizenship and national identity (1994), I argue that the Integration Act, the Danish Citizens Act, and their respective revisions represent examples of state-created and state-sanctioned constructions of what it means to be Danish. Despite claims from the state that Danish identity can be achieved through integration and then naturalization (what Turner called citizenship "from above"), in practice, acquiring Danish identity "from below" or among the native Danes is not attainable for all groups and at the same pace. I posit that Danish identity from below represents an "imagined community" (Anderson, 1991) that is based on perceived ethnic or cultural—almost tribal—ties among "native Danes."

This chapter is organized into three parts: The first section outlines how prevailing theories on nationalism, citizenship, and social identity are defined and theorized. The second section summarizes the histories of and recent changes to Danish immigration and integration policies. The final section analyzes the convergence of nationality, citizenship, and social identity as demonstrated by recent implementation of the above policies—in particular, the contradictions contained in these policies. Specifically, I show how Danish identity is manufactured through the use of citizenship from above and how social exclusion is maintained through the use of citizenship from below.

A TALE OF TWO ELITES: SELECTIVE CONDITIONS FOR CITIZENSHIP

Despite the seemingly neutral language of the Danish Citizens Act, the selective application by the Danish government of the conditions for citizenship has resulted in what Anthony Marx (1998) describes as "race-making." Marx defines race-making as official state policies that codify racial orders, enforce racial and ethnic distinctions, and can result in pervasive discrimination. This selectivity is best demonstrated by the differences in

the naturalization process of two elites: first, Mary Donaldson, an Australian woman who became the fiancée of Denmark's Crown Prince Frederik in 2003 and subsequently married him in May 2004; and, second, Wilson Kipketer, the Kenyan-born track and field athlete who was voted Denmark's most popular Olympian.

Despite the seven-year residency and Danish language proficiency requirements outlined within the Danish Citizens Act, Mary Donaldson was given Danish citizenship almost immediately after her engagement to Prince Frederik was made public. The Danish parliament approved the exemption called Mary's Law by a 102 to 2 vote. Politicians who voted in favor of Mary's Law argued that Donaldson was not given special treatment and that the law was standard procedure for any non-Dane marrying into the royal family. The two dissenting votes were cast by members of the leftist political party the Red–Green Alliance. These representatives publicly questioned whether it was fair for the Australian to get citizenship ahead of other immigrants and permanent residents who were in line and for whom the language and residency requirements would be mandatory.

Søren Søndergaard, one of the two representatives who voted against Mary's Law, was quoted in an article posted by the Associated Press:

> Many fine men and women want to become Danish citizens by marriage. Everyone should be treated equally in naturalization cases. Denmark made it harder for people to get citizenship, even by marriage, in 2002. A foreigner can get citizenship only after living in Denmark for seven years, but the law exempted anyone who marries into the royal family.

This exception was not made for Wilson Kipketer. Kipketer, who migrated to Denmark in 1990 from Kenya as a foreign exchange student and met his Danish girlfriend (later wife) in college, first applied for Danish citizenship in 1995. Despite international

recognition for his athletic talents as a runner and his popularity among Danes, he was initially denied Danish citizenship.

His decision to seek Danish citizenship sparked controversy in several ways: First, in 1995, Olympic officials questioned whether or not Kipketer could compete for Denmark because he was ineligible for Danish citizenship due to the then five-year residency requirement as outlined in the Danish Citizens Act. The Olympic Committee did not allow him to compete until 1997, when he eventually acquired Danish citizenship. Despite the Olympic Committee's decision, there was no discourse among politicians or the general public to make an exemption to the Danish Citizens Act for Kipketer.

Second, some Danish publications criticized Kipketer's decision to seek citizenship and argued that the decision was financial in nature. Kipketer was perceived by some at the time as someone who benefited greatly from his marriage to a native Dane. He gained access to Danish citizenship and all of the benefits associated with membership—universal health care and a very generous social welfare system. Kipketer has publicly refuted this claim on a number of occasions.

Third, and perhaps most significantly, despite the fact that Kipketer has acquired Danish citizenship, is married to a native Dane, speaks fluent Danish, and has been voted most popular Olympian, he is still consistently referred to in many Danish and international publications as the Kenyan-born athlete and not simply as a Danish athlete. The Kipketer and Donaldson examples clearly demonstrate the disjunction between identity construction through citizenship from above (formal citizenship acquisition) and from below (social acceptance from fellow citizens).

Nationalism

When theorizing nationalism, we can examine the role of states in creating national identity with the use of legislation and social policies. We can also observe nationalism expressed as both a formal

and an informal power that can both constrain and inspire agency among social groups and political actors vis-à-vis the state (Puri, 2004). All of these points are salient when viewing nationalism as an expression of the nation-state and group social identity—it can also, at times, take tangible form as an instrument that can be wielded by both political actors and social groups to create or manufacture identity, thereby determining which groups can make legitimate claims to a particular construction of national identity. The prevailing literature on the nation and how nations form is divided into three primary strains of discourse: nations as political communities, nations as cultural phenomena, and nations as a function of modernity.

Political conceptualizations of the nation usually begin with some analysis of the role of the state and the processes associated with state-building. Charles Tilly (1999) views nations as political communities but stresses the role of the state as a critical actor in fostering national consciousness among the citizenry. For him, the state also manages the tensions that emerge between notions of equality and the social reality of inequalities that arise as a function of cultural differences among citizens. Tilly calls this process "state-led nationalism" (Steinmetz, 1999: 417).

Cultural conceptualizations of the nation attempt to bridge the theoretical gap between the nation as a political community and the cultural dimensions that exist among the citizenry in all societies. Proponents of this perspective argue that national identity is based on mythical claims to some common ancestry or point of origin. Benedict Anderson (1991) defines the nation as a set of social and political relations but argues that the political community is based on "imagined communities" where cultural artifacts are created and command "profound emotional legitimacy and sovereignty" (6). Poole (1999) further argues that Anderson failed to explain why the nation, as an imagined object, has the tangible ability to make claims on us as individuals. He posits that if the nation is an imagined community, it is also a form of identity (12–13).

The third approach to theorizing nationalism views nations as a function of modernity. This view of nation-building tends to integrate elements of both cultural and political conceptualizations. Modernists argue that nations and nationalism stem from historical events tied to modernity rather than exclusively biological or ancient origins. They claim that nations constitute a modern phenomenon that is not simply elite-driven but operates or functions through political actors and institutions and is congruent to cultural patterns (Puri, 2004: 47–51). In this instance, nations are born out of all conditions of modernity, the development of the bureaucratic state and capitalism, imperialism, and exploration.

One of the leading scholars from this theoretical strain, Rogers Brubaker (1992), argues that citizenship is the key concept that explains the development of modern nations and that bridges the political and cultural realms within any given society. He views citizenship as a result of the French Revolution, where civil equality was established, political rights were institutionalized, and legal and ideological distinctions between those defined as citizens and foreigners were established. Brubaker argues that nationhood, as expressed through citizenship rights, defines the boundaries between "us" and "them."

I agree with the synthesis contained within the works of modernists like Brubaker on nation-building. In terms of examining the connection between citizenship and identity, modernists often fail to thoroughly explore the inventive nature of nationalism and the informal mechanisms of power. These can manifest within the nation via the state and among its population in terms of social group formation. For Brubaker and others from this strain of discourse, the state is viewed as not playing an active role in creating who is "us" and who is "them." Yet as I demonstrate, the Danish state is a very active participant in these processes—using citizenship and integration laws as a tool to create a fixed boundary between "us" (those who can make legitimate claims to Danish national identity) and "them" (those who cannot).

Citizenship

Citizenship has traditionally been the key concept viewed by many theorists as the tie that binds members of multicultural and diverse populations within the same nation-state. As a result, when a person acquires citizenship, this person has also acquired national identity. Classic theories on citizenship focus our attention on how citizens are made and the processes associated with citizenship acquisition, while more recent scholarship has focused on issues associated with social inclusion and exclusion that can result from changes to citizenship laws. Few scholars have explicitly explored how citizenship can be used a tool to both include and exclude in terms of creating identity. Irene Bloemraad (2006) argues that citizenship is not only a legal status that accords rights and benefits, but it is also an "identity that provides a sense of belonging" (1–2). Bloemraad argues that in countries with significant ethnoracial diversity, the "glue that binds strangers is citizenship in the political body that provides an invitation to participate in a system of mutual governance." While Bloemraad examines immigrant incorporation[1] in Canada and the United States, her emphasis on the differing levels of political and social incorporation of immigrants is very salient and applicable to many societies. Citizenship (whether from above or below) is often granted by what she describes as "an invitation" that is selectively offered to different groups or individuals. I argue that it is this selectivity that often results in social identity creation and a sense of belonging or not belonging. This selectivity also reinforces social exclusion for those who have not been extended an invitation to join.

While classic theories on citizenship predominantly focus on how citizens are created (Brubaker, 1992; Turner and Hamilton, 1994), citizenship has been conceptualized in terms of three forms of social rights provided by the state: social entitlements (access to the welfare state or pensions), legal status, and political participation as expressed through voting or membership in civic associations (Marshall, 1950).

Turner aptly argues that citizenship is more dynamic and dialectic in nature where ethnicity, nationalism, and indigenous populations play a significant role in the formation of citizenship and national identity (Turner and Hamilton, 1994). He used the citizenship pattern exhibited in the United States as an illustration of this point, where the pattern on one level represents melting-pot patterns of assimilation and on another level, racial stratification serves as a barrier that blocks some people and groups from attaining full citizenship rights and participation in the same society. This view of citizenship is similar to Bloemraad's thesis that citizenship is a form of identity that is selectively granted by invitation to different groups at differing points in time.

For Turner, citizenship is a non-uniform concept that can result in different manifestations of citizenship depending on distinct historical trajectories. He argues that there are two dimensions that should be examined when theorizing citizenship. The first dimension distinguishes between active citizenship (social and political participation) and passive citizenship (non-participatory membership). The second dimension examines whether citizenship is developed from above (status granted via the state) or below (status acquired as a result of conflict or agency among the population) (199–204).

Turner argues that a conservative view of citizenship as passive and private (where rights, duties, and status are merely transferred) contrasts with a more revolutionary idea of active and public citizenship (where citizens are engaged and have the potential to both mitigate and exacerbate inequalities). Turner says that by combining these two dimensions, it is possible to conceptualize citizenship as "an inclusionary process involving some re-allocation of resources and an exclusionary process of building identities on the basis of a common or imagined solidarity" (Turner, 2001: 191–192).

As noted earlier, we can also examine the role of states in creating national identity with the use of legislation and social policies.

If we view citizenship legislation as an example of Tilly's concept of state-led nationalism, then what is the role of the state in creating or responding to nationalism? Anthony Marx (1998) argues that states are very active participants in creating nationalism by "race-making." Marx also says that race-making policies often emerge in fits and starts and are "shaped by different histories and state structures, trial and error, and continued conflict and competition."

More recent citizenship scholarship has focused on issues of social inclusion and exclusion that can result from changes to citizenship law. I argue that many nation-states are playing an increasingly active role in shaping their respective identity boundaries between a defined "us" and "them." This tension is best conceptualized by what Riva Kastoryano (2002) calls "citizenship identity," where citizenship becomes "a process of identity formation that emerges through direct or indirect participation and in the name of shared interests of individuals and groups, whether immigrant or not" (124–125). Kastoryano assumes that citizenship as a concept has the capability to integrate or incorporate all categories of foreigners into the national community. It is also assumed that the newly integrated person is supposed to adopt or "even to appropriate historical references as proof of their belonging and of their loyalty to the founding principle of the nation . . ." (120–121).

Moving from Elites to the Masses: A Case for Convergence

Few theorists have asked the question: What happens after a person acquires citizenship and has formally attained all of the rights, duties, and responsibilities associated with citizenship but is still informally rejected by the native or dominant population? A second question rarely addressed by citizenship scholars is: What happens when the state vis-à-vis legislation and administrative policies selectively applies the conditions for citizenship, thereby

making citizenship acquisition difficult for some populations and quite easy for others? Finally, even fewer theorists (Ong, 2006) have asked: What happens when the state enacts laws that erode the citizenship rights of existing members of the society?

These three questions are pivotal to exploring the convergence of citizenship, nationality, and social identity as manifest in contemporary Danish society. Examining recent changes to citizenship legislation and integration policies best demonstrates this convergence. Tilly's conceptualization of "state-led nationalism" is useful for viewing the process of fostering national consciousness used by some Danish political actors (Steinmetz, 1999: 407–421). Some conservative citizens and political actors have pushed for stricter legislation and administrative policies that limit the number of immigrants migrating to Denmark.

In 1998, the Danish government, led by two conservative anti-immigration political parties (the Danish Liberal Party [Venstre] and the Danish People's Party [Dansk Folkeparti]) enacted the Integration Act, which dramatically changed immigration and social welfare policy for new immigrants and ethnic populations receiving social assistance. The Integration Act of 1998 (with revisions in 1999, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2005) established the procedures for integrating new immigrants into Danish society. This legislation marked a significant shift in immigration policy from simply permitting legal entry into the country to a focus on the integration of the immigrant upon arrival. The act has three main purposes: first, to ensure that all new immigrants can participate in Danish society on "equal footing" with citizens; second, to assist in making new immigrants self-supporting as quickly as possible; and third, to impart to new immigrants an understanding of the fundamental values and norms of Danish society.

Prior to 1998, the Danish Liberal Party and the Danish People's Party were minority political parties in the Danish parliament. Yet they gained momentum and began to sway public opinion, thereby creating a national consciousness. They achieved this by running a

series of controversial but influential advertisements, first in tabloid newspapers like *Ekstra Bladet* and later in mainstream publications like *Politiken*.[2] For example, one popular ad campaign stated that if a native Dane wanted to receive a government-subsidized apartment in Copenhagen, he/she should wear a headscarf. The photograph in the ad featured a Muslim woman wearing a hijab and opening the front door to a nice Copenhagen apartment with several children inside. This and similar ads ran often in both newspapers from 2000 to 2001 (prior to the 2001 national elections). The ads were financed by these conservative political parties and effectively harnessed growing anti-immigrant sentiment.

These ads were successful in winning national support for these once-marginalized political parties because the ads assigned a visual image to a racially and religiously classified other. They effectively tapped into growing sentiments that third-country immigrants were migrating to Denmark in order to abuse the social welfare systems.

THE PRACTICE OF RACE-MAKING

In addition to the process of fostering national consciousness, I argue that recent changes to citizenship and integration legislation in Denmark serve as examples of Anthony Marx's (1998) concept of "race-making." While Marx describes race-making in the context of the histories of African slavery, European colonialism, and apartheid in his seminal comparison of the United States, Brazil, and South Africa, his state-centered argument for the processes associated with race-making is quite applicable to many other nation-states. The selectivity in applying the conditions for citizenship in the Donaldson and Kipketer cases further demonstrates that the Danish state is a very active participant in race-making, using citizenship as a tool to create fixed identity boundaries. As Marx (1998) states "the process of defining the nation with rules of citizenship is obvious relevance for how racial

categories are established and reinforced . . . states bind the nation they claim to represent by institutionalizing identities of racial inclusion and exclusion" (5).

The revisions to the Danish Citizens Act and the Integration Act are selectively applied to third-country immigrants and represent examples of codified state policies that create racial orders and enforce religious and ethnic distinctions and differing levels of human capital among populations that migrate to Denmark. I argue that citizens from wealthy and powerful nations also enjoy these privileges when traveling or migrating to other nations, while citizens from less wealthy and powerful nations are relegated to subordinate statuses when traveling or migrating, particularly to wealthy nations. As a former citizen of Australia, Mary Donaldson is perceived by Danes as less of a threat because she hails from another relatively wealthy nation and is less likely to be seen as benefiting from her marriage to a native Dane. Both the Danish state and native Danes differentiate among foreigners who migrate to Denmark on the bases of nationality, religion, and race/ethnicity. As defined by Marx (1998), I show the legal distinctions that are made within the Danish Citizens Act and the Integration Act between those who migrate from poorer nations and those from wealthier nations. Indeed, the second- and third-generation Turkish ethnic denizens are treated differently in contrast with those who are considered native Danes by ethnicity, ancestry, or naturalization. Those who can claim native Danish identity have been given legitimacy and empowerment vis-à-vis the state and generally enjoy an elevated status within Danish society.

It is reasonable to assume that the contrasting experiences of the two elites are caused by some combination of race and national origin. More importantly, the vastly different experiences of Kipketer and Donaldson illustrate the need to examine how citizenship is not only a legal status that accords rights and benefits, but is also (as Bloemraad and Kastoryano respectively state) an identity that provides a sense of belonging.

Race in the traditional sense is not the primary factor guiding immigration and integration discourse in Denmark. Many theorists have conceptualized race as a biological concept, a social construction based on obvious biological or perceived intellectual differences, or some combination of both biological and social constructions (Desmond and Emirbayer, 2010: 6–20). Here (and in many other Western European nations), a combination of religion (specifically Islam) and culture (an expectation on the part of native Danes for migrants to assimilate quickly and to adhere to prevailing Danish cultural values and social norms) has organized Danish identity into concentric zones consisting of groups within the inner circle who are more readily extended the invitation to join Danish national identity and those groups least able to do so.

What is most salient about Marx's analysis is his view of the state as an active participant in shaping national identity and setting the boundaries for who can and cannot make legitimate claims to this identity. When applying Marx's concept of race-making to the Danish case, there are contradictions within current citizenship and integration legislation that serve to codify racial, ethnic, and religious orders among migrants. On one hand, some ethnic populations are perceived as either more or less of a threat to Danish national identity and this perception dictates the level of social acceptance of the group among native Danes. On the other hand, all groups are also encouraged through legislation to quickly integrate and find a place within Danish society.

Turner's multidimensional view of citizenship is the analytical tool used for observing these contradictions within the Danish case. The Kipketer and Donaldson stories best illustrate the tension between citizenship from above and below—where acquisition of Danish citizenship does not guarantee the experience of social acceptance. Both Kipketer and Donaldson enjoy celebrity status and as such are treated as elites, albeit for different reasons—one being a celebrated Olympian and the other, a member of the royal family. Yet Kipketer is a dark-skinned Black man from Kenya and

Donaldson is a Caucasian woman from Australia whose physical appearance (height, weight, hair color, and facial features) is not significantly different from that of an average Danish woman. Despite integrating in almost every way, Kipketer is not considered really Danish by many, but Crown Princess Mary has been publicly embraced as Danish by most. The princess was voted Woman of the Year in 2008 by a popular Danish magazine, *Alt for Damerne*.

THE DANISH CITIZENS ACT

In Denmark, citizenship status has recently become most important in terms of securing a higher level of social rights, benefits, and social recognition. As discussed earlier, there has been particular attention paid, on the part of political actors, toward integrating foreign and ethnic populations living in Denmark and (theoretically) setting them on a pathway to Danish citizenship. I argue that this narrative is at odds with what is happening on the ground—or as Turner called it "citizenship from below."

Kastoryano's (2002) conceptualization of citizenship identity highlights the primary research question of this chapter and when applying Kastoryano's concept of citizenship identity to the Danish case, two key assumptions arise. First, she asserts that citizenship (as she defines it) has the ability to incorporate all categories of foreigners into the national identity. Second, Kastoryano asserts that states have the ability (and willingness) to resolve claims for social inclusion by adjusting public perceptions of foreigners away from being viewed as problematic outsiders to being seen as potential citizens. These assumptions are explicitly stated within the provisions of the Integration Act and will be examined in greater detail in subsequent chapters but bear mentioning here because the revisions to the Danish Citizens Act and the enactment of the Attachment Requirement reflect the notion that third-country nationals are not viewed as potential citizens—despite the fact that

the public discourse implies otherwise. Rather, these legislations serve to restrict immigrant access to Danish citizenship and degrade the citizenship rights of their native and ethnic Dane partners.

Concurrent with the passage of the Integration Act, the Danish parliament also enacted several revisions to the Danish Citizens Act of 1950. Table 2.1 outlines the Danish Citizens Act of 1950 and its subsequent revisions. Citizenship is typically determined by the law of jus sanguinis, or by descent—which is determined by legitimate birth into a family where the mother or father is "Danish." The original legislation (1950) stated that in the case of children born in Denmark to foreign-born parents or to a Danish father, the child must wait until he/she is at least 21 years but not older than 23 years to apply for citizenship. In addition to the age requirement, the child must also demonstrate continuous residency in Denmark for at least five consecutive years. This policy is also applied to illegitimate children born in Denmark to Danish parents of either sex. The 2002 revision extended the residency requirement from five years to seven years, eliminated dual citizenship as an option, required criminal background clearance, and made proof of Danish language proficiency a requirement for citizenship.

Some liberal Danish politicians have expressed concerns about recent revisions to the Danish Citizens Act and the new residency and language requirements. Some politicians and immigrant advocate groups have argued that the Danish government has selectively applied the conditions for citizenship by placing greater restrictions on third-country nationals than on others seeking Danish citizenship.

EXAMINING DANISH IMMIGRATION AND MIGRATION POLICIES

I now turn to an analysis of migration policies to provide context for the legislative changes discussed above. Table 2.1, which summarizes Danish Migration Policies from 1926 to 2002, shows that prior to 1926, few restrictions were placed on foreigners who wanted

Table 2.1   Danish Migration Policies (1926–2004)

Year	Law/Policy	Key Points	Revisions
Prior to 1926	No Immigration Law	No restrictions on immigrating to Denmark	
1926	First Immigration Law passed by parliament	• Required foreigners to obtain both residence and work permits • Work permits would only be issued if qualified Danish labor was unavailable	
1950	Danish Citizens Act passed by parliament	• Established Danish citizenship	
1954	Formation of the Nordic Council	• Permitted citizens of Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Iceland) freedom of movement and work within other Nordic countries	• Created exemptions for Nordic citizens from the residence and work permit requirement
Late 1960s	Creation of Guest Worker Programs	• Permitted Danish firms to import low-wage (mostly manufacturing or agricultural) labor from outside of Europe • Largest wave of immigration came from Turkey, Poland, former Yugoslavia, and Pakistan	• Guest workers were granted residence and work permits upon arrival into Denmark

1973	Enactment of Family and Spousal Reunification Law Revisions to Immigration Law passed by parliament	Beginning of Guest Worker Retention and Family Reunification Immigration Policy	• Immigration Law was changed to require that residence and work permits be obtained PRIOR to immigrating to Denmark • Exemptions were made for former Danish citizens, those married to Danish citizens or foreign nationals with a residence permit, asylum seekers, and citizens of the European Community (predecessor to the European Union)
1980	Stricter revisions to Immigration Law passed by parliament	• Most previous exemptions were repealed • ALL non-Nordic and nonEuropean Community citizens must apply for temporary residence and work permits PRIOR to immigration to Denmark	• Nordic citizens and European Community citizens were still exempt from residence and work permit requirements
1983	Aliens Act passed by parliament	• Lowered the age requirement for elderly parents of immigrants who wanted to immigrate under Family Reunification Policy to age 60 regardless of gender of parent	• Established administrative and appeal procedure for immigrants and asylum seekers • Created a two-year waiting period for immigrant spouses before they could obtain permanent residence permits
1992	Aliens Act revised by parliament	• Lengthened the bureaucratic process for third-country nationals to obtain temporary residence and work permits PRIOR to immigrating to Denmark	• Extended the waiting period for permanent residence permits from two to three years

(Continued)

Table 2.1   (*Continued*)

1994	Aliens Act revised by parliament	• Lengthened the bureaucratic process for third-country nationals to obtain temporary residence and work permits PRIOR to immigrating to Denmark	• Extended the waiting period for permanent residence permits from two to three years, with an additional one- to two-year application-processing period
1998	Integration Act passed by parliament	• This law has 13 key points that focus on creating administrative policies that would promote successful integration of immigrants and foreign nationals living in Denmark	• This law would be applied to all third-country nationals who immigrate to Denmark and all previous immigrants with temporary residence permits from January 1, 1999 forward
		• These policies had "anti-ghetto" provision that restricted where new immigrants could live when applying for public housing. The goal was to restrict ethnic enclaves and to disperse ethnic populations into non-ethnic neighborhoods	• The Introduction Program was only required for immigrants who also applied for social welfare benefits such as cash and housing subsidies. It was voluntary for all others
		• Created the Introduction Program, which included Danish language and Danish culture classes and the assignment of an Integration Case Manager	• Nordic citizens and European Union citizens were exempt from the Integration Act
			• The exception was not applied to the new members (2004) of the European Union, which includes Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia

Year	Event	Details
2002	Revisions to the Danish Citizens Act of 1950 were passed by parliament	• Required completion of the Introduction Program as a condition for applying for Danish citizenship • Required proof of Danish language proficiency as evidenced by passing the Danprove—an advanced comprehensive exam designed to test Danish grammar and reading comprehension at the 13th-grade level • First time that a high level of language acquisition became required for citizenship
2002	Revisions to the Integration Act passed by parliament	• Completion of the Introduction Program was no longer voluntary. It became a requirement for all third-country nationals applying for permanent residence and work permits
2004	Revisions to the Integration Act passed by parliament	• Extended the waiting period for permanent residence permits from three to four years (from two to three years), with a one- to two-year application-processing period

Sources: Coleman and Wadensjo et al., (1999); Hjarnø (1996, 1997); Rasmussen (1997); Wadensjo and Orrje (2002).

to relocate to Denmark to live and work. The Danish parliament passed the first immigration legislation in 1926, requiring foreigners to obtain a work permit before finding work in Denmark. These permits could only be issued if qualified Danish labor could not be found (Coleman and Wadensjo, 1999: 152–157). Nordic citizens (from Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, and Finland) could move freely within Scandinavia for relocation and employment. Other nationals wanting to remain in Denmark for longer than three months had to apply for residence permits and labor permits if they wanted to work (Hjarnø, 1997: 27).

Despite immigration from other Nordic countries, the Danish pattern of ethnic immigration did not change rapidly until the late 1960s, when guest workers came to Denmark (Hjarnø, 1996). These workers held jobs at the bottom of the employment hierarchy, including dirty, hazardous and/or hard physical labor. Many Danes avoided these jobs due to their relatively high levels of education and previous work experience (Coleman and Wadensjo, 1999: 149–151).

Despite an economic recession during the 1970s, many guest workers and their families decided to remain in Denmark, which conflicted with expectations that these workers would be temporary inhabitants and would eventually return to their respective home countries. The retention of guest workers and the later migration of their family members created a third category in the population of Denmark—the denizen who is quite distinguishable from citizens and temporary foreign visitors/workers. Within Tomas Hammar's (1990) Concentric Gate Model, the denizen is defined as a person who has the following attributes: has lived a long period in the host country (15–20 years or more); has strong family ties (parents or children are citizens or were born in the host country); and whose residence status is fully granted or almost so (Hamburger, 1992: 294–296). The denizen and his/her descendants (in some cases third-generation descendants) will become the focus of integration policies to emerge years later, in the 1990s.

Following the lead of other Western European countries, Denmark began to tighten immigration policies in the early 1970s, resulting in significantly decreased primary immigration. However, as Table 2.2 demonstrates, secondary immigration continued in the form of family reunification or the immigration of dependent spouses, children, and elderly parents, which significantly increased the overall population size of many ethnic groups living in Denmark over a relatively short period of time.

Table 2.1, which summarizes Danish Migration Policies from 1926 to 2002, shows that the rules for immigration to Denmark became more stringent in the early 1970s. From this point forward, foreign nationals had to apply for these permits prior to immigrating to Denmark. The following categories were exempt from this new policy: former Danish citizens, those married to a Danish citizen or to a foreign national with a permanent residence permit, European Community citizens, asylum seekers, and young people under the age of 20 with at least one parent with a permanent residence permit. In 1980, the rules for immigration were again tightened and the above exemptions were no longer allowed. Subsequent amendments to this legislation have made the acquisition of a residence permit a lengthy task for most third-country nationals by adding waiting periods.

The enactment of the Integration Act of 1998 further extended the waiting period for a permanent residence permit by adding a one- or two-year processing period. In 2004, the waiting period was extended again to four years, along with a one- or two-year processing period. As Table 2.3 demonstrates, the legislative changes from 1998 to 2004 have had the most chilling effect on the ability of third-country immigrants to obtain permanent resident status. This trend toward greater restriction of residence permits has also occurred in the area of citizenship law and has had a similar reducing effect on the number of people who are able to acquire Danish citizenship by naturalization, as demonstrated by Table 2.2.

Table 2.2 Foreign and Ethnic Rates of Naturalization (1980–2010)

	1980	1996	1998	2000	2004	2008	2010
Turkey							
Immigrants	12,064	22,868	23,782	23,912	21,335	20,315	20,572
Descendants	1,885	12,872	13,799	12,756	9,115	8,347	8,204
Naturalizations	22	919	1,243	3,096	3,270	581	239
Iraq							
Immigrants	118	5,650	7,448	10,109	15,966	14,034	12,569
Descendants	4	700	1,082	1,504	2,435	3,024	3,034
Naturalizations	4	339	718	2,224	1,015	1,166	368
Former Yugoslavia							
Immigrants	6,085	10,266	12,399	12,988	14,016	7,174	6,203
Descendants	1,367	3,763	4,309	4,758	5,818	2,159	1,864
Naturalizations	59	617	648	917	837	196	52
Bosnia–Herzegovina							
Immigrants	0	15,183	17,909	18,014	14,648	10,124	9,624
Descendants	0	513	1,184	1,636	2,089	1,457	1,426
Naturalizations	0	1	4	469	3,358	270	131
Afghanistan							
Immigrants	19	1,174	1,769	2,563	8,124	7,947	7,474
Descendants	4	115	193	269	799	1,351	1,418
Naturalizations	4	29	101	276	367	359	354
Somalia							
Immigrants	93	5,924	9,763	10,947	9,703	6,494	5,945
Descendants	20	969	2,094	3,286	3,353	2,257	2,278
Naturalizations	11	32	159	1,205	2,022	527	142
Thailand							
Immigrants	305	2,639	3,229	3,931	5,245	6,397	7,370
Descendants	22	89	98	123	164	183	216
Naturalizations	7	65	85	219	180	79	64
Pakistan							
Immigrants	5,637	6,062	6,377	6,644	6,748	5,224	5,556
Descendants	1,878	2,559	2,660	2,580	2,329	1,278	1,331
Naturalizations	149	220	284	550	332	191	21
China							
Immigrants	359	1,572	1,882	2,257	4,825	5,985	6,781
Descendants	45	167	227	259	283	356	387
Naturalizations	9	42	117	236	339	181	103

Note: These data reflect the way in which citizenship is defined. According to the Danish Citizens Act, the mother determines citizenship.

Source: Statistics Denmark, *Statistical Yearbook 2011*, www.statbank.dk/BEF3.

Table 2.3   Pre and Post Revisions to Danish Citizens Act (1996–2010)

	1996	1998	2000	2004	2008	2010
Turkey						
Immigrants	22,868	23,782	23,912	21,335	20,315	20,572
Descendants	12,872	13,799	12,756	9,115	8,347	8,204
Asylum Permits	5	10	5	7	4	0
Spousal Permits	0	0	883	153	255	290
Family/Minors Permits	0	0	822	164	52	60
Family/Other Member Permits	0	0	12	3	46	43
Iraq						
Immigrants	5,650	7,448	10,109	15,966	14,034	12,569
Descendants	700	1,082	1,504	2,435	3,024	3,034
Asylum Permits	1,009	1,749	1,745	86	300	71
Spousal Permits	0	0	635	67	50	54
Family/Minors Permits	0	0	1,354	159	19	28
Family/Other Permits	0	0	21	4	0	0
Former Yugoslavia						
Immigrants	10,266	12,399	12,988	14,016	7,174	6,203
Descendants	3,763	4,309	4,758	5,818	2,159	1,864
Asylum Permits	2,164	365	597	0	0	0
Spousal Permits	0	0	153	0	0	0
Family/Minors Permits	0	0	88	0	0	0
Family/Other Permits	0	0	5	0	0	0
Bosnia-Herzegovina						
Immigrants	15,183	17,909	18,014	14,648	10,124	9,624
Descendants	513	1,184	1,636	2,089	1,457	1,426
Asylum Permits	1,876	225	173	81	31	10
Spousal Permits	0	0	73	23	35	57
Family/Minors Permits	0	0	234	6	5	5
Family/Other Permits	0	0	15	0	0	3
Afghanistan						
Immigrants	1,174	1,769	2,563	8,124	7,947	7,474
Descendants	115	193	269	799	1,351	1,418
Asylum Permits	334	324	1,322	171	88	573
Spousal Permits	0	0	232	93	49	49
Family/Minors Permits	0	0	615	220	13	47
Family/Other Permits	0	0	9	3	0	8

Table 2.3   (*Continued*)

	1996	1998	2000	2004	2008	2010
Somalia						
Immigrants	5,924	9,763	10,947	9,703	6,494	5,945
Descendants	969	2,094	3,286	3,353	2,257	2,278
Asylum Permits	1,702	946	538	49	11	35
Spousal Permits	0	0	395	52	13	22
Family/Minors Permits	0	0	769	139	13	39
Family/Other Permits	0	0	7	1	0	0
Thailand						
Immigrants	2,639	3,229	3,931	5,245	6,397	7,370
Descendants	89	98	123	164	183	216
Asylum Permits	0	0	0	0	0	0
Spousal Permits	0	0	427	281	455	577
Family/Minors Permits	0	0	176	162	155	167
Family/Other Permits	0	0	1	0	1	17
Pakistan						
Immigrants	6,062	6,377	6,644	6,748	5,224	5,556
Descendants	2,559	2,660	2,580	2,329	1,278	1,331
Asylum Permits	2	3	11	4	0	2
Spousal Permits	0	0	261	40	80	88
Family/Minors Permits	0	0	168	16	13	22
Family/Other Permits	0	0	7	0	8	21
Work Permits*	0	0	7	148	317	1,144
Educational Permits*	0	0	42	144	152	105
China						
Immigrants	1,572	1,882	2,257	4,825	5,985	6,781
Descendants	167	227	259	283	356	387
Asylum Permits	17	14	10	15	7	4
Spousal Permits	0	0	140	78	140	152
Family/Minors Permits	0	0	72	30	25	10
Family/Other Permits	0	0	5	0	2	0
Work Permits*	0	0	135	1,679	2,177	1,542
Educational Permits*	0	0	355	1,946	1,680	932

*Included this category because this is the largest source for immigration growth.
Source: Statistics Denmark, *Statistical Yearbook 2011*, www.statbank.dk/VAN6.

The Integration Act and its Effect on Citizenship Acquisition

The Integration Act had two primary objectives: First, it established procedures for integrating new immigrants into Danish society. Second, it established integration protocols and requirements for denizens (multigenerational ethnic populations living in Denmark) who wanted to acquire Danish citizenship through naturalization.

The Integration Act has 13 parts that outline the following: housing for refugees and non-self-supporting immigrants, administrative tasks of the local authorities, the Introduction Program (language and culture classes) for all immigrants covered under this legislation, special funds available for new immigrants, activation and work stipulations, the establishment of local integration councils for ethnic populations, rights and responsibilities concerning the release of personal information, and the protocol and procedure for appealing administrative actions.

As stipulated within the legislation, the Integration Act has three main purposes: first, to ensure that all new immigrants can participate in Danish society on "equal footing" with citizens; second, to assist in making new immigrants self-supporting as quickly as possible; third, to impart to new immigrants an understanding of the fundamental values and norms of Danish society.

Table 2.4 shows that the revisions to the Integration Act in 2002 and 2004 were passed by parliament concurrently with changes to the Danish Citizens Act and resulted in the following changes from the original legislation (1998):

1. Completion of the Introduction Program was no longer voluntary. It became required for all third-country nationals applying for permanent residence and work permits.

Table 2.4   Summary of Integration Act with Revisions (1998–2005)

Year	Law/Policy	Key Points	Revisions
1998	Integration Act	• Three primary purposes: equal footing, self-supporting, and impart fundamentals of Danish culture • 13 Parts/Provisions	• First time a high level of language acquisition became required for citizenship
2002	Revision to the Integration Act passed by parliament		• Completion of the Introduction Program was no longer voluntary. It became a requirement for all third-country nationals applying for permanent residence and work permits
2004	Revisions to the Integration Act passed by parliament		• Extended the waiting period for permanent residence permits from three to four years, with a one- to two-year application-processing period
2005	Revisions to the Integration Act passed by parliament		• Upon receiving pressure from the European Union, the Danish government extended the exemption to the new Eastern European Member States in a 2005 revision to the Integration Act

Source: Schmidt (2011); Schmidt and Jakobsen (2004); Schmidt et al., (2009); Seeberg (2002).

2. Completion of the language components of the Introduction Program must be verified by proof of Danish language proficiency, as evidenced by passing the Danprøve—an advanced comprehensive exam designed to test Danish grammar and

reading comprehension at the 13th-grade level. Prior to 2002, there was no exam requirement—the person only needed to demonstrate one to two years of courses taken at an approved language school. This revision marked the first time that a high level of language proficiency became a condition for citizenship acquisition.

The 2004 revision extended the waiting period for permanent residence permits to a span of three to four years (from the previous two- to three-year period), with the same additional one- to two-year application-processing period. Despite the revisions to the law, the three main purposes of the Integration Act have remained the same and can be contested on their respective meanings. The notion of new immigrants participating on equal footing with Danish citizens contradicts the revisions made to the Danish Citizens Act. The revised legislation made it more difficult for immigrants to first obtain a residence permit and to later naturalize by requiring proof of Danish language proficiency as evidenced by passing the Danprøve. Some have criticized this requirement because the test is so difficult that some have questioned whether many native Danes would be able to pass it. In response to this criticism, in 2012, the Danish government relaxed the testing and other requirements for citizenship in the following ways (Wenande, 2012):

1. The immigration test (*invandringsprøven* in Danish) was exempted for those seeking citizenship on their own and not as part of immigration by marriage. For example, if a denizen who could prove 26 years of continuous residence in Denmark wanted to seek Danish citizenship, he or she would no longer have to take this test. But the test is still required for someone who immigrated to Denmark under the umbrella of family reunification and later seeks Danish citizenship.

2. The Danish test level was lowered from Danish Test 2 (Prøve i Dansk 2) to an easier level of Danish Test 1 (Prøve i Dansk 1) for permanent residence applicants (the denizens). It is still at the Danish Test 2 level (Prøve i Dansk 2) for family reunification applicants.

3. To achieve permanent residence, applicants must show they have worked for three out of the last five years, instead of two years and six months out of the last three years, as the rules previously stood. The revisions now consider most education to be the equivalent of full-time work. This change is helping to keep more foreign students and professionals in Denmark. Additionally, the points system where applicants had to amass 100 points through work, language, and volunteer requirements was removed.

4. Previously, applicants for citizenship had to show that they had been self-supporting for four and a half out of five continuous years. The revisions changed the self-supporting requirements to two and a half out of the last five years.

5. The revisions also addressed the fees and financial guarantees associated with seeking citizenship that many advocate groups said were burdensome for many ethnics seeking citizenship. According to the new law, the financial guarantee was reduced from 100,000 kroner to 50,000 kroner. This is the amount the individual has to deposit to the government as a bank guarantee, thereby illustrating that they will not be seeking social benefits. Additionally, the payment was structured in a way that reduces the amount with the passing of Danish language tests.

Despite these positive legislative changes, there is still a clear bias—differentiating categories of those seeking Danish citizenship. Those who immigrate on their own or through family reunification are still placed at a considerable disadvantage as compared

to denizens in this regard. Citizenship scholars clearly tell us that citizens and non-citizens cannot possibly achieve equality when the political participation of non-citizens is extremely limited. Non-citizens and non-permanent residents cannot vote in local or national elections in Denmark. Under these conditions, new Danes cannot possibly enjoy full access to the political and social realms of Danish society.

The second purpose of the Integration Act focuses on making immigrants self-supporting as soon as possible. Inclusion of this provision was a direct result of the growing political discourse from parties with conservative leanings on immigration issues that exaggerated the correlation of welfare abuse with rising immigration numbers and growing generations of ethnic populations living in Denmark. The anti-ghetto provisions of the Integration Act restricted where new immigrants could live when applying for public housing. The goal of these provisions was to restrict the size of current ethnic enclaves in Copenhagen and to disperse ethnic populations into non-ethnic neighborhoods. These provisions are contradictory to the vast literature on ethnic enclaves that shows immigrants often become more quickly self-supporting among ethnic communities with strong kin/ethnic networks (Portes et al., 2002) and segmented neighborhood-based economies (Portes and Zhou, 1993).

The third purpose of the Integration Act, to impart immigrants with an "understanding of fundamental values and norms of Danish society," is accomplished by the completion of the three-year Introduction Program, which consists of Danish language instruction, a Danish History and Culture course, and the completion of the labor market action plan. This final purpose is the most widely contested because some argue that the curriculum developed for the Danish History and Culture course creates a narrow and stereotypical construct for Danishness. This aspect will be explored in greater detail in later chapters.

The Attachment Requirement and Erosion of Citizenship Rights

Since 2000, Danish immigration law requires that each partner demonstrate a "strong affiliation/attachment" with Denmark that is measured by years living and/or working in Denmark. In 2002, the liberal conservative government revised the Danish Aliens Act, proudly describing it as "the strictest in the world" (Schmidt, 2011: 257–258). These changes now require the native or ethnic Dane sponsoring the third-country national spouse to not only demonstrate that he/she can support the spouse with proof of income and a "suitable" home but also provide a financial guarantee of 50,000 kroner[3] (later increased to 100,000 kroner in 2004) that is held in escrow by the Danish authorities. In addition to the revisions to the Aliens Act, in 2003, a law was passed that required that both spouses must be at least 24 years old before they could apply for family reunification based on marriage. These legislative changes have had the greatest impact on ethnic Danes from non-Western countries and their descendants, who typically marry at a younger age, are more likely than native Danes to marry a foreigner, and have the greatest difficulty meeting the financial requirements associated with sponsoring a third-country national spouse (Kauppinen and Poutvaara, 2011).

The Attachment Requirement and related policies discussed above have resulted in the erosion of citizenship rights of native and ethnic Danes who choose to partner with third-country nationals. In other words, an individual can formally be a Danish citizen, but this juridical status in itself is no guarantee that one has the same rights as other citizens. The Attachment Requirement, used by state authorities in determining a couple's right to obtain family reunification, best demonstrates this. One aspect of this requirement is that the right to family reunification is based on the couple's ties to another country, including, for example, whether the partner living in Denmark has made extended visits

to that country. This rule draws a fine line between formal Danish citizens with attachment to the country and formal citizens who, based on individual assessments, are judged as lacking this attachment.

Although people holding Danish citizenship are, in most respects, equal before the law, these kinds of rules and regulations have established a hierarchy among citizens according to which, based on an assumption of "true" belonging, some citizens have certain rights that others do not. This policy has also negatively affected native Danes, who are Caucasians and who choose to marry third-country nationals, by placing new limits on their citizenship rights. As demonstrated by Ralf and Merih Christensen's ordeal with Danish Immigration Services and as noted by several of my respondents, this and other restrictive policies force many affected native Danes to live outside of Denmark because they cannot live in Denmark with their third-country national spouses due to these restrictive laws. The Danish case highlights how this discourse focuses on how third-country immigrants establish and organize their family lives and further demonstrates how the formation of these marriages has become a public concern rather than what was once considered a private matter (Schmidt, 2011: 260–265).

Conclusion

As I have demonstrated in this chapter, citizenship nationalism and social identity converge in the present social and political condition of "native," "ethnic," and "foreign" relations in contemporary Danish society. I also demonstrated how the contradictions contained within the Danish Citizens Act and the Integration Act create the disjunction between Danish identity acquisition through citizenship from above and the social acceptance from below. When examining citizenship from above, I agree with Kastoryano (2002) and Marx (1998) that reforms making legal

citizenship more accessible can serve as a means for ethnic populations living in Denmark to achieve greater political participation and agency.

However, when examining citizenship from below, I am less certain that legal citizenship (as Kastoryano defines it) can serve as a means to achieving legitimacy for identity claims. This is again evidenced by Kipketer's crisis of legitimacy when he evokes and attempts to claim Danish identity. Since the controversy surrounding his Olympic participation, Kipketer and his Danish wife have had children born in Denmark. Although his children are not public figures, one can only wonder if the Kipketer children's Danishness would be similarly called into question. Since the controversy surrounding Mary's Law, the Crown Princess and the Crown Prince have also had several children, and these children are regarded in every way as Danish and are considered legitimate heirs to the Danish crown.

The recent changes to citizenship and integration legislation have significant impacts on immigrants wanting to migrate and remain in Denmark. First, legal entry to Denmark became more difficult for all third-country nationals. Second, these laws established new language and cultural education requirements as a condition for staying in Denmark. Third, these laws have re-defined the relationship of the citizen to the state by creating legal distinctions and greater restrictions among the Danish citizen (or the "native Danes"), "new Dane/denizen" (or the second- or third-generation foreign national living in Denmark), and the third-country immigrant (new arrival).

Prior to 1998, all of these groups had equal and largely unrestricted access to the Danish welfare state, including monetary, housing, and educational benefits, apart from health care and other direct or indirect services within "the system." From 1998 to 2002, the public discourse shifted away from a generosity of access for most toward retrenchment and a "need" to conserve benefits. The conservation shift also gave rise to an increasing

perception that the immigrant was "abusing" the system and migrating to Denmark with this express purpose in mind.

At first (in 1998), the Introduction Program was considered an "offer" and therefore was not mandatory. In 2002, there were subsequent revisions to the Integration Act enacted that now make this program a requirement for most new foreigners (some exceptions are made for refugees). However, the immigrants' compliance with the action plan and the information submitted to Danish Immigration Services by the local authorities have always been considered when rendering a decision about whether or not to grant a permanent residence status after three years. As it has been more than 15 years since the legislation was enacted, it will be useful in future research to examine the impact of non-compliance with the Introduction Program on a negative decision regarding a permanent residence permit. It would also be useful to examine whether non-compliance with the mandated Introduction Program impacts on a positive or negative decision from Danish Immigration Services for naturalization.

As the tables provided show, there has been a sharp increase in Danish citizenship acquisition rates among the largest ethnic denizen populations between 1998 and 2004 (prior to the most strict legislative changes to the Integration and Danish Citizens Acts), followed by a sharp decline in citizenship acquisitions in 2008 and 2010. A similar trend is also noted in the rates of permanent residence permits among the same denizen populations during the corresponding periods.

THE MANUFACTURING OF AND MAKING CLAIMS TO DANISHNESS

THIS CHAPTER ANSWERS THE FOLLOWING RESEARCH QUESTION: How has Danish identity been constructed by actors in light of increased diversity and recent changes to immigration and integration policies?

As discussed earlier, conservative political actors, specifically the Danish People's Party, were most effective in harnessing growing anti-immigrant sentiments and rising nativism among the Danish majority during the 1990s. Although the Danish People's Party is not the mainstream political force in Denmark, this party has accomplished quite a bit in the past 15 to 20 years. It successfully used the media to shape the conversation of identity politics in Denmark from 1998 to the present. The members of the party heavily contributed to the conflation of immigrant identity with Muslim identity. As a result, the anti-immigration focus is evident and frequently highlighted in the Danish People's Party's political program and public statement documents. They state on their website,

> Denmark is not a country of immigrants, and has never been one. We cannot therefore accept a multiethnic transformation of the

country. Denmark is the country of the Danes, and its citizens should be granted the opportunity to live in a safe community founded on the rule of law, which is evolving in line with Danish culture . . . The Danish People's Party is in favour of cultural cooperation with other countries, but we are against giving other cultures, building on completely different values and norms than ours, leverage in Denmark.

This quotation succinctly describes the political agenda of this party. This agenda includes rejecting the notion of Denmark becoming a multicultural society and the belief that the Danish state should actively work to keep Denmark Danish. The second part of the above quotation also highlights the "us" versus "them" dichotomy of immigrant discourse. Specifically, it is the Danish People's Party's belief that immigrant culture is somehow gaining leverage over Danish cultural norms and values. Several Scandinavian social scientists have also interpreted these statements as evidence of veiled references to Muslims. They also note that the Danish public often has difficulty untangling conversations about immigration and ethnics in general (which can include a diverse range of people) from conversations about Muslim populations living in Denmark (Faist, et al., 2003; Fog Olwig and Paerregaard, 2011; Schmidt, 2011; Nielsen, 2012).

Jens Rydgren (2004) noted three primary strains of party rhetoric and media talking points for the Danish People's Party. First, he argued that the party perpetuates the characterization of an "us" versus "them" dichotomy in terms of usage of the Danish welfare system. This characterization is often portrayed as immigrants and ethnics coming to Denmark to drain an already overburdened welfare system. Second, he noted that the party's belief that immigrants and ethnics are the major causes of criminality and that, among native Danes, this increased the feeling of being less safe in Denmark. This perception is most pronounced in the three major cities, namely, Copenhagen, Odense, and Aarhus.

Third, he identified the view that increased immigration and rising ethnic populations are perceived threats to Danish culture and native "ethnonational" identity (484–487).

I agree with Rydgren's summation of the major themes of current political and media climate in Denmark and will focus the first part of this chapter on exploring these rhetorical themes in greater detail. These themes have particular salience to present-day identity politics but had reached their zenith during 2008 due to several political events. These include the Prophet Muhammad Cartoon controversy and the resulting demonstrations that happened in and around the Nørrebro section of Copenhagen, the global economic and financial crisis and its impact on the Danish welfare state, and finally, several sensationalized media stories about crimes that had been allegedly committed by ethnics and immigrants in the Greater Copenhagen area. Here, I will briefly discuss the first two rhetorical themes and then spend more time analyzing the final theme—the perception that rising immigration poses a threat to Danish culture and ethnonational identity.

During the mid-1990s, the political and social climate in Denmark regarding the allocation of welfare benefits to immigrants, ethnics, and refugee populations shifted away from absolute and somewhat unconditional generosity toward a growing retrenchment model. There was social and political pressure to place more conditions and requirements on denizens and immigrants in return for social benefits. Many of these new requirements were bundled into the Integration Act of 1998 and other related administrative policies. Much of this retrenchment discourse certainly contributed to the first theme noted in Rydgren's (2004) article—the "us" versus "them" dichotomy in terms of use of the Danish welfare state.

In relation to the second theme noted by Rydgren—the growing perception that ethnics and immigrants are the cause for criminality in Denmark—this perception certainly exists throughout the country but is especially felt in the three major cities, namely,

Copenhagen, Odense, and Aarhus. However, much of this dis-course has been centered by media coverage of the Nørrebro section of Copenhagen. This community, which is located just northwest of downtown Copenhagen, has developed over the past 25 years into an ethnic enclave for the growing Somali, Turkish, Iraqi, and Pakistani ethnic, immigrant, and refugee populations. Historically, this neighborhood has often been inhabited by the Danish and other European immigrant working-class population.

Present-day Nørrebro has developed unlike typical enclave pat-terns noted in countries with longer immigrant-receiving histories and where neighborhoods became exclusive to one or two ethnic groups. Nørrebro has attracted a vast range of people living in this community. This includes some elderly native Danes (this group has dwindled in the past 15 years due to death from old age and a bit of elders' flight or leaving for the suburbs). Diverse ethnic pop-ulations from all over and native-Dane and international univer-sity students and artists also came to this neighborhood because of cheaper rents (as compared to other sections of Copenhagen), close proximity to major transportation lines, and the cultural flare of the many ethnic shops, trendy nightclubs, and restaurants that comprise the main boulevards of Nørrebro. This ethnically diverse neighborhood has had mixed reviews from some politi-cal actors and among everyday people. On the one hand, some perceive the neighborhood as a cultural gem of racial and ethnic diversity within a seemingly homogenous city and country. Like many of my respondents also noted, I often visit Nørrebro to shop or enjoy a meal at the many ethnically owned or operated busi-nesses. Coming to Nørrebro is also a way to escape from the social isolation one naturally experiences when living abroad. Being in this neighborhood can be a way to connect with and simply inter-act with "people like me (us)"—other ethnics living in Denmark.

On the other hand, some consider Nørrebro to be a ghetto with many of the attributes of urban theater that often accompany this label—high crime, immigrants, and graffiti-covered and blighted

buildings. This neighborhood has also accumulated a colorful list of disparaging, and often negative, nicknames over the years. The streets around Nørrebrogade, the community's main avenue, are sometimes called "Little Arabia," "The Islamic State within Denmark," and the "Nørrebronx." The latter nickname is a clear reference to the Bronx, one of the five boroughs of New York City with a well-documented history of high crime, urban blight, and rap music culture. I am a native New Yorker and I lived in the east and south Bronx during the 1980s at the height of high crime, urban blight, and the emerging rap music culture. As a result, I can say with some authority that it borders on ridiculous that Nørrebro is regularly compared to 1980s Bronx by some Danes. It is unfortunate that this neighborhood is not viewed as a potential strength for ethnic enclave labor economy or as a potential tourist attraction. In this context, the use of the term ghetto often has racist and anti-immigrant undertones.

This negative perception of Nørrebro is often echoed by some political actors and media outlets. For example, Pia Kærsgaard, the leader of the Danish People's Party, wrote an article entitled "Give Us Back Nørrebro" in her newsletter published in November 2003. She said,

> To us who grew up in Copenhagen in the 50s and 60s, Nørrebro stands in a special light. It was probably not the most upscale part of the capital . . . [but] you could find everything: solid and decent working-class people with high self-esteem were the most common, but also odd characters, petty thieves and thugs, artist and young, believing, conservative Christians who had just arrived with the four o'clock train . . . Today, Nørrebro is totally changed . . . the tolerance is gone. And one of the main reasons for this is that Nørrebro has become a Muslim enclave. And where Islam goes in, tolerance goes out.
>
> (Schmidt in Nielsen (eds.), 20: 100–101)

The negative perception of this neighborhood is also sensationalized and exacerbated by some media outlets. As noted earlier, 2008 was a particularly turbulent year in relations

between native Danes and the Muslim population. This year was also punctuated by a series of fictional and real-life news articles, popular films, and television programs that highlighted themes of urban blight as well as crime in minority areas of Copenhagen. The first notable news story of the summer of 2008 involved a series of gun shootings in Nørrebro. In August 2008, two young men were wounded but survived gunshots as a result of an apparent rivalry between different groups of young immigrants and a Hells Angels-type motorcycle group. When the story was first reported in the media, there was quite a bit of initial speculation that the dispute was minority gang related. It was reported that violence had erupted over a need for one group to gain controlling interests of drug territory in Nørrebro over the other group.

The second notable media story during the summer of 2008 involved the stabbing of a young native Danish woman on the Stroget, the main shopping street in central Copenhagen. The woman was found dead near a public bench on the walking street by a passerby. When the story was initially reported, many speculated that the suspect(s) were young Muslim men. This was based on the accounts of several people who recalled a group of rowdy Muslim men in the area at about the time when the woman's body was found.

Both of these news stories were used by media and political actors to explore in greater detail public perceptions about crime, immigration, urban blight, and what to "do" about wild young ethnics who were acting out. Several of my respondents mentioned both of these news stories during our interviews. The consensus among some of the Africans and Muslims in my sample was that the popular perceptions dominating the media were inaccurate among their respective circles of friends and family. Sameah was a 50-year-old woman from Iraq who had come to Denmark with her young children (one boy and one girl) in 1989. She had the most interesting response to the claims made by some Danish

reporters that ethnic youth are wild, rude, and grossly unsuper-vised by their families. Sameah said,

> It is really hard to raise our [Iraqi] children here [in Denmark]. I felt so frustrated at times raising my children because they have so much freedoms here, more than I had [growing up] in Iraq. When I was bad, my parents beat me and yelled at me, not to abuse but this is how they correct my bad behavior. Here [pause], I could never do that, my God. They [the Danish Authorities] would throw me out of Denmark for that. Here, no one teaches you how to be a parent here. Of course, we bring our culture with us. It's natural that that we bring the culture with us. We parent as our parents did us but you learn fast that it can't be that way here.

Ananda was a 35-year-old woman who came to Denmark in 2007 from Cameroon with her 8-year-old son from a previous marriage. She echoed Sameah's comments on raising her son in Denmark. Ananda was a strikingly beautiful woman with dark brown skin and meticulously styled, braided hair. She wore con-servative but colorful facial makeup and a bright yellow-colored African-inspired dress. Ananda said that she came to Denmark after marrying her second husband (also from Cameroon). He previously immigrated to Denmark as a university student in 2001 and later stayed. Ananda said that she and her husband also hesitate in their actions when disciplining her son. She said,

> Duna is now in school with the Danish and he talks to his friends. The Danish are so permissive with their children. When I am at the school, I am shocked how they speak to their parents. In our culture that is not our way. You must show respect for the family and the older people. When Duna talks like his Danish friends, I tell him this is not our way and that he must respect me and his father. He is still young so I can control this for now but the more he is with the Danish and the more he learns their ways, [pausing and shaking her head] I don't know.

After talking with Sameah, Ananda, and some of my other respondents, I gained a new perspective on this issue. I can better understand both perspectives on these stereotypes. Many of my ethnics and native-Dane respondents shared their stereotyped beliefs about the other on the issue of parenting children. On the one hand, I can relate to the frustration of some ethnics. Many are trying to parent their children in a new cultural environment using what they are most familiar with—the cultural parenting tools learned from their parents and the cultural norms of their previous societies. Several of my ethnic respondents talked about how yelling or corporal punishment as parenting techniques were culturally normative for them but they were fearful to use these methods in Denmark.

On the other hand, I also can appreciate the Danish view on parenting. It is common in Denmark for children to have more independence from parents at an earlier age. For many Danes, children are not viewed as the "property" of their parents. Young people are permitted great latitude and say-so in their upbringing. As a result of these divergent viewpoints on parenting and the rights of children, I can understand how both native Danes and ethnics have difficulty understanding the views of the other. These divergent perspectives may provide a possible explanation for the growing perception that immigrant and ethnic youth contribute most to criminality in Denmark. Perhaps, more dialogue on these issues might break down the negative stereotypes and perceptions each have for the other.

I now turn to analysis of the final theme noted in Rydgren's (2004) article—the view of immigrants and ethnics as threats to the preservation of Danishness. In order to explore this theme fully, I return to my analysis of Danish citizenship law and integration policies presented in the previous chapter. I argued that recent changes to these laws and administrative policies represent a manufactured and specific type of Danish identity that is packaged by state actors and government agencies and then

taught to new and ethnic Danes (through the Danish History and Culture course mandated in the Integration Act). Later, I will examine the curriculum of this course in greater detail, but it is important to note here that the curriculum fosters a stereotyped construction of Danishness. I also assert that this narrow—and often stereotyped—notion of Danish identity can also be used by actors to exclude many ethnic Danes from making their identity claims. Simply put, by creating tightly woven criteria for what constitutes Danishness, people who do not fit or who choose not to confirm to prescribed conditions can easily be excluded.

Understanding Danishness (called danskhed in Danish) is a critical first step to social acceptance among native Danes and is one of the primary markers used by Danish authorities to measure successful integration. As long as becoming Danish is expected but undefined, ethnic and new Danes will never become truly Danish. The state claims that Danish identity can be achieved through integration and then naturalization (what Turner called citizenship "from above" [Turner and Hamilton, 1994]). I argue that we must first critically analyze what it means to be Danish and pursue explorations into whether or not this construct has the capacity to incorporate multiculturalism. Without this analysis, Danish identity acquisition (what Turner called citizenship identity "from below") will remain elusive for many ethnic and new Danes. For my analysis of Danishness, I use the term "manufactured citizenship," as conceptualized by Veronique Benei (2005). For Benei, the material manufactured may be fictitious in part and includes collective memories, images, emotions, and practices of citizenship in various dimensions. These dimensions include the political, judicial, cultural, social, and historical realms of any given society. Of course, I acknowledge that ethnonational identity is quite real and tangible for native Danes. However, I also assert that the criteria for determining who is included or excluded is so narrowly defined that few non-native Danes are permitted access to Danishness. It is for these reasons that Danishness is

most often evoked and manufactured by native Danes in response to an identified "other."

Constructing Danishness

Scandinavian scholars (Østergård, 1996; Rasmussen, 1997; Hansen and Waever, 2002; Jespersen, 2004) have grappled with the perplexing task of defining Danishness with little success. Hans Kornø Rasmussen (1997) included a chapter in his book entitled, "Who are the Danes?" He answered the question by outlining who Danes are not—foreigners. The chapter discussed the growing perception among native Danes that increasing numbers of third-country immigrants pose threats to "it" (Danish culture). He also described how multigenerational ethnic populations (denizens) living in Denmark are changing "it." Yet, Rasmussen provides no operational definition for what Danishness actually is.

Tina Gudrun Jensen (2011) identified Danishness in the context of explaining why many native Danes conflate being an immigrant with also being a Muslim. While describing why some native and ethnic Danes convert to Islam, she argued that "Danish core values" prevent many native Danes from embracing the notion that one can be *both* Danish and Muslim. She said these core values include "liberalism, individualism, secularism and democracy" (Olwig and Paerregaard, 2011: 112–113).

Garbi Schmidt (2011) argued that in the public discourse about Muslim immigration and the controversial and often sensationalized media coverage of so-called forced and sham marriages, the notion of Danishness is often coupled with discussions of what is considered by many native Danes as "un-Danish" (or udansk in Danish). She, like Jensen, attributes the coupling to paradoxical and often stereotyped characteristics that make up Danishness and, by contrast, the un-Danish. Here Schmidt states, "Danishness is associated with progress, civilised behaviour, decency, trustworthiness, and respect for individual

rights . . . [the] un-Danish [are associated with] qualities such as primitiveness, uncivilised behaviour, rudeness, dishonesty and violent oppression of individual rights" (260–261). I argue here that both Schmidt and Jensen, like Rasmussen, are constructing Danishness in opposition to an "other" rather than crafting a definition that can stand on its own.

The difficulty with constructing an operational definition for Danishness is similar to the processes associated with how other dominant identities (masculinities or whiteness) are more easily defined by the "other." Such identities are simultaneously invisible and yet ubiquitous as the default category. Often these dominant identities only become visible in relation to the other. Desmond and Emirbayer (2010) called this "racial domination normalized." For them, the normalization "produces and reproduces many cultural, political, economic, and social advantages for white people and withholds such advantages and privileges from non-white people." They provide everyday examples that demonstrate how whiteness operates in daily life and is often unrecognized by most when racial domination is normalized. For example, "there are 'black ghettos,' 'Chinatowns' [and Muslim sections of Copenhagen—Nørrebro] but gated suburban communities, many of which are nearly all white, are simply referred to as 'gated communities' or the 'suburbs'" (38–39). As noted in the examples, few people would commonly refer to the "suburbs" or a "gated community" as the White community. But spaces occupied by minorities are often defined by the sex, race, ethnicity, religion, or sexuality of the people who reside there.

While Desmond and Emirbayer were discussing the normalization of racial dominance in the context of how whiteness operates in the United States, this concept is also salient to the Danish case. This understanding provides a plausible explanation for why Danishness is often manufactured or evoked in relation to the other or the "non-Dane." It also could explain the differing experiences of some religious minorities and people of color in claiming

Danish identity. Racial domination normalized provides insight into Wilson Kipketer's (the Kenyan–Danish Olympian) experience when making claims to Danish identity. It also explains the relative ease with which Crown Princess Mary Donaldson and a select few like her can achieve legitimacy for their identity claims from native Danes.

Knud Jespersen (2004) provided a historical analysis that outlined the evolution of Danish national identity in relation to the development of the Danish state. Jespersen said, "The Danes are not a nation . . . they are a tribe. This is the strength of their fellowship and the reason that they have unshakable trust in each other"[1] (3–4). When describing the Danish national character, Jespersen highlighted the concept of folkelighed (popular democracy). He argued that this emerged because the Danes had no history of class struggle or socialism as punctuated and observed in the development of other European states. Rather, the Danish state—and the resulting political culture—centers on the notion of popular equality that politically expresses itself as a culture of consensus rather than one of direct conflict (31–38).

While Jespersen's explanation for the Danish national character explains some aspects of Danishness, it only scratches the surface and still does not provide a practical and useful conceptualization of what it means to be Danish. The notion of popular equality and the inclusion of immigrants and ethnic populations also become problematic when examining the social location of ethnic denizens and their descendants in contemporary Denmark. I return to the question posed earlier—to what extent can legal citizenship, as Riva Kastoryano (2002) defines it, be a solution to social exclusion and simultaneously be inclusive of demands for equality? Specifically, how can the social inclusion of ethnic populations be achieved within a political culture that prefers consensus rather than conflict?

Patrick Kingsley (2012), a British expatriate with frequent travels to Denmark, expressed similar difficulty with defining

Danishness in his book entitled, "How to be Danish from Lego to Lund . . ." While the book title is tongue-in-cheek, he aptly describes the collective fear among native Danes that their culture and identity are changing due to multiculturalism. In a chapter called, "Being Danish: the Immigrant's Dilemma," Kingsley describes watching a Danish news program where Mogens Camre, a politician from the far-right Dansk Folkeparti, and Fatih Alev, a liberal, Danish-born Muslim imam, were participating in a panel discussion on how to integrate the growing number of Muslim denizens living in Denmark. The pleasant conversation quickly becomes hostile, when Camre snaps to Alev, "You have come to this country. Who do you think you are?" Alev calmly counters, "I was born in this country. I'm not an immigrant." Camre angrily counters, "Stay in your country. Denmark is my country. You need to respect your fellow citizens. Du er ikke medborger I mit land (you are not a fellow citizen)" (97–99). This exchange between Camre and Alev highlights the reluctance by many native Danes to view ethnic Danes like Alev as equal citizens and new Danes like Kipketer as potential citizens. It also underscores the default position held by many Danes to define Danishness in opposition to a racialized or religious other.

Some social scientists have attributed exchanges like the one between Camre and Alev to a lack of social trust and few positive social contacts between and among native Danes and ethnics, especially Muslims. Christian Albrekt Larsen's (2013) book aptly explains the conditions associated with how and why social cohesion and social trust rise and decline in societies. Albrekt Larsen offered two critical operational definitions that are highly salient to examining the evident lack of trust between native Danes and ethnic populations. First, he defined social cohesion as "the belief—held by citizens in a given nation state—that they share a moral community which enables them to trust each other." Second, he defined social trust and distrust toward fellow citizens as being "understood as judgments depending on citizens' perceptions of

the society in which they live." For him, this definition hinges on the subjective perception of trust, which can be influenced by the "real" events of any given society. But he argues that it is most heavily influenced by the individual or collective perceptions of "real" events (Albrekt Larsen, 2013: 3–4). Albrekt Larsen's main thesis is that the Danes and the Swedes have high levels of social cohesion and social trust within their respective groups. Trust and social cohesion exist because people perceive their fellow citizen as generally equal to themselves and therefore trustworthy. Albrekt Larsen's thesis does not directly incorporate perceptions and attitudes about immigrant populations into his trust and social cohesion analysis. He does acknowledge that ethnic heterogeneity presents the greatest challenge to societies with high trust and cohesion like Denmark and Sweden.

Bülent Diken (1998) highlights the notion that immigrants are considered "strangers inside and outside of Denmark." He argues that immigrants represent a growing Danish underclass that is not only economically marginalized but is also culturally isolated. He argues that much of this is caused by the immigrants themselves and what he describes as a lack of cultural capital, resistance to live among native Danes, and ineffective and infrequent connections to the Danish labor market (Diken, 1998: 65–69). Citing Richard Sennett's (2001) theory of "social touching," Diken ironically viewed neighborhoods like Nørrebro as potential sites for melting the cultural boundaries between and among ethnics and native Danes.

As I have noted throughout this chapter, the conflation exists multicultural and immigrant discourse as being indistinguishable from conversations about Islam by political, social, and media actors. This poses an interesting question related to the rhetorical themes: Is the resistance toward viewing Denmark as a multicultural society with a more inclusive definition of Danishness more about fear of Muslims than about negative feelings about immigration or ethnics in general?

Andrew Buckser's (2003) ethnography of Jewish identity and community in present-day Denmark presents an interesting and illuminating view into a possible test case of this issue. His study allows us to explore the ability of Danish identity to integrate a group of religious "others." In his excellent ethnographic study, Buckser explores how despite a backdrop of anti-Semitism that existed in most of Europe before and after the Holocaust, Jews in Denmark thrived and became a fixed and consistent part of the Danish middle class. He states, "Denmark was not a paradise for Jews, and many forms of discrimination survived the establishment of Jewish citizenship in 1814. [Despite the presence of discrimination,] . . . Jews became steadily more accepted as they immersed themselves in Danish culture; their living standards rose, some became leaders of science and industry, and the anti-Semitism of the larger society grew steadily less pernicious" (Buckser, 2003: 2–3).

Buckser also notes that as the Holocaust spread throughout Europe in the 1940s, the Danish government and citizens (almost unanimously) refused to join other nations that either abandoned or actively persecuted Jews during the German occupation. Danes even went a step further—refusing to turn over Jews to the Nazis who demanded their execution. ". . . Alone in occupied Europe, Denmark saved almost all of its Jews from the Holocaust, and in the years afterward Denmark blotted anti-Semitism almost completely from its culture" (2–3). This is a narrative that many present-day Danes still evoke with national pride and discuss openly in casual conversation: how the Danes stood up to the Nazis in defense of a religious "other" or minority group in their country and at a time when most of Europe did not. Yet—and ironically—despite this historical pride among most native Danes, many of the recent xenophobic incidents committed by anti-immigrant and extreme individuals and groups often make use of holocaust and anti-Semitic symbols such as swastikas and Nazi emblems—not toward Danish Jews but rather toward the growing Muslim populations in present-day Denmark.

Buckser describes the present-day Danish Jewry as a tight-knit community of a few thousand people who are highly concentrated in Greater Copenhagen. He argues that this group also represents a series of contradictions and requires us to reconsider traditional definitions of community and how individuals function in every-day life. Some of these contradictions include what he describes as a strong awareness and acknowledgment of Jewish identity and interest in the Jewish world. Despite the strong collective identity, most Danish Jews are fractured and disagree (at the individual and small-group levels) on many aspects of Jewish life and tradi-tions. He also asserts that many Danish Jews are physically indis-tinguishable from traditional native Danes and resemble them in terms of race and most physical attributes (171–179). As Buckser aptly describes in his book, Denmark came closer than any other country in fulfilling its promise made to the Jews post-World War II. But when considering the other (and perhaps more con-troversial) religious minority to experience a modern-day diaspora throughout Europe, the Muslims, one must question why and how Danish Jews assimilated into Danish culture so seamlessly?

The Great Orthodox Synagogue (called Synagogen I Krystalgade in Danish) serves as the main Jewish worship site in Denmark and is located in the heart of Central Copenhagen. It looks (from the out-side) like any other historical and architecturally endowed building in the area. It has few of the signature and traditional markings of other large synagogues that I have visited in the United States and other parts of the world. This building, like many of the Danish Jewry, exists but is almost hidden from plain sight for the casual observer. I lived in Denmark for almost two years and frequently return for research, and I observed few obvious visual indicators of a Jewish presence in Copenhagen. There are no shops that exclu-sively carry kosher products; Jewish characters or actors do not fea-ture prominently on Danish television programs, films, or radio. There are no ethnic enclave employment chains, such as jewelry districts and fur/clothing manufacturing business districts—as

existing in other major cities with Jewish populations. Of the few Jewish civic and cultural organizations that exist in Denmark, none openly recruit for members or advertise their events in the media or other mainstream channels.

Buckser explores two central research questions that provide insight into the unanticipated consequences of the seamless integration of Jews in Denmark: "As Jewishness becomes a chosen identity, and as it co-exists with non-religious national and regional identities, what becomes of Jewish community and tradition? Can the different elements of the Jewish tradition—its institutions, its beliefs, its folklore, and so on—survive outside of a milieu that forcibly binds them together? Will they simply dissolve, withering under the onslaught of secularizing modernity? Or will they change into something new, finding new forms of relevance and meaning in an open society?" (3).

Buckser's questions are highly salient to my analysis of Danishness and my own questions about whether or not this seemingly imagined and manufactured identity has the capacity to absorb ethnic and immigrant populations—absorb them how and in what ways? How will the notion of Danishness (the real, the manufactured, and the imagined) be transformed by the natives, ethnics, and new Danes that now embody and make claims to it?

To explore these questions, I return to Kastoryano's (2002) thesis of citizenship identity that asserts that states have the ability (and willingness) to resolve claims for social inclusion. For Kastoryano, the state has the capacity to focus the public's perceptions of foreigners to one of potential citizens rather than that of problematic outsiders. As noted throughout and as Camre's comments highlighted above clearly demonstrate, most political actors focus public attention on the integration process as a one-sided process or experience where the ethnic, immigrant, or new Dane must change to become Danish. The new Danes must incorporate and practice the packaged and narrowly constructed notion of Danish identity acquired during the Danish

History and Culture course mandated within the provisions of the Integration Act.

To date, the Danish state has not utilized its ability to focus public attention in the ways described by Kastoryano. In fact, little attention is paid to how native Danes and Danish society will also have to adapt and change to growing multiculturalism. Danishness, as an identity construct, will need to become more elastic and public perceptions toward it will also have to bend into a more inclusive view of ethnic Danes, denizens, and naturalized immigrants as citizens (or at least potential citizens) with equal rights, protections, and duties.

Deconstructing Danishness

As noted throughout, the default position of the Danish government and many native Danes has been to define the immigrant or foreign national by his or her country of origin, color, or religion. Then, the Danish identity is constructed in opposition to the characteristics of "the other." Here, I use the data gathered through my interviews and my observational data to answer how Danish identity has been constructed by actors in response to increased diversity and as reflected within recent changes to immigration and integration policies. Specifically, I show how Danish national identity is being manufactured and reproduced. During the life-history interviews, I asked the native-Dane spouses of my respondents, native-Dane instructors at the language schools, and social workers who work with immigrants to describe Danishness to me. As noted earlier, it was very clear that becoming Danish is expected but undefined. Because of this, I decided early in this research that exploring Danishness was critical to understanding how immigrants, ethnics, and native Danes negotiate their respective identities within this cultural expectation and what this expectation meant to them. Two concepts were described consistently by the majority of my respondents: Janteloven and hygge.

Janteloven as Cultural Narrative

This concept stems from the fictional novel by Aksel Sandemose, who portrayed life in a small Danish town where no one is anonymous and whose inhabitants live their lives guided by the Law of Jante. As Table 3.1 demonstrates, the Law of Jante asserts that everyone is equal, everyone should be treated the same, everyone should conform and should not stand out. According to my respondents, the Law of Jante is used today as a means to discourage individual achievement as paramount over collective welfare and the common good. The denizens, ethnics, and new Danes describe in great detail how this emphasis on the collective as

Table 3.1   The Jante Law (Danish to English Translation)

Danish	English
1. Du skal ikke tro, du er noget	1. Don't think you're anything special
2. Du skal ikke tro, at du er lige så meget som os	2. Don't think you're as good as us
3. Du skal ikke tro, at du er klogere end os	3. Don't think you're smarter than us
4. Du skal ikke bilde dig ind, at duer bedre end os	4. Don't convince yourself that you're better than us
5. Du skal ikke tro, at du ved mere end os	5. Don't think you know more than us
6. Du skal ikke tro, at du er mere end os	6. Don't think that you are more important than us
7. Du skal ikke tro, at du dur til noget	7. Don't think that you are good at anything
8. Du skal ikke le ad os	8. Don't laugh at us
9. Du skal ikke tro, at nogen bryder sig om dig	9. Don't think anyone cares about you
10. Du skal ikke tro, at du kan lære os noget	10. Don't think you can teach us anything

Sources: Andersen, S., 1992; http://sandemose.dk/projekt99/bibliotek/artikler/jantebrug.html; Foreigners in Denmark Organization 2012. http://www.foreignersindenmark.dk/display.cfm?article=1000552&p=1000549&page=Jante+Law.

superior to the accomplishments of the individual manifests for them in everyday interactions with native Danes.

Most of the native Danes I asked about Janteloven viewed the concept as old fashioned—almost quaint or stereotypical Danishness. Yet all of my native-Dane respondents named the concept as the main marker of Danishness and generally viewed it as something positive in terms of the values that the concept promoted (collective identity, solidarity, equality, and humility). As a result, these native Danes viewed the Janteloven as something that positively connected them to other Danes and, to a certain degree, to other Nordic people.

Many of my ethnic and immigrant respondents viewed the Janteloven quite differently from native Danes. While the use of the Jante to discourage individual achievement and self-importance was viewed as positive by the native Danes, many ethnic and immigrant respondents viewed this as a negative aspect of Danishness.

Patricia, 40 years old, is from Venezuela and came to Denmark in 2001 to be with Jens, 45, her native-Dane husband whom she met while he was working for a Danish firm with offices located in Venezuela. Patricia is petite (in height and physique) with very long, jet-black curly hair. She has a caramel-colored complexion and speaks in a soft, melodic tone that is infectious to listen to and that immediately grabs your attention. Her personality is very warm and inviting—she has a way of making people instantly comfortable with her. Jens is an extremely tall (even by Nordic standards) and muscular person with light brown hair and blue eyes. The couple, married in 2002, are physically and character-istically opposite in every way. Jens was more reserved when I first interviewed them in 2004. He was evasive and reluctant to concretely describe Danish culture when first asked. By the sec-ond interview in 2008, he was more open in his responses about Danish culture. I asked him to describe Danishness, and Jens immediately starting talking about the Janteloven. He only said

one sentence before Patricia cut him off and said, "I absolutely hate that Janteloven." She took particular objection to several Jante laws—Law # 1 (Don't think you're anything special); Law # 4 (Don't convince yourself that you're better than us); and Law # 7 (Don't think that you are good at anything).

When I asked her to elaborate, she said,

> It is worst thing about Denmark—to celebrate nothing and to not acknowledge people who are exceptional. I know that everyone is supposed to be the same, but we are not! Come on, Jens, you know this is true. There are people in this world who really have talents and gifts that should be praised and nurtured. How do you raise children who have something special about them but they grow up never being praised for it or spend their whole life suppressing it just to fit into some stupid Jante? It is a tragedy, really.

After listening to Patricia for a while, Jens agreed with her perceptions about the Janteloven. He said,

> I never really looked at it that way until I lived in other places (Venezuela and the United States) where it is more individual focused. When I had my son (Jens was married previously and has a teenage son from that marriage), I was very conscious not to raise him with the Janteloven. We praised him when he did something well and things like that. This is hard for many Danes because we are taught not to make yourself get the big head or to show-off . . .

Patricia interrupted him again and said,

> How is it showing-off if it is true and you are really exceptional at something? That is something about this place I will never understand.

Patricia's assimilation experience was very similar to that of Milagros (from Brazil) (discussed in Chapter 1). Like Milagros, Patricia is also highly fluent in Danish but speaks with a notable

accent. She also works for a Danish firm and has completed all of the required parts of the Introduction Program mandated by the Integration Act. Similar to Milagros, she has also placed a clear line of demarcation between her work and home life. Patricia works at a social agency that provides labor training and career mentorship opportunities to immigrant and ethnic-born women. Despite the population that her company serves, she notes that she is one of only two ethnic people who work there at a managerial level. Patricia described several examples of how she experienced the Janteloven in her everyday life at work. She said,

> I will tell you how stupid this law is. When I was searching for a job (after completing her language studies and before obtaining her current job), Jens told me, "You will never find a job with this CV. We (Danes) would never say these things. They (Danes) will think you are big-headed or difficult and will not interview you." *What do you mean by this?*

> I have worked for years in Venezuela and in the US before coming to Denmark and [on a CV] we talk about our achievements at work, projects that I managed, and innovations that I was responsible for. This is normal there. But here, NO. Because of that stupid law, I have to downplay what I can do and say what "we" can do. "We" did not do it—"I" did it. It took me over one year to find a job here because I would not listen to him (Jens).

Both laughed and Jens nodded affirmatively:

> As soon as I changed the "I's" to "we's," I got this job (laughing). Then I had to keep doing it (practicing the Jante) every day at work. In my first month there, I created a better system for tracking our clients—to make it more efficient. I kept waiting for someone to say "good job" or "thank you for making our jobs much easier," but that never came because of that stupid law. It is not that I need constant praise but it is human to want acknowledgement for your hard work. Am I right?

What is most salient about this exchange between Patricia and Jens over developing her résumé for a Danish job market and audience is that it highlights Jante Law # 5 (Don't think you know more than us). The use of "I" created versus "we" or "my colleagues and I created . . ." shows how this way of expressing individual achievement is frowned upon in Danish culture. If she did not have Jens to explain this cultural nuance to her, Patricia may have continued to search for work and never understood why she was not being called in for interviews. This is another example of how many of the ethnics in my sample have notable advantages over other immigrants and ethnics with less human capital and less frequent access to native Danes as cultural insiders.

In addition, Patricia's example of creating the more efficient client-tracking system and the perceived lack of appreciation from her co-workers highlights Jante Law # 10 (Don't think you can teach us anything). Again, without the assistance of her husband or another cultural insider, she may not have been aware of the context for her co-workers' reactions to this innovation. Also, without this understanding of the Jante, she might not have been empowered to develop a coping mechanism to help her adapt her workplace behavior to be aligned with the Jante (similar to what Seeberg [2002] describes as "negotiated integration").

Farah, a 23-year-old ethnic Dane, never experienced Janteloven until she started making native-Dane friends at school and having interactions with her Danish teachers despite the fact that her Iranian mother encouraged her to fully embrace Danish culture from an early age. Farah described an incident at school that happened soon after she came to Denmark from Iran. In commenting on her early impressions of the Janteloven, she said,

> I remember being in the grundskole var (primary school in Danish) and my mother brought me a new doll after the Christmas holiday. I was so excited so I begged her to bring it to school and my mother allowed me. I was showing the doll to some Danish

friends at school and the teacher got so angry with me and told me to put the doll away and told me not to show off or to get a big head about getting such a fancy doll. I don't know why that was the first thing that came to my mind but I will always remember that example because at the time, as a young girl, I could not figure out what I did that was so wrong.

What is so salient about Farah's memory of the doll is that as a child it was difficult for her to understand why her teacher was so angry with her. Without realizing it, Farah being so proud of the doll violated Jante Law # 1 (Don't think you're anything special) and she became noticeably upset when sharing this story with me.

The Practice of Hygge

This second concept most commonly used to describe Danish culture is difficult to translate to English but is often described as coziness, a comfortable and cheerful atmosphere. This is a term used by Danes to describe home and family life and it is a term that is reserved for those who are allowed into one's private realm. I experienced hygge during the birthday party at the kollegium. The native Danes, ethnic Danes, and immigrants that I interviewed also viewed this concept differently. The native Danes described hygge as something almost sacred and reserved for those who you are most intimate with—family and close friends.

Adriana's (from Brazil) husband, Erik, described hygge as something that is to be experienced and something that is uniquely Danish. He said,

> This hard to describe in English because nothing is really the same. It is the feeling you have being with those you love, having them at home and spending quality time. It is even in how you arrange your home, the table and candles [the way the dinner table is set] to create that cozy feeling.

Why do you say that this is unique to Denmark?

I don't know . . . it is hard to say but I know I have not experienced it any place else that I have been. Of course, I had special times with Adriana's family when we lived in Brazil but it was different—maybe it is how we do it. I really can't explain it to you but another Dane would understand what I am trying to say.

When I asked Farah and Benjie (two ethnic Danes who grew up in Denmark) to describe Janteloven and hygge, both acknowledged the concepts as part of native Danish identity but neither said that these concepts were part of their personal sense of Danish identity as ethnic Danes—which was notably different from the native Danes that I spoke with. Both Benjie and Farah recalled experiencing the Janteloven and the hygge but both said that they only experienced them with their native Dane friends and a few other ethnic Danes.

Some ethnics that I spoke with viewed hygge more as spectacle, strange and, in some cases, even nationalistic. I also agreed with these opinions when I was first exposed to hygge at the birthday party at the kollegium. Like several of my ethnic respondents said and based on my own experience living in Denmark, the quintessential and almost stereotypical representation of hygge is the traditional Julefrokost (Christmas lunch in Danish). Teaching us (the visiting American scholars) how to properly behave at a Julefrokost was part of the official orientation program at the Danish-American Fulbright Commission. On the first weekend in September, the organizers held a dress rehearsal Christmas lunch with most of the traditional rituals (some of the food and drink items are only available during the Christmas season). Even though it was September, our program directors created the full experience by decorating their conference room with Christmas decorations they brought in from home, a small table-sized Christmas tree decorated with white lights and paper garlands made from stringing a series of the Danish national flags together.

The conference table was set with red linen tablecloths, fine china, silver flatware, and white linen napkins with the Danish flag on it. The traditional Julefrokost meal consists of either duck or, more commonly, pork roast, served with different potato sides—most notably sugared potatoes. The other items typically served are an assortment of pickled herrings, breads, fruit, sweets, and desserts, including a dish called Ris a la Mande (rice with almonds), which looks like rice pudding but has a thicker consistency like American-style mashed potatoes. Serving this dish is part of a party game called Mandelgaven (The Almond Gift), where one whole almond is hidden in one of the plates of Ris a la Mande. The one who gets the almond wins a special almond gift—usually a well-chosen but inexpensive present bought especially for this purpose.

Of course (like most things Danish), there is a rule that must always be followed. The one who finds the almond must hide it and not reveal the win until everyone has eaten their full portions of the dish. The person who breaks this rule will be considered extremely rude and unmannered by the host. The Directors explained the directions and rules to the American scholars before we played the game.

There is no shortage of alcohol at this event, including beer and wine, but the signature drinks are Gløgg (red wine that is served warm with cinnamon and other mulled spices) and Aquavit or Snaps (pronounced like Schnapps). These were also served during the orientation despite the fact that the session was being held at 10:00 a.m. Similar to the birthday party at the kollegium, this meal is also punctuated with several speeches and traditional Danish Christmas carols. At the time, I dismissed this training, but by the time the Christmas season began, I was invited to several Julefrokosts (one was held at the kollegium) and they all went according to the rituals described at the orientation program. Thanks to the careful training, I did not embarrass myself at these events.

The rule and ritual of concealing the win from the host and other guests until all have finished eating during the Mandelgaven demonstrates how hygge is neatly aligned with several tenants of the Janteloven, most notably, Jante Law # 1 (Don't think you're anything special) and Jante Law # 5 (Don't think you know more than us).

A similar rehearsal Julefrokost was also taught to me as one of the learning modules included in the Danish History and Culture course mandated by the Integration Act. I experienced the lesson firsthand and I also observed two different cohorts of immigrant and ethnic students also experience this lesson in their respective courses—which I will describe in greater detail later in this chapter. While I acknowledge that the Julefrokost is an extreme representation of hygge, my respondents and I also experienced more everyday examples and manifestations of this concept. These can also include everyday lunches or dinners at home with native Danish family and friends.

Regardless of the size (or even seemingly casual nature) of the event, hygge is typically planned to perfection by the host and noted in a native Dane's calendar weeks, and perhaps even months, in advance. Milagros, 20 years old and who came from Brazil to Denmark in 2000, had the most interesting opinion of her experiences with hygge when describing an unannounced visit to her mother-in-law's home. She said (in 2004),

> The Danish are so strange with this hygge thing. They say that it means cozy, warm feeling but going to their houses is nothing like that. They act like it is such in inconvenience to have one or two people over at a time and serve coffee and some pastries (laughing). In my country, people are always coming by and doors are always open to friends and family. At my house (in Brazil), my cousins and other family would just stop by. You might have 15 or 20 people in the house but we would serve them real food (a complete meal) and drinks and it was no big deal—you were happy to

do it. But not with the Danish. When we first came here, I went to Richard's mother's house without an appointment. Oh my God that was so bad. I was shopping in that part of København and thought it would be nice to just go by to say hello. She was polite but after she told Richard how upset she was that I did not make an appointment first. How is that hyggelit? I can only feel cozy warm when I have an appointment? [laughing].

When I asked her (in 2008) if this early incident with her mother-in-law had changed any in the eight years following, Milagros said that she still interacts in a similar way with her husband's family and other Danes from work. She said that she has changed her reaction to it. She said,

> I don't try to fight it anymore. Do I still think that it is strange that Richard has to make an appointment to see his mother and his brothers? Yes but now I know it is just how it is here. I don't take it personally anymore.

Sabrina came to Denmark in 2000 from South Africa with her native-Dane husband. I interviewed Sabrina on three separate occasions (2001, 2004, and 2008). When I asked (in 2008) her to reflect on her first impressions of native Danes, she said, "It was a huge culture shock; people were shut down. It was not what I thought it would be like."

> *When you say, "shut down" what do you mean?*
>
> For example, when I came here, I did not know any of my neighbors. I don't think that I had ever seen any of them or spoken to any of them and for me, that was crazy. Because where I came from, your door is always open. I also lived in a flat all my life but I knew my neighbors. I mean we spoke, we go into their homes—especially if it is an old lady; you would bring them food and check in on them. Even when you meet someone, you have a good

time—hyggelit, then you never hear from them again. I mean, what the hell? What is going on here? Looking back on it now, I don't think people were being mean. That is just how Danish people are and that is the way that life is set up here. Back then, I thought it was the Twilight Zone [laughing].

Both Milagros and Sabrina describe the contrasting meanings associated with the practice of hygge. As Erik (Adriana's native-Dane husband) noted, his experience practicing hygge was something uniquely Danish where the event is planned so that the people who attend experience coziness and warmth. I also experienced this emotion at the birthday party and the Julefrokost at the kollegium but at these same events, I also experienced feelings of exclusion and isolation similar to someone being on the outside of an inside joke. Similar to Milagros' experience with her mother-in-law, many of my respondents also described their respective experiences with hygge as a series of contrasts—experiencing the intended warmth but also experiencing its practice as awkward, artificial, and forced.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I showed how Danish identity has been constructed by political and social actors. With the passage of the Integration Act, I argued that Danishness has also been manufactured and then packaged to ethnics and immigrants in several ways. These manufactured notions of Danishness are experienced by ethnics and immigrants in everyday interactions with native Danes. The interview data presented in this chapter explored how new Danes encounter and negotiate the cornerstones of Danish identity: the practices of Janteloven and hygge. These articulations of Danishness exist formally within the contents of the Danish History and Culture course. But they can also be found and lived informally in the workplace and at home.

The Integration Act and Manufactured Danishness

This chapter answers the following research question: How do immigrants and ethnics experience the integration requirements and restrictive social policies in Denmark? To answer this question, I performed a critical analysis of the curriculum for the Danish History and Culture course as mandated within the Integration Act. In addition to content analysis, I also use observational and survey data to explore ethnic and new Dane experiences with the formal processes associated with their integration into Denmark.

The provisions of the Integration Act require new Danes and ethnic Danes seeking Danish citizenship to complete a three-part Introduction Program, which consists of Danish language courses, completion of the Danish History and Culture course, and an individualized work activation plan. According to the law, the Introduction Program must begin within one month of arrival (if an immigrant) or of filing the request for citizenship consideration (if a denizen). The process begins with an initial meeting with an Integration Consultant at the municipal office. During this initial meeting, the Integration Consultant makes an

assessment of the person's previous education and labor market participation and the skills that he/she has. The primary purpose of this meeting is to create an individual "action plan" that is to be followed by the applicant for the next three years. As part of the action plan, the Integration Consultant also makes referrals as needed for additional language and culture courses, social assistance, and educational or labor-training programs.

According to the legislation, the primary purpose of the course is to "impart the immigrant with a fundamental knowledge of Danish history and culture." This purpose is the most widely contested part because some argue that the curriculum developed for the Danish Culture and History course creates a narrow and stereotypical construct for Danishness. My data also highlight this assessment and, as a result, I argue that this course represents a prepackaged notion of Danishness that both the native-Dane instructors and many of their ethnic students view as stereotypical, rigid, and almost a spectacle. I also argue that this construction of Danishness is also used as a tool designed to exclude many ethnic Danes from making identity claims by making the completion of the three parts of the Introduction Program a prerequisite condition for citizenship acquisition.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE DANISH HISTORY AND CULTURE COURSE

The Danish History and Culture course is divided into six weekly learning modules, with each module lasting about three hours, and the modules are based on the following topics: General Introduction to Life in Denmark; Danish History and Political Systems; Everyday Living in Denmark; Getting around Your City (Copenhagen); Danish Labor Market and Educational System; and Integration: Living in a New Land. These module titles are listed in the Integration Brochure that I was given by my Integration Caseworker in 2001. The data presented below are based on a series

of interviews with directors and social workers/case managers. First, I conducted in-depth interviews with each of the three directors at the respective language schools: Sprogcentret Kigkurren and the Center for Beskæftigelse, Sprog og Integration (CBSI). Then, I conducted another series of interviews with three social workers who were responsible for referring the majority of new immigrants to the Copenhagen municipality for language classes and work training at these schools. These referrals typically occurred with new immigrants and ethnic Danes. The purpose was to establish the action plan for their Introduction Program.

Students were grouped into cohorts by primary language spoken, educational attainment (and literacy level), and place of residence (section of Copenhagen). In terms of place of residence, students who lived in ethnic sections of Copenhagen were deliberately dispersed into cohorts with students who lived in other (non-ethnic) sections of the city. This was done to ensure the municipality's compliance with the residential and housing provisions of the Integration Act. Nørrebro is the largest ethnic enclave and is where the largest language center (CBSI) is located. Amager is the second-largest ethnic enclave and where the second language center (Sprogcentret Kigkurren) is located. There are smaller concentrations of ethnic populations in the Valby, Enghave, and Frederiksberg sections of Copenhagen county.

The instructors for the culture courses were selected by the Center Directors of the respective language schools and were predominantly native Danes. At the Sprogcentret Kigkurren (2001), out of 25 instructors for the culture class, only 2 were ethnic Danes, and at the CBSI (2008), out of 50 instructors for this class, 7 were ethnic Danes. While many of the instructors at the Sprogcentret Kigkurren and the CBSI held graduate degrees in education or were certified (at the Baccalaureate level) as social pedagogues (direct-care social workers), some instructors teaching this course had little professional or educational experience teaching culture to adult learners. In addition to the instructors leading

the class, in some cases translators were also provided by the government to assist with class instruction in the student cohort's primary language. The use of the translator, while practical, created an awkward classroom dynamics in terms of the teacher–student interaction, which will be discussed in greater detail below.

KEY OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS—CLASSROOM DYNAMICS

In the spring of 2000, Sine Grumlose, a Danish researcher from the University of Copenhagen, conducted a qualitative study of the History and Culture course conducted in Copenhagen. She participated in a course for Chinese immigrants and conducted interviews with the teacher, the students enrolled, and the coordinator of the course for the language school. Her study also consisted of a comparative analysis of the course objectives as outlined by the Danish government within the Integration Act and the course content and teaching pedagogy as implemented.

Grumlose (2000) found a disjunction between the objectives outlined within the Integration Act and the implementation of the culture courses. The law states that the objective of the course is to "offer [an] understanding of Danish society" in order to ease the transition into Danish culture (Integration Act, 1998: 6). However, the legislation does not specifically indicate how this objective will be achieved and no teaching pedagogy or standard curriculum had been created on the national level at the time of her study. Therefore, the local authorities were left to interpret the above teaching objectives on their own, with minimal guidance.

My research supports Grumlose's findings that the autonomy given to the local authorities to create the curriculum for this course led to inconsistent applications of the legislation at the municipal and site (within and across language schools) levels. It would have been more beneficial to students and instructors to have had approved course materials to be utilized in all

municipalities where this course was offered. When I asked the director of Sprogcentret Kigkurren (in 2001) why there was no uniform text for this course, she said that the instructors and she preferred this because it allowed for instructor discretion on what to include (and exclude) from the course delivery. She argued that this discretion also fostered greater interaction between the instructor and student to "shape the curriculum together."

In my course (2001), there was no textbook; rather the instructor used photocopied news articles and chapters from English-language textbooks describing Danish history and political events as the required materials for the course. These materials were given out at the start of each course module, and the teacher gave the impression that these items were created with little advance preparation as she neither had a prepared presentation based on the reading nor a formal lesson plan. She distributed the materials the week before each module, and on the day of the module she opened each class with questions and comments on the readings. There was little structure to the class discussions, which consisted of a free-flowing conversation among students with the teacher interjecting at points.

My instructor, Birgitte, was a strikingly tall, blonde woman with blue eyes, and she appeared to be about 35–40 years old. On the first day of class, Birgitte introduced herself, and we (my classmates and I) introduced ourselves to her and each other. The class had seven people (three men and four women)—three people from the United States, one from Canada, two from the United Kingdom, and one from Australia. Birgitte asked us to also share the reasons that we came to Denmark. I was the only person in the class who did not come to Denmark for family reunification. I told them that I came to Denmark to study for one year as a graduate student at Roskilde University.

We covered the modules in the order listed above. Of the six modules, the ones with the most inconsistent curriculum development and instructional delivery were the following two: Everyday

Living in Denmark; and Integration: Living in a New Land (based on my observations and the previous research by Grumlose, 2000; Schou and Sharpes, 2007). In all three studies, due to a lack of an agreed-upon textbook or uniform course material, the instructors were given wide discretion on how best to introduce these topics to their respective students.

Based on the handouts (provided by Birgitte) given out at the beginning of the course, the module on Everyday Living would address daily life in Denmark, consisting of everything from where to grocery shop and how to purchase a monthly subway pass to how Danes spend their vacation time in the country homes outside of Copenhagen. The Integration module would address cultural norms and explain to new Danes how native Danes live and behave.

Birgitte described Janteloven and hygge as the two concepts that most defined Danish culture during the module on Integration. Her discussion of the Janteloven was quite similar to the descriptions from my native-Dane respondents (discussed earlier). She explained the origin of the concept, and the response from my class was most notable because all of us asked many questions about how and why Danes use this concept. She patiently addressed each of our questions, but her answers maintained a consistent theme of "this is just how Danes are," rather than providing in-depth detail on how this concept became culturally embedded. This omission might be more of a function of Birgitte's lack of training on teaching culture rather than a conscious attempt to evade a deeper discussion on Danish culture. The lack of training on how to approach issues of culture in the classroom may account for the numerous instances of stereotyped and narrowly constructed notions of Danish identity noted in the Grumlose study.

The class discussion quickly turned when the British man in the class asked the following question: "If Danes believe this Jante that everyone is equal and no one is better than anyone else then why do they have such problems with immigrants coming to

Denmark?" Birgitte's face flushed, but she answered the question by saying that most Danes are not opposed to immigration in general but there have been many problems with some groups not integrating into Danish society and this is why the government created the Integration Law and this course to help resolve the problems.

To demonstrate hygge, Birgitte chose to use the last half of the class to simulate a Julefrokost (Danish Christmas Lunch) similar in message but much smaller in scale than the one that I had previously experienced at the Fulbright orientation. Also, because my class occurred in February, all but one of the persons in the class had already experienced attending a Julefrokost with family or friends, which made the discussion move quickly. The questions from the class focused on why the holiday is celebrated in Denmark with such ritual and spectacle. Class members also shared their likes and dislikes of the traditional Danish foods served. Birgitte did not share her personal likes and dislikes and was more removed from the conversation—serving more as moderator than as contributor. Despite this more neutral position on this topic, she repeated the previous pattern of answering questions or comments with the theme of "this is just how Danes are."

When I observed these two modules being taught to the cohort of Russian-speaking students and another cohort of English-speaking students (in 2008), I found that the instructor of both cohorts also chose (similar to my instructor, Birgitte) to discuss the Janteloven, hygge, and the Julefrokost for describing Danish culture in their respective classes. The major difference that I observed was that the course materials distributed to each class were the same and included a prepared assortment of articles (in English) prepared by educators and social scientists on these concepts rather than the homemade handouts that Birgitte provided my class. Because this instructor used peer-reviewed articles, the students benefited from alternate views (other than the teacher) on what these concepts meant in terms of their increased knowledge about

these parts of Danish identity. This difference (in terms of more-structured learning materials) also reflected the changes made by the course coordinators at the language schools who standardized the course materials for all classes. This time the instructors were given prepared materials that had to be distributed for each module. All of the instructors that I spoke with enjoyed this change but quickly noted that they still had the discretion to add to these prepared materials in order to enhance instruction.

Despite the changes made in course uniformity, I found that the instructors were not able to draw upon a standard operational definition for integration. This is an important step that is missing from the legislation (the Integration Act) and course objectives. The lack of a formal definition raised more questions than answers—Does integration mean assimilation or accommodation? How does the Danish government define a multicultural society and does it see Danish society becoming this in the future? These questions permeated the classroom discussions that I observed.

This lack of a definition implies that the Danish government has no clear conceptual or operational model for incorporating immigrants into its society. Without clear definitions for these concepts and without somewhat uniform answers to the questions posed above, there is no consistent way to test for efficacy. In other words, how can the practitioners of and participants in these courses assess their progress? On a practical level, how can one know what it means to be successfully integrated into the Danish society? To date, there is no standard available to measure whether or not the policies and programs implemented under the Integration Act are effective or have achieved the stated objective of "assisting in ensuring that newly arrived aliens can participate in the life of society in terms of politics, economy, employment, social activities, religion and culture on an equal footing with other citizens" (Integration Act, 1998: 1).

While some of my observations and recommendations echoed those of previous studies (Grumlose, 2000), my findings differed

in several important ways. First, my observations of the two Danish culture classes found that the students appeared to be quite satisfied with the teaching pedagogy used by this instructor. In the English-speaking cohort, I observed a high degree of respect and comfort between the teacher and the students. The students were extremely vocal in the class, feeling free to interrupt the teacher and contribute to the discussion at hand. Despite the fact that both courses had the same instructor, the Russian-speaking cohort was not as vocal during the modules observed. I believe that the classroom conditions, not necessarily the teaching pedagogy, were the cause for less classroom participation on the part of the students. For the Russian cohort, the teacher's lesson in Danish (with some thoughts communicated in English) and student comments in Russian were translated back and forth by a Russian/Danish-speaking translator. Even though some students exhibited a high level of English comprehension, the majority of the discussion occurred through translation from Danish to Russian and vice versa. Therefore, the discussion did not appear to be very natural since there were delays in the conversation due to the time taken for translation. This made a free exchange of ideas somewhat difficult to achieve under these conditions. Despite the awkwardness of the translating process, I also observed that both the instructor and the students were still very comfortable with each other. This was evident by a large amount of laughter and joking during the discussions and the relaxed body language displayed on the part of both the students and the teacher.

Second, the teacher of both cohorts used a student-centered pedagogical style where the goals and objectives of the course were mutually agreed upon before the start of each module. She effectively explained each module of the course and her plan for addressing it and asked the students to assist her in developing changes or additions to her course plan. Based on my observations of the English-speaking cohort, the course plan, in terms of how these modules would be addressed, was a collaborative process

between the students and the teacher. For example, for the module about Danish History and Political Systems, in the English-speaking cohort, the teacher and the students planned a field trip to tour the House of Parliament and to possibly meet with a Danish politician. In the Russian-speaking cohort, the students and the teacher planned to visit the University of Copenhagen, International Students Office in order to discuss the Danish educational system and the possibility of pursuing university studies.

This was a notable change from my 2001 experience with this course. Unlike my experience with Birgitte, this instructor seemed to be more experienced and organized with her instructional delivery. Based on my interview with Lisbeth, the CBSI Director from 2005 to 2008, more emphasis was placed on teacher training and preparing instructors to deliver the course in a more structured manner than I experienced in the earlier years. Also, Katija (the course instructor for both the Russian and the English cohorts) had previously taught this course for over five years. She noted the considerable difference in her teaching. She said,

> It was so chaotic in those early years of the Integration Law. We were simply told to teach them and given little guidance on how and what to teach them other than the basic outline of the modules. I remember thinking of lessons off hand as a way of filling the time. My students over the years and the training that came later helped to make the course better and more useful for them . . .

Third, unlike the teachers observed by Grumlose (2000), Katija avoided many of the stereotypes about Danish identity and did not marginalize the students in terms implying that they were living outside of Danish society because they had different cultural norms. On the contrary, I observed her frequent use of the statements like "when you become a citizen, you will be able to vote in national elections," or "when you decide to own a home, you may want to do the following things . . ." I believe that her

choice of language contributed to the students having a positive sense of belonging and to viewing themselves as being able to establish roots in Denmark.

Unlike the experiences of the Chinese immigrants observed in the Grumlose study, I found that the cultural bridge among the students in terms of feeling isolated from and moving toward a feeling of being incorporated into Danish society was shortened by the instructor's language choice and pedagogical approach to teaching. The differences noted in Grumlose and my findings demonstrate that a uniform curriculum and standard pedagogical approach would minimize the inconsistencies in teaching and learning outcomes for this course in the future.

I observed a very different dynamic in the class with the seven Asian students. This cohort of students had a different native-Dane instructor than the other two cohorts. This instructor also created a positive classroom environment and encouraged discussion and debate. During the module on Danish History and Political Systems, I observed that many of these students (all of whom were relatively new immigrants to the country) were keenly aware of the social discourse and political tensions arising about immigration to Denmark. I noted a very spirited class discussion about the Danish political parties and what issues and population each party represents. The teacher began the lesson by writing the names of the various Danish political parties on the board and then asking them what they knew about each. A young woman from Korea said that she knew about the Danish People's Party (called the Dansk Folkeparti in Danish). The teacher responded by asking her what she knew about them, and the same student replied, "They are racists; they are against foreigners coming to Denmark."

This started a lot of discussion among the students about various stories in the media about this political party, and many expressed feelings of not being welcomed by the government and the society in general. The teacher responded to their comments

by discussing how the Danish People's Party gained a voice in parliament and the political platforms of the other parties on immigration issues. Another student, a young man from Sri Lanka, asked the teacher, "Why are they so hostile toward immigrants?" The teacher took a slow, deep breath and said, "I don't know really. Maybe Denmark is just afraid of change, and all of you represent change."

THE SURVEY DATA AND KEY FINDINGS ABOUT EVERYDAY INTEGRATION

In addition to the content analysis and observational data, I distributed a life-history questionnaire to newly arrived immigrants or new Danes in 2001 ($N = 60$) and again in 2008 ($N = 40$). I asked participants about their respective experiences with the Introduction Program as outlined in the Integration Act of 1998. I also wanted to learn more about their everyday lives and their respective experiences living as an immigrant or as an ethnic in Denmark. From these samples, several participants self-selected to further participate in this study by allowing me to also conduct life-history interviews with them. The interview data will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapters. The key findings from the data set obtained from the 2001 survey were as follows:

- Despite the relatively high levels of prior educational and labor market experience cited by the respondents, many said that they had great difficulty in integrating into the social and economic dimensions of Danish society. In addition, of those who indicated that they were working at the time, many said they held positions well below their educational levels and prior work experiences.
- Despite public perceptions that ethnics and immigrants were "resistant" to integration efforts, the majority of my respondents supported the integration mandates. On the survey

most noted high levels of satisfaction with the main objec-
tives of the Integration Law (learning Danish language, cul-
ture, and history). They also stated that they felt welcomed
by Danish society in general.

- In terms of social, economic, and political integration, the
respondents split down the middle on these questions. Thus,
49% the participants said that they felt well integrated into
Danish society and, conversely, 46% said they felt isolated,
while the rest did not answer the question. Those who felt
isolated cited feelings of living on the margins of Danish
society with few experiences with social integration.

The demographics of the 2001 participants were as follows: 57%
of the participants were female and 43% were male. In terms of
age, 62% of the respondents were between 25 and 34 years of age,
followed by 25% aged between 35 and 44 years of age and 13%
between 18 and 24 years. In terms of country of origin, 38.6%
of those surveyed identified themselves as "other," which made
up the largest group of the respondents, followed by Asian and
African participants (26.3% and 21.1%, respectively). The larger
numbers of people from Africa and Asia in the sample are repre-
sentative of the data collected by Statistics Denmark, which show
that immigrants from these two continents have been the fastest-
growing populations in Denmark over a 20-year period.

Reasons for Coming to Denmark

When asked (in 2001) to explain why they came to Denmark,
91% of my respondents said they came for spousal or family
reunification, 1% arrived under refugee status, armed with a
work visa, or to be with a Danish boyfriend/girlfriend. Another
8% indicated "other" but did not specify their reason for com-
ing to Denmark. When asked how long they had been living in
Denmark at that time, 53% indicated that they have been living

in Denmark for 7–12 months, followed by 23% who said 3–6 months; 17% said 13–18 months, 5% said 0–2 months, and 2% said 2 years or more. This was not an unusual pattern considering the changes that had recently been made to Danish immigration laws and have been discussed in greater detail in earlier chapters of this book.

I asked my respondents where they lived within the Municipality of Copenhagen. The top four answers were as follows: 26% settled in Amager and 17% in Nørrebro, followed by 8% and 7% at Vanløse and Vesterbro, respectively. When asked if they made an active choice to live in an area with a large number of ethnic people or other immigrants, 63% said no, whereas 35% said yes. When asked (in 2001) why they chose to live in this area versus another, the majority (85%) indicated that their spouse or family member (who sponsored them) already had a flat in that area before their arrival. Therefore, the choice was not theirs to make. A smaller group (10%) indicated that they had made an active choice to live in an area with native Danish people in order to integrate better. These findings contradicted the media and political discourse of the time. As noted earlier, conservative political actors, specifically the Danish People's Party, used the media to perpetuate the belief that ethnics and immigrants are unwilling to disperse and live in areas of the city populated with native Danes. This discourse contributed to public support for the passage of the "anti-ghetto" housing components of the Integration Act. These provisions geographically limit where ethnics and new immigrants can reside if they request social assistance from the Danish government.

Social Integration

In terms of social integration, when asked questions about their intentions concerning Danish language acquisition, 92% said they intended to take Danish language classes and would like to speak fluent Danish. The remaining 8% of respondents said they

had no intentions of taking Danish language classes. When asked
to further elaborate on this answer in subsequent questions, those
who said yes to taking language classes attributed their desire to
learn Danish to economic goals. They wanted to acquire the lan-
guage to help them find a job or to enable continuing with educa-
tion. Others who wanted to learn Danish cited social needs. This
group wanted to use the language to better "fit in" and interact
with native-Danish people. Of the 8% of respondents who said
they would not take language classes, some cited the following
reasons: feelings of not wanting to lose their native language or
previous culture.

As noted earlier, when asked (in 2001) whether or not they feel
well integrated into Danish society, there was a split pretty close
to the middle: 49% said yes, 46% said no, and 5% did not answer
the question. When asked to elaborate further on these answers
in subsequent questions, those who indicated feelings of being
well integrated attributed these feelings to the following: they
considered Denmark "home" or that their spouse and family in
Denmark made them feel welcomed or helped them with getting
acclimated to Danish society. Of the ones (46%) who indicated
feelings of not being well integrated into Danish society, many
cited feelings of perceived hostility on the part of native Danes
toward immigrants. Others expressed frustration with "fitting in"
socially or economically in terms of finding work.

When asked (in 2001) whether or not they see themselves or
their children eventually becoming Danish, 68% said yes, 17%
said no, and 15% did not answer the question. When asked to
elaborate on their answers, of the ones who answered yes (68%),
many said they wanted to complete the Introduction Program as
a means for beginning a new life for themselves and their future
children in Denmark. In the case of the ones who said no (17%),
there were different reasons. About 50% of this group said that
they did not want to achieve complete assimilation into Danish
identity. Rather, they envisioned their integration process as

eventually creating a fusion of their past culture with the Danish culture. When asked about the future of their families, some commented on forming new norms and values based on this cultural fusion. The other half of this group (17%) expressed strong resistance to giving up their past culture. One respondent wrote on the survey in bold and capital letters that "I am American to the core and I will not and do not want to change."

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

Table 4.1 shows that in terms of economic integration, my respondents reported high levels on all socioeconomic status (SES) variables. Specifically, 68% of respondents reported an education level higher than secondary schooling prior to immigrating to Denmark; 53% also indicated that they had at least 6 years of prior work experience before coming to Denmark. In terms of work experience after immigrating to Denmark, 53% of participants indicated that they were working at the time of the study, whereas 47% were not working at the time. When asked if they had difficulty finding work, 28% said they found work immediately, whereas 68% said that they encountered difficulties and 3% did not answer the question. When asked to elaborate on their responses in subsequent questions, those who encountered difficulties finding work (68%) noted that the lack of Danish language skills was the primary barrier to finding work.

Some of the most interesting findings actually came from the 28% who said they found work immediately upon arrival in Denmark. The overwhelming majority of this group said that they found work through connections made by their spouse, family, and/or friend who had also immigrated to Denmark during an earlier wave of immigration. When I asked this group (in 2001) what type of work they found, 41% of this population responded that they found work in the service sector as taxi drivers, hotel cleaners, or kiosk attendants or found employment by delivering

Table 4.1   2001 Respondents by Educational Level and Previous Work Experience (*N* = 60)

Last level completed	Percentage
Education Level	
None	3.0
Primary School	7.0
Secondary School	22.0
Technical/Trade School	3.0
1–2 years of College/University	20.0
Bachelor Degree	28.0
Master Degree or higher	17.0
Total	100.0
Previous Work Experience	
None	3.0
2 years or less	15.0
3–5 years	22.0
6–10 years	28.0
11–19 years	18.0
20 or more years	7.0
Total	100.0

newspapers or in restaurants; 12% answered that they found work in technical/trade industries as off-the-books construction tradespeople and factory workers; and 6% indicated that they found work in the corporate sector, in offices doing clerical work, or as self-employed consultants.

As noted earlier, the media discourse at the time highlighted perceptions that immigrants were coming to Denmark to drain an already overburdened welfare system. As a result of this discourse, I put out a series of questions asking whether or not the people in my sample were accessing social benefits. When asked about their eligibility status, 70% of the respondents said they were never eligible for social assistance at any time since arriving in Denmark, whereas 23% were eligible for benefits at some point but were not accessing the system at that time, and 7% did not answer the question. Of those who indicated that they were

eligible for benefits at some point since arriving in Denmark, 85% said they refused to accept benefits and 15% gave up their benefits when their economic situation changed. When asked why this population refused benefits that they were entitled to, the majority had social reasons including fears of being viewed negatively by others or the society at large as "abusing the system."

Thoughts on the Integration Act

The questionnaire also addressed components of the Integration Act and the participants' opinions of and experiences with the administrative procedures and mandates. As noted earlier, all participants in this study were residents within the Municipality of Copenhagen. As a result, they were required to comply with most of the mandates contained within the Integration Act. When asked (in 2001) about their initial meetings with the Municipality of Copenhagen's Integration officials, the majority of respondents said they were generally satisfied with the services received to date. Thus, 82% said their meetings with the Integration Consultant at Modtageenheden was helpful to their integration process so far, whereas 14% said it was not helpful, and 4% did not answer the question. When asked to elaborate on their answers, of those who felt that the meetings were helpful the majority indicated that they liked having a contact person for questions about how "the system" functioned and as an overall resource for questions associated with their integration. Of those who said that the meetings were not helpful, the majority said their expectations were different from the intentions of the Integration Consultant. Some noted that they wanted help from Modtageenheden to immediately find a job, whereas the Integration Consultant's focus during the meeting was on sending them to school for language classes. Some in this group also expressed dissatisfaction with the lengthy waiting periods for placement into their preferred language and culture classes in terms of time of day or school location.

Findings of 2008 Survey

As noted earlier and in greater detail in Chapter 1, I administered a similar questionnaire to new arrivals in 2008 (N = 40). I asked questions based on similar categories previously asked in the 2001 survey instrument. These included questions about motivations for coming to Denmark, thoughts about becoming Danish, and their social identity and their feelings about social and economic integration. I reduced the number of questions about accessing social benefits for the reasons discussed in greater detail in Chapters 1 and 2. The rules concerning immigration law and immigrant eligibility for social welfare benefits had been significantly tightened in 2004, thus making the majority of immigrants arriving thereafter ineligible for most benefits.

The demographics of the 2008 participants were similar to that of the previous sample and were as follows: 62% of the participants were female and 38% were male. In terms of age, 70% of the respondents were between 25 and 34 years old, followed by 25% aged between 35 and 44 years, and only 5% between 18 and 24 years old. There was a significant drop (from 12% to5%) in the 18- to 24-year-old cohort in the sample from 2001 to 2008. This trend was representative of a larger pattern also observed in the government statistics. According to Statistics Denmark, the newer immigrants coming to Denmark for spousal reunification are older than those in previous waves. Some social scientists attribute this age difference, particularly among ethnic immigrants, to the passage of the 24-Year Rule in Denmark in 2004. This policy is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.

There were similarities in the two samples in terms of country of origin. The majority of the 2008 sample also came from Africa and Asia. When asked (in 2008) why they came to Denmark, 100% said they came for spousal or family reunification. When asked how long they had been living in Denmark at the time, 40% said they had been living in Denmark for 7–12 months;

followed by 36% who said 3–6 months, 12% who said 13–18 months, 9% who said 2 years or more, and finally, 3% who said 2 months or less. It is worth noting that it is typical for this sample to have high numbers of very new arrivals because the sample was generated at government offices and language schools that provide services for new arrivals and the small numbers of denizen populations who are mandated by the Integration Act.

When asked (in 2008) whether or not they had difficulty in finding work immediately upon arrival in Denmark, 65% said they had difficulty finding work, whereas 30% said they had no difficulty, and 5% did not answer the question. When asked why they (65%) had difficulty finding work, 98% of this group indicated that the inability to speak Danish was the largest barrier to finding work and only 2% expressed a perceived lack of interest on the part of Danish employers to hire them based on their work qualifications. In the group of respondents who said they had no difficulty finding work, 50% said they were not looking for work at the time of the study due to attendance at Danish language or work-training courses; 22% had assistance from family; 20% got their job through arrangements negotiated prior to coming to Denmark; 6% were self-employed; and 2% answered "other" but did not specify how they found work.

The main findings from the 2008 data set (N = 40) differed from the previous survey data (2001) in several critical ways.

- There was a notable change in the residency patterns and attitudes about these decisions. The top three areas for primary residences within the Municipality of Copenhagen among my newer respondents were as follows: 40% lived in Nørrebro; 20% in Amager, followed by Vesterbro at 7%. The significant increase among those living in the Nørrebro section from 26% in 2001 to 40% in 2008 is an interesting finding. This increase seems to contradict the policy initiatives enacted since the passage of the Integration Act,

specifically the "anti-ghetto" housing provisions. As noted earlier, the primary objective of these policies was to disperse new arrivals and encourage greater interaction between immigrants and native Danes. When asked if they made an active choice to live in an area that has a large number of ethnic people, 35% said no, whereas 61% said yes, and 4% did not answer the question. This is another critical change from the 2001 data. Here, the group which indicated that they had made an active choice to live in an area with ethnics or other immigrants was the larger group (61%). This group was unlike the 2001 respondents who said they wanted to live in areas with more native Danes in order to interact with them more. These respondents specifically said that they wanted to live in areas with more ethnics or other immigrants in order to reduce interactions with native Danes, which they regarded as negative.

- There was also a notable change in responses to the questions asking whether participants felt welcomed into Danish society. Many of the 2008 respondents commented on what they perceived as negative media and political discourse about immigration issues. These comments were noted when participants were asked whether or not they saw themselves or their children as eventually becoming Danish. In 2008, 34% said yes, 60% said no, and 6% did not answer the question. The "no" responses to this question increased significantly from 17% (in 2001) to 60% (in 2008). The majority of this group said that they did not want to achieve complete assimilation into Danish identity. When asked if this group envisioned their future identity as a cultural fusion of their previous culture with Danish culture, the majority of this group said they were skeptical about this based on the negative media discourse about immigrants in Denmark. A smaller percentage of this group expressed strong resistance to giving up their original culture.

- Most of the 2008 participants also supported the main tenets of the Integration Act and the requirements associated with formal integration into Danish society. Unlike their 2001 counterparts, many of the new respondents noted greater skepticism about becoming socially accepted by native Danes. As noted previously, the Integration Act was newly adopted in 2001, and the political and social climate was not as negative. The most restrictive immigration policies were passed after 2004, and many of the 2008 participants were vocal about this discourse.

Conclusion

In this chapter, the content analysis of the curriculum for and the observational data from the Danish History and Culture course demonstrate how Danish identity has been manufactured by state actors. The topics covered in the Danish History and Culture course also show how immigrants and ethnics are socialized to a narrowly constructed and stereotyped notion of what Danish identity constitutes.

The survey data presented in this chapter also highlight the impact of media and political discourse on relations between immigrants and native Danes. These data also demonstrate that despite the fact that my respondents had high levels of education and previous work experiences, many still expressed feeling excluded and being on the margins of Danish society.

I also explored the contradictions contained within the Integration Act about what it means to be Danish and who can and cannot make claims to this identity. As a result, I conclude that the Danish History and Culture course, while remaining the primary means for socializing new Danes and ethnic Danes to this particular construct for Danish identity, also has demonstrated the potential for serving as a means for expanding how Danishness is lived and expressed. The positive and inclusive exchanges observed

within the classes have the potential to become sites for empower-
ment and the voice for immigrants and ethnics to challenge and
transform these constructions. I observed the future potential for
this in Katija's classes. Her student-centered teaching style created
a safe space for the students to be critical of the media discourse
on integration and the prevailing constructions for Danishness.
If harnessed or developed, the culture courses could become a
potential platform for developing a more inclusive and mutually
determined and multicultural construction of Danish identity.

Assimilation and Intermarriage

As noted earlier, the issues of intermarriage and immigration policies gained national attention in Denmark with the publication of journalist Ralf Christensen's op-ed piece on his personal and negative experiences with Danish Immigration Services in August 2012. After much publicity and greater scrutiny of the processes associated with applying for family reunification visas, Ralf and Merih eventually prevailed and were awarded the visa upon appeal based on European Union (EU) laws associated with family reunification. Their story, which went viral both domestically and internationally, exposed an invisible and often-unjust side effect of the recent restrictive legislative changes to Danish immigration law and social policy. Unfortunately, Ralf and Merih Christensen's story is becoming more commonplace as increasingly restrictive immigration laws and social policies are making it quite difficult for third-country nationals to marry native or ethnic Danes and reside in Denmark.

This chapter demonstrates how the Danish case presents challenges for prevailing theories about intermarriage and assimilation. Within the context of a restrictive immigration system and a hostile climate of anti-immigration public discourse, I argue that

social boundaries have become more fixed despite the increased occurrence of intermarriage between native Danes and third-country nationals. I explore how increasingly restrictive immigration policies and recent changes to citizenship law have negatively affected immigration by marriage for third-country nationals. As a result, there is substantial debate about whether some immigrants and non-EU foreign nationals living in Denmark have the same rights of access as the Danish citizen and, as Ralf and Merih's case and the cases of several of my respondents show, there are now questions emerging about whether these restrictive immigration and integration laws have also led to an erosion of the citizenship rights of native Danes.

Specifically, I address the following research question—How have restrictive social policies and anti-immigrant discourse concerning intermarriage between native Danes and third-country nationals affected social boundaries between the two and contributed to the erosion of citizenship rights of these native Danes? In order to answer this question, I examine two laws that best demonstrate how the Danish state vis-à-vis some political actors are guiding and shaping assimilation outcomes: the Attachment Requirement and the Integration Act.

Denmark, as a relatively homogeneous country and a relative newcomer as an immigrant-receiving country, gives us the opportunity to re-examine classic theories on assimilation and intermarriage from a unique point of view. In his seminal work, Milton Gordon (1964) argued that intermarriage would contribute to the inevitable absorption of ethnic populations into the dominant society. By examining intermarriage in this context, we observe that increasingly restrictive laws and social policy have also complicated the respective social locations of native and ethnic Danes and some third-country nationals in terms of who can and cannot make legitimate claims to "Danishness."

Gordon, in his analysis of assimilation in the United States, aptly distinguished between what he called "descriptive models" of

what *has* happened in history versus "goal models" of what *should* happen according to the assimilation narratives (Gordon, 1961: 263). By examining the assimilation processes and outcomes in the Danish context, I explore the disjunction between what theoretically "should happen" versus what "actually happens" in practice. I accomplish this by showing how the Danish state is guiding and shaping the assimilation outcome for many third-country nationals at the group level. I also argue that attempts to achieve cultural fusion at the individual level is thwarted by the state with the enactment of laws that heavily restrict the outcome of structural assimilation, as outlined by Gordon and re-conceptualized by Alba and Nee.

Theorizing Assimilation and Intermarriage

Classic Definitions of Assimilation

Milton Gordon's (1964) primary contribution to assimilation literature was to identify the multiple dimensions of assimilation, where he argued that acculturation occurs first. He defined acculturation as the minority group adopting the "cultural patterns" of the host society beyond symbolic expressions (such as language acquisition, consuming food, and styles of dress). For him, the adoption process is profound and more internal where the minority group acquires emotional expressions of key life goals or core cultural values associated with the host society.

Gordon hypothesized that structural assimilation represented the highest dimension of integration into primary groups—specifically, he viewed intermarriage as the final step of the process. For him, prejudice and discrimination would decline first and then eventually disappear, making intermarriage more common and thereby completing the processes of cultural and structural assimilation (Alba and Nee, 2007: 126–128). Implied here is the assumption that intermarriage would become commonplace

and social boundaries would significantly reduce or disappear altogether. Gordon also assumed that these dimensions would occur naturally as minority and dominant groups have increased interaction and that the transition to intermarriage would accelerate over the generations. The data presented in this chapter complicate these predictions. I demonstrate that in the Danish case, the state is an active participant by using immigration legislation and social policy to shape, and in some cases limit, the conditions for minority–majority group interaction and social contact. I argue that this form of state intervention has changed Gordon's predicted outcome. The new outcome (under these conditions) has increased social boundaries among these groups rather than leading to the cultural fusion that Gordon envisioned.

Herbert Gans (2007) coined the term "straight-line assimilation," where assimilation is based on a sequence of generational steps. This definition assumes that each generation represents a new stage of the adjustment to life in the host society: the further each subsequent generation steps away from the immigration experience, the closer the group (as a whole) steps toward complete assimilation into the dominant group. Gans assumed that the trajectory projects outward where the steps toward assimilation would be linear. Yet, this assumption when applied in the United States is true for groups with more similarities to the respective dominant groups of the era (i.e., the Irish, Italians, Eastern Europeans, and some Jews) and is faulty for groups with the most differences from the dominant groups (i.e., Blacks, some Latino and Asian ethnic groups, and some religious minorities like Muslims or orthodox Jews) (Alba, 1998; Brubaker, 2001: 532–535).

In order to answer questions about why the trajectories for all groups are not uniform, theorists began exploring markers of social mobility as indications of why some groups assimilate "better" or "worse" than others. Peter Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan's classic study on status attainment laid the foundation for theories on socioeconomic assimilation where the assumption is that old

immigrant groups coming from agricultural backgrounds (Irish, Italians, and Mexicans) to the United States enter the labor market at the lowest rungs because of lack of language (English) and low human capital. This assumption has been challenged by contemporary scholars (Portes and Zhou, 1993; Portes and Rumbaut, 2001) for failing to explain the multidimensional experiences of post-1965 immigration, which include a myriad of educational, language-related, and occupational skill sets that can no longer be assumed to be inferior to those of the host society (Alba and Nee, 2007: 126–129). These arguments have resonance in the Danish case, as I demonstrate below.

Reworking the Classics with Different Outcomes

The primary limitation of the body of work on assimilation theory is that it is heavily rooted in the American narrative and it is interesting to explore these classic theories in more homogeneous contexts and settings with shorter immigration experiences to see if the same patterns can/will emerge. In order to do this, I agree with Talcott Parsons (as cited in Kivisto, 2004), who called for the nation-state to re-emerge as the appropriate unit of analysis for examining the social, political, and economic inclusion of minorities within any given society, and argue that it is at the macro level where we can gain an aerial view of the state as a critical actor in shaping the conditions for and the processes associated with assimilation. Similar to Will Kymlicka (1995), I also argue that the state sets the climate for possible inclusion and can play a critical role in either increasing or reducing discrimination associated with incorporation. As noted in earlier chapters, the state can take the position of seeing the immigrant or the ethnic as a potential citizen rather than as a threat to the dominant group or nation-state. Which viewpoint is adopted by dominant political actors sets the tone for the legislation and social policies that will follow.

There have been two main criticisms against the use of the nation-state and a structuralist approach to examining assimilation processes. First, scholars (Soysal, 1994; Sassen, 1999; Portes et al., 2002) have argued that transnational communities evolved as the product of globalization and that the modern immigration story can no longer be contained within the boundaries of a single nation-state. This perspective has also translated into citizenship scholarship where proponents have pushed for greater recognition of dual and global citizenship, which they argue is representative of the global processes of new waves of immigration into global societies. Second, the rejection of the idea that individual rights are grounded within the relationship of the citizen with the nation-state and the assertion that rights can be obtained from other sources—particularly state-sponsored organizations, regional transnational organizations, and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations (Kivisto, 2004: 295).

With regard to the first criticism, it is true that technology, the Internet, and greater overall access to wealth permit today's immigrant to maintain transnational connections at the individual level and perhaps even to achieve the dual or global citizenship status as conceptualized by Soysal and others. But I still maintain (like Parsons) that it is the state that makes these outcomes possible. For example, the Danish state places several impediments to transnationalism for its immigrants. First, Denmark does not recognize dual citizenship, and therefore when one naturalizes it means that the person must give up their previous citizenship. Second, citizenship is not automatic, which has great salience for the growing ethnic denizen population in Denmark. If a person of Turkish descent is born in Denmark, he or she must wait until the age of 23 years to apply for Danish citizenship and still must demonstrate significant attachment to Denmark (this policy is discussed in greater detail elsewhere).

With regard to the second criticism and the assertion that individual rights can be obtained from entities outside of the

nation-state, I turn to the fact that the restrictive legislation and social policies in Denmark have been publicly admonished by the EU, which has been unsuccessful in forcing Denmark to change them. Some question whether the EU even has jurisdiction to do anything more than to shame Denmark with published reports on these restrictive policies. I argue that both of these examples demonstrate a strengthening of the role of the nation-state as a powerful actor in setting the conditions for and limitations associated with citizenship rights and the resulting assimilation of ethnic populations.

The significance of Parsons' theory of modernity and the emergence of the "societal community" was based on his belief in the expansion of the nation-state to include ethnic groups in full societal membership. However (even he acknowledged that) the inclusion did not necessarily signal the disappearance of ethnic groups but rather a means to utilize citizenship as the method for achieving collective solidarity (similar to Riva Kastoryano's concept of citizenship identity).

Parsons viewed a shared sense of citizenship as a powerful and potential means for the nation-state to avert ethnic conflicts and overall marginalization (Kivisto, 2004: 291). While acknowledging economic and labor market variables as contributing factors that lead to full incorporation into the societal community, Parsons placed the greatest emphasis on cultural changes and processes. Particularly, he considered events that could derail the linear progression toward inclusion, such as rapid social change in a society, might produce what he called "anomic social disorganization and alienation." This social disorganization and alienation could lead to an intensification of "groupism" or "de-differentiation." Despite this acknowledgment of potential roadblocks to inclusion, Parsons viewed them as temporary in relation to the inevitable progression toward inclusion. Similar to Gordon, he believed that the trajectory of these processes would naturally evolve and inclusion would ultimately prevail

(292–293). As will be demonstrated later, I argue that both Gordon and Parsons assumed that it would eventually be in the long-term interest of the nation-state to assume a neutral position in its dealings with ethnic populations, thus leading to the inevitable incorporation of these groups into the national identity. Using the Danish case, I show how this outcome is altered when the state assumes a hostile position and sometime agitates (rather than mediates) minority–majority relations.

ASSIMILATION AND INTERMARRIAGE
IN THE DANISH CONTEXT

Joel Perlmann and Mary Waters (2007) defined intermarriage as "a process by which group members cross a recognized boundary with increasing frequency and eventually so often that the boundary becomes blurred or disappears" (110). Embedded in this operational definition is an assumption similar to that made by Gordon—that intermarriage will eventually break down social boundaries. Perlmann and Waters argued that two factors affect whether or not out-marriage occurs: the respective sizes of the minority and the majority groups and the level of social distance between the minority and the majority groups. They argued that small groups tend to have higher rates of out-marriage out of necessity. They also argued that in times of great social distance, out-marriage decreases between the majority and minority groups. In this case, the "replenishment effect" will occur where the minority group will seek out partners from their own group or other minority groups, instead of from the majority group (116–118).

Perlmann and Waters argued that intermarriage rates and patterns are useful for measuring changes (increases or decreases) in social divisions between majority and minority populations. They also explored the link between intermarriage and the maintenance of multiple identities on the part of immigrants as a means

for explaining the variations in patterns of social mobility and differing perceptions about intermarriage among post-1965 immigrants. Perlmann and Waters concluded that intermarriage would ultimately decrease social boundaries and increase social mobility for the second and subsequent generations (111–112).

The limited amount of research into intermarriage of foreigners in Denmark contrasts with the abundant literature existing in countries with greater and longer traditions of being immigrant-receiving nations—particularly the United States, France, Germany, and Britain. Few have focused this analysis on countries with high levels of homogeneity and a relatively recent history of receiving immigrants with vastly different cultural variations. The recent influx of third-country nationals and rising denizen populations are reshaping the Danish marriage market (Kauppinen and Poutvaara, 2011).

In addition to the nuances of the setting, no theorists have explored the impact of intermarriage between Danes and third-country nationals in this way. The laws and social policies governing intermarriage in Denmark have complicated the outcomes identified by Perlmann and Waters. Both argue that in times of great social distance and limited population size, the minority group will seek out partners from their own group—resulting in what they called the "replenishment effect" (Perlmann and Waters, 2007). The Danish state prevents replenishment by placing significant restrictions on intermarriage and immigration for these populations. This was noted by the ethnic Danes in my sample who chose to marry a person from their own ethnic group. These couples highlighted the respective difficulties they experienced with Danish Immigration Services when trying to bring their spouses to Denmark.

In addition to the concentric nature of Danish identity discussed earlier, citizenship has been used as a means to racially subordinate the denizen population in Denmark. In a similar manner to Asian Americans in the United States, the denizen and

ethnic populations are viewed by many native Danes as "forever foreigners" (Kim, 2008). These populations (even if they have Danish citizenship) do not enjoy the full privileges of citizenship as compared with native Danes when it comes to intermarriage. Nadia Kim (2008) posed a central question in her research, which I argue also applies to the Danish context: "How can a group [Asians] racialized as foreigners bask in the full privilege of whiteness if the central privilege of being White is to be an authentic American?" (53–54). What is most salient about Kim's analysis is that a similar argument can be made regarding the social location of ethnic Danes and some third-country nationals as situated within a discussion of who can and cannot make legitimate claims to Danishness. Here, non-Whites, Muslims, and third-country nationals from non-Western countries encounter the greatest challenges to their identity claims to Danishness and their right to marry another third-country national and reside in Denmark.

Assimilation discourse in Denmark, as well as in other parts of Western Europe, makes use of the term "social integration." Often the concepts of integration and assimilation are theoretically intertwined in the scholarly literature. In terms of social policy and media discourse, these concepts are used interchangeably and are often undefined. Initially, integration literature focused on integration as another extension of traditional definitions of assimilation. These definitions presented integration as a one-sided process where the immigrant makes active progress incorporating the primary dimensions of the dominant group's culture—language, customs and rituals, and ultimately labor market participation—into one's self. More recent scholarship on European integration has moved toward a more dynamic conceptualization. Newer definitions describe integration as a process where immigrants and ethnics as well as the dominant populations *both* experience a shift in thinking, feeling, and being. This newer conceptualization is well reflected in the EU Common

Basic Principles (CBPs) on Integration (2004) documents. These define integration as

> dynamic long-term and continuous two-way processes of mutual accommodation, not a static outcome. It demands the participation not only of immigrants and their descendants but of every resident. The integration process involves adaptation by immigrants, both men and women, who all have rights and responsibilities in relations to their new country of residence. It also involves the receiving society, which should create opportunities for the immigrants' full economic, social, cultural and political participation. Accordingly, member states are encouraged to consider and involve both immigrants and national citizens in integration policy and to communicate clearly their mutual rights and responsibilities. (Open Society Foundations Special Report on Muslims in Europe, 2011: 17–18)

This definition also highlights what the EU believes the role of the state should be. According to this definition, the state assumes responsibility for articulating the rights and responsibilities associated with integration processes for all parties—immigrants, ethnics, and dominant groups.

In addition to refining operational definitions for integration, much of the recent scholarship has focused attention on indicators of successful integration. Some Danish researchers (Just Jeppesen, 1995) have reached similar conclusions as Gordon and others in terms of structural assimilation remaining the primary indicator of successful immigrant integration. Other researchers have also focused their attention on ethnic enclave economy as a possible explanation for an overall lack of labor market integration on the part of some immigrant groups (Diken, 1998; Husted et al., 2000; Dahlmann, 2001). These authors argue that ethnic enclaves slow the process of overall ethnic assimilation and provide an alternate economic venue that serves to discourage overall ethnic labor participation in the mainstream labor market (Schmidt and Jakobsen, 2004).

Other social scientists have taken a less-fixed approach to measuring successful integration of immigrants and ethnics. Peter Seeberg (2002) coined the term "negotiated integration" to describe the integration of young Turkish immigrants in Denmark. He defined this as a fluid process of negotiating the terms of integration within a fixed integration regime as outlined by the majority population. Here and within this fixed regime that consists of rules for active participation in work or school, these young ethnic minorities in his study found "a life strategy that fulfilled their wishes and yet functioned within the rules, regulations and laws of the majority society" (4). This dynamic manner of negotiating daily life within the structure of the "rules" of Danish society has strong resonance for many of my respondents and will be highlighted later in the chapter. Many of these studies have examined or measured levels of socioeconomic assimilation (as defined earlier) among third-country nationals and denizen populations in Denmark (Hansen and Waever, 2002; Schmidt et al., 2009) and conservative political actors have focused public attention on indicators of socioeconomic assimilation for this population.

Legal and Structural Background: Intermarriage and Danish Immigration Laws

Despite the fact that intermarriage (marriage between a native Dane and a third-country national) in Demark is relatively few in relation to all other marriages, recent legislative changes to migration based on marriage have made it very difficult for both ethnic Danes and native Danes to marry a third-country national and reside in Denmark. This tightening has been applied to those third-country nationals who consider migrating to Denmark and those already in the country and who want to marry a Danish citizen. Despite the increased population sizes for most immigrant groups, the recent tightening of immigration laws (from 2002 to the present) has significantly reduced the number of marriages

between Danes (ethnic and native) and partners who are third-country nationals (Kauppinen and Poutvaara, 2011).

The passage of the Attachment Requirement and the Integration Act are examples of how political actors are guiding and shaping the assimilation outcomes for these populations. Both of these laws demonstrate state interventions into the natural process of intermarriage breaking down ethnic barriers and reducing social distances (as envisioned by Gordon and Perlmann and Waters).

Since 2000, Danish immigration law has required that each partner demonstrate a "strong affiliation/attachment" with Denmark that is measured by years of living and/or working in Denmark. The Attachment Requirement is an instrument that has two critical impacts on assimilation outcomes: First, this law serves to erode the citizenship rights of native Danes and ethnic Danes who want to intermarry with third-county immigrants. Second, the provisions of the law and the administrative procedures that have emerged heavily regulate the conditions under which intermarriage can occur while residing in Denmark.

These legislative changes have had the greatest impact on ethnic Danes from non-Western countries and their descendants who typically marry younger or marry a foreigner more often than native Danes (Kauppinen and Poutvaara, 2011). Perlmann and Waters (2007) argued that for groups with great social distances, the minority group will seek out partners from their own group—yet Danish immigration law makes this very difficult. Legal changes have dramatically reduced the percentage of 23-year-old married immigrants from 46% of women and 26% of men in 2000 to 19% and 7%, respectively, in 2008 (Kauppinen and Poutvaara, 2011: 38).

Kauppinen and Poutvaara also argued that these laws have greatly affected native Danes with third-country national partners who live abroad but would like to return to Denmark with their spouse and cannot do so due to the legal restrictions. Citing a 2009 study analyzing marriage patterns of Danish citizens, first-generation immigrants, and second-generation immigrants, they

argue that these policy changes may force native Danes who have a third-country partner to choose between living with their partner and living in Denmark (37–38).

Another interesting aspect of the Danish case for examining assimilation and intermarriage is how powerful, manufactured notions of Danish identity are used to underscore a fixed boundary between those who are "Danes by nature" and those who are "Danes by jurisdiction"—something that is perceived by many Danes as unstable and changing (as the legislation on family unification illustrates) (Rytter, 2007). In other words, an individual can formally be a Danish citizen, but this juridical status in itself is no guarantee that one has the same rights or levels of social acceptance as other citizens perceived as "truly" Danish.

NATIVE- AND NEW-DANE DISCOURSE

Despite the fact that today many scholars (Lieberson and Waters, 1988; Portes and Rumbaut, 1996; Qian and Lichter, 2007; Åkesson, 2011) have argued that the creation of transnational ties and assimilation into the culture of the destination country are not contradictory processes, anti-immigration political actors and many native Danes frame successful integration as an either/or choice. The new Dane is strongly encouraged to fully assimilate into Danish culture, equally expected to weaken homeland ties, and also resist ties to existing ethnic enclaves in Denmark.

Immigrant rights advocate groups oppose these recent legislative changes. Many of these groups have argued that integration legislation has forced assimilation upon new arrivals in the form of required language and culture courses and restrictive housing policies for third-country nationals.

Social and political actors formally assert that successful integration entails acquiring an "understanding of the fundamental values and norms of Danish society" while simultaneously achieving socioeconomic assimilation. My data highlight how

first-generation immigrants position themselves in relation to the integration discourse described above. I am most interested in how notions of belonging are intrinsically linked to the ways in which social inclusion and exclusion are subjectively experienced. In addition to how the first-generation immigrant to Denmark views him/herself, I am also interested in how he/she positions his/her family within the context of the assimilation/integration discourse described earlier. I answer how these first-generation immigrants experience social boundaries in Denmark, as well as how these boundaries are influenced by political actors vis-à-vis public policies and anti-immigration discourse.

Who are the New Danes?

Embedded within the provisions of the Integration Act is a fundamental assumption that once the new Dane completes the Introduction Program, he or she will achieve structural assimilation and social integration. Many of the respondents in this study obscure this assumption—the overwhelming majority of the participants immigrated to Denmark for a native-Dane spouse or partner; the majority of these respondents resided outside of ethnic enclaves; all reported having strong social networks through their partner or spouse; all were fluent and literate in English (English is the second most commonly used language in Denmark—after Danish); all were highly educated with many having completed baccalaureate degrees; all had long-term ties to the labor market in the countries they immigrated from and skills that would have generally been transferable; and all had completed all or most aspects of the Introduction Program. Based on all of these factors, these participants had significant advantages over other immigrants with less human capital, and had the highest likelihood of achieving integration. Yet, most still expressed feelings of social isolation and not feeling fully integrated into Danish society. They felt like they were living on the fringes or margins of Danish society.

For this chapter, I focus on 14 respondents whom I interviewed multiple times at varied stages of their assimilation into life in Denmark (more information about this sample is available in Table 5.1). I believe that these data provide the most layered insight into the lives of third-country nationals married to either a native or ethnic Dane, who immigrated to and/or has lived in Denmark during the periods before, during, and after the implementation of the restrictive policies described above. These 14 respondents come out of a larger sample of 20 adults who had migrated to Denmark after the passage of the Integration Act and due to marriage with a Danish citizen (the majority were married to native Danes, but three participants were married to ethnic Danes by jurisdiction). My first contact with 11 of these adults goes back to 2001; I interviewed them and (in some cases) their native- or ethnic-Dane spouse multiple times (2001, 2004, and 2008). The majority of these participants were clients at the Municipality Office of Social and Labor Training (Københavns Kommune-Famile og Arbejdsmarkedsforvaltningen in Danish) and Center for Beskæftigelse, Sprog og Integration (CBSI)—both located in the Nørrebro section of Copenhagen (this section of the city has the largest ethnic populations). My primary objective was to explore the interplay between the respondents' lives in Denmark and their perceptions about their social location within the integration discourse.

Key Findings from the Interview Data

Despite claims that achieving socioeconomic, cultural assimilation and language acquisition are integral to social inclusion and acceptance into Danish society, many of the third-country nationals in my sample, despite achieving these objectives, still expressed significant feelings of exclusion. Despite the premise asserted by Perlmann and Waters that intermarriage would decrease social boundaries and increase social mobility, many of my respondents—while feeling connected to their native-Dane family members—still felt that social boundaries were rather fixed when

Table 5.1   2008 Interview Respondent Demographics

	Male	Female	Country of Origin	Age at 1st Interview	College Degree	Year of Marriage	Year of Immigration
Couple 1							
Patricia*		Yes	Venezuela	40	Yes	2002	2001
Jens*	Yes		N. Dane	45	Yes		
Couple 2							
Adriana*		Yes	Brazil	33	Yes	2002	2001
Erik	Yes		N. Dane	34	No		
Couple 3							
Milagros*		Yes	Brazil	20	No	2001	2000
Richard	Yes		N. Dane	25	Yes		
Couple 4							
Helen*		Yes	United States	29	Yes	2001	2001
Andreas	Yes		N. Dane	30	Yes		
Couple 5							
Kanika*		Yes	India	30	Yes	2006	2004
Jon	Yes		N. Dane	35	Yes		
Couple 6							
Mette*		Yes	N. Dane	27	Yes		
Hasan*	Yes		Morocco	29	Yes	2006	2002
Couple 7							
Amihan*		Yes	Philippines	24	No	2008	2008
Benjie	Yes		E. Dane Philippines Ethnicity	24	No		1992
Couple 8							
Maria*		Yes	Philippines	21	No	2004	2004
Jorgen*	Yes		N. Dane	23	Yes		
Couple 9							
Robin*		Yes	Trinidad	32	Yes	2003	2004
Steen*	Yes		N. Dane	38	Yes		
Couple 10							
Lene*		Yes	N. Dane	24	Yes		
Brian*	Yes		United States	24	Yes	2000	2001

(*Continued*)

Table 5.1   (*Continued*)

	Male	Female	Country of Origin	Age at 1st Interview	College Degree	Year of Marriage	Year of Immigration
Couple 11							
Sabrina*		Yes	South Africa	23	Yes	2001	1999
Lars	Yes		N. Dane	27	Yes		
Couple 12							
Dorthe		Yes	N. Dane	44	Yes		
Abasi*	Yes		Gambia	34	No	2000	2000
Couple 13							
Brittany*		Yes	United States	25	Yes	2000	1999
Christian	Yes		N. Dane	27	Yes		
Couple 14							
Farah		Yes	E. Dane Iran Ethnicity	23	Yes	2008	1991
Sven	Yes		N. Dane	23	Yes		

*People who were interviewed by the researcher. N, native; E, ethnic.

interacting with native Danes outside of their respective immediate families. All of my respondents were acutely aware of the anti-immigration and intermarriage discourse and how this discourse, coupled with increasingly restrictive social policy, affected their respective social locations within Danish society. Each respondent articulated this awareness in interesting ways.

In addition, the use of optional identity (Waters, 1990) was quite prevalent among those of my respondents who had acquired enough Danish language skills and whose race and physical appearance most closely resembled that of native Danes. The respondents who were able to use optional identity also expressed the strongest desire to distance themselves from those they perceived to be "less desirable" immigrants. Of the respondents, those who could not use optional identity (due to race, ethnicity, or religion) expressed the most concern about how growing negative and anti-immigration discourse would affect them and their families.

On the Margins: Experiences of Exclusion

As noted earlier, the native-/new-Dane discourse places particular emphasis on integrating foreigners and ethnic populations. The provisions of the Integration Act focus on the economic and cultural assimilation of new and ethnic Danes, but little attention (whether in social policy or in media discourse) is given to how these populations are perceived by native Danes and whether or not some of these groups will be fully accepted into Danish identity. The new- and ethnic-Dane discourse has contributed to the racial marginalization of denizens and some third-country nationals in Denmark. In Yen Le Espiritu's (2003) words, this marginalization has been "shaped not only by the social location of their group . . . but also by the position of their home country within the global racial order" (Espiritu, 2003: 210).

This sentiment was echoed by many of my respondents whose country of origin and physical appearance differed greatly from those of native Danes. Abasi, a Black man from Gambia, came to Denmark in 2000 to live with Dorthe, his native-Dane wife. I interviewed Abasi on three separate occasions (2001, 2004, and 2008). When I asked Abasi (in 2004) how he believes Danes view him, he said,

> It like, just every African because they say all Africans—you look alike. Wherever you go, they see you just as an African—not White, you know. Obviously, they see you.
>
> *Does this bother you?*
>
> No, I don't know. O.k. like if you meet someone in the street, you want to talk to them and say "hi," you look pushy. I don't know why, just because so few Black people, so like they be afraid of Black people sometime like there was something that happened a long time ago.

Sabrina is also Black and came to Denmark in 1999 from South Africa with Lars, her native-Dane husband. They met

in South Africa while her husband was studying there and they were married in Denmark. I interviewed Sabrina three times (in 2001, 2004, and 2008). When I asked her (in 2008) about how Danish society has changed in terms of race and immigration discourse during the nine years she has lived in Denmark, she said,

> I think Danish society is becoming more open to different cultures but at the same time closing . . . when I first came here, nobody noticed. I remember telling my mother, I have never ever been around so many White people and no one noticed that I am Black. I wanted to be like, "hello people, I'm Black (laughing)" . . . But now, they do notice it and depending on who you are with, you will get a different reaction. Some will sour to it and you'll see that straight away and some are open to the culture change and you, know.

> *Since the change, have you experienced being treated differently or negatively because of your race or because of being perceived as a foreigner?*

> If you had asked me that question then (2001), I would have said, "no, never." But now, definitely yes. Like I said before, that's why I put so much effort into my Danish studies to speak without an accent because it is the only way to be treated on equal par with Danes. This is the key to being accepted here at least on some level.

When I first met Sabrina, her initial and primary emphasis was on learning to speak Danish with a "perfect" and non-foreign accent. At the time, she felt that the language was the key to achieving socioeconomic assimilation and social integration. Despite achieving this goal within her first five years in Denmark, she still felt that the social boundary between herself and native Danes was rather fixed. When I interviewed her in 2008, she spoke perfect Danish, had graduated from a Danish university, and was enrolled at a Danish law school but she said something

was still missing—she felt separate from native Danes and on the margins socially.

Forever Foreigners and Fixed Social Boundaries

As Nadia Kim (2008) argues, the dominant culture's perception of a group directly affects the social location of that group and its ability to achieve legitimacy with regard to identity claims. Within the Danish context, the social location of ethnic Danes and some third-country nationals is situated within a discussion of who can and cannot make legitimate claims to Danishness. This was especially salient for two of my respondents who are ethnic Danes and who spent the majority of their lives in Denmark. Benjie, who grew up in Denmark after his parents migrated from the Philippines when he was young, said that he sees himself as more Danish than Filipino but his identity is not always accepted by native Danes.

> Some people still ask me "where are you from?" even though I was raised here. They think I am foreign.

> *Does this bother you?*

> Sometimes. I feel I am just as Danish as they are. I feel more Danish than I feel like I am from Philippines. My parents do not like when I say this but it is true. They still feel attachment to Philippines but my connection is [to] here.

Farah, who also grew up in Denmark after her mother migrated from Iran when she was four years old, has similar feelings as Benjie. Farah is attractive and slender, with dark brown wavy hair, brown eyes, and golden tan skin color. She met her husband, Sven, a native Dane, while both were studying at a Danish university. When asked how she believes native Danes view her, Farah said,

> Some accept me as just Danish but also some see me as immi-
> grant because I look Muslim. They ask me "why don't you have
> Tørklæde [head covering in Danish]"? "You're allowed to date
> Danish guys? Aren't you Muslim?"—like I must be forced into
> marriage or oppressed.

While answering this question, her tone changed and her voice
became raised as compared to her usual soft tone of voice. For
Farah these questions were extremely upsetting because she said
that her life experiences were quite different from the typical expe-
rience of an Iranian girl. Her mother migrated to Denmark from
Iran in 1991, leaving Farah's father, who was verbally and physi-
cally abusive, behind. She and her mother do not practice Islam;
her mother severed all ties with most family members in Iran and
raised Farah to fully embrace Danish culture. She, like Benjie,
said that she feels more connected to Denmark than to Iran and is
bothered when her Danish identity is challenged.

Some of my intermarried respondents who have children
expressed similar concerns about how their children's identities will
be perceived in Danish society. Where there are significant differ-
ences between the parents' respective cultures (religion or race),
some of these children felt compelled to choose one parent's ethnic
identity over the other rather than the cultural fusion hypothesized
by Gordon's theory of intermarriage assimilation. When talking
with Sabrina about her two children, both born in Denmark (a
five-year-old boy and an eight-year-old girl), about how they view
themselves in terms of identity she noted a significant difference
between her two children; she describes her daughter, Maya, as
being very "pro-South African" while her son, Mikkel, rejects his
South African heritage and solely identifies as Danish. She said,

> He doesn't want to speak any African languages or even English
> even though he understands me. I never forced him to speak but
> with Maya I did. I made sure that she spoke English and it has

definitely affected her. She takes pride in speaking English. She loves her African side and she really tries to connect with it whenever she can. Whereas Mikkel doesn't need the connection . . . even when I have family over [from South Africa], he refuses point blank to speak to them in English [laughing]. Even though he can understand every word you say, he will answer them in Danish and if he didn't like the question, he will ignore them [laughing]. I guess that he feels like he has to fight to be Danish.

What do you mean that he "has to fight to be Danish?"

Well, he had a problem at his school. The class was doing a project about the countries in the world and the teacher says to the class that Mikkel is from South Africa and he got so angry and said, "no, I from Denmark, I am Danish not South African."

What was most salient about the incident at Mikkel's school is that while the teacher was probably well intentioned and using a class project to highlight the obvious diversity that Mikkel brings to the classroom, the long-term impact was that a five-year-old boy was placed in the position of having to fight for and defend his sense of identity and place in Danish society. Mikkel's story is so similar to experiences that both Benjie and Farah described during my interviews with them as they discussed growing up in Denmark: feeling forever foreign despite their respective claims to Denmark as their home.

Restrictive Social Policies: How Bonds are Constituted and Perceived

As discussed earlier, the Attachment Requirements used by Danish authorities to establish a couple's right to obtain family reunification distinguishes between Danish citizens with attachment to the country and citizens who, based on individual assessments, are judged as lacking this attachment. This rule in particular has established a hierarchy among citizens, in which, based on

an assumption of "true" belonging, some have certain rights that others do not have.

The effect of this legislation is best demonstrated by four of my respondents. Steen, a native Dane, met his wife Robin, a citizen of Trinidad, in 2004 while working for a Danish firm with offices in Trinidad. In order to bring his wife back to Denmark, he had to demonstrate that he maintained significant ties to Denmark and not to Trinidad. Steen had to provide employment records that proved that he worked and lived for more years in Denmark than in Trinidad. He also provided Danish authorities with proof of taxes paid on his apartment back in Denmark and provided the Danish government with proof of enough income to support himself and his wife. He also provided a bank guarantee of 100,000 kroner. These requirements were rather easy for this couple to satisfy because they were older when the relationship formed (the husband was 38 years old and the wife was 32 years old at the time). Also, as a result of his age, the husband could easily provide a lengthy employment history in Denmark prior to working in Trinidad. Further, because of their respective ages, the marriage was not suspected of being a "forced" marriage where the 24-Year-Rule (discussed in Chapter 4) would have applied and resulted in greater scrutiny from the Danish authorities.

Benjie and his wife had a significantly more difficult time demonstrating suitable attachment to Denmark. Benjie, an ethnic Dane of Filipino ethnicity, was 24 years old at the time that he applied for spousal reunification to bring his wife, Amihan (also 24 years old), to Denmark in 2008. Benjie said,

> I thought that it would be no problem to bring [her] here because I am Danish but because we are young and she is foreign we had so many problems with the government. They kept asking me to prove that I had enough money to sponsor her, how long I work and if I had a decent place to live. Then they asked for the deposit and we had so many problems.

The difficulties surfaced in terms of Benjie's ability to demonstrate that he could financially support his wife and to show his strong "affiliation/attachment" to Denmark. Even though Benjie is a plumber and could demonstrate sufficient income, he had a relatively short work history (due to his younger age). Because he was a renter with a short rental history and not a homeowner, he could not immediately demonstrate to the Danish Authorities strong residential ties to Denmark. Finally, Benjie also had a difficult time securing the 100,000 kroner financial guarantee to sponsor his wife (he said that he saved the money for over two years by living with his parents). The decision to live with his parents, while helping him to save the guarantee money, simultaneously hurt his ability to demonstrate to the Danish authorities that he could provide suitable housing for himself and his wife because he did not have his own apartment at the time of application. Only after his parents (who fortunately had a large enough flat) agreed to let the couple live with them did Benjie secure the visa for his wife.

Benjie's case is the most salient in demonstrating how these restrictive policies have placed significant limits on his Danish citizenship and contributes to him being kept on the margins of Danish society. As an ethnic Dane with Danish citizenship, he assumed (as many would) that he had the freedom to marry whomever he wished and would have relative ease in bringing this person to live with him in Denmark. Yet, as demonstrated above, these policies have called his "attachments" to Denmark into question and placed significant restrictions on citizenship rights and, ultimately, on his personal choice to marry whomever he wanted.

Difficult Choices: Country or Love

As Kauppinen and Poutvaara (2011) stated, these laws have also greatly affected native Danes with third-country national partners who live abroad but would like to return to Denmark with their spouse and cannot return due to the restrictions. Two of

the couples in my sample highlight this trend. Mette is a native Dane who met her husband, Hasan (from Morocco), while both were on holiday in Spain. He was a student living in Holland and she was a student in Denmark at the time. During their courtship, she traveled to Holland for extended periods of time to visit him because he could not obtain a tourist visa to visit her in Denmark. When she became pregnant, they married and wanted to relocate to Denmark, but her frequent visits to Holland were counted by Danish Authorities as time away from Denmark that lessened her attachment to Denmark. Because Mette's apartment in Copenhagen was deemed unsuitable housing by the authorities (due to the small size), her parents had to sign paperwork giving permission for Mette and her husband to live with them. Because she was a university student with limited work experience and income, her parents also had to provide the 50,000 kroner financial guarantee to permit her husband to obtain a temporary permit to come to Denmark.

I first interviewed Mette and Hasan in 2004 when they were living with Mette's family near Copenhagen. I interviewed them again in 2008, after they moved to Sweden, and when asked about how the changes to the immigration laws affected him and his family Hasan said,

> It is a lot of Danish citizens living in Malmö now because of that law. In 2002, we tried to renew the temporary permit and we were told that I had to leave Denmark and re-apply from Morocco.

Mette interrupted him and said,

> We were scared that he would get denied and could not come back [to Denmark] so we went [in 2004] to Sweden instead. I did not know anything about this immigration stuff until I got pregnant and we wanted to live in Denmark. I started calling them [the Danish Authorities] and found out that I could not stay in my

own country if I wanted to stay with him. They said that he had to go back to Morocco, so he had to go back there and stayed for three months before he could apply for a tourist visa. So he went back to Morocco for three months and I was in Denmark calling them [the Danish Authorities] every week to ask when can he get his visa. I am pregnant and getting bigger and my baby is coming. Finally, I spoke with the right person and I was crying to them and maybe she felt sorry for me. They required photos of us to prove that we were together and there were interviews about how we met and our life together. I called her again two weeks before I had the baby and suddenly she said she was faxing the visa to Morocco. After he got that, we were asking how can he stay in Denmark permanently but I had to show that I had a big enough apartment and the 50,000 kroner. We lived with my parents and they gave them the money [the financial guarantee] and he was still denied the visa extension.

When Hasan's visa was denied, the couple contacted Marriage Without Borders, an immigrant advocate group, and they were advised to consider moving to Malmö because Sweden has less-restrictive immigration laws, and with the short distance both of them could commute for work in Copenhagen. When I asked Mette how she felt about living away from Denmark, she said,

Because I am working in Denmark, I am paying my taxes and everything is in Denmark. That's the stupid thing. The kids are going here [Sweden] for kindergarten. We both [Hasan and I] are paying our taxes in Denmark since he works there too. I feel like I am paying taxes there but my life is here. I can't even live or vote in my own country. It was really hard when we moved here. It was really hard we had no one here—no friends, no family. We had to find an apartment and jobs. I was nine months pregnant and not knowing if he could stay or if we could be together. It was really stressful and it seems like they are making it harder for people like us. I just remember driving over the bridge [that connects Malmö and Copenhagen] in the moving van when we moved here and

crying. I felt like we were leaving everything . . . my family, friends behind and it was so unfair.

Mette and Hasan's story highlights how these restrictive policies also place limits on the citizenship rights of native Danes who partner with third-country nationals. Both Mette and Hasan talked about how they felt disenfranchised by paying taxes in Denmark but not being able to vote or live in Denmark. Mette also talked about how there was a lack of awareness about how these policies affect native Danes. She admitted during our interviews that before meeting Hasan and experiencing her difficulties with the Danish authorities, she believed (like many Danes) that these new laws only affected new immigrants and second- and third-generation immigrants (ethnic Danes) and were protecting these groups against forced and arranged marriages.

Kanika and her husband had a similar experience to Mette and Hasan. Kanika is 30 years old and from India. In 2004, she met Jon, her native-Dane husband through mutual friends while she was visiting Denmark. They were married in 2006 and were living in the Amager section of Copenhagen. When her temporary visa was set to expire, the couple made the decision to move to Sweden. When I asked her to talk more about why they left Denmark, she said,

It was a visa problem. In Denmark, I would have had to go back to India and then apply for the visa from there. We knew it would have taken a long time and no guarantee that we would get approved or that they would let me back into the country. We wanted to try something easier by living in Sweden. In Sweden, I just went to the migration office in Malmö and we tell them what citizenship we have. They checked us out and in one month we had the visa. It was much easier. In Sweden, they don't force you to learn the language. It was my choice to take Swedish classes. I wanted to learn because I feel it is important to know the language when you move to a new country. It is the key to society. We didn't

even apply in Denmark because we heard that it would take long time and we were insecure that I might be turned down and sent back to India. It has been hard for my husband because we had to find a new place to live and we are far from his family but we talked and decided that it was better to be here.

Kanika talked a lot about how she felt more relaxed living in Sweden as compared to living in Denmark. She said that she did not feel pressure about her status or rushed to learn the language. While she is now fluent in Swedish and is working in Sweden, her husband commutes to Copenhagen for work and has expressed more anxieties about living away from his friends and family. She said,

> [When we first moved to Sweden] it was very hard for Jon. He thought that we would not have any problems with me staying in Denmark until we started talking to friends who were also married to foreigners and who could not get the visas. Even though it was his idea to move to Sweden, I know that it upset him to leave his flat, his friends and all of his family behind. Even though he will not say it, I know that it must be strange and sad for him to not be able to live in his country because he is married to me.

The stories of these two couples underscore the findings of Kauppinen and Poutvaara (2011) that these restrictive policies force native Danes to choose between country and love when partnering with third-country nationals. As noted earlier with Benjie's experience, these policies also make it difficult for ethnic Danes who wish to partner with members of their own group. Perlmann and Waters (2007) argued that for groups with great social distances, the minority group will seek out partners from their own group. Yet these restrictive policies make this very difficult and thereby contribute to widening the social boundaries among these groups.

SITUATIONAL DANISHNESS: THE USE
OF OPTIONAL IDENTITY

Despite the experiences of most ethnic Danes like Benjie and Farah of being forever foreigners, some third-country nationals in my sample were able (under certain circumstances) to make use of optional identity. Mary Waters (1990) defined this term to refer to "an identity that individuals may choose to express at times and in ways that [are] convenient to them." For the respondents with the most similarities to native Danes in terms of race (White), high fluency with English (native English speaker), and high country-of-origin ranking within the global racial order (Australia, Canada, and the United States), the use of optional identity was especially salient. These respondents (once they achieved a high level of Danish fluency) could opt to "blend in" with native Danes and situationally discard the identity associated with their original country of origin while simultaneously achieving social distance between themselves and other (perceived less-desirable) immigrants.

These respondents articulated quite differently their respective experiences with situational Danish identity and their use of optional identity. Brittany is White with blonde hair and blue eyes and is from the United States. She is quite tall and has a slender physique. Brittany met Christian, her native-Dane husband, in California in 1998 while he was visiting a Danish friend who was living there. I interviewed her in 2001, 2004, and 2008. When I asked (in 2001) how she viewed herself in light of the discourse about new Danes and immigration to Denmark, she said,

> I guess I am an immigrant but for me, it's different. Well, right now it's weird because I don't understand Danish but I guess my goal is to be able to speak Danish well enough so that I can meet people and they don't assume I'm not a Dane right off.

I first interviewed Brittany at the same time I interviewed Sabrina. Both women were married to native Danes and both identified

learning Danish with a "perfect" non-foreign accent as their initial goals. I interviewed both women again in 2008 and while both women achieved the goal of speaking non-accented Danish, Sabrina (being Black and from South Africa) did not feel as incorporated into Danish society as Brittany (being White and from the United States). Brittany made note of her physical appearance and how similar it is to typical Danish women. She described how this allowed her to situationally blend into Danish identity at will. Brittany was quite intentional in her use of optional identity and she articulated a strong desire to separate her experience from that of people she perceived as problem immigrants. For her, if these individuals were feeling excluded, it was from a lack of effort to fit in on their part. She said,

> You know what actually, I think that the reason the immigrants are outside is not because of race. Racial issues are more there—in the States. I feel like here if you are part of the culture. If you speak Danish and if you are in society. I think people will give everyone an equal chance. It is just that you have to try. I met a guy who owns a restaurant, an American guy. I met him shortly after coming here and he has a very interesting view. He thinks Danes are all very cold and unwelcoming. He has been here five years and doesn't understand Danish. And I think yeah, people are cold toward him. He shows no interest in their culture. So I think that's it. I think that people, the immigrants, the people having a problem are the ones refusing to change and keeping themselves separate.

Only after I pressed by asking her about race relations in Denmark in several different ways did Brittany reluctantly admit that her race and her US citizenship gave her some advantages over other immigrants living in Denmark. Unlike Brittany, Brian, who is also White and from the United States, with light brown hair and blue eyes, immediately highlighted his racial and citizenship advantages over other immigrants. Yet, when I asked him (in

2001) how he viewed himself in light of the growing discourse on immigration in Denmark, he also sought to distance himself from less-desirable immigrants. Brian said,

> I don't see myself as a immigrant. I know that I am but not like the ones on the news. My wife's family talks about this all the time and they say, "these people should learn Danish and change to fit in". I don't know about that. I agree about the language but not about everything else. I feel like Danes want you to change to them but their society is not so great in all ways. For example, everything is so controlled and structured here. I feel like I am under constant surveillance here with everyone making demands on me. It is really hard to find a good job without the language. They make it almost impossible to make life here. I can't wait to go back to the States. My life would be so different there.

Interestingly, Brian was the only respondent who could have made use of optional identity and who made an active choice not to. Brian met Lene, his native-Dane wife, while she was on holiday in New Mexico in 1998. He came to Denmark in 2000 and I interviewed him and his wife Lene in 2001 and 2008. Brian and his wife left Denmark in late 2001 to live in the United States, and after having twin boys in 2006, they decided to return to Denmark to live in 2007. When asked (in 2008) how he viewed himself in the discussion about immigrants and new Danes and whether or not he considered himself a foreigner or a new Dane, he said,

> Is that what I am? [laughing] I am a new Dane? I'll see about that.
>
> *Do you see yourself becoming a Danish citizen in the future?*
> No
>
> *Okay, that was quick [laughing]*
> No, I never want to be a Dane. My citizenship is part of my identity. I would never give that up. When she [looking toward his

wife, Lene] was in the States, she would have said the same thing. Being Danish is her identity.

When I asked about how Brian and his wife felt their sons would be perceived within Danish culture, Brian said,

> Our kids will have a much easier time and will see themselves as Danish and fitting in. They can blend in. They have blonde hair and look Danish. I think that it is different. I feel perfectly at home here right now. If I walk out on the street, I am not threatened and I don't feel any stress. My sons' identity will be Danish with an American father [laughing] but they will be Danish. It won't be questioned. This is all new to Denmark. There have been 400 years of trying to figure it out in the States and Denmark has had a few decades to figure it out. Danes will also take two to three generations to come to terms with this.

Both Brian and Lene expressed strong certainty that their sons' identities would not be challenged and would be accepted as Danish because of their physical similarities to Danes (being White, blonde, and with blue eyes), but Brian was also very quick to point out that Denmark is a relative newcomer to dealing with race relations in comparison with the United States. He and his wife were hopeful that the Danes would handle race relations better as more time passes. As noted earlier, tightening immigration laws and increasingly restrictive social policies enacted toward non-White, non-Western immigrants and ethnic populations, as noted by the experiences of ethnic Danes like Benjie and Farah, make me less hopeful that Denmark is moving in a more-inclusive direction in terms of race relations.

Adriana, who is from Brazil, demonstrated the most interesting use of optional identity of all of these respondents. She was the only non-native English speaker in the sample to make use of optional identity. Her physical appearance is most notable because she appears White with fair and freckled skin and blue

eyes. At first glance, you would not know that she is foreign as compared with native Danes or that she is Brazilian.

Adriana is 33 years old and met Erik, her native-Dane husband, online in 2000. He traveled to Brazil during their courtship and the couple stayed there for six months. They decided to move to Denmark and were married in 2001. When I interviewed her in 2008, she spoke Danish at a high fluency and without a foreign accent. Adriana said that she took extra Danish language classes beyond what was required because she wanted to be perceived as a native Dane at first glance. She, like Brittany, expressed a strong desire to distinguish her assimilation experience from those perceived as problem immigrants. When I asked her why she spent so much time perfecting her Danish, she said,

> I worked really hard on my Danish because I did not want anyone to know immediately that I am not Danish. I like that I am not treated different. It was very hard for me when I first came here. No one would talk to me and I always felt so lonely. I remember thinking this place was cold and dark and I just wanted to go home. I never wanted to feel like that again. When I would open my mouth they knew I was foreign because of my accent. I spent so many hours practicing my Danish so they wouldn't know . . .

When I interviewed Adriana's husband, Erik, he also expressed negative feelings about problem immigrants in Denmark. He was also very quick to point out that he had voted for the conservative Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti in Danish) in the past two elections. When I asked him if he viewed his political beliefs as a contradiction since his wife was an immigrant and was a third-country national (Adriana received her Danish citizenship in 2008), he said,

> Adriana and people like her are not the problem. She works, has learned the language and follows the culture here. Things in Denmark have changed a lot and become more crazy in a sense.

These people, especially the young people, have no respect for other people. They are taught from the home to care about themselves and no one else. I would not mind them being here if they would learn the language and follow our culture . . . why should Denmark change for them? If I went to another country, I would follow the rules and try to fit in. Why can't they?

Despite her hard work on perfecting her Danish and her husband's conservative political beliefs, it is ironic that she said that the majority of her close friends are other internationals who are also married to native Danes. When I first interviewed Adriana in 2001, she said that she felt very lonely and isolated, which she attributed to her lack of Danish and not working at the time. When I interviewed her again in 2008, she said,

Now that you are working, have you made connections with Danes?

Yes, some—a few. My colleagues are very friendly and nice but most of my close friends are international people who are married with Danes. I have not been able to make many Danish close friends unless they are also friends of Erik's. Now that I speak Danish, this has helped a lot because people are more open to you when you speak Danish. Before, I could not speak and I really felt outside back then. Now, not so much. The language is the key. I worked really hard to speak without an accent because I did not want anyone to know right away that I am a foreigner. I think it is much harder if they think you are a foreigner.

When I asked her to elaborate on whether she thought that the language or her physical appearance helped her to connect with Danes more than when she first arrived, she was quick to say both. Adriana, unlike Brittany, was the most willing to admit that her White skin and blue eyes made it easier for her to connect with native Danes.

Milagros, who is also from Brazil, could not make use of optional identity as easily as Adriana. Milagros has dark hair,

brown skin, and brown eyes, and despite being highly fluent, she speaks Danish with a notable accent. She came to Denmark in 2000 to be with her native-Dane husband, Richard. I also interviewed her and her husband several times (in 2001, 2004, and 2008), and with each interview, her frustration with how native Danes interact with her seemed to increase. She said (in 2008),

> I give up trying to do as they do. I speak Danish and follow their culture and I still get nothing back from them . . .

Richard interrupted his wife and said,

> I think this is Milagros' problem with dealing with the Danes and the Danish system. She is so open and giving of herself to others and it is not like that here. She reacts every time someone does not respond the same way to her. Does this bother you

Milagros interrupts and says,

> . . . It used-to bother me and now I don't care because I am going to be who I am and I am not going to change that. I do as they do at work but at home, I want to be free to be myself.

The sentiment that Milagros expressed in her last comment is significant. For Milagros, she compartmentalizes her experiences with "the Danes." She has established a clear demarcation between home and work. Milagros works for a Danish firm and she shared with me many examples of how she has changed herself while at work to conform to how she believes Danes behave in the workplace. She said that she used to compliment her co-workers on their appearance or tell her colleagues "well done" on a completed work project. She said that she stopped doing this because people distanced themselves from her and thought that she was strange for giving them this kind of attention.

When Milagros said that at home "she wants to be free to be herself," this sentiment is also reflected in the décor of her and Richard's home. Unlike my other respondents, Milagros' home was the only one that was not painted with neutral colors and did not have Scandinavian designed furnishings and decorations. Her home was painted in warm tropical colors (peach, cocoa brown, and deep avocado greens) and had many lush plants and Latin-inspired artwork and sculpture. When stepping into her living room, it felt like you were leaving Denmark on the outside and entering a warm, lush, South American country on the inside. Milagros' mechanism for functioning in Danish society highlights Peter Seeberg's (2002) concept of "negotiated integration." Her life strategy for finding a place in Danish society was to assimilate and conform to Danish social norms at work. Then, she sheds these behaviors and scenery at home and in her private life. Like Adriana, most of Milagros' close friends were other internationals who were partnered with native Danes. But unlike Adriana, Milagros actively seeks out these kinds of relationship as a means of sharpening the line of demarcation between her "external" life in Denmark and her private time in her personal life where she is "free to be herself."

Conclusion

As noted throughout the chapter, the integration discourse in Denmark has paid little attention to how immigrants and ethnic populations are perceived by native Danes. As noted earlier, people and political actors define successful integration quite differently. For political actors, the benchmark for successful integration within this discourse is often measured by the achievement of socioeconomic assimilation and language acquisition on the part of immigrants. For many ethnic populations, successful integration is defined in deeper and more-layered ways. As my respondents demonstrated with many of their stories, the integration

experiences of many third-country nationals are often more nuanced than just achieving language acquisition, labor market participation, and residential assimilation with native Danes. Many also desire social acceptance and inclusion in all realms of social life in Denmark.

As demonstrated in this chapter, the premise asserted by Perlmann and Waters that intermarriage would decrease social boundaries and increase social mobility is complicated when juxtaposed with restrictive social policies that limit the citizenship rights of ethnic and native Danes and that also marginalize third-country nationals. I have demonstrated how these restrictive policies tightly regulate this form of intermarriage and, as a result, have deepened social boundaries among these groups. As demonstrated by the experiences of my intermarried respondents and where there are significant differences between their respective cultures (religion or race) and native Danes, they felt compelled to retain their original ethnic identity rather than the cultural fusion hypothesized by Gordon's theory of intermarriage assimilation. As demonstrated by the cases of Benjie and Farah, non-White ethnic Danes face challenges to their identity claims by native Danes and often are perceived as and subjected to living in Denmark as forever foreigners (Kim, 2008).

My data also highlighted how increasingly restrictive policies in Denmark are contributing to a rise in out-migration of native Danes with third-country national partners who cannot stay in Denmark because of these policies. Much of the integration discourse emphasizes Danish language acquisition as the key variable for increased social and economic integration on the part of immigrants. While the vast majority of respondents echoed this sentiment, it is important to note that all of the respondents were English-proficient (which is the second most commonly spoken language in Denmark—following Danish); most possessed a high level of educational attainment prior to immigration to Denmark, and all were married to a native or ethnic Dane—which in theory

would provide greater social networks into mainstream Danish society. Despite all of these social and cultural advantages over other immigrant populations with far less human capital, most respondents still expressed feelings of social isolation and an overall cultural resistance on the part of native Danes to include them into the multicultural view of Danish identity.

CONCLUSION AND BROADER IMPLICATIONS: WHERE DO WE (THEY) GO FROM HERE?

So, what is Danishness and who is included (or excluded) from this? In light of what has been discussed throughout, the majority of my respondents (including most native Danes) agreed with Jespersen (2004) that at the individual and group levels Danish society functions like a tribe—where social inclusion is infrequently given until trust has been well established. I argue that it is this selectivity that often results in social identity creation and a sense of belonging and also reinforces social exclusion for those who have not been extended an invitation to join. Many of my native-, ethnic-, and new-Dane respondents echoed this sentiment (though some were more reluctant to admit it than others). Many also identified the Janteloven and hygge as cultural constructs that best demonstrate this inclusivity. They also highlighted several everyday examples of the perceived unwillingness of many native Danes to accept "strangers" into their closed community.

As evidenced by my earlier analysis of Danish citizenship law and integration policies, I posit that Danish identity is manufactured in opposition to the other and this specific type of Danish identity is packaged and then taught to new Danes (through the Danish History and Culture course mandated in the Integration Act). This particular construction of Danishness is also used as a tool designed to exclude many ethnic Danes from achieving legitimacy in their identity claims. My analysis of the development of Danish integration policy and practices expose a strong and growing emphasis on issues of culture.

As Hedetoft and Hjort (2002) observed, the emergence of consensus among the Danish population on "the integration problem" associated with some third-country nationals has manifested into explicit demands for "cultural transformation." As demonstrated throughout, these demands are situated in a legislative emphasis for these groups to assimilate to Danish culture—an expectation not mandated for other European Union or Nordic immigrants to Denmark (Schmidt, 2011: 258–260). Hedetoft and others have called for the integration discourse to shift over to more conversations about multiculturalism and models for achieving this. Kivisto and Wahlbeck (2013) assert this and view multiculturalism in "two reciprocal ways." They see it "first, as a form of claims-making by minority groups and second, as a way in which the dominant society and its political system accommodate to and manage diversity" (5). This operational definition for multiculturalism best highlights how aspects of culture must also be considered when thinking about integration.

In Denmark, the topic of integration and the resulting social and political discourse can be summarized into two questions commonly asked among many native Danes—the first more benign than the second—"how can we better integrate different groups of immigrants and the Danes" and "why won't foreigners integrate?" (Kingsley, 2012: 104–105).

The first question has been addressed by two primary and influential actors (the state vis-à-vis politicians and the media). Both have tried a number of initiatives to achieve the goal of successful integration. I have discussed in great detail the legislative initiatives enacted by the Danish state in earlier chapters. Yet, there are also media initiatives that tend to be more sensational and controversial in nature.

Two media attempts occurred in 2008—(1) during the aftermath of the Prophet Muhammad Cartoon controversy, the bombing outside of the Danish embassy in Islamabad, and the government ban on the wearing of religious head coverings for Danish judges in court and (2) during the height of the anti-immigration media discourse: the Miss Tørklæde (headscarf) contest sponsored by Danmarks Radio, and the Jeg Er Også Dansker (I am also a Dane) Campaign that ran in the *Politiken* newspaper.

In June 2008, the state broadcaster, Danmarks Radio, announced that it was sponsoring the first Miss Tørklæde beauty contest. Contest organizers said in news articles that the purpose of the contest was to dispel the belief held by many Danes that the hijab is a symbol of female oppression in Islam and to open communication lines between native Danes and the growing Muslim denizen population on this taboo subject. The pageant was one of several programming initiatives charged to Skum-tv, the youth division of Danmarks Radio that creates web-based programs and blogs geared toward the 15- to 20-year-old demographic. Rune Sparre Geertsen, spokesperson for Skum-tv, said, "We were originally drawn to the idea because it seemed like a bold and innovative way to address the subject of increasingly heated debate in Denmark . . . here 'Western' beauty pageant meets with 'Muslim' values of modesty and chasteness, challenging both stereotypes and the notion that they are somehow fundamentally incompatible" (Nørregaard and Schwartz, 2008: 1). Hibo Abdull, a 24-year-old aspiring actress, participated in the contest and agreed with the goals articulated by the organizers by saying, "I just feel like

showing people a different side of what it is to be a Muslim . . . It (the Tørklæde) actually makes me feel more feminine not to show too much of myself"(Nørregaard and Schwartz, 2008: 1).

The contestants could enter by uploading their personal photos, showing them wearing a tørklæde, onto the Danmarks Radio website. The women who entered the contest were quite diverse racially and ethnically, with many native Danes also submitting pictures. In addition to race and ethnicity, there were also diverse submissions in terms of age. Some women appeared to be teenagers and 20-somethings and others to be older (in their 30s and 40s). Many of the women wore traditional tørklædes and some others wore homemade ones that appeared to be self-made from sheets and other colorful swatches of fabric. The organizers of the contest said on the website that the winner would be selected by the president of a Danish fashion company and would win a "hot, specially designed" custom Tørklæde and a brand-new Apple iPod. The top five runners-up would receive subscriptions to Muslim Girl, a bimonthly fashion, beauty, and lifestyle magazine published in Canada (Nørregaard and Schwartz, 2008: 2). Huda Falah, an 18-year-old seemingly Middle Eastern woman, was chosen as the winner. The contest judge, Uffe Buchhardt, a Danish fashion guru, said that Falah was chosen because of the "fantastic and shocking" light blue color of her headscarf (Nørregaard and Schwartz, 2008: 2).

The Miss Tørklæde pageant met with resistance from some members of the ethnic community as also from native Danes. Some members of the Muslim community questioned the appropriateness of having a beauty contest using the Tørklæde as the basis for determining the winner. They argued that this was contradictory to the value of female modesty that the Tørklæde was designed to promote among devout Muslim women. Criticism from far-right politicians and some native Danes was that this pageant "normalizes" the use of the headscarf and justifies and celebrates the oppression of Muslim women. To give context to these criticisms, the pageant was held immediately

following the passage of laws preventing religious head coverings from being worn by Danish judges in court. While the law is gender-neutral in language, many argued that the law was targeting the Tørklæde in particular because of the fact that at the time (2008) there was only one female, Muslim judge in the Danish courts and she wore a Tørklæde. Despite the criticisms, the pageant was deemed a success by organizers and they boasted in the media that over 100 people participated in less than five days of running the contest. Yet, this was the first and last Miss Tørklæde pageant—the contest was not sponsored again by Danmarks Radio.

The second media initiative was less sensational than the Miss Tørklæde contest but also sparked debate. During the spring of 2008, the *Politiken* ran a series of articles and photo ads called the Jeg Er Også Dansker (I am also a Dane) Campaign. The goal of the news articles and the accompanying photos was to engage the public in debates about the inclusion of ethnics in Danish identity. The photography consisted of native Danes and images of the ethnics wearing a tee-shirt with Jeg Er Også Dansker printed on the front of the shirt. The articles were written by Danish journalists with op-eds by conservative politicians and liberal public leaders from the Muslim community included. The articles and op-eds debated both sides of this issue. Those writers with more liberal opinions on the subject criticized the Danish government and native Danes for not recognizing how growing diversity is changing Danish identity and for the lack of inclusion of ethnics into Danishness. The more conservative writers, while acknowledging the growing diversity, still argued that Danish ethnonational identity is something still reserved for native Danes and that it functions in society separate from ethnic identities. The tone of these articles was not overtly racist or discriminatory but rather articulated the position of some political actors and conservative native Danes that I discussed in great detail in the

previous chapter. This perspective underscores the fixed boundary between those who are "Danes by nature" and those who are "Danes by jurisdiction."

Although the campaign was generally well received because the articles expressed both sides of the issue, there was an online public response to the photography included in *Politiken*—which some argued pushed the visual envelope on the issue. Some individuals and groups launched an online anti-campaign in response. Some native Danes began posting pictures online with a stereotypical-looking (blonde and blue eyes) native Dane wearing a tee-shirt that said, Jeg Er Dansker (I am a Dane!). Another series of Internet images were posted of ethnics wearing similar tee-shirts that read, Jeg Er Ikke Dansker (I am NOT a Dane!) (Source: http://profileengine.com/groups/profile/425721849/jeg-er-ogs-dansker; http://www.24.dk/group/etracismefrit24timer/forum/thread/2101750). Both of these online anti-campaigns had divergent motivations. The native-Dane anti-campaign was meant to underscore the position articulated by conservative political actors—keeping Denmark truly Danish by preserving ethnonational identity. The ethnic anti-campaign seemed to articulate a desire by some ethnics to integrate only to a point or to negotiate a different notion of Danishness rather than simply assimilate the traditional one highlighted above.

The second question generated by integration discourse in Denmark—Why won't foreigners integrate?—is perhaps the most frustrating for both native Danes and ethnics alike. For many native Danes, the answer might begin with a growing perception that immigrants and ethnics do not want to integrate but rather want to have their cake and eat it too. In other words, ethnics want to benefit from all that Danish society has to offer—universal health care, free or heavily subsidized education, a strong social safety net, and so on—but do not want to sacrifice anything to maintain it. The latter part of this sentiment is the crux of the citizen-to-community relationship: the idea is that to benefit from

the collective one must put in the work and sacrifice that benefits the individual, for that will ultimately benefit the whole.

In addition to the trust that citizens have for one another in this relationship, it is also implied in this type of relationship that citizens also have a basic trust of the state. Here, the state is viewed as an entity that protects and provides social order to the community. The majority of native Danes have been socialized to this type of citizen-to-community/state relationship, as evidenced by the way the Janteloven has been so tightly woven into the fabric of Danish identity. Unless immigrants and ethnics also buy into this conceptualization of the citizen-to-community and state relationship, this type of community cannot exist in the same way as it has for native Danes to date. As I have demonstrated throughout, the Danish state has not been a neutral actor in its dealings with ethnic and immigrant populations and, as a result, trust has not yet been established between the two.

To explore this question again from the perspective of ethnics, I begin with a critical look at who is a "foreigner" in this instance? Is the term native Danes referring to new immigrants, denizens, or Danish-born ethnics? If it is the latter, then this is the crux of the problem. As evidenced in my interviews with ethnic Danes, the view of this group as being "forever foreigners" (Kim, 2008) will continue to block ethnic buy-in to the type of citizen-to-community/state relationship described above. How can one be born into a community where the government and the dominant population do not acknowledge or accept them? Then, after not being accepted, one is simultaneously asked and expected to sacrifice for the collective benefit in a manner similar to those who have been incorporated or who are dominant in that community. In this instance, the community takes on a different meaning—the loyalties and trust identification might lie with the community of the ethnic group rather than with the broader community of the nation-state.

COMMUNITY AND THE CITIZEN-TO-NATION-STATE RELATIONSHIP

In his analysis of the Danish Jewry, Andrew Buckser (2003) argued that community "consists not so much in a group of people as in a body of symbols, a set of references that individuals can construe in many different ways. What makes people part of the community is not their agreement on the [exact] meaning of particular symbols but their use of a common symbolic framework to construct their understandings of self and world" (5).

Brint (2001) aptly defined community as "a sense of familiarity and safety, mutual concern and support, continuous loyalties, even the possibility of being appreciated for one's full personality and contribution to group life rather than for narrower aspects of rank and achievement" (2–3). Both of these definitions of community have high salience for how Danish culture has been described by both insiders and outside observers. Acceptance of and living with the parameters of these definitions are often coupled with high expectations and demands, as evidenced by the practice of the Janteloven and hygge. But, as with any relationship, fulfilling these notions of community also requires high trust among members. Perhaps this is the core problem with the native Dane–ethnic Dane relationship, that is, a lack of basic trust on both sides!

As noted in Chapters 3 and 4, the exchange between the conservative Danish politician and the Danish-born, Muslim imam on the news program illustrates this basic lack of trust. Mogens Camre could not even bring himself to acknowledge Fatih Alev's claims to Danish identity as being similar or equivalent to his own. Based on Alev's calm demeanor, he probably was not surprised by Camre's view of him as a forever foreigner (similar to Benjie and Farah's descriptions of not having their claims to Danishness accepted by some native Danes). This failure to trust and see the other's perspective illustrates how the ways in which community

is conceptualized and experienced by both natives and ethnics is also critical in determining whether or not groups (and individuals) are included or excluded as members of the community.

Buckser, while highlighting the predominant contraction among many Danish Jews living in contemporary Denmark—the desire to be fully integrated while simultaneously maintaining Jewish identity, religion, and traditions—advocates for examining community as a fluid rather than a fixed concept. He says, "This approach allows us to understand the persistent appeal of ethnic communities in the fragmented world of late modern society. Such communities offer a sense of rootedness and authenticity . . ." (Buckser, 2003: 5). I would take his perspective a step further to argue that this desire for "rootedness and authenticity" also exists among native Danes even if this is obtained through the evocation of a manufactured or an imagined community of "Danishness."

The concept of community is the crux of Ferdinand Tönnies' analysis of the "Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft" (community and society). As described in Chapters 3 and 4, the processes associated with integration of immigrants and ethnics show how Denmark is transforming from a tribe-like community to a modern, multicultural society. Tönnies (2001) described two contrasting systems of social order. He defined the first, community (Gemeinschaft), as a social order based on the unity of kinship ties or familial relationships guided by "fundamental harmony of wills and . . . developed and cultivated by religion and custom." Within the community, customs and ritual are highly valued and viewed as critical to maintaining the common good. This was observed in Chapter 4 with the practice of Janteloven in terms of providing the cultural narrative and normative behaviors associated with a specific construct of Danish identity. As also demonstrated in this chapter, the practice of hygge is highly salient for demonstrating Tönnies' description of the communal life within Gemeinschaft where the reliance on kinship ties makes the demarcation between stranger and native highly pronounced and thus strictly enforced.

Emile Durkheim's major contribution to the conceptualization of community was to disaggregate its meaning and to unlink it from its rural and common setting (as originally conceptualized by Tönnies) (Brint, 2001: 4–6). For Durkheim, elements of Gemeinschaft could also exist in urban settings because community can transcend structure and also be observed as processes that manifest themselves in behavior and consciousness. This was demonstrated in Chapters 1 and 3 when describing the birthday party and the Julefrokost celebrations at the kollegium and the lessons on these events that were taught in the Danish History and Culture classes and my Fulbright orientation. The ritualized practice of these events and the strict adherence to the ritual when teaching these events to immigrants and ethnics best demonstrate this transcendence.

Durkheim identified six properties of "Gemeinschaft-like" relations (four of these are structural variables and two are cultural). These include (1) dense and demanding social ties, (2) social attachments to and involvements in institutions, (3) ritual occasions, and (4) small group size and the cultural variables of (5) perceptions of similarity with the physical characteristics, expressive style, way of life, or historical experience of others; and (6) common beliefs in an idea system, a moral order, an institution, or a group (4).

In my analysis of the Danish case, I focused on two *structural* variables—ritual occasions and small group size—and two *cultural* variables—perceptions of similarity and common beliefs and shared moral order, to demonstrate how Danish culture is perceived and practiced by native, ethnic, and new Danes. According to Durkheim, "ritual occasions help to cement group identity and to strengthen individual feelings of self-worth and vitality," and demonstrating participation in these occasions in the presence of other members contributes to identification with the group and what the group values (4). This description is salient as demonstrated by use of the Julefrokost as a

representation of hygge. This way of celebrating Christmas was consistently evoked in the Danish History and Culture class as a means of socializing new and ethnic Danes to the practice and ritual of hygge.

With regard to small size, both Durkheim and Tönnies note that this is essential for group cohesion and individual connectivity. Small group sizes allow high familiarity and facilitate trust building among members, which is the key to creating community. Denmark prides itself on being a "small country," but as I have described above, the high familiarity and trust building must be extended to the growing numbers of Danish-born ethnics or, as these numbers continue to increase, Denmark will find itself as a divided community.

The two cultural properties of "gemeinschaft-like" relations (as defined by Durkheim)—perceptions of similar and common beliefs and a shared moral order—were examined in my discussion of the Janteloven and how native Danes, ethnics, and immigrants differed in their perceptions about and use (or in some cases, non-use) of this cultural construct. Most of the native Danes, while acknowledging the flaws, still saw the belief in and practice of the Janteloven as a positive value that connected them to other Danes and Nordic people. Most of the immigrant respondents were frustrated with the tenets of Janteloven and saw them as a negative aspect of Danish identity that suppressed individual autonomy and achievement. The most interesting response to the Janteloven came from the ethnic-Dane respondents who experienced the Janteloven in their interactions with native Danes but chose not to incorporate it into their construct of ethnic Danish identity. This finding further supports the observational data from the Danish History and Culture course and the interview data with native Danes and ethnic Danes presented in earlier chapters by demonstrating that Danish identity is manufactured by political actors and constructed in opposition to a racialized other.

NORDIC NEIGHBORS: INTEGRATION CHALLENGES
FOR SWEDEN AND NORWAY

As noted earlier, the Janteloven is not uniquely Danish. In addition to being tightly woven into Danish culture, it is also interconnected with Nordic identity. Scandinavian scholars have commented on its practice in Sweden and Norway. Here, I will briefly discuss how this concept is also evoked in Swedish and Norwegian identities. Later, I will explore the integration challenges and respective discourses and how both have permeated everyday life for immigrants and ethnics living in Sweden and Norway.

THE LAW OF JANTE IN SWEDEN AND NORWAY

In Sweden, the Janteloven is practiced to a lesser degree than in Norway and Denmark. Yet, as Möller (1998) notes, it frequently plays out in the Swedish business culture. The origins of its practice are similar to the motivations of their Nordic neighbors—a centralized, egalitarian, political, and social culture that emphasizes community solidarity. Here, the conformity to the Janteloven provides the moral code that underscores everyday interactions in the Swedish workplace and daily life. Despite the fact that social class divisions are less pronounced in Sweden (as compared to the situation in the United States), with fewer distances from rich to middle and from middle to working classes, Möller aptly notes that these differences are downplayed. If a Swedish doctor happened to make higher salary than his/her neighbor, then the Jante would prevent him/her from publicly displaying the salary difference. She notes that if the Swedish doctor was able to take her family on a lavish vacation to India, then it would be considered poor taste to show the vacation pictures to the neighbors or to coworkers around the office (unless asked to). Even mentioning the vacation in casual conversation would violate the Jante Laws # 4

and # 6—do not convince yourself that you're better than us and do not think that you are more important than us (34).

Möller's descriptions of everyday situations in her research echo many of the stories told by my ethnic and immigrant respondents in terms of their respective experiences with this cultural construct in Danish society. According to Möller, there is an inherent contradiction contained in the Swedish version of Janteloven, which is not typically observed elsewhere. She cites public opinion surveys to argue that most Swedes would say that being "envious of our neighbor's good fortune" is one of the most prevalent characteristics of their society. The contradiction is that Swedish society scolds those who are flashy with what they have, but, as she argued, it is human nature to admire or desire something others have, thus causing the envy (33). In their book, *Nordic Views and Values* (1984), Engellau and Henning assert that daily life and the practice of Janteloven in Sweden can be summed up by the old Swedish proverb "noble deeds are done in silence" (1984: 57). They assert that Swedes will not boast or be comfortable with high praise and these practices manifest in most dimensions of social life.

Avant and Knutsen (1993) defined the Janteloven as it is practiced in Norway as "a term which expresses and communicates both this essential fear of individualism in Norwegian culture and values and the Norwegian awareness of this fear" (Avant and Knutsen, 1993: 3). Similarly Möller et al. stressed the negative aspects of Janteloven on Norwegians, namely that it demands social conformity and discourages spontaneity and individual happiness. In their article, Avant and Knutsen highlighted everyday examples of the Janteloven in the Norwegian educational system. They argued that philosophically Norwegians believe that every child should be educated according to his/her individual needs. Despite this belief, teachers are trained to mainstream the classroom and teach to the middle-performing students—even if there are some students functioning above or even well below the middle. They

state further that conformity to the Jante would prevent the school system from ever grouping students by individual intellectual abilities (Avant and Knutsen, 1993: 5–6). In Norway, Avant and Knutsen said, there is also an inherent contradiction contained with conforming to the Jante. Here the "Janteloven encourages ethnocentricity [among native Norwegians and also] tends to support efforts to exclude those who are different." As Avant and Knutsen aptly pointed out, this concept serves the purpose of successfully binding native Norwegians under an ethnonational identity but also serves as the means to exclude all others, namely the rising immigrant and ethnic populations in Norway.

Engellau and Henning (1984) argue that the Jante laws may be Scandinavia's greatest cultural difference from the rest of the world. Although Möller et al. and Avant and Knutsen, in their respective works, conclude that the Jante stifles individual achievement, not all view the Janteloven as negative. Some have commented positively on the Janteloven's contribution to robust Scandinavian economies and successful business entities. In his 2013 article, "The Law of Jante: How a Swedish Cultural Principle Drive Ikea, Ericsson and Volvo, and Beat the Financial Crisis," Christopher Harress asserted that in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, there was no housing bubble or massive bailout of financial institutions in Scandinavia as compared to the situation in the United States. Harress attributed these successes to the cultural tenets of the Jante, which he argued prevents Scandinavian businesses, governments, and their people from "taking the same economic risks that led much of the Western world to the brink of financial apocalypse . . . because it would seem antithetical for anyone to take on more debt than necessary for everyday living" (Harress, 2013: 2).

The different manifestations of everyday uses of the Janteloven in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden are not huge but rather are subtle and not easily visible to the casual observer. The devil is more in the details. The subtleties are highlighted in the examples

provided by the authors above and those by my respondents. They show how the Janteloven is embedded into Nordic culture and the respective ethnonational identities of these three Scandinavian countries. All of these countries are rule oriented, have a strong respect for and trust in their nation-state, and socially function within a system that will rarely put the needs of one ahead of the needs of the community.

Immigration Trends and Integration Policies in Sweden and Norway

I now turn to a brief summary of immigration patterns in Sweden and Norway respectively. Then, I will summarize the respective integration discourses and the roles of social and political actors in shaping these conversations. Unlike its Nordic neighbors, Sweden has had the longest history with being an immigrant-receiving nation. Sweden was the first in the region to look abroad for guest workers during labor shortages in the 1960s and 1970s. Similar to the patterns exhibited in Denmark, many Swedish guest workers did not return to their respective countries of origin. Later, these groups increased their respective population sizes due to subsequent waves of family reunification immigration. These populations also increased because Sweden granted entrance to more international refugees than its Nordic neighbors. Sweden was also the first (and, in some cases, preferred) destination for immigrants coming to the region. Similar to Norway and Denmark, the largest populations among newer immigrants include the following countries: Turkey, Pakistan, and later refugees from Iraq, Bosnia, Iran, and Somalia (Kivisto and Wahlbeck, 2013). Swedish integration policy has traditionally set expectations for assimilation, which often required conformity to Swedish cultural norms and values.

The first immigration policy was adopted in 1975 by the Swedish Parliament and this significantly changed the national

approach toward assimilating minority populations. This law gave ethnic minorities the right to maintain a "distinctive culture" and to also have the same rights and status as the Swedish majority. At a time when most European countries began restricting immigration, Sweden was the outlier. As Rogers Brubaker (1989) noted, Sweden lacks the cultural and ethnonationalism of other European countries and, as a result, has been relatively successful with integrating immigrants "with so little fuss or friction" (Brubaker, 1989: 10).

Castles and Miller (1993) noted that Sweden is an unusual case among countries with newer migration trends. Despite the fact that it was not a country with a history of immigration (like Canada or the United States), Sweden adopted a multicultural model for integration (Castles and Miller, 1993: 227). Another unique characteristic of Swedish multiculturalism is what Castles and Miller called the "state interventionist model." They assert that these models exist when the state plays an active role in "helping" migrants to "maintain their culture." The objective of these actions is for the state to be viewed as benevolent in terms of helping the original culture survive in the new environment. In addition, the state also assumes the responsibility of "teaching" the dominant groups about cultural and ethnic "differences" (227–228).

Swedish immigration laws, while celebrated within and outside of Sweden for being progressive and inclusive in scope, have proven complicated to implement on several levels. First, they created ambiguous guidelines for integrating immigrants and ethnics. If individuals and groups have the right to retain their cultural distinctiveness, then how can the state also regulate the processes of integration into Swedish life? Second, the laws blurred the lines between citizen and non-citizen in terms of traditional markers of citizenship by granting the above rights to immigrants and ethnics. These traditional markers include voting rights, languages of instruction in Swedish schools, languages for

printing official government materials and documents, and the formation of social and political associations. Questions surfaced over whether these traditional "rights" associated with citizenship would now apply to immigrants and ethnics with resident status and in what ways. Third, the laws also raised questions about how implementation of these "new rights" could be achieved and incorporated with tandem efforts to integrate these populations into Swedish society (Åkesson, 2011: 218–219).

Despite these complications, Sweden has been celebrated internationally for being one of the most amenable countries for immigrants and ethnic populations. Here, immigrants and ethnic populations have rights rarely conveyed in other European countries. They can vote in local and regional elections. They have access to bilingual primary and secondary education. Immigrant and ethnic associations can obtain state funding to organize themselves "ethnically, culturally, religiously, and nationally in order to enhance their collective interests" (Eliassi, 2013: 8–9). The conditions for obtaining Swedish citizenship are also not as rigorous as in other European countries.

Over the years, the political and social discourse on multiculturalism has shifted in the opposite direction. Public support for these policies began to wane. Nationalistic viewpoints among Swedes and conservative political posturing emerged in the 1990s. Unlike their Nordic neighbors, these political parties were unable to secure a solid foothold in the government and among the Swedish people as a whole. However, these shifts in public and political attitudes led to the passage of the 1997 Integration Act. The language of the revision kept the essence of the earlier legislation in terms of preservation of ethnic cultures. But these new provisions drew a greater distinction in terms of identity. The revision "conjures up an image of Swedish society as composed of groups of people from intrinsically different ethnic 'backgrounds,' who do not share a common identity but who may co-exist in the same society" (Åkesson, 2011: 220–221). Despite the fact

that present-day Swedish integration policy recognizes and even protects the right to maintain one's original identity, this revised law follows a similar pattern as its Nordic neighbors—to draw a sharp boundary between those identified as Swedish and those with distinctive cultural backgrounds.

This new line of demarcation between Swedish identity and "other" cultures is underscored by Eliassi's (2013) study of Kurdish identity in Sweden. According to Eliassi's respondents many Kurdish youths born in Sweden still feel detached from claiming Swedish identity. The respondents in Åkesson's (2011) study of the multicultural identity among Cape Verdean descendants growing up in Sweden note similar feelings. One of her respondents said,

> My Swedish friends, who I play tennis with, they don't think about whether I'm Swedish or not Swedish or Cape Verdean. They don't care about that because we have formed a relationship. But there's a difference between the relation and the society as such and the way they see me the first time, then, they think "that's a . . ." I'm not sure what they think.

Another of her respondents said it more directly. He said,

> I never feel at home. I mean, you are always reminded, every day in one way or another. And it's not my fault. Reality, that is the way it is, and then you can walk around and try to make everything appear to be fine saying, "I feel 100 percent Swedish." That's just bullshit. (225)

Blennow (2011) concluded that the feelings expressed by these two respondents are not unusual within the context of what he called a "hegemonic system." In this kind of system, state actors use legislation to articulate the limits for claiming Swedish identity. For Blennow, social acceptance for identity claims among Swedes is conditioned upon the individual's acceptance of these articulated boundaries. Blennow defines Swedishness as "an

effect of articulated norms regulating limits for true or real cultural specificity and a Swedish subject as the position a person embraces/receives within those limits." Here, the state can produce a Swedish subject among immigrants and ethnics who also embrace these limits (12). Based on this analysis, Blennow concluded that power (or hegemony) is exerted over immigrants and ethnics by the Swedish state by demanding strict adherence to these articulations.

Norway

Norway is also an interesting case for examining issues of immigration and integration. As Gullestad (2004) noted, most Norwegians view themselves as "victims" of past Danish oppression and its previous history of Nazi occupation. She also argues that this self-positioning allows many Norwegians to view their society as one that is somewhat innocent on issues of race as compared to other nations. Instead the people and many Norwegian social scientists tend to view racism as an individual matter rather than as something embedded within social structures (182–183). Norway has no colonial history and has few domestic ethnic minorities. In her work, Gullestad cites Wikan as an outlier to this trend. Wikan, while somewhat acknowledging the presence of racism in Norway, also asserted that Norwegian authorities encourage the emergence of an economic underclass (consisting mostly of ethnics and immigrants) through "foolishly generous" welfare support (Wikan, 2002). Wikan equated these welfare practices to racism by describing what she called "cultural fundamentalism" and "welfare colonization." According to Gullestad, Wikan's work underscores a general attitude among everyday Norwegians and takes a particular look at the growing Muslim populations in Oslo, the capital city. These groups have been singled out because it is believed that Muslims most contradict "basic Norwegian values"

(Gullestad, 2004: 188). The following statement was made in a government document:

> A support of the national culture needs to embody great respect for the cultures of other countries. To strengthen Norwegian culture does not imply that it is better than everybody else's culture, but that it is important because it is *ours*. Because it embodies *our* very history, our traditions, our way of life, the very form and content which generations before us have given their ideas and dreams. (191)

In Norway, contemporary immigration and integration discourse most closely matches the Danish experience. In the 1990s, conservative political parties, namely the right-wing Progress Party (called Fremskrittspartiet in Norwegian), successfully used the media to campaign on an anti-immigration platform and to foster notions of nativism among Norwegians. The above statement from government documents, where political actors make consistent attempts to frame conversation about culture into "our" and "their" language, demonstrates this more conservative shift. These statements are also similar to those made by the Danish People's Party where Norwegian identity is reserved for those with a "legitimate" ethnonational claim to it.

As Avant and Knutsen (1993) noted, "Many Norwegians feel that immigrants should give up their language, religion and lifestyles in order to be assimilated into Norwegian society. They oppose public funding of native language classes in schools and agitate for a stricter quota system to regulate immigration, even though Norway's borders are virtually closed . . ." (6). Despite the fact that Avant and Knutsen made these comments in 1993, the public discourse on immigration and integration in Norway has not changed much. Rather, these conversations become more pronounced and gained international attention with the mass

shooting of 77 people (mostly teenagers) by Norwegian Anders Breivik in July 2011 on the island of Utøya, Norway. This incident shocked most domestically along with the rest of the world because mass shootings are rare in Scandinavia. This horrible incident was also shocking for the motivations behind his actions, which were later revealed. Breivik released his manifesto, titled "2083–A European Declaration of Independence," which advocated for the violent destruction of multiculturalism and what Breivik called the end of "Eurabia, resulting from the invasion of Muslims to Europe" (Kvisto and Wahlbeck, 2013: 3). Obviously Breivik's beliefs are not representative of most people in Norway. But it is important to note that this incident has sparked quite a bit of discussion and discourse about growing multiculturalism throughout Scandinavia and the rest of Europe. These comments and the resulting discourse also demonstrate the conflation of and difficulties with untangling conversations about Muslims from those about immigration and ethnic diversity in general.

Conclusion

Åkesson argued that contrary to popular belief, transnationalism and integration do not have to be (and typically are not) contradictory processes. She asserts that most ethnics and immigrants want to integrate and fit in. The tension often lies within a disjunction between and among competition expectations and demands. Gullestad (2004) aptly noted that European social scientists avoid frank conversations about race while preferring to focus their attentions on issues of ethnicity and ethnic relations, thus allowing race to "slip in through the back door." This assertion also sums up the respective discourses on immigration, ethnicity, and integration that seem to challenge notions of Nordic and ethnonational identities in Scandinavia. I agree with Gullestad that at the crux of these conversations is race—front and center. Race seems to be the primary barrier to identity claims made by ethnics born

and raised in Scandinavia. Both Gullestad and Blennow asserted in their respective works that the state often exerts power over ethnics and immigrants. For Blennow, this power is articulated and manifested within the legislative capacities of the Swedish state. For Gullestad, the power is embedded within the social institutions, thereby serving as the sites for racial discrimination in Norway. For the Danish case, I would argue that it is both.

This idea that nodes of racism are embedded into the laws and social institutions in Denmark was expressed by the majority of my non-White respondents. Two of the couples from my sample said that the environment in Denmark was so hostile that they felt forced to leave Denmark for Sweden. Rather than continuing to fight the administrative policies of Danish Immigration Services, they believed that life would be easier across the bridge, in Malmö. Both Mette and Hasan said that although they took active steps to learn Swedish and their children attend Swedish primary schools, they felt less pressure to integrate in Sweden than in Denmark. Jon and Kanika also made similar comments about living in Sweden. Kanika said,

> Here, I can breathe. It is not perfect here but I know that here my children have a chance of being accepted. In Sweden, they can have their mother without feeling threats from the government that she might be sent back to India at any time . . . I know this change has been difficult for Jon (her husband) but given the choice to stay with his family and friends in Denmark or to have his wife taken away by [Danish Authorities], he would choose us—for our family to stay intact.

Kanika's comments note that the identity discourse in Sweden is subtle. Unlike their previous experiences in Denmark, there is a less-aggressive tone to attitudes about who can and cannot make claims to Swedish identity. I previously discussed the vast limitations the Danish state places on those seeking Danish

citizenship in contrast to the seemingly minimal conditions for Swedish citizenship. At the time of the interviews, none of my respondents were eligible for Swedish citizenship. All told me that they would pursue citizenship as soon as possible and build their lives with their respective families in Sweden.

Throughout this book, I have discussed the critical role that nation-states play in creating the parameters for successful integration and conditions associated with inclusive multicultural identity. I have also examined the ways in which states have shaped the identity politics for the people living within its border. My state-centered analysis of citizenship has broader implications for social science research. By exploring the positioning of the state and state actors, we have an aerial view of the outcomes associated with integration and assimilation. We can better understand the articulations and limitations of identity claims that constitute the everyday experiences of groups and individuals experiencing integration.

As noted earlier, the nation-states can potentially serve as critical actors in shaping the citizenship rights and assimilation outcomes of their respective immigrant and ethnic-born populations. The state could take the position of viewing these populations as potential citizens, which would establish a strong foundation for trust building among the multicultural and native populations currently living in these countries. This state-centered position may accelerate the transformation of more homogeneous nations with shorter histories of being immigrant-receiving countries from a community to a multicultural society (as conceptualized by Tönnies and Durkheim). This positioning also has the potential to minimize racial and ethnic tensions among immigrants, ethnics, and dominant populations.

Unlike the community, the multicultural society (Gesellschaft) has no predetermined unity. According to Tönnies, the rationality of the society also makes the distinction between natives and

strangers less relevant because membership within the society is no longer based on kinship relations but rather based on contributions made to the society (as measured by various forms of human and social capital). I explore this in great detail in Chapter 2 where I argue that the Danish state could allow citizenship to perform its traditional function of binding members of multicultural and diverse populations within the same nation-state. In this case, when one acquires citizenship, this person would also acquire national identity without the distinction between Danes by nature and Danes by jurisdiction.

Tönnies viewed the transition from community to society as an evolution from "the childhood of humanity" to a mature society with all of the features of modernity. As Denmark continues the evolution to Gesellschaft (society), the potential exists for a more inclusive notion of Danish identity to emerge with increase in multiculturalism.

In Chapters 2 and 3, I developed my argument that the state has manufactured Danish culture through the use of the Danish History and Culture class as a means of maintaining a particular construct of what Danishness is. The selectivity of accepting minority claims to Danishness is best illustrated by the survey and interview data presented in Chapters 4 and 5. These data show how increasingly restrictive policies like the Attachment Requirement have created a fixed boundary between those who are Danes by nature and those who are Danes by jurisdiction. This distinction also serves to degrade the citizenship rights of native and ethnic Danes who partner with third-country nationals. A more inclusive vision of citizenship and national identity has the potential to break down this fixed boundary. I comment on this with my descriptions of the two media attempts—the Jeg Er Også Dansker (I am also a Dane) Campaign and the Miss Tørklæde contest. The organizers of these events (whether intentionally or unintentionally) were exploring a more flexible and multicultural notion of

Danishness. Exploring the integration discourse from both viewpoints (those of native Danes and ethnics) highlights the fact that the transformation from community to society is ongoing. What is certain is that culture and how it is defined and experienced will be at the center of the transformation process once it is complete.

Appendix:
Reflections on Self,
Methods, and Place

Throughout this project, I have given considerable thought to my identity and "place" during my time in Denmark for both work and pleasure. I am an African American woman from New York City and I am a native-born US citizen. I am also university educated and was college administrator and a Sociology professor at a community college in upstate New York while also being a PhD student prior to my first trip to Denmark—all of these attributes did not make me the typical 27-year-old when this journey began.

As I mention in the preface, I was initially drawn toward conducting research in Denmark because I learned about Scandinavian welfare systems and I wanted to examine these systems through firsthand experience. At the time (1999–2000), the United States had emerged from another round of robust political debates about Welfare Reform and the sustainability of entitlement programs. The crux of these debates centered over whether or not a safety net is a citizen's right or a means-tested privilege reluctantly given by the government. Welfare Reform and Workfare programs in the United States was the topic I spent the previous three years researching and I was looking for answers and solutions to these issues abroad.

Prior to studying in Denmark, I thought Scandinavia held many of these answers and solutions to the problems I saw in

my own country. Scandinavian people and societies were already convinced of their government's responsibility to provide a safety net for all citizens (and in many cases non-citizens as well)—not just the most needy, disabled, and vulnerable.

To my surprise, when I arrived to Denmark the public discourse had turned increasingly toward welfare retrenchment, coupled with desires to create restrictive immigration and integration policies. While living in Denmark, I enjoyed equal and largely unrestricted access to the Danish welfare state (I was eligible for student welfare payments, but I did not access them). I did receive educational benefits (I did not pay tuition fees for my language, culture, or university classes that I took at Roskilde and Copenhagen University). I also had free-of-charge access to health care. When I applied for my yellow Danish CPR card (Det Centrale Personregister , similar to the US social security card), I was provided with a Danish primary-care doctor and full health-care coverage in the event of an accident or illness. Despite all of the benefits and amenities that I accessed during my stay in Denmark, no native Dane that I met ever accused me of "milking" or taking advantage of "the system." Like Adriana's husband, Erik said—and many of my native Danish friends still say—I am not the problem immigrant of Denmark. What did that mean? I am a person of color but I am not non-Western nor am I a Muslim. Is it because I am a native-born citizen of the United States? Is it because I am educated and was working and studying in Denmark? Perhaps it is all of these.

Two of my early experiences in Denmark helped to shape the direction of this research. On the first day that I moved into the kollegium, Anders,[1] our floor captain (similar to a dorm resident assistant in the United States), gave me a tour of the shared fourth-floor kitchen and explained the rules for living on this floor of the kollegium.

Anders is stereotypically Nordic—extremely tall, with a lean athletic build, blonde hair and blue eyes. He explained how the

honor system is used among the residents when you want to take a beer or soda from the shared refrigerator or use cooking items from the shared pantry. There were many rules governing everything from milk, soda, and beer use, a separate basket in the fridge and drawer in the pantry for each person, to what newspapers and magazines could be checked out from the shared kitchen. Even the cable television in the kitchen had a schedule for viewing. He told me, rolling his eyes, that several of the female residents reserve the lounge area in the kitchen on Sunday and Monday nights to watch popular television shows from the United States like "Sex and the City" and "Buffy the Vampire Slayer." If I wanted to use this area, I had to check the schedule to reserve it in advance.

There were many charts with each resident's name on them and color-coded stickers next to each name—each sticker represented a different shared item used by the resident. There was a similar chart on the door of the pantry for cooking staples such as flour, yeast, common spices, and other cooking essentials. Anders explained that at the end of the month, he would add up the stickers from these various charts and each resident was responsible for paying the beverage and pantry tab at the end of the month. When I observed that the doors of the kitchen, refrigerator, and pantry were not locked, I jokingly asked him "what happens if someone takes items and does not record it with a sticker?" I was laughing and he was very serious. He replied, "This is not the US, in Denmark we trust each other and it doesn't happen." Then he cracked a smile and said, "You know I lived in the US for a while and you'll see, you will be able to walk here at night. Denmark is safe. The town where I am from people don't lock the doors to their houses and nothing happens. You'll see."

After this exchange, Anders continued "the tour" by showing me the pictures of each resident that hung above the cabinets in the kitchen and most of the faces were typical of native Danes—blonde or brown hair with blue eyes, but two faces were notably different. One looked Middle Eastern and the other appeared to

be Asian. When he described the first person, Anders said, "This is Rana and she is Danish. Well, not really. I mean she is from Iraq." I said, "Oh she's international like me?" He said, "No, not really. She has been in Denmark since she was young." I said, "So, she is Danish. I am confused." He said, "Never mind." He continued with the introduction of the residents through their photos and when he got to the second "different" face, he said, "This is Binh and she is from Norway but as you can see she is also from Vietnam. Like Rana, her family came to Norway from Vietnam when she was a baby."

When I begin thinking about this research, that first day in the kitchen always stayed with me. Similar to the television exchange between Alev and Camre described in Chapter 3, Anders could not simply describe Rana as Danish and Binh as Norwegian without adding the disclaimers of how they came to their respective countries. I suspect (based on the experience of Alev, the Danish-born Muslim imam) that even if both women had been born in Denmark and Norway, respectively, the disclaimers about their ethnicity would still be included in describing them. This was completely alien to me as a US citizen. Yes, there are racists and certain conservative groups in the United States that would delight in denying me (as an African American and a woman) certain rights and opportunities in my country. But to date, I have never experienced rejection of my claims to being an American. It has always been—and continues to be—strange to me that Anders (and many native Danes) could not also see Rana as Danish.

The second experience happened within the first two months of living at the kollegium (after the first birthday party described in the Preface). Once my neighbors found out that I was taking Danish language and History and Culture classes, several took a particular interest in teaching and showing me all things Danish. Jens was always very polite but also reserved with me. One morning, he asked me if I had ever been to a football match and when I said no he invited me to go to one with him and Magnus (another

neighbor). I thanked him and agreed to go to the football game the following week.

When we arrived at the national stadium, I was immediately uncomfortable with the crowd because many people appeared to be drunk and because I did not see any other women of color in our immediate area. We took our seats and when a Black player from the opposite team took the field the crowd erupted in a "Monkey Call," where the crowd chanted at the player making sounds like a monkey, and some threw bananas onto the field. I told Jens and Magnus that I was uncomfortable and I immediately left the stadium feeling uneasy with the unsavory mix of bigotry and alcohol intoxication that I witnessed among the crowd. When they returned home, both Jens and Magnus appeared at my door confused and they asked why I left the match early. When I explained to them why I was not comfortable with what happened, they looked back at me perplexed and with blank expressions. They told me that the crowd was overly rowdy and that I was being overly sensitive. I thanked Jens for the invitation to the game and ended the conversation. That was my first and last football match in Denmark and the last time that Jens and Magnus invited me anywhere outside of events in the kollegium. I was astonished at both men for failing to see why I would be offended by actions that they found unimportant and somewhat funny. Clearly, they could not view the events at the stadium from my (or another person of color's) perspective. This was the crux of the angered responses of the Muslim community in Denmark after the Prophet Muhammad Cartoon controversy that occurred years after the football match. Yet, both responses were very similar. Many native Danes initially did not see what all of the fuss was over what was meant as a joke and saw the Muslim populations in Denmark and abroad as being overly sensitive and overreacting.

Similar to my respondents, I have also had many wonderful experiences living in Denmark. At the risk of adding to what Patrick Kingsley (2012) called "Scandi-fever" and "Danish

delirium," made popular by the recent wave of Danish TV shows and Scandinavian novels, I do believe that the Danes (and their Nordic neighbors) are the "happiest people in the world" for many of the reasons named in the now-infamous Forbes Magazine article noting the findings of the United Nations World Happiness Report. When I lived in Denmark, I did not draw a large salary (in fact, I made less than $25,000 per year), but I lived very well. I worked 35 hours per week and was not physically and mentally exhausted at the end of the day. I still had time to meet friends for a nice dinner at a sidewalk cafe; I had weekends free of the chores of daily living (at that time, no shops or banks were open for business on the weekends). I traveled extensively within and outside of Denmark and enjoyed good food and wine. I could enjoy cultural events for pennies or for free (most museums are free or heavily discounted). I felt secure that if anything were to happen to me, there was a social safety net that would assist me until I was able to help myself again. It is for all of these reasons that I feel that Denmark is a place that I could see myself living in again.

Despite all of these wonderful attributes, Denmark also has a large cloud hovering above it—the inability (or perhaps unwillingness) to open itself up to a multicultural notion of Danish identity. In the ten years that I lived in and traveled to Denmark (2000–2010), I have observed and experienced the cultural wall that I describe throughout this book. I remember traveling (in 2001) with Anette, one of my neighbors at the kollegium, to her family home in Jutland for a holiday and people on the streets of that small town staring at me because they had never seen a Black person up close. The looks in their eyes felt more like wonder and curiosity rather than looks of hate and disdain. In the summer of 2008, I again traveled throughout Denmark (into Odense and Jutland—places I have been to before) and I felt a significant difference in the looks and stares. This time, I felt (as several of my respondents commented) fear, disdain, and hate. During the summer of 2008, tensions between ethnics and native Danes

were high due to the toxic discourse that I described earlier in this book. When I returned to Denmark again in January 2010, the tensions seemed to have dissipated but something still felt different from earlier periods. Perhaps I was sensing a bit of battle fatigue for both native Danes and ethnics on this issue. I believe that Denmark had lost the innocence that it had in the late 1990s and early 2000s toward issues of immigration and assimilation.

I am keenly aware of the fact that I have enjoyed a somewhat privileged position as a researcher of this topic. I have been on the inside and outside of immigration and integration issues in Denmark. As a non-Dane and as someone who knew that I was not going to make Denmark my permanent home, I had a considerable advantage researching this topic. Because I have no direct stake in the integration discourse, I offer a somewhat neutral position when talking with ethnic and new Danes. As a non-Dane, my respondents often said they could tell me the truth about their experiences with Denmark and the Danes without the fear of offending me because they were not talking negatively about my culture.

I also enjoyed an inside view into the world of an immigrant to Denmark—from my firsthand experience with the Introduction Program. When I shared with my respondents that I lived in Denmark and experienced learning the language and taking the History and Culture course, they immediately opened up to me and I gained instant rapport with them. I could easily relate to many of them who were living in Denmark as a person of color. Like some of my respondents commented, I also experienced racism in Denmark. Grandiose examples like the football match but also everyday examples of some native Danes staring at me and my husband on the subway and saying in Danish, "Foreigners, go back home" (perhaps thinking that I could not understand them).

Similar to many of my respondents, I possess several of the attributes that would theoretically make my integration rapid and successful as compared with immigrants with far less human

capital. I am educated, English-speaking (with some basic Danish language skills), and have friendships and professional networks with native Danes. Despite all of these social and cultural advantages and similarity to many of my respondents, I also felt socially isolated and excluded at times in Denmark. I am still processing all that I learned and experienced with this research. I am also hopeful about Denmark becoming more open and accepting of multiculturalism.

Sampling and Data Collection

My sample was randomly generated by the Municipality Office of Social and Labor Training (Kobenhavns Kommune-Famile og Arbejdsmarkedsforvaltningen) and Center for Beskæftigelse, Sprog og Integration Sprogcentret Kigkurren (CBSI)—both located in the Nørrebro section of Copenhagen—from their respective databases of newly arrived third-country immigrants living in the Greater Copenhagen area. Copenhagen Municipality personnel sent a cover letter with my respondent letter with a request-for-interview data sheet, life-history questionnaire, and the informed consent form to their clients. Interested respondents returned the questionnaire, informed consent form, and the request-for-interview data sheet directly to me at my office mailing address at the Danish National Institute for Social Research. The language on the cover letter and questionnaire was neutral—using the term partners with no reference to gender or marital status. It was coincidence that only heterosexuals and married persons responded to my request for interview. At no time did I have the names of potential respondents or access to the municipality records. This sampling protocol was a non-negotiable condition of gaining access to the sites and was utilized in order to maintain their respective clients' confidentiality at all times.

Also (at the time), I was not fluent or literate in the Danish language and the questionnaire utilized for the study was in English;

therefore, the municipality compiled a sample pool of English-proficient immigrants from their database of existing clients. The most obvious limitation of this sampling strategy was that the number of participants was significantly reduced (only 145 of the active cases maintained by Modtageenheden indicated a high level of English proficiency). Also, the sample contained a high number of participants from North America, English-speaking parts of Europe, Africa, and Asia, which is not representative of the largest immigrant/ethnic populations living in Denmark at this time (nationals from Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq). As I have discussed in greater detail in the chapters, I believe that this sampling "limitation" is the strength of the project—the immigrants with the greatest opportunity for successful assimilation due to high levels of human capital still expressed difficulties integrating socially and economically into Danish society. In addition to the above protocol, I also used snowball sampling from individuals who self-selected and asked them if they knew other third-country nationals who would be interested in participating in the study in order to access more-recent arrivals.

The participants in the original study were male and female adults (18 years old or older) who recently immigrated to Denmark and settled into the Municipality of Copenhagen from January 1, 1999 to February 1, 2001. These participants are third-country nationals (non-Nordic and non-European Union nationals), and the majority of them immigrated to Denmark for family or spousal reunification. Immigrants who were classified as refugees and asylum seekers were excluded from this study due to the special circumstances surrounding their immigration and integration process. Refugees were excluded from the requirement of completing the three-year Introduction Program. I wanted to focus on third-country nationals who were required to participate in the Introduction Program because I wanted to explore the effectiveness of these programs in integrating this population.

There were 60 respondents who returned the completed questionnaire. Of the 60, 11 agreed to complete the life-history interview. Based on the questionnaire, 57% of the participants were female and 43% were male. In terms of age, 62% of the respondents were between 25 and 34 years old; followed by 25% aged between 35 and 44 years old and 12% between 18 and 24 years old. In terms of country of origin, 38.6% of those surveyed identified themselves as "other," which made up the largest group of the respondents, followed by Asian and African participants (26.3% and 21.1%, respectively). The larger numbers from Africa and Asia are representative of data from *Statistics Denmark*, which show these two ethnic groups as the fastest-growing groups in Denmark over a 20-year period.

Notes

1 The Context and Setting

1. Statistics Denmark has tried to address this measurement error by including categories on parents' descent, which may resolve this problem up to a point, but this solution is short-lived. For example, consider the case of the third-generation individual, whose grandparents may be from Turkey but whose parents could be Danish citizens. In this instance, this individual would be statistically counted as "Danish," and his/her ethnic identity as "Turkish" may not be measured accurately in terms of the statistics collected by Statistics Denmark. As the generations increase beyond the third generation, data collected on "parents' descent" will be less salient and not accurate at all for capturing ethnic populations living in Denmark.

2. Despite this, there are other provisions and social policies within the same laws that contradict these ideals.

3. Norway, despite being another Nordic country, is included in these figures because it is not a Member nation within the European Union (EU) and therefore its citizens are counted statistically with non-EU foreign nationals living in Denmark.

4. All names have been changed, and a pseudonym was assigned by the researcher to protect the identity of the respondents.

5. In 2007, I took a graduate qualitative research methods course (EDUC 619) with Gretchen Rossman, where she taught the class to use this technique for data analysis using our respective and existing data sets. At the time of taking the course, I had previously completed two rounds of data collection (in 2001 and 2004) and was able to use this technique to analyze the interview data collected in

the field. I also repeated this technique in the final round of data collection in 2008.

6. Here, I am using native to describe those who have non-foreign ancestry and would perceive themselves as, and would be perceived by most (if not all) as traditional Danes.

2 THEORIZING CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

1. Bloemraad defined political incorporation as the process of becoming part of mainstream political debates, practices, and decision-making. She argued that there are three indicators of political incorporation: citizenship acquisition; community advocacy and mobilization; and gained access to political office at any level of government. She also argued that political incorporation is successfully achieved when immigrant political participation rates are comparable to those of the native-born population.

2. *Ekstra Bladet* is a Danish tabloid that is well known for sensational or salacious stories that are controversial or of a sexual nature, while *Politiken* is a Danish daily newspaper that is second in national circulation. *Ekstra Bladet* was founded as a supplement to the *Politiken*, and it later became an independent newspaper. This newspaper, while covering the same national issues, is considered of rather lowbrow content (as compared to mainstream newspapers like the *Jyllands-Posten* or *Politiken*), with a more working-class and politically conservative audience. This is a comparison similar to that between readers of the *New York Times* and of the *Post* in New York City. *Politiken* is a Danish daily newspaper that is second in national circulation. Despite earlier political ties to the Danish Social Liberal Party, today, the paper typically has more investigative articles and features that tend to be longer and more in-depth than traditional newspaper articles.

3. In 2002, 50,000 kroner was worth approximately US $7,353.00. In 2004, the amount was increased to 100,000 kroner, or approximately US $16,382.00 in 2004 dollar-to-krone exchange rates.

3   The Manufacturing of and Making Claims to Danishness

1. As cited within Jespersen (2004), the quote was originally the words of Sir James Mellon, the British Ambassador to Denmark in the 1980s. For Mellon the idea of a nation required a synthesis of both cultural adaptation and fellowship among each other. For the Danes it is not a matter of both but rather an either/or. In published papers (1992), Mellon compared his time in Denmark to tribal behavior he observed among the Ashanti in Ghana. Among the Danes "he found the same concern for weaker members of society, the same propensity for consensus and uniformity, the same avoidance of conflict, and the same implicit faith that political results should be achieved through discussion and compromise rather than revolutionary or violent conflicts" (Jespersen, 2004: 3–6).

Appendix: Reflections on Self, Methods, and Place

1. All names have been changed and a pseudonym assigned by the researcher to protect the identity of the respondents.

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